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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
‘Bribery blights lives. Its immediate victims include firms that lose out unfairly. The wider 
victims are government and society, undermined by a weakened rule of law and damaged 
social and economic development. At stake is the principle of free and fair competition, 
which stands diminished by each bribe offered or accepted.’ 
Kenneth Clarke, UK Secretary of State for Justice, March 20111 
 
There is a shift taking place in the fight against corruption. Increasingly 
attention is turning to the role of the private actor.2 This can be characterized as 
a shift from a public approach that sees the state and government as the 
primary driving force in the fight against corruption to an approach that sees 
private processes and actors playing an equally important role. This begs the 
question: what is a private approach? What is its motivation, content, or 
method? How does a private approach interrelate with the public approach? 
This book on private remedies for corruption is a response to these questions 
from the perspective of private law.3 This chapter introduces the research 
question, the research method and the relevance of this research. 
                                                     
 
1  See Foreword of the UK Ministry of Justice Guidance on the UK Bribery Act 2010. 
2    See recent paper by S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘Anti-corruption policy: can international actors play a 
constructive role?’, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 440, September 2011. 
Electronic copy available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926852.I. In the last two years, 
the role of the private actor has been an important theme at international fora attended by this 
author. In November 2010, this author was a participant at a ‘Workshop on Legal Redress for 
Victims of Corruption: Enhancing the Role of Civil Society in Corruption’ in Bangkok, 
Thailand at the 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC). She also participated in 
a ‘Peoples Empowerment Special Session’ billed as a response by the IACC to the ‘paradigm 
shift’ toward a ‘people centered approach.’ See 14 IACC Documents at 
http://iacconference.org/documents/ws43MaudPerdrielVaissiere_SR.pdf. In June 2011 this 
author presented the ideas summarized in Chapter 10 of this book at a conference in Bellagio, 
Italy, on ‘Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a Constructive Role’, 
organized by the Yale Law School/Rockefeller Foundation, 13-17 June 2011. See Yale Law 
School News at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/13528.htm/. In December 2011 in The Hague, 
the Netherlands, this author took part in an International Fraud and Corruption Expert Meeting 
on ‘Dispute Resolution on International Fraud and Corruption’ of the World Legal Forum, to 
discuss The Hague Utilities for Global Organizations (HUGO) program, which focused on a 
‘private approach’ to the prevention of international fraud and corruption. 
3  Private law is the law that applies to persons in their relations with each other. See T. Foster, 
Dutch Legal Terminology in English, Kluwer, Deventer, 2009. The expression private law in 
common law countries is regarded as the law pertaining to civil or private rights and duties 
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1.1 The Corruption Conundrum 
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that challenges the best 
of efforts to confront, much less eradicate it. The World Bank recognizes 
corruption as ‘the greatest obstacle to economic and social development’ 
whose harmful effects are ‘especially severe on the poor.’4 Despite being 
recognized as a problem in most cultures,5 it remains a pernicious and 
enigmatic obstacle.6 While some may argue that ‘the corruption obsession […] 
crowds out the debate on other crucial problems,’7 there is broad agreement 
about the detrimental effect that corruption has on the economic,8 social and 
political development of countries.9 The 140 members of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption acknowledge the ‘seriousness of the problems 
                                                                                                                            
 
rather than to matters arising under administrative, criminal or military law: See Webster’s 
New World Dictionary, Wiley, New York, 2006; Hesselink remarks that:  
‘Private law is usually defined as the law which governs relationships between 
citizens as opposed to public law, which is the law which deals with the relationships 
between citizens and the state, or among state institutions. However, this clear-cut 
distinction does give rise to some doubt. Not only as a result of the development of 
administrative law and, especially, of functional fields of the law which do not seem 
to fit in very well with this distinction.’  
See A. Hesselink, ‘The Structure of the New European Private Law’, Vol. 6.4, Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law, December 2002, www.ejcl.org/64/art64-2.html.   
4 See World Bank Website on Corruption 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm. 
5 Nichols shows that corruption is condemned in every major legal tradition from Buddhism, 
Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism as well as in most 
countries. See P. Nichols, ‘Outlawing transnational bribery through the World Trade 
Organization’, Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1997, p. 305. 
6  Chapter 2 of this book examines the problem of definition as one of the challenges faced in 
tackling corruption. Chapters 3 charts how the process of worldwide criminalization of 
corruption in international transactions has resulted in the category of ‘international 
corruption’, which is distinguished from other forms of corruption such as, for example, petty 
corruption or political corruption, and also distinguished from corruption in a broad sense as a 
verb to describe the interactions between actors in a corrupt exchange. International corruption 
is typically of the sort referred to as grand corruption. It occurs at the highest levels of 
governance and ‘distorts the central functions of government.’ See Preamble  UN Convention 
against Corruption, New York, 31 October 2003, in force 14 December 2005, 2349 UNTS, p. 
41;  43 ILM , 2004, p. 37 (Hereinafter, the UNCC). 
7  M. Naim, ‘Tunnel Vision on Corruption’, The Washington Post, 20 February 2005, 
http://www.moisesnaim.com/es/node/277. 
5. See for example M. Paolo, ‘Corruption and growth,’ Vol. 110, No. 3, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1995, pp. 681-712; J.E. Campos, D. Lien, S. Pradhan, ‘The impact of corruption 
on investment: predictability matters’, Vol. 27, No. 6, World Development, 1997, pp. 1059-
1067; P.H. Mo, ‘Corruption and economic growth’, Vol. 29, No. 1, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 2001, pp. 66-79. For a comprehensive review of the current economics literature 
on the effects of corruption see A. Dreher, T. Herzfeld, The Economic Costs of Corruption: A 
Survey and New Evidence, 2005. (Monograph on file at Wageningen University and Research 
Center Publications (Netherlands) http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0506/0506001.pdf.  
9  See generally G.T. Abed, S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, 
Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2002; S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and 
Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, CUP, Cambridge, 1999. 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
5 
 
and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies.’10 
They link corruption to organized and economic crimes stating that it involves 
‘vast quantities of assets, which may constitute a substantial proportion of the 
resources of states.’11 At the regional level, the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption disavows the corruption that strikes ‘at society, moral order 
and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples.’12  
The African Union for its part decries corruption’s ‘devastating effects on the 
economic and social development of the African peoples’ as well as the 
‘negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic, social 
and cultural stability of African States.’13 The members of the Council of 
Europe state that their strong interest in the international fight against 
corruption stems from ‘the obvious threat corruption poses to the basic 
principles the Organization stands for.’ These principles it enumerates as the 
rule of law, the stability of democratic institutions, human rights as well as 
social and economic progress.14 Petter Langseth of the World Bank sums up 
the essential nature of the fight against corruption when he states: 
‘The rationale for combating and containing corruption is not because 
corruption is “immoral,”, “wrong,” or even illegal. Rather, it is because of the 
negative impact of corruption on economic development and on the 
emergence of an enabling environment for the private sector, and its role in 
deepening poverty in the developing world.’15 
However, despite increased awareness, international, regional and domestic 
initiatives, as well as self-regulatory mechanisms, corruption remains a 
pressing problem.16 Instances like the intervention of the UK government in 
                                                     
 
10  Para. 2 Preamble UNCC id., Note 6 above. 
11  Id. 
12  Para. 1 Preamble Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 29 March 1996, 35 ILM, 
1996, p. 724. Adopted at Caracas, Venezuela. Entered into force on 6 March 1997. 
(Hereinafter the IACAC). 
13  Para. 6 Preamble African Union Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption, 43(1) 
ILM, July 2003, p. 5. (Hereinafter the AUC). 
14  Para. 1 Explanatory Report, Civil Law Convention 174 CETS.   
15   P. Langseth, Building Integrity to Fight Corruption: A Partnership between Uganda, TI and 
EDI to Improve Service Delivery to the Public, in A. Ruzindana, P. Langseth, A. Gakwandi 
(Eds.), Fighting Corruption in Uganda: The Process of Building a National Integrity System, 
Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda, 1998, p. 159. 
16  In 2009, Transparency International reported that ‘governments are considered to be 
ineffective in the fight against corruption – a view that has remained worryingly consistent in 
most countries over time.’ See 2009 Global Corruption Barometer Report, p. 3, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2009. As of 2011 the 
situation has not much improved. The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that public 
frustration is well founded. No region or country in the world is immune to the damages of 
public-sector corruption; the vast majority of the 183 countries and territories assessed scored 
below five on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). See Our Countries Our Future, 
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the investigation of the BAE bribery scandal17 and the regular appearances of 
large corporations in bribery scandals raise disquieting questions about the real 
substance of the fight against corruption.18 Some are of the opinion that the 
chorus of anti-corruption voices renders a one-sided and rather politicized 
account of a much more complex and nuanced issue.19 However, the 
dichotomy between the reality of the market place and a wealth of regulation 
suggests an urgent need to continue in the quest for effective schemes of 
‘restraint.’20 In strategizing a way forward, the question must be asked: should 
there be a different approach in the fight against corruption? Should it continue 
primarily to follow the criminal law approach of deterrence through 
punishment or is a different strategy required?21  
The fact that corruption is such a pervasive problem should not act as a 
dampener to such questions but rather motivate the search for more effective 
ways of protecting society from its serious consequences. This is particularly 
true because of social, economic and political changes in the last three decades 
                                                                                                                            
 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail/.  
17  In 2006, the Serious Fraud office of the United Kingdom announced that it was ending its 
investigation into the BAE bribery allegations on the grounds that continuing the investigation 
might lead to Saudi Arabia withdrawing diplomatic co-operation with the UK on security and 
intelligence. See ‘Lords Says SFO Saudi Move Lawful’, BBC News, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7532714.stm.  
18  Companies such as Baker Hughes International, Chevron Corporation, Vetco Gray 
International York International, El Paso Corporation, Ingersoll Rand co., Siemens, 
Halliburton, to name a few, have in the last few years paid fines in the millions of dollars for 
offences relating to the bribery of foreign officials.  
19   Williams and Beare note that ‘…despite the appearance of an array of separate voices all 
reaching the same conclusion(s), closer inspection of the corruption “debate” reveals a clear 
overlapping of positions and interests. With most of the research on the topic being sponsored  
and conducted by members of the major economic development agencies – the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the OECD – there has been a strong convergence between academic, public policy 
and corporate perspectives. This convergence has contributed to a singular and highly 
politicized account of corruption, its underlying causes, and the necessary policy responses.’ 
See J. Williams, M. Beare, The Business of Bribery: Globalization, Economic Liberalization, 
and the ‘Problem’ of Corruption in M. Beare (Ed.), Critical Reflections on Transnational 
Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption, UTS Press, Toronto, 2003, pp. 89-90. 
Ha-Joon Chang, using contrasting patterns of countries like Zaire and Indonesia, shows that 
high levels of corruption can have surprisingly different economic impacts. This suggests that 
it is not so much the fact of corruption but how it is managed that is a predicator of its impact 
on economic growth. See H. Chang, ‘Zaire vs. Indonesia’ in his book Bad Samaritans: The 
Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity, RH Business Books, 
London, 2007, pp. 160-181. 
20  C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, 1764, Translation by D. Young, Hackett Publishing 
Company, Indiana, 1986, Chapter 2, The Right to Punish.  
21   Jan Smits notes: ‘If the law is to retain its role of regulating society (be it no longer a national, 
but a global one), we have to find new ways of making law and enforcing law.’ See J. Smits, 
‘Law Making in the European Union: On Globalization and Contract law in Divergent Legal 
Cultures’, Vol. 67, No. 4, Louisiana Law Review, 2007, p. 1181. 
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that have changed the environment in which grand corruption, the focus of this 
book, occurs.22 Grand corruption is described as:  
‘corruption that pervades the highest levels of government, engendering major 
abuses of power. A broad erosion of the rule of law, economic stability and 
confidence in good governance quickly follow. Sometimes it is referred to as 
“state capture,” which is where external interests illegally distort the highest 
levels of a political system to private ends.’23 
In today’s integrated world, interactions that used to be the preserve of the 
state are now significantly influenced by non-state actors and the increasingly 
powerful multinational corporations.24 Regulating corruption is complicated by 
the absence of an identifiable nexus of governance in international society as 
well as the blurring boundaries between the public and private sectors.25 State-
centered criminal law approaches do not easily translate to the sanctioning of 
transactions that occur outside territorial boundaries. Pieth has remarked that 
‘given the dynamism of globalization, it would be logical for the private sector 
to take a more pro-active approach in influencing regulations and defining their 
own rules, particularly at the international level.’26 
                                                     
 
22  Corruption is a word that has a complexity of meanings. Johnson and Sharma provide a 
representative list of examples and  patterns of corruption as including, Bribery and Graft 
(extortion and kickbacks); Kleptocracy (stealing and privatizing public funds); 
Misappropriation (forgery, embezzlement, misuse of public funds); Nonperformance of duties 
(cronyism); Influence peddling (favor, brokering and conflict of interest); Acceptance of 
improper gifts (speed money); Protecting maladministration (cover-ups and perjury); Abuse of 
power (intimidation and torture); Manipulation of regulations (bias and favoritism); Electoral 
malpractice (vote buying and election rigging); Rent seeking (public officials illegally charging 
for services after creating artificial shortage); Clientelism and patronage (politicians giving 
material favors in exchange for citizen support); Illegal campaign contributions (giving 
unregulated gifts to influence policies and regulations). See R. Johnson, S. Sharma, About 
Corruption, in R. Johnson (Ed.) The Struggle against Corruption: A Comparative Study, 
Palgrave, New York, 2004, p.1 at p. 2  
23   See The UN Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and 
Investigators, Vienna, September 2004, pp. 23-24. A distinction is drawn between grand and 
petty corruption. Petty corruption ‘involves the exchange of very small amounts of money, and 
the granting of small favors.’ See UN Handbook id at p. 23. All further references in this book, 
unless otherwise indicated, are with respect to grand scale corruption. 
24 P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, OUP, Oxford, 2007, pp. 81-83. 
25 P. Muchlinski, Global Bukowina Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a 
Transnational Law Making Community, in G. Teubner (Ed.) Global Law without a State, 
Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot, 1997, p. 79. 
26  This remark was made in reference to money laundering, not corruption, but the argument is 
equally valid for all transnational crimes including corruption. See M. Pieth, G. Aiolfi, ‘The 
private sector becomes active: the Wolfsberg process’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 10, 
No. 4, 2003, pp. 359-365. In a similar vein from the opposite point of view, Slaughter and 
Burke-White remark that in order to address problems of an international dimension, 
international law must be able to influence the domestic policies of states and harness national 
institutions in pursuit of global objectives. They note that the ‘primary purpose of  international 
law then shifts from providing independent regulation above the national state to interacting 
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As the demarcating lines between private and public law,27 are being 
challenged by the nature of transacting in a global world traditional 
categorizations are coming under increasing pressure. Private claimants and 
private actors are becoming increasingly active in societies which are no longer 
strictly territorial but stretch as far as the market reaches on a truly global 
scale.28  Brownsword remarks on how this changing terrain influences the 
interaction between public and private law when he states:  
‘the relationship between contract and public law, despite having many 
important facets, has not always been a matter in which private lawyers have 
taken a particularly keen interest. However, with the emergence … of a 
modern contracting state, in which there is extensive public procurement from 
the private sector, privitised supply of public utilities and a strong contract 
culture within the public sector itself, it is clear that contract lawyers can no 
longer afford to ignore the interface between contract and public law.’29 
This book makes the case that broadening the conceptual framework in the 
fight against corruption to focus more deliberately on private law transactions 
that accompany corrupt exchanges is the inevitable next step in the fight 
against grand corruption.30 Since corruption occurs in interactions, the future 
of the fight against corruption may lie in moving its boundaries beyond the 
traditional criminal law dialogue of offender and punishment. Such a shift will 
bring into focus the contracts, assets, and liability for harm resulting from 
corruption. It will also emphasize the private actor as an important element in 
the sanctioning processes of corruption.31  
                                                                                                                            
 
with, strengthening and supporting domestic institutions.’ See A. Slaughter., W. Burke-White, 
The Future of International Law is Domestic: (or, The European Way of Law), in J. Nijman 
and A. Nollkaemper  (Eds.), New Perspectives of the Divide between National and 
International Law, OUP, Oxford, 2007, p. 110 at p. 111. 
27  Traditionally a distinction has been drawn between public and private corruption. Public 
corruption involves the ‘breaking by public persons for the sake of private financial or political 
gain, of the rules of conduct in public affairs, prevailing in a society in the period under 
consideration,’ while private bribery has been defined as ‘dishonesty between private persons 
in economic transactions represented by the giving and taking of bribes and the granting and 
taking of favors. See generally R. Nield, Public Corruption: The Dark Side of Social 
Evolution, Anthem Press, London, 2002, at Appendix A. 
28   Virilio remarks of globalization, ‘We are not seeing an end of history, but an end of 
geography.’  P. Virilio, The Information Bomb, London, Verso Books, 2000, p. 9. 
29  Emphasis added. R. Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd 
Edn, OUP, Oxford, 2009, p. 230. 
30   See Chapter 10 for the outlines of such a conceptual shift to a Transaction Approach to 
fighting corruption based on the insights acquired from the research done in this book. 
31   Rose-Ackerman includes the private actor in her checklist of international actors that may play 
a role in the fight against corruption. See S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘Anti-Corruption Policy: Can 
International Actors Play a Constructive Role?’, id., Note 2 above.  
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Private law can play a double role. Corrupt exchanges, often camouflaged as 
private contracts, are often supported by private law processes that protect the 
autonomy of parties and create protective bubbles designed to break the chain 
of ownership to dispersed owners. This can be exploited by parties seeking to 
cover the trial of corrupt transactions. However, the flip side of the private law 
is its ability to follow and sanction these same transactions in a manner that 
can be of serious consequence to the parties. Private actors can upset the 
dynamics of the corrupt exchange by challenging the contracts that result from 
it, by pursuing the benefits of corrupt exchanges and by seeking to undo legal 
arrangements that seek to preserve illicitly acquired assets within the reach of 
the perpetrator but outside the reach of the law.32 Private legal proceedings can 
bypass a compromised state by initiating actions wherever a jurisdictional link 
in assets or in person presents itself. Civil judgments and awards are 
enforceable against the defendant in any jurisdiction where he or she holds 
assets. Furthermore, by enabling the victim of corruption to seek recourse 
independently of the state, private remedies introduce a neglected but 
motivated actor into the fight against corruption 
In general, private remedies can target not only the wrongdoer but also related 
persons or organizations. Simpson concurs and states that ‘some theoretical 
and anecdotal empirical evidence suggests that civil justice processes may 
offer more efficient corporate deterrence than the imposition of criminal legal 
sanctions.’33 Furthermore, the language and processes of private law are 
intuitively better understood by private actors who traditionally stand apart 
from public law criminal processes. The private law can be described as a 
sleeping tiger that is in many ways better equipped to ensure that the 
participants in grand corruption do not profit from their crimes.  
Although there has been considerable research into the criminal law aspects of 
corruption, the role and potential of private law in the fight against corruption 
is in need of more inquiry.34 The link between private law and crime 
                                                     
 
32  Kevin Chamberlain, for example, discusses the difficulties faced by the Nigerian government 
in recovering moneys stolen from Nigerian citizens and deposited outside the jurisdiction of 
Nigerian courts by the former head of state, General Sanni Abacha (now deceased), using 
foreign banks and various laundering schemes. See K. Chamberlain, ‘Recovering the proceeds 
of corruption’, Vol. 6, No. 2, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 2002, pp. 157-165. 
33  S. Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control, CUP, Cambridge, 2002, p. 78. 
34      Olaf Meyer points out that a review of the practices in several countries in Europe and the 
United States shows that ‘there is still no discernible systematic approach to the phenomenon 
of corruption … in the shape of a well-planned civil law strategy.’ See O. Meyer, The Civil 
Law Consequences of Corruption: An Introduction, in O. Meyer  (Ed.), Civil Law 
Consequences of Corruption, Nomos, Baden Baden, 2009, p.18. In their study of thirteen 
OECD countries, Heine, Huber and Rose point out that the reasons for the reluctance to pursue 
private redress include: (1) rules that substantially limit the plaintiff’s possible claim; (2) the 
fact that damage claims must be brought in separate proceedings from criminal prosecutions; 
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prevention is not new. Atiyah, a doyen of contract law, has pointed out that 
private law may be ‘surprisingly effective’ in tackling crime.35 Alan Berg 
highlights the question of the private law consequences of corruption and 
laments that ‘on the part of regulators there has been no recognition that 
improving and clarifying the civil law remedies … would do much to combat 
corruption.’36 Burger and Holland give several examples of cases where 
private actors have pursued claims for injury suffered as a result of 
international bribes even without ‘direct statutory support’37 and conclude that 
‘the right of civil action provides a useful complement to criminal proceedings 
as a deterrent.’38 They argue that private actors, rather than governmental ones, 
are in a position to lead the next stage of the global fight against corruption.39   
In a similar vein Paul Carrington remarks on the weakness of enforcing anti-
corruption laws by means of the very public servants that are part of the 
problem and states ‘it is the integrity of governments that is the global problem 
in greatest need of a plausible threat of civil liability.’40 The potential created 
by the intervention of private parties is also emphasized by Pines, who argues 
that the possibility of a limited private right of action for the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act41 would aid in ‘achieving the economic and moral goals 
of the FCPA.’42 In his view the most effective means of solving what he 
describes as the problems of vagueness and weak enforcement of the FCPA are 
best met by allowing competing US businesses that have suffered as a result of 
                                                                                                                            
 
(3) damages do not adequately compensate for the costs of protracted litigation; (4) difficulty 
in investigating and compelling production of evidence and witnesses in international cases; 
(5) showing damages with certainty and proving causal links; and (6) obtaining jurisdiction. 
See G. Heine, B. Huber, T. Rose (Eds.), Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of 
National and Supranational Legal Structures, ICC, Paris, 2003, pp. 654-655. 
35  Atiyah remarks that while it is normally the function of criminal law to provide a deterrent 
against criminal conduct, contract law as an additional deterrent over and above that provided 
by criminal law can be surprisingly effective. P. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of 
Contract, 3rd edn,  OUP, Oxford, 1981, p. 255. 
36  A. Berg, ‘Bribery: transaction validity and other civil law implications’, Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, Iss. 1, 2001, p. 27 at p. 29. 
37  Burger and Holland cite cases such as Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc. 847 
F.2d 1052, 1054-56 (3d Cir. 1988); Dooley v. United Technologies Corp. 786 F.Supp. 65, 69 
(D.D.C. 1992); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp. 348 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 63 P.3d 937, 94142 (Cal. 2003). See E. Burger, 
M. Holland, ‘Why the private sector is likely to lead the next stage in the global fight against 
corruption’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 2006-2007, pp. 63-69. 
38  Id., at p. 63. 
39  Id., at p. 75. 
40  P. Carrington, American Law and Transnational Corruption: Is There a Need for Lincoln’s 
Law Abroad?, in O. Meyer (Ed.), Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, Nomos, Baden 
Baden, 2009, p. 49. 
41  See Chapter 3 below. 
42  D. Pines, ‘Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’, California Law Review, Vol. 82, 
1994, p. 185 at p. 220. 
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bribery to have a right of enforcement.43 In motivating private actions for 
corruption Simon Young, argues that:  
‘The crime of corruption is unique in many ways. The gains and losses can be 
massive. The state or government is often the victim. The proceeds of 
corruption, if traceable, are often in another jurisdiction, thereby complicating 
recovery … [;] civil actions against corruption are indicative not necessarily 
of a failing of the criminal justice system but of the absence of a better 
alternative to recovery ….’44 
In summary, the character of the principal actors in grand corruption (the 
government on the one hand and the multinational corporation on the other), 
and the environment in which this corruption occurs, presents a conundrum yet 
unresolved by the criminal law approach to fighting corruption. The fight 
against corruption must adapt itself to the international environment in which 
grand scale corruption occurs. 45   
Here lies the potential of a private law approach.46 Private actions before courts 
of law or, as is more likely in international commercial disputes, before 
international arbitration tribunals, have a capacity for decentralization and 
dislocation from territory that can play a vital role in ensuring that the 
ramifications of the international criminalization of corruption are consistently 
applied in a global world. In addition private actors also assume a more 
prominent role because of the potential and resources that they can bring to the 
fight against corruption. This creates a new paradigm for providing security 
with private actors acting in partnership with the state. 
1.2 The Research Question 
Corruption is not an abstraction but takes shape in the form of agreements, 
payments, kickbacks and other transactions. At the heart of the corrupt 
                                                     
 
43  Id. 
44   S. Young, ‘Why Civil Actions against Corruption’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol.16, No.2, 
2009, p. 144 at pp. 144-145. 
45  Essential to this is development of methods to overcome  the conflict of interest created by the 
monopoly held by the state in initiating the sanctioning process under the criminal law. See A. 
Makinwa, International Corruption and the Privitisation of Security: Resorting to Private 
Remedies, in M. Hildebrandt, A. Makinwa, A. Oehmichen (Eds.), Controlling Security in a 
Culture of Fear, Boom Legal Publishers, The Hague, 2009, p. 99 at pp. 105-107. 
46  A. Portnoy and J. Murino speak of an imminent front that is being opened by ‘private parties 
now joining the fight against corruption.’ In ‘Private actions under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: An imminent front?’, IBA’s International Litigation News, April 2009, pp. 31-
33. 
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exchange are agreements that trigger the private law into action. This raises 
questions about the response of private law to such transactions.47   
From the perspective of private law, four primary relationships are affected by 
the corrupt exchange. The first is the relationship between the person who pays 
a bribe (hereinafter referred to as the bribe-giver) and the person who receives 
a bribe while acting in a position of trust to negotiate in the best interest of a 
third party (hereinafter referred to as the agent or bribe-recipient). Contracts 
for special fees, kickbacks, consultancies and commissions are examples of 
agreements to give a bribe. This agreement is referred to in this book for 
convenience as the primary contract because it evidences the payment of a 
bribe and kicks- off the sequence of actions and contracts that are tainted by 
this original act of bribery. 
Figure 1: The Corrupt Exchange 
 
The second relationship is the relationship between the bribe-giver and the 
party in whose interest the bribe-recipient negotiated with the bribe-giver 
(hereinafter referred to as the principal or employer). The contract that results 
from the successful bribery exchange between the bribe-giver and the principal 
or employer of the bribe-recipient is referred to for convenience in this book as 
                                                     
 
47  See A. Berg, id Note 36 above. 
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the secondary contract because it results from the successful execution of the 
primary agreement to give a bribe. 
The third relationship is that between the principal and the disloyal agent. The 
term principal is used in the broadest sense as representing any party who 
grants trust to another to act in the best interest of the principal. The 
relationship between the bribe-giver and the agent is the catalyst for the corrupt 
exchange. Without such a grant of trust there would be no basis for the bribe-
giver to negotiate with the agent, nor would a secondary contract that binds the 
principal to the bribe-giver come into existence.   
A fourth situation, which is a more indirect relationship, is that of the person 
who suffers harm as a result of the corrupt exchange but who is not in a 
contractual relationship with any of the parties (hereinafter referred to as the 
indirect victim).48 The indirect victims of corrupt acts are often the suffering 
majority. Citizens lose the benefit of contracts with a public dimension where 
corruption results in unrealized or sub-standard projects as well as a lack of 
social and economic development.   
                                                     
 
48   This book does not deal with the related issue of the passage of property rights under the 
primary and secondary contracts. Art. 34 UNCC requires that due regard should be had to the 
rights of third parties acquired in good faith with respect to measures taken by states to address 
the consequences of corruption. This has implications with respect to innocent third parties 
who seek to sue on the contract because property may have passed under the contract to such 
parties. It is important to note that although a contract tainted by bribery is considered 
unenforceable, it does not mean that property may not pass to an innocent third party under the 
transaction. An illustrative case in this regard is the US case of Bankers Trust Company v. 
Litton Systems, Inc., where the court applied the holder in due course doctrine to a transaction 
tainted by bribery. The defendant had entered into an agreement to lease photocopying 
machines from Regent Leasing Corporation on the recommendation of the defendant’s agent. 
Litton later found out that its agent had entered into an agreement with Regent Leasing under 
which he was to receive ‘service fees.’ To finance the photocopiers which it intended to lease 
to Litton, Regent took a loan from Bankers Trust and assigned Litton’s leases as security. 
Litton defaulted in meeting its obligation to the bank under its leases and in the subsequent 
court actions argued that the bribery of the agent advising Litton rendered the Leasing contract, 
which had been assigned to the bank by Regent Leasing, void and unenforceable and that as 
such the bank had no basis for a claim. The court held that the question that arose from these 
facts was ‘whether a holder in due course may enforce lease contracts not enforceable by the 
holder’s assignor because the contracts were induced by commercial bribery committed by the 
assignor.’ The court held that where an innocent party, such as a holder, in due course sues on 
an illegal contract, the innocent party has done no wrong for which it should be penalized. The 
court further held that ‘[b]ribery which induces the making of a contract is much like a fraud 
which has the same result. The bribery of a contracting party’s agent or employee is, in effect, 
a fraud on that party…. Inasmuch as the New York Uniform Commercial Code allows a holder 
in due course to enforce a contract induced by fraud, Sec 3-305(2), the same treatment should 
be given to a contract induced by bribery. The result ought not to be changed by the additional 
fact that commercial bribery is a criminal offense in New York.  Finally the court stated that it 
would be poor policy for courts to transform banks and other finance companies into policing 
agents charged with the responsibility of searching out commercial bribery committed by their 
assignors. See Bankers Trust Company v. Litton Systems, Inc. 599 F.2d 488 (1979). 
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How does a private law response to these relationships further the fight against 
corruption? How are courts and international arbitration tribunals influenced 
by the public policy objectives of world-wide anti-corruption laws?49 To what 
extent will they provide relief to parties that have suffered damage related to 
corrupt exchanges? A framework within which these questions can be 
answered is provided in the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption 
(UNCC).50 The UNCC presents a model for private law intervention in the 
fight against corruption along two fronts: firstly, in claims relating to the 
validity or enforceability of contracts resulting from the corrupt exchange, and, 
secondly, in encouraging personal actions by persons who have suffered injury 
as a result of corruption. These interventions can be summed up as transaction 
validity on the one hand, and the right to institute legal proceedings on the 
other.51  
These two points of intervention form the basis of analysis in this book. In the 
absence of an international system of private law, questions about transaction 
validity and instituting legal proceedings can only conceivably be answered 
from within the context of national law systems. This implies not just a 
consideration of the international instruments that impact on private remedies 
for corruption but also national law.  
A secondary aspect of this research project was how to combine the divergent 
strands of civil, criminal, private, and public approaches to corruption into a 
coherent framework. The public/private divide that characterizes current 
research on anti-corruption creates a disconnected set, of events which are in 
reality a single narrative. The insights drawn from this book are used to 
formulate a conceptual framework for fighting corruption that places the 
transaction, not the offender, as the logical central point of intervention in a 
manner that brings the public and private law aspects together.52 
In summary, the research question can be outlined in four parts: (1) What is the 
motivation and foundation for an international framework on private remedies 
for corruption? (2) What is the position of national laws regarding the issue of 
private remedies for corruption? (3) How do these national laws complement 
the framework for private remedies provided by the United Nations 
Convention? (4) Can a conceptual framework that incorporates the various 
                                                     
 
49  See Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 for a comparative viewpoint on private remedies in the US, 
England, the Netherlands and those under International Arbitration. 
50   See Chapters 8 and 9 below. 
51  See Chapter 8 for an analysis of Art. 34 UNCC as a factor in assessing the validity of 
transactions and contracts tainted by corruption and Chapter 9 for an analysis of Art. 35 UNCC 
on the right to institute legal proceedings for damage suffered as a result of acts of corruption. 
52  See Chapter 10 below. 
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strands of public/private, criminal/civil law strategy in the fight against 
corruption be formulated?    
1.3 Choice of Research Method 
Researching private remedies for corruption implies a move from the 
normative demand in the UNCC that member states ought to address the 
validity of transactions tainted by corruption and to provide victims of 
corruption the means to seek redress for damage suffered to the substance of 
how such remedies are provided in interpretation and implementation. 
Furthermore, the UNCC rules present concepts such as ‘victim,’ ‘damage,’ 
‘compensation’ and ‘validity of contracts,’ which are in themselves complex in 
nature. As such, exploratory research of an analytical character is necessary in 
order to translate and give content to these concepts. This nature of the 
research questions suggests that a comparative methodology is the appropriate 
choice.53 
Comparative law can serve many purposes, depending on the purpose for 
which it is being used. It starts from a given problem or issue, and it is this 
‘main purpose for which … comparative study or research is undertaken [that] 
will to a large extent dictate the choice of legal systems or topics to compare 
and the method of comparison.’54 Comparison may occur at the macro level, 
involving the comparison of entire legal systems, or at the micro level, 
involving the comparison of particular elements or issues of selected legal 
systems.55 Comparison may be viewed as an end in itself in the search for 
common principles or as a means to achieve insight into the reaction of legal 
systems to common problems. For several reasons a comparative approach is 
adopted to address the research question. 
Firstly, grand scale corruption is a problem of international dimension. This 
means that an effort to tackle it requires the creation of an environment in 
which a common legal regime that is binding for all players displaces the 
fractured responses of diverse national rules with varying requirements. 
                                                     
 
53   This section on the choice of the comparative method updates methodology previously 
published as A. Makinwa, ‘Researching Civil Remedies for International Corruption: The 
Choice of the Functional Comparative Method’, Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
November 2009, p. 335. I thank Prof N. Dorn for his critique as commentator when I presented 
the paper, ‘Researching Civil Remedies for International Corruption: The Choice of the 
Functional Comparative Method’, at the Erasmus Law Review Seminar on ‘The possibilities of 
comparative law methods for research on the rule of law in a global context’, 23 January 2009.   
54 W. Kamba, ‘Comparative law: a theoretical framework’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 23, Iss. 3, 1974, p. 489. 
55 P. De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 2nd Edn, Cavendish Publishing, London, 
2007, pp. 233-236.  
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Proposals for shaping an environment that encourages compliance with anti-
corruption rules require a methodology that can work across differing national 
positions to arrive at an approximation of a level playing field.56 The 
comparative method enables the identification of such a baseline of legality 
from a plurality of jurisdictions. 
Secondly, this research on private remedies for corruption in international 
transactions requires an outward-looking methodology that can accommodate 
and anticipate a plurality of meanings and interpretations and accepts that in 
today’s global environment several legal systems must interact in communities 
to create shared values.57 An inward-looking approach, which focuses on the 
position in a given legal system, may be suitable for national problems. 
However to assess the potential and scope of private remedies for corruption 
across jurisdictions, an inward-looking approach is handicapped by the 
limitations of national values and interpretations. This suggests the adoption of 
an approach that involves the comparison of more than one national system.  
Thirdly, the gap between the law and the remedial needs of society requires the 
law to possess a certain flexibility or indeterminacy to achieve justice in the 
particular case. This means that there is an inevitable penumbra of 
uncertainty58 that exists in legal systems. Indeterminacy implies that legal 
theories may lack comprehensiveness, may contain gaps and may be 
contradictory.59 In the fluid dynamics of interactions of international society, 
this penumbra of uncertainty is even more pronounced. However, as Singer 
points out, indeterminacy is balanced out by the consolidating effect of culture. 
He states that within a ‘particular culture’60 commonality of thought may lead 
to a ‘shared understanding’61 that makes the outcome of the judicial processes 
                                                     
 
56  Emphasis added. 
57   A major objection against this notion of ‘shared values’ is that it is based on ‘misleading 
generalizations.’ Franz von Benda-Beckmann cautions against a ‘neglect of legal pluralism’ 
and points out that in ‘legal and philosophical assertions, human rights, like any positive law, 
‘exist’ in the temporal and spatial dimension normatively specified, in legal texts, and in their 
implementation. But from a legal anthropological point of view, there are more ‘existences’. 
‘… [H]uman rights also “exist” in the knowledge of people, in the programs, strategies and 
struggles of social movements and individuals, in political philosophies of the powerful and 
the oppressed.’ F. von Benda-Beckmann, Human Rights, Cultural Relativism, Legal Pluralism; 
Towards a Two-Dimensional Debate, in F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von Benda-Beckmann, 
A. Griffiths (Eds.), The Power of Law in a Transnational World, Berghahn, New York, 2009, 
p. 114 at pp. 120-121.  
58 H. Hart, ‘Positivism and the separation of morals’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 593, 
1958, pp. 606-607. 
59 J. Singer, ‘The player and the cards: nihilism and legal theory’, Yale Law Journal , Vol. 94, 
No. 1, 1984, p. 1 at pp. 14-16. 
60   Emphasis added.  
61   Emphasis added. 
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predictable.62 This idea of shared understandings can also be applied to the 
particular culture that develops in the international business environment. This 
‘shared understanding’ embraces a plurality of legal traditions and suggests 
that, as regards research on a problem of international dimension such as grand 
scale corruption, a research methodology that addresses this pluralism should 
be adopted.   
Fourthly, an approach that accommodates a plurality of diverse national 
systems, is supported by the fact that the international anti-corruption 
framework places compliance at the level of domestic legal systems. This 
implies a plurality of enforcement methods in diverse systems. To arrive at an 
understanding of the potential and scope of private remedies for international 
corruption, a movement must be made from the international framework 
presented by the UNCC and other international, intergovernmental and 
regional instruments to the workings of domestic systems in which this 
framework will find expression and be implemented. As such, the content of 
the international framework can only be evaluated by an assessment of national 
legal principles across representative jurisdictions. The comparative method 
enables such a content-filling exercise.  
In summary, in this book a comparison is undertaken with the objective of 
assessing the role of private law in the fight against corruption. The aim is to 
obtain insight into areas of consensus and/or divergence with regard to private 
remedies that may indicate shape and future of private law and private actors in 
the fight against corruption.  
1.4 Functional Comparison 
A fundamental question, however, in assessing an international framework for 
private remedies for grand corruption is how such an articulation can take 
place across legal traditions and cultures. As an answer to this, this book 
adopts the method of functional comparison. This is a methodology that 
focuses on the solutions63 presented by chosen legal systems. Zweigert and 
Kötz in their seminal text argue that the basic methodological principle of 
comparative law is ‘functionality,’ which they argue rests on the fact that ‘the 
legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems and solves 
these problems by quite different means though very often with similar 
results.’64 Rheinstein, describing the functional approach, states that it shows 
                                                     
 
62 Id. 
63   Emphasis added. 
64 K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, translated from the German by Tony 
Weir, 3rd Edn, Clarendon, Oxford, 1998, p. 34. 
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how ‘the problems set by life … the actual conflicts of social interests [are] 
solved by the legal order….’65 Rheinstein touches on the essence of 
functionalism when he states that it ‘will show us the variety of means which 
may be and have been used for the same purposes, thus enlarging our ‘stock of 
solutions.’66 Functional comparison facilitates the cross-cultural analysis of 
‘solutions’ provided by different systems.67 It focuses not so much on legal 
rules and concepts, as on the response a legal system gives to a particular 
problem. By focusing on function rather than content, it can provide a picture 
of the position regarding private law responses to corruption in various 
jurisdictions.  
The logic of the international trading order requires certainty of the rule of law. 
This is the driving force for the constant formulation of common rules to 
regulate the expanding sphere of commercial activity beyond state borders. 
The process of rule formulation proceeds from ‘problem to problem’, as states 
coordinate their responses in the framework of their mutually dependent 
relationships. The methodology adopted in this research on private remedies 
for corruption focuses on the identification, comparison and analysis of these 
responses. Starting from the problem enables a certain detachment from 
particular concepts, substantive laws or procedures in cases where they arrive 
at ‘more or less the same result.’68 This method of comparison is functional 
and pragmatic. In this way, the functional comparative method enables the 
identification of various solutions to the question of private remedies for 
international corruption, i.e. its building blocks.  
How valid are comparisons of laws dealing with corruption that reflect 
countries at different stages in social, political and economic development? 
How does one bridge the differences in language and concepts?69 Private 
remedies, proceeding as they do from the individual, are closely linked to local 
customs, attitudes and practices. The diversity of such practices means that a 
                                                     
 
65 M. Rheinstein, ‘Comparative law and conflict of laws in Germany’, University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 2, No. 232, 1934-1935, p. 248. 
66 Id. 
67 Rosenblum remarks that ‘[c]omparative law holds significant potential to understand how 
nations internalize international norms.’ See D. Rosenblum, ‘Internalizing gender: why 
international law theory should adopt comparative methods’, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 45, No. 759, 2006-2007, p. 770. 
68 Reitz points out that ‘[b]y asking how one legal system may achieve more or less the same 
result as another legal system without using the same terminology or even the same rule or 
procedure, the comparatist is pushed to appreciate the interrelationships between various areas 
of law, including especially the relationships between substantive law and procedure.’ See J. 
Reitz, ‘How to do comparative law’, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 46, 1998, p. 
622. 
69 Legrand discusses this problem of translation at length. See P. Legrand, ‘How to compare 
now’, Legal Studies, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, 1996, pp. 232-234. 
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‘view from nowhere’70 may fall short of reality. Notions of private remedies 
are necessarily limited by the constraints of national legal systems. The 
functional comparative approach allows for the identification of the basic 
elements at play; how they operate within the selected national systems; the 
extent of their compatibility or incompatibility; and how, if at all, they are 
likely to influence a ‘common platform.’  
The functional comparative method does not resolve the ‘enigma of 
translation’71 but, by focusing on function rather than content, it can provide a 
picture of private remedies for corruption across jurisdictions in a manner that 
reflects the blended international environment. In this view, the functional 
comparative method can provide an element of predictability. Freeman points 
out that the law is normative but it is also factual, as is the degree of 
compliance with the law.72 It should be freely admitted that the pragmatism of 
the solution is colored by the realities of power and politics. The functional 
comparative method can only provide a window into how the law is likely to 
develop. Beyond this point lies the unpredictability of politics, power and 
governance. 
Functional comparison involves an examination of the responses of national 
systems that are representative in the fashioning of international anti-
corruption rules. In the first instance the comparison is ‘cross-national,’ 
comparing the private law positions of selected jurisdictions, and in the second 
instance, it is ‘vertical’ in its comparison of national and international rules. 
This book presents in Part 2 models of private remedies under chosen national 
jurisdictions as well as international arbitration, and subsequently, in Part 3, a 
comparison of the solutions presented under these chosen systems within the 
framework established by the UNCC. This process raises two important 
questions. Firstly, what legal systems should form the basis of the comparison? 
Secondly, what should the parameters of the comparison be?   
                                                     
 
70 Donaldson and Dunfee point out that the ‘pivotal traditions of ethical theory, when applied in 
diluted form to real world problems, have offered a ‘view from nowhere.’ They have been 
incapable of locating the complex, particular problems of corporations, industries, economic 
systems, marketing strategies, etc., in a way that would provide an institutional ‘somewhere.’ 
See T. Donaldson, T. Dunfee, Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business 
Ethics, Harvard Business Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, p. 13. This phrase is the title of the 
illuminating book by T. Nagel. The View from Nowhere, OUP, New York, 1986. 
71 Reitz refers to this as the ‘enigma of translation.’ He points out that ‘[i]n one sense every term 
can be translated because there are things in each legal system that are roughly the functional 
equivalent of things in the other legal system. In another sense nothing can be translated 
because the equivalents are different in ways that matter at least for some purposes. At a 
minimum, generally equivalent terms in each language often have different fields of associated 
meaning….’ J. Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’, id at Note 68 above at pp. 620-621. 
72 M. Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
UK/Malden, 2002, p. 77. 
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1.4.1 Choice of Countries for Comparison 
It can be argued that the question of private remedies for grand corruption 
cannot be answered without having detailed information about the response to 
this issue from all participants in the international economy. Since most 
countries in the world are involved in international commerce, this would be a 
weighty task. However, this may not be a valid argument, as not all players in 
a system necessarily play a similar role in the emergence of the rules that shape 
it. There is a definite politics of rule-making, in which traditional 
configurations of power play an important role. The process of the emergence 
of international rules regulating grand corruption, and the central role played 
by the United States, underscores the influence of political interest.73  
The selection of countries for comparison in this book was guided by the 
history of the development of the anti-corruption regulatory framework. Here, 
the US has played a pre-eminent role. Its position in the world economy, 
coupled with its historical role in the regulation of corruption occurring in 
foreign countries make it an important indicator on the question of private 
remedies for corruption. The United States was the first country to adopt in 
1977 far-reaching anti-corruption legislation (the ‘Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act’), which laid the foundation for the international framework against 
corruption.  
Also important are countries whose legal systems have greatly influenced and 
continue to influence the international trading system. Grand corruption is an 
issue of international commercial law and is greatly influenced by the Western 
tradition. As Watson points out ‘… virtually every country in the world has 
borrowed most of its commercial law from a few legal systems, particularly 
French and German civil law and English common law.’74 These legal systems 
remain the foundation of commercial laws all over the world and from a 
pragmatic point of view are the logical focus of a comparative study to assess 
the scope and potential of private remedies for international corruption. This 
fact narrows the discourse by excluding religious traditions such as Islamic and 
Hindu law, traditions of the Far East such as the Chinese and Japanese systems 
and other legal traditions such as African, Russian or unclassifiable systems.75  
                                                     
 
73  See Chapter 3 for a description of how the domestic US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act served 
as a catalyst for the worldwide criminalization of international corruption.  
74 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, University of Georgia 
Press, Athens, GA, 1974. 
75   For an impressive overview of the major legal families see Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of 
the World, OUP, Oxford, 2000. 
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In this book the example chosen for a civil law jurisdiction is the Netherlands 
while England76 is chosen as a common law jurisdiction. The choice of the 
England and the Netherlands stems from the fact that they are representative of 
the two families of law (civil and common law), whose distinct socio-legal 
histories reflect the scope and content of the commercial laws of major legal 
systems. These fairly representative systems give insight into how civil and 
common law positions on these issues are formulated. In addition to these 
national rules, reference is made to the Restatements of the U.S. common law 
published by the American Law Institute.77 Occasional reference is also made 
to the Principles of European Contract Law by the Commission on European 
Contract Law (the ‘Lando Commission’)78 and to the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference on European Private Law.79  
                                                     
 
76   The focus of this book is the law of England as opposed to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. It should however be noted that all the anti-corruption legislation discussed in this 
book applies to the whole of the United Kingdom (UK). Furthermore, London is often 
described as the financial capital of the world. The coming into force of the far-reaching new 
UK Bribery Act of 2010 also underscores the importance of this jurisdiction as a comparative 
law source. 
77   As a federation of states, contract, tort, agency and unjust enrichment laws in the US are found 
in state case law and statutes. However, the American Law Institute in producing the 
Restatements of US Law has codified the common law in these areas. Although they are not 
binding rules they are regarded as persuasive authority by the legal establishment and courts. 
See Restatement of the Law (2nd) Torts, as adopted and promulgated by the American Law 
Institute at Washington, DC, 19 May 1976, American Law Publishers, St. Paul, MN, 1977; 
Restatement of the Law (2nd ) Contracts, as adopted and promulgated by the American Law 
Institute at Washington, D.C., 17 May  1979, American Law Publishers, St. Paul, MN,1981; 
Restatement of the Law (3rd) Unfair Competition, as adopted and promulgated by the 
American Law Institute at Washington, DC, 11 May 1993, American Law Publishers, St. Paul, 
MN, 1995; Restatement of the Law (3rd) Agency as adopted and promulgated by the American 
Law Institute at Washington, DC, 17 May 17 2005, American Law Publishers, St. Paul, MN, 
2007; Restatement of the Law (3rd) Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, as adopted and 
promulgated by the American Law Institute at Washington, DC, 19 May 2010, American Law 
Publishers, St. Paul, MN, 2011.  
78   O. Lando, H. Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II Combined and. 
Revised, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000; O. Lando, A. Prüm, E. Clive, R. 
Zimmermann, Principles of European Contract Law Part III, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2003. The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) have been described as a form 
of a ‘restatement’ based on comparative research of European contract law. However, 
Zimmermann urges caution regarding it in the same light as the American Law Institute 
Restatements of US Law stating that the drafters of the PECL were more ‘creative’ in their 
task compared to what the authors of the American Restatement were faced with. See R. 
Zimmermann, ‘The Present State of European Private Law’, Mededeligen, Part 73, No. 1, 
Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW), 2010, p. 8. He notes that ‘divergences between national 
legal systems had to be resolved, decisions implying value judgments and policy choices had 
to be taken, and sometimes unconventional solutions were adopted which draftsmen of the 
PECL themselves describe as a progressive development from [the] common core.’ See R. 
Zimmermann, id at p. 9. For this and several other reasons, he concludes that ‘the PECL, as 
they stand, present an incomplete and partly inadequate picture of European contract law. 
Zimmermann, id. at p.10. 
79  C. von Bar, E. Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), OUP/Sellier, Oxford, 2010. 
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Another important legal process regarding corruption and the transactions that 
result from the corrupt exchange is international arbitration. The fact that most 
international contracts contain an arbitration agreement means that the bulk of 
disputes that are tainted by corruption in international transactions are more 
likely to end up before an international arbitration tribunal than a court of law. 
This fact alone indicates that there is a role for international arbitration in the 
discussion about fighting international corruption.80 Consequently, in addition 
to the national legal systems selected for comparison, this book examines the 
responses to issues of transaction validity provided by international arbitration 
as well as its role with regard to the issue of private remedies for grand 
corruption.   
In summary, in this book data is collected from the normative international 
legal framework for private remedies established by the UNCC, the legal 
systems of the United States, England, the Netherlands as well as by 
international arbitration. By focusing on the pragmatism of the solutions 
presented to the question of private remedies for grand corruption using these 
reference points, the functional comparative method can provide a window into 
the ‘building blocks’ or concepts that may influence the shape of a ‘common 
platform’ for actions by private actors in the fight against corruption. To a 
certain extent, the functional comparative method addresses the 
methodological problems associated with research into private remedies for 
corruption across several jurisdictions.81 To put it simply, this book uses the 
comparative method to explore private remedies for corruption in an attempt to 
map the path toward an international framework. 
1.4.2 The Parameters for Comparison 
In his work, Kamba proposes a three-stage process of comparison that 
comprises a descriptive phase, an identification phase, and an explanatory 
phase.82 This process is derived, in his words, from the fact that comparison 
‘entails not merely the ascertainment of divergences and resemblances between 
the legal systems or parts of the legal systems compared, but also the 
explanation of such divergences and resemblances.’83 This systematic 
approach allows for the identification of the basic elements at play; how they 
operate within the selected national systems; the extent of their compatibility 
                                                     
 
80  See Chapter 7 on the Role of Arbitration for further discussion of this point. 
81   To this end, the functional comparative method is most useful where it paints a vivid picture of 
the interaction between the cultures, legal traditions, economies and indeed political practices 
of the legal systems chosen for comparison as they respond to the shared problem that forms 
the basis of the research question. 
82 W. Kamba, ‘Comparative law: a theoretical framework’, id., Note 54 above at pp. 511-512. 
83 Id., at p. 511. 
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or incompatibility; and how, if at all, they are likely to influence the ‘common 
platform.’  
The first step of the descriptive phase of functional analysis is to ascertain the 
existing state of affairs under the legal systems chosen for comparison. This 
can be done by examining the solutions presented by the chosen legal systems 
as dictated by the two principal requirements regarding private remedies for 
corruption contained in the UNCC i.e., transaction validity and the right to 
institute legal proceedings. Art. 34 UNCC requires its parties to consider 
corruption as a ‘relevant factor’ in legal proceedings relating to the validity of 
contracts, the grant or withdrawal of a concession or similar instrument, or 
other remedial action.84 Art. 35 UNCC requires that parties should take 
measures to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a 
result of an act of corruption shall have the right to initiate legal proceedings 
against those responsible.85  
The first aspect of private remedies presented by the UNCC flows from the 
fact that most jurisdictions now have measures in place criminalizing 
international corruption. To allow persons to benefit from contracts resulting 
from such criminal transactions contradicts the logic of the international rules. 
What is the effect of corruption on contracts arising from or tainted by 
international corruption? The second aspect is focused on persons who have 
suffered damage because of corrupt activity. These persons are to be given the 
right to sue for compensation. This right to privately sue for harm suffered can 
change the dynamic of the fight against corruption by bringing in the victims 
of corruption as active participants in the sanctioning process. 
How does comparison take place? Simply placing the national laws next to the 
international stipulations may not convey how these rules influence or fit 
within the decision and rule-making process.86 The process of comparison 
itself should be much more than a dry analysis of ‘juxtaposed’ rules. Rather, it 
should reflect the systems, processes and solutions of the legal systems chosen 
for analysis. The parameters for comparison chosen for this research project 
are drawn from the interface between the rules and the societies in which they 
operate. This research project has chosen as parameters the extent to which the 
chosen legal systems (1) provide recourse to private remedies and (2) interpret 
provisions in a manner conducive to the pursuit of such remedies. This 
approach helps to identify a framework of solutions that provides an element 
                                                     
 
84 Art. 34 UNCC. See further analysis in Chapter 8 of this book. 
85 Art. 35 UNCC. See further analysis in Chapter 9 of this book. 
86 Legrand castigates what he refers to as the ‘narrow view of the comparative enterprise’, which 
is reduced to a ‘dry juxtaposition of the rules of one legal culture … with those of another.’ 
Legrand, ‘How to compare now’, id., Note 69 above at p. 234. 
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of predictability and may highlight areas of ‘shared understanding,’ which can 
influence the development of an international approach toward the question of 
private remedies for corruption. To this end, the research question has been 
contextualized by viewing the question of private remedies in the context of 
the legal regulatory framework regarding corruption in the chosen 
jurisdictions.  
1.5 Empirical Case Study 
To enable this researcher to gain a better understanding of the issues that a 
private law response to corruption should anticipate, a preliminary illustrative, 
qualitative case study was carried out to put the question of private remedies 
for corruption into context.87 Qualitative research has been described as 
activity that locates the observer in the world. This means that ‘qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of 
or to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.’88 
The flexibility of the qualitative method89 suggested that it could be used in 
this research on private remedies for corruption to give insight as to how 
‘social experience is created and given meaning.’90  This study provided the 
researcher with insight into the interrelated conditions that influence the 
incidence of grand scale corruption and what the potential of private remedies 
is in such circumstances.91 
While merely illustrative, it is helpful to underscore the effect undertaking the 
case study has had on clarifying the direction and content of this book. Firstly 
it provided real experiences that gave the researcher more insight into the 
complexity of the issues that arise in fighting corruption and the limits of the 
                                                     
 
87 Van Oer points out that ‘contextualizing actually is a process of adding new meaning to a 
given situation in order to characterize this situation in terms of what could (or should) be 
done, and by the same token to exclude (for the time being) alternative interpretations of the 
required mode of acting.’ See B. Van Oer, ‘From context to contextualizing’, Learning and 
Instruction, Vol. 8, Iss. 6, 1998, pp. 473 at p. 482. 
88 N. Denzin, Y. Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research, in N. 
Denzin, Y. Lincoln (Eds.), The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues, Sage 
Publications California, 2003, pp. 4-5. 
89 It has been observed that ‘…qualitative research, as a set of interpretative activities, privileges 
no single methodological practice over another. As a site of discussion or discourse, qualitative 
research is difficult to define clearly. It has no theory or parading that is distinctly its own.’ N. 
Denzin, Y. Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research, id., at 
p. 9. 
90 N. Denzin, Y. Lincoln id., at p. 13. 
91 ‘The idea that all kinds of learning processes in any situation can be accounted for by one 
limited general set of laws or mechanisms, has been replaced by a view on learning that 
acknowledges the importance of the content of learning, as well as the nature of the learning 
situation.’ B. Van Oer, ‘From context to contextualizing’, id., at p. 473. 
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law.92 This provided realistic impressions that gave a face and voice to the 
effects and consequences of corruption. This exposed the researcher to factors 
that may not have been encountered in a purely dogmatic analysis.93  
Secondly, the case study emphasized for this researcher the necessity of 
‘looking beyond black letter law’ in proposing solutions to the problem of 
corruption. This encouraged the writer to explore the possibilities that exist as 
a result of the ‘environment’ where corrupt transactions actually take place. 
This provided further motivation to tackle the research question from the 
perspective of how this environment is affected by encouraging private actors 
to participate in the fight against corruption; by the provisions of the law; by 
the role of the courts and arbitration panels; by strategies to encourage private 
prosecutors and private claims; as well through public/private partnerships in 
processes of negotiated settlements. These factors shape the environment in 
which corruption occurs in a manner that influences the choice for compliance 
or non-compliance with anti-corruption rules.  
Thirdly, the case study underscored the need for innovative thinking where 
traditional approaches in the fight against corruption collide with the reality of 
a changed global world. An approach that utilizes the contracts, transactions 
and relationships that characterize corrupt exchanges as important points of 
intervention can help to overcome the ‘fault-lines’ of criminalization.  This is 
particularly true of the environment ‘beyond the state’ in which grand scale 
corruption occurs. This provided the impetus for the conceptual shift towards a 
Transaction Approach suggested in this book.   
Fourthly, the case study gave a perspective of the sheer scale of the problem of 
corruption; from the reality of corruption as an ‘entry point’ into a market to 
the viciousness of the ‘cycle of poverty’ that perpetuates the conditions that 
                                                     
 
92 This admittedly unusual step for a researcher in private law was prompted because this 
research project was situated in the former Research School of Safety and Justice a co-
operation between the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Leiden University, University of 
Twente, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and 
Law Enforcement, the Addiction research Institute and the Research and Documentation 
Center. I greatly appreciate the greater depth and insight about the importance of societal 
aspects of research I gained. I am grateful for the advice and guidance given to me by Dr. 
Damián Zaitch formerly of the Criminology Department of the EUR and Ms. Karin van 
Wingerde also of the EUR in respect of this illustrative case study. I also thank Prof. R.  
Swaaningen and Prof. H Bunt for their critique as commentators when I presented the paper 
‘Contextualising a Private law Response to International Corruption:  Nigeria as an Illustrative 
Case Study’ at the Research Programme Monitoring, Safety & Security, Lunch Seminar on the 
7th of January 2010. 
93   I. Curry-Sumner, M. van der Schaaf, Research Skills: Introduction for Lawyers, Nijmegen Ars 
Aequi Libri 2010 at p. 23. These writers mention the usefulness of empirical research in legal 
research. 
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foster deep institutionalized corruption.  This helped to underscore the urgency 
of the problem and the need to spare no effort in finding ‘real solutions’ to the 
societal, economic and political logjam that results from corruption. The 
following sections describe the method adopted in conducting this limited 
illustrative case study. 
1.5.1 Choice of Country for Analysis 
The research question was put into a social context by examining the views of 
experts drawn from Nigeria, a developing country that is suffering the 
detrimental effects of corruption.94 These experts give their perspectives on 
grand corruption, its nature, causes, impact, the role of private remedies and 
court intervention, as well as the way forward. Previous works on corruption in 
Nigeria have provided helpful insights but are mostly approached from a 
general perspective of corruption as a whole and not corruption in international 
commercial transactions in particular.95  
Nigeria is Africa’s second largest economy and its most populous country.96 At 
the time this study was undertaken, Nigeria ranked 147th out of 179 countries 
in Transparency International’s ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ for 2007.97 
Despite being rich in natural resources, 50-90 million Nigerians live in 
‘absolute poverty’ with an income of less than one dollar a day.98  Nigeria used 
to rank as one of the foremost developing nations, with a sound agricultural 
industry, hospitals and universities that were among the best on the continent. 
Over the space of 40 odd years the situation has completely reversed and 
corruption is held up as the primary culprit. 
                                                     
 
94 The author also comes from Nigeria and attended some years of secondary school as well as 
undergraduate and postgraduate university education in Nigeria. 
95 See for example, I. Lame, F. Odekunle (Eds.), Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime in 
Nigeria: Challenges for the New Millennium, Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 2000, p. 31-52; C. 
Akani, Corruption in Nigeria, The Niger Delta Experience, Fourth Dimension, Nigeria, 2002; 
T. Iredia, ‘Civil Society and Corruption: the Nigerian Experience’, 2005 Annual Alumni 
Lecture of the Asaba Chapter of the University of Ibadan Alumni Association, Nelrose Hotel 
Asaba, 11 May 2005,  D. Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular 
Discontent in Nigeria, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007. Also relevant from the 
broader African perspective are the country case studies in K. Hope, B. Chikulo (Eds.), 
Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Case-Studies, Palgrave, New York, 
2000. 
96 World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
Population Division, http://www.un.org/esa/population/. 
97 Available at http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/cpi2007. In 2011 Nigeria 
ranked 143 out of 183 countries on the TI Index. See 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/.  
98 The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) estimates that 90 
million Nigerians live in absolute poverty. DFID, ‘Nigeria Country Assistance Plan, 2004-
2008’, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/nigeria-cap.asp. 
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1.5.2 Methodology of the Case Study 
Field research was carried out in Nigeria and the Netherlands from July- 
August 2008 based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews with seven 
participants drawn from the business sector, the legal profession as well as law 
academics. Participants were selected based on their level of experience with 
the Nigerian domestic and international trading sectors and knowledge of the 
Nigerian legal system. However, as Nigerians living and experiencing the 
reality of life in Nigeria, they were also able to give a personal account of 
corruption. Letters of introduction requesting an appointment were sent out 
that stated this researcher was interested in obtaining a perspective on the role, 
desirability and viability of actions by private actors in the fight against grand 
corruption from a demand side country. Six of these interviews were 
conducted in Nigeria and one in the Netherlands. The interviews were recorded 
and varied in length from about 70 minutes to about 120 minutes. The 
participants were assured that their privacy will be protected, that the 
interviews would be anonymously reported and that excerpts of these 
interviews would be reproduced in this book.   
The participants will be referred to anonymously as Participants 1-7. 
Participant 1 is one the most recognized leaders in Nigerian business circles, 
who has served as the chairman of a multinational corporation, been actively 
engaged in business research and education and has chaired several 
government commissions as well as served as the Nigerian Ambassador to one 
of Europe’s largest economies. Participant 2 is a senior member of an 
international petroleum company operating in Nigeria. This participant is also 
from the Delta region of Nigeria which is particularly affected by the direct 
effects of oil exploitation despite being the source of the bulk of Nigeria’s 
income. Participant 3 is a Senior Advocate of Nigeria with first-hand 
knowledge of the workings and capacities of the Nigerian legal system. 
Furthermore as prominent member of Nigerian society he is able to give 
insight into the political and legal processes as they relate to the fight against 
corruption in Nigeria. Participant 4 is a senior member of the Nigerian Bar and 
in a leading position of the Section on Business Law of the Nigerian Bar 
Association. He runs an international commercial legal practice as well as 
participating actively in social and development activities in Nigeria. 
Participant 5 is a Senior Member of the legal profession and a leading 
practitioner in the area of commercial law and intellectual property. Participant 
6 is a Professor of International Law at one of Nigeria’s federal universities. 
Participant 7 is an Associate Professor of Environmental Law at one of 
Nigeria’s state universities. 
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1.5.3 Analysis of Data 
A thematic strategy of data analysis based on systematically listening to the 
recordings of the interviews with the 7 participants was adopted. The data was 
analyzed by first listening to the complete interviews to identify particular 
points made. These points were grouped together into themes which were 
given the headings that have been reproduced in this report. A summary is 
made under each theme of the general thrust of the interviews and a selection 
of quotes is included to illustrate the particular theme. As much as possible 
these quotes are left intact so that the reader is able to reference the highlighted 
points of the thematic analysis directly from the quotations from the experts.  
The objective of these interviews was to obtain expert Nigerian opinion on the 
problem of grand corruption and the effectiveness of the criminal/civil law 
approaches to fighting corruption.  These interviews present a vivid picture of 
the elements to be considered in addressing the question of private remedies 
for grand corruption. The principal themes that emerged from the interviews 
with the participants cover the following areas: (1) The definition of 
international corruption; (2) the sufficiency of the Nigerian anti-corruption 
rules; (3) the key actors and (4) victims of grand scale corruption in Nigeria; 
(5) the causes and impact of corruption on the economic and social fabric of 
Nigerian society; (6) the question whether corruption is a cultural issue; (7) the 
effect of the international regulatory framework against corruption on Nigerian 
business practices; (8) the role of the courts and (9) the role of private sector in 
the fight against corruption. Finally (10) the participants gave their opinions on 
how to chart a way forward in the fight against corruption. The findings and 
conclusion of this empirical study confirmed for this researcher the complexity 
of the problem of corruption and provided insight into some areas and issues 
that have been considered in articulating and assessing the research question. 
Excerpts are used to supplement the discussion in Chapter 2, which outlines 
the challenges faced in tackling grand corruption.99 
1.6 Relevance of Research 
By evaluating the potential and scope of private remedies for corruption this 
book hopes to provide a platform upon which discussion about a private 
approach to fighting corruption can take place. The laws criminalizing grand 
corruption leave open the question of the private law consequences of 
agreements and contracts arising from or tainted by such corruption. Fora for 
                                                     
 
99 The full report is available at A. Makinwa, ‘Motivating private remedies for international 
corruption: Nigeria as a case study’, CALS Review of Nigerian Law & Practice, Vol. 2, 2008, 
pp. 97-129.  
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the settlement of international commercial disputes are then faced with the task 
of ‘finding their way’ to an answer that accords with the spirit of the criminal 
laws. This book highlights various approaches that are possible and argues that 
the mandatory nature of the laws criminalizing corruption implies that private 
law jurisprudence should develop in a manner that supports the goals of 
criminalization. Only where there is coherency between the criminalization of 
grand corruption and the private law consequences of the crime can the anti-
corruption rules act as an effective deterrence. 
The stability of the international consensus repudiating corruption is 
challenged by the persistence of the consequential transactions that result from 
successful violations of anti-corruption rules. This encourages risk taking and 
undermines the effectiveness of international rules. Furthermore, in a global 
market, the complexity of transactions, the character of the actors and fluidity 
of money moving across borders present serious challenges for the criminal 
process. Articulating private remedies as a strategy helps to move the global 
fight against corruption a step further by addressing not only the crime but also 
framing the transactions affected by corrupt acts as a central point of 
intervention. In urging a shift from the offender to the transaction, this research 
departs from approaches in previous works that deal with the question of civil 
law consequences of corruption primarily by describing and assessing national 
legal provisions.100  
Private remedies exploit the rational behavior of corporations. Companies will 
favor a course of action that best boosts company earnings and satisfies 
shareholders. Where the satisfaction of shareholders can be quantified in terms 
other than company profits, the choices of corporations will reflect this 
                                                     
 
100  See discussion about the Civil Law Consequences of Corruption in Denmark, Sweden, 
Germany, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, England, France and Spain in O. Meyer (Ed.), Civil Law 
Consequences of Corruption, (Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik an 
der Universität Bremen) (ZERP), Vol. 53, Nomos, Baden Baden, 2009;  See also G. Heine, B. 
Huber, T. Rose, Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of National and Supranational 
Legal Structures, ICC, Paris, 2003, pp. 654-655; C. Nicholls, T. Daniel, M. Polaine, J. 
Hatchard, ‘Civil Remedies’, in Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, OUP, New York, 
2006, pp. 225-265; A. Berg, ‘Bribery: transaction validity and other civil law implications’, 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, Iss. 1, 2001, p. 27 at p. 29; E. Burger, M. 
Holland, ‘Why the private sector is likely to lead the next stage in the global fight against 
corruption’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 2006-2007, pp. 63-69.; T. Daniel, J. 
Matin, Civil Proceedings to Recover Corruptly Acquired Assets of Public Officials, in Mark 
Pieth (Ed.), Recovering Stolen Assets, Peter Lang, New York, 2008, p. 245 at pp. 250-252; A. 
Portnoy, J. Murino, ‘Private Actions under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An 
Imminent Front?’, IBA’s International Litigation News, April 2009; P. Carrington, American 
Law and Transnational Corruption: Is There a Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad?, in O. Meyer 
(Ed.), Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, Nomos, Baden Baden, 2009, p. 37; S.  Young, 
‘Why civil actions against corruption?’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, pp. 
144-159. 
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changed environment. Factors such as increased awareness by consumers of a 
corporation’s corrupt activity, the aversion of the public to damage caused by 
corrupt activity, the reputational implications of private actions by victims, can 
increase the risks of corrupt activity for the corporation in a manner that can 
positively influence compliance.101  
Developing a systematic approach implies a broader approach to the question 
of private remedies. This book attempts to tie together the various threads of 
the public/private discourse regarding the fight against corruption in a 
systematic way to provide a cohesive picture of the landscape of the fight 
against corruption from the point of view of intervention by the private actor. 
To this end, Chapter 10 of this book advocates a Transaction Approach in the 
fight against corruption that is centered on the notion of restoring interactions 
damaged by the corrupt exchange. By identifying and addressing ‘broken’ 
interactions, the environment in which corruption occurs can be influenced in a 
way that encourages compliance with anti-corruption rules.102  
Corruption remains an urgent issue and this book joins the growing discussion 
about the role of the private actor, which is catalyzed by the changing 
regulatory environment and the opportunities offered by an integrated world. 
As the state grapples with the governance gaps created by globalization, the 
center of gravity is broadening with respect to the private actor. This is a 
natural adjustment that may be expected in a ‘global world without global 
government.’103 Territorial boundaries have become shadows of their former 
selves and in many respects the foundations of the old world are incompatible 
with the new. Old insights may remain true but operate differently as 
traditional demarcations between public and private rights, public and private 
law are redefined.104 Private dispute settlement processes, supported by states 
but engineered by private actors, operate beyond the nation state. Self-
regulatory and hybrid reward schemes redefine the method and nature of the 
                                                     
 
101  Such activities make the corrupt actions of corporations more tangible and ‘seen’ by ordinary 
citizens. This presents real victims in a manner that triggers mirror responses in the general 
public. The abstraction of public corruption becomes more concrete and evokes a desire for 
more direct repercussions for the offenders in the eyes of the general public. See E. Salcedo-
Albarán, I. De León-Beltrán, M. Rubio, ‘Feelings, brain and prevention of corruption’, 
International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 3, Iss. 3, 2008, p. 2 at p. 11 and ff. 
102  John Braithwaite in his seminal work Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, OUP, 
New York, 2002, argues that restorative practices may serve as more effective deterrent 
systems than traditional criminal punitive sanctions. 
103  J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, WW Norton, New York, 2002, p. 248. 
104   This was also my experience in writing this thesis. My methodology in this thesis, the 
categorization of the primary and secondary contracts, public and private interests, and 
conceptualization of a transaction approach to fighting corruption were a reaction to my need 
for order in my thinking processes as well as my dissatisfaction with the artificial separations I 
encountered in the private and public law narratives on corruption. 
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process of sanction. A central argument of this book is that public-private 
partnerships shall be a principal feature of the emergent terrain in the fight 
against grand corruption.  
Ruggie has remarked that ‘[t]here is no single silver bullet solution to the 
institutional misalignments in the business and human rights domain. Instead 
all social actors – states, businesses, and civil society – must learn to do many 
things differently.’105 This research on private remedies is a response to the 
need to develop models of intervention that are more consistent with the 
realities of the international environment, in which grand corruption occurs. 
The hope is that this research will add to the growing recognition of the role of 
the private actor in the fight against corruption and contribute to a viewpoint 
that emphasizes the need for a seamless platform of international consensus 
that spans the breadth of the public/private law divide – from the originating 
acts to the consequences of corruption.  
1.7 Outline of this Book 
Part 1 of this book, The Foundation for Private Remedies, answers the first 
aspect of the research question, namely, what is the motivation and foundation 
for an international framework on private remedies for corruption? To this end, 
Chapter 2 builds on the arguments presented in this introductory chapter and 
using excerpts from the Nigerian case study, discusses the challenges that must 
be taken into consideration in any attempt to provide strategies for reform in 
regulating corruption. These challenges are broadly grouped into the problem 
of definition, the challenge of compromised processes of governance, the 
challenge faced by business operators, the challenge faced by the judicial 
process as well as the challenge posed by the new ordering of international 
society. Chapter 2 ends with insights from participants on the path ahead in the 
fight against corruption. These challenges and insights provide an illustrative 
backdrop for the international normative framework repudiating grand 
corruption discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 describes the process of the 
emergence of a world-wide consensus repudiating international corruption 
starting from a domestic US Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, to a 
variety of regional, intergovernmental and international instruments. This 
global consensus provides the baseline of legality upon which a discussion 
                                                     
 
105   J. Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. Available 
at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf at Para 7. Endorsed by 
the UN as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Human Rights Council, 17th Session 
A/HRC/17/31. 
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about private remedies for corruption can take place by (a) establishing 
international corruption as an international legal wrong and (b) providing new 
insights on processes of implementation that engage the private actor.  
Part 2 of the book, Models of Private Remedies, answers the second aspect of 
the research question, namely, what is the position of national law and 
arbitration regarding the issue of private remedies for corruption? The position 
of private remedies for corruption is examined under the three jurisdictions 
chosen for study in this book as well as from the context of international 
arbitration. Chapter 4 examines the right to private remedies in the United 
States, Chapter 5, the right to private remedies in England, Chapter 6, the right 
to private remedies in the Netherlands, and Chapter 7, the role of international 
arbitration with regard to contracts that are tainted by corruption.  
Part 3 of the book, Towards an International Framework, answers the third 
and fourth part of the research question, namely, (1) what is the common 
ground or areas of divergence on private remedies for corruption and (2) how 
can a framework for private remedies be conceptualized? The methods of 
private redress provided by the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCC) 
are used as the reference point. To this end, Chapter 8 assesses the contrasting 
approaches to the validity of the transaction tainted by international corruption 
against the framework of Art. 34 UNCC, while Chapter 9 assesses the 
contrasting approaches to the right to institute legal proceedings for corruption 
under the chosen legal systems against the framework of the model provided 
by Art. 35 UNCC. Chapter 10 brings the different threads together and 
presents a conceptual framework for the future of the fight against corruption 
that takes as a starting point the environment in which international corruption 
occurs and the interactions that characterize the corrupt exchange. This 
approach is centered on the transactions that result from the corrupt exchange 
and urges an increased instrumental role for private law. Chapter 11 ends the 
book with conclusions and recommendations about the future of private 
remedies for corruption that can be identified from the findings in this book as 
well as areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CHALLENGES OF FIGHTING 
CORRUPTION 
‘Corruption is by no means a new phenomenon. It is as old as human nature itself.’1 
Mark Pieth 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of private remedies for corruption is part of the larger question of 
how to develop effective strategies to fight corruption in international 
commercial affairs.2 Although it has been argued that the tools and 
methodology3 of ascertaining the true extent of the problem of corruption are 
far from perfect,4 there seems to be sufficient evidence that corruption has 
                                                     
 
1   Mark Pieth, in his introduction to the history and development of the OECD, opens with these 
very apt words. They sum up the breadth and scale of the problem of corruption and put the 
efforts in this book and indeed all other works regarding the fight against corruption into 
perspective. Corruption is an ancient and complex problem. This alone should caution that 
there are no simple answers to be found in this area of inquiry. M. Pieth, Introduction, in M. 
Pieth, L. Low, P. Cullen (Eds.), The OECD Convention on Bribery, CUP, Cambridge, 2007, p. 
5.  
2   One of the most significant areas of legal development in the next 20-30 years will be 
developing the tools and methods to tackle crimes of international dimensions such as 
corruption, piracy, terrorism, environmental pollution, cybercrime, money laundering, human 
trafficking and international fraud. These activities undermine governance, jeopardize 
development and compound poverty. They pose an urgent threat to international peace, 
security and well-being in a world that is increasingly integrated. This is the motivation for the 
urgent and sustained efforts to develop rules and strategies to fight this problem as well as a 
motivation for this book. 
3 Williams argues that it is ‘almost inevitable that the “evidence” used by students of corruption 
is bound to be fragmentary, biased, anecdotal, potentially misleading, impressionistic and 
inadequate,’ and thus incapable of sustaining general (comparative) theory. See R. Williams, 
Political Corruption in Africa, Aldershot, Hampshire, England, Avebury, Gower Publishing 
1987, p. 27-28. Quoted in W. Sandholtz, W. Koetzle, ‘Accounting for corruption: economic 
structure, democracy and trade’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, Iss. 1, March 2000, 
p. 31. 
4 Sandholtz and Koetzle argue that the reasons for the lack of numerical data on corrupt 
practices are not hard to imagine: corrupt actions take place in secret and are generally meant 
to remain secret; even the victims’ of corruption frequently are unaware that they have been 
victimized; those reporting or alleging instances of corruption can be political opponents of the 
accused with motives to discredit them; critics of corrupt practices often have a separate 
agenda to extol or denigrate specific groups; and governments may not want researchers 
probing such sensitive areas. See W. Sandholtz, W. Koetzle, id. 
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deleterious effects, which justifies international and domestic efforts to 
confront it.5 As I have noted elsewhere,  
‘The articulation of the rule of law has become imperative as the globalization 
and integration of world markets makes national borders opaque … 
Regardless of market advances, the gains of globalization can be undone. A 
vacuum created by an incoherency in the rule system may lend itself to 
alternative ideologies, grabs for power, the rise of nationalism, the promotion 
of self-interest and a race to wealth by the strong and rich at the expense of the 
weak and poor. It is against this background of an urgent need for common 
rules in a global society that the issue of civil remedies for international 
corruption has arisen.’6 
Identifying the challenges faced in fighting corruption is an important indicator 
of the problems and the prospects of private remedies. A helpful step in this 
regard is to contextualize the problem and develop an understanding of the 
legal landscape against which the issue of remedies for victims of corruption is 
played out.7 It is appropriate to highlight some of these challenges as an 
introduction to the research question tackled in this book.8 
Fighting corruption in today’s integrated world is no easy task in view of the 
multiplicity of legal traditions, varying levels of social development and the 
diverse political, cultural and economic conditions that characterize the 
international community. Complicating this diversity is the absence of a clear 
nexus of governance with the result that traditional state based solutions to 
crime may not transplant adequately in the ‘global city.’9 This poses challenges 
that can be grouped into two main categories. The first set of challenges has to 
do with the notion of corruption and the rule of law. The challenges in this 
                                                     
 
5 Economists such as Susan Rose-Ackerman have provided economic data that point to the fact 
that corruption impedes economic, political and social growth as well as general security. An 
impressive compilation of this data is found in the recent S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), 
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
England, 2006. These studies also show a link between levels of corruption and liberal open 
democracies.  
6 A. Makinwa, ‘Researching civil remedies for international corruption: the choice of the 
functional comparative method’, Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, November 2009, p. 331 
at p. 335. 
7  This chapter is based in part on an award-winning essay contemplating the future of the fight 
against corruption. See A. Makinwa, ‘Future Thinking through the Prism of International 
Corruption’, Award winning essay at the HiiL Law of the Future Conference 23-24 June 2011. 
8 A few excerpts of interviews from the brief case study undertaken in the introductory stages of 
this research provide personal accounts and contextualize the problem of corruption in Nigeria, 
a society grappling with its negative effects. The full report is available at A. Makinwa, 
‘Motivating private remedies for international corruption: Nigeria as a case study’, CALS 
Review of Nigerian Law & Practice, Vol. 2, 2008, pp. 97-129. 
9 Sassen describes how privatization, deregulation and digitalization have resulted in the 
weakening of the nation state. See S. Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, 2nd 
edn, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2001, at p. xviii. 
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regard center on the definition of corruption and the deleterious consequences 
of the failure or absence of an effective rule regime. These challenges are 
described below as the Problem of Definition, Compromised Processes of 
Governance, the Challenge faced by Business Operators and the Challenge 
faced by the Judicial Process.  
A second set of challenges has to do with the efficacy of the rules developed to 
fight corruption. The challenges center firstly, on the narrow focus of the 
criminal law, which excludes the victim of corruption in penalization and 
enforcement processes; secondly, on the narrow conceptual framework, which 
leaves transactions that result from corruption inadequately addressed; and, 
thirdly, on the limitations to effective regulation of corruption via the criminal 
process in a world where the position of the sovereign state has receded. These 
challenges are described under the headings, the New Ordering of 
International Society and the Path Ahead. 
These afore-mentioned challenges shape the legal terrain of any efforts to 
review or reform the laws regulating corruption. Certainly, these challenges 
have political, social and economic dimensions that lie beyond the purview of 
law reform. Nonetheless they serve as a helpful reminder of the complexity of 
corruption to provide a dose of realism as a starting point to this inquiry into 
the potential and scope of private remedies for corruption. 
2.2 The Problem of Definition 
What is corruption? Does it lie in the eye the beholder or does it have a 
minimum content? There are several fundamental challenges to tackling 
corruption from an international perspective. The first challenge is determining 
the point at which it occurs. Corruption, an ancient problem, has been beset 
with the problem of a lack of content. One man’s corruption is another man’s 
gift.10 The term ‘corruption’ throws up images of diverse traditions, cultures, 
peoples, values and norms, all flooded with a kaleidoscope of meanings. The 
social, political and economic dimensions of corruption, as well as cultural 
values and accepted practices, lend themselves to a state of cultural relativism 
that could severely limit the possibilities of a collective response to the issue of 
private remedies for corruption. How does one arrive at a common 
understanding of this word?  
This is important because in the absence of a common understanding, there is 
little basis for common intervention. Domestic interpretations of what is in 
                                                     
 
10   S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, CUP, 
Cambridge, 1999, at p. 5. 
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essence an international problem will not bridge the ‘impunity gap’, where 
countries act according to their own understanding and values. The 
interconnectedness of our societies and markets today dictates the need to 
develop common rules for efficiency and growth. A common solution is the 
only way to ensure that the playing field of international commerce is indeed 
level. At the same time, any definition must be set against the background of 
real experiences. This suggests that any over-arching definition of corruption is 
to a certain degree artificial. 
While it is well accepted that corruption is a problem that has a ‘multitude of 
faces,’11 defining the nature and content of corruption is a necessary 
preliminary step to legal analysis and a common frame for action. The absence 
of a common definition is a limiting factor to any concerted international effort 
to fight corruption or indeed any discussion about private remedies for 
corruption from an international perspective. Two primary problems confront 
the attempt to give specific content to corruption. The first is the use of the 
word corruption to cover a varied cross section of activities. The second is the 
problem of pluralism and cultural diversity.  
2.2.1 Corruption as an ‘Umbrella Term’ 
Corruption is an ‘umbrella’ term. Vastly different activities are lumped 
together in the expression corruption. The lack of precision as to what 
corruption means reflects the elasticity of the word.12 As Kimberly points out, 
the extent to which people abuse their position for personal gains is limitless.13 
Friedrich remarks that ‘in English and other languages the word corruption has 
                                                     
 
11 E. Campos, S. Pradham (Eds.), The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the 
Sector Level, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2007, p. 9. 
The authors point out that the scale of corruption can be grand or petty and classify corruption 
into three broad types: state capture, patronage and nepotism, and administrative corruption. 
12  Bribery scholar Daniel Lowenstein has described corruption as a series of concentric circles 
with the most severe form of corruption − bribery − at the ‘black core’ surrounded by grey 
circles ‘growing progressively lighter as they become more distant from the center, until they 
blend into the surrounding white area that represents perfectly proper and innocent conduct.’ 
D. Lowenstein, ‘Political bribery and the intermediate theory of politics’, UCLA Law Review, 
Vol. 32, April 1985, pp. 784-786.  
13 K. Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations, in 
K. Elliott (Ed.), Corruption and the Global Economy, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC, 1996, p. 177. Elliott points out that ‘corruption involves many types of 
crimes. The extent to which people abuse their position for personal gains is limitless. At one 
end of the spectrum are local low-level officials taking small sums of money to expedite 
routine approvals or transactions i.e. petty corruption to defense contractors paying billions of 
dollars to lawmakers for awarding major defense or transportation projects.’ 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
37 
 
a history of vastly different meaning and connotations.’14 This creates a 
stumbling block to analytical inquiry as separate categories of ‘corruption’ are 
considered together within a general analysis of corruption. Petty corruption 
and grand corruption are as different as tea and coffee and this fact must 
separate any analytical consideration of the two phenomena. 
A proper analysis of corruption must therefore start with some clarity about 
what activity and in what context the word is being applied. More importantly, 
in drawing conclusions and making recommendations, emphasis must be 
placed on the precise form of corruption that such conclusions have a bearing 
on. To speak generally of a fight against ‘corruption’ may make for a good 
headline but is in fact confusing in content. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime for example, distinguishes several types of ‘corruption’ 
including grand corruption, petty corruption, bribery, embezzlement, theft and 
fraud, extortion, abuse of a discretion, conduct creating or exploiting 
conflicting interests, and improper political contributions.15 The root causes 
and manifestations of each type of ‘corruption’ listed are not necessarily the 
same. Petty corruption may be more symptomatic of poverty, inequality and 
lack of development while political corruption is more related to power, 
personal gain and a monopoly on the political process. To discuss both types 
under the general term corruption results in a confused process of analysis. 
Clearly medicine must be prescribed to suit the disease and a clear diagnosis is 
key to any hope of cure. Incoherency and conflicting conclusions result from 
the indeterminate use of the term ‘corruption.’ 
2.2.2 Corruption as a Culturally Complex Phenomenon 
Corruption is a long standing problem that is identified in most cultures.16 
Cultural relativism may result in differing standards and values. A corrupt act 
in one society may be a culturally accepted practice in another.17 For example, 
                                                     
 
14 C. Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective, in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston 
(Eds.), Political Corruption, Concepts and Contexts, 3rd edn, Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick, 2002, p. 15. 
15   See the UN Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and 
Investigators, Vienna, September 2004, pp. 23-24. 
16 Nichols shows that corruption is condemned in every major legal tradition from Buddhism, 
Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism as well as in most 
countries. See P. Nichols‚ ‘Outlawing transnational bribery through the World Trade 
Organization’, Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 28, 1997, p. 305. 
17 Klitgaard, for example, states ‘when historian J.S. Furnivall examined why according to 
British standards, colonial Burma was so corrupt, he concluded that in many cases the 
Burmese were simply following their customary norms of correct conduct.’ Other examples 
are the practices of compradazgo system, described as a ritual network of relatives and adopted 
relatives that commands the loyalty of Filipinos more than any formal institution. See R. 
Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, University of California Press, Berkley, 1988, pp. 3-4.  
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in feudal Thailand the historic Sakdina system allowed for cultural practices 
‘where giving or demanding a bribe or giving something in return for favors 
has long been a practiced norm.’18 Another example is the harambee system in 
Kenya popularized in the 1960s, which originally started out as a practice of 
communal self-help but has with the passage of time become a means of 
influencing public servants. The argument of counsel representing the giver of 
a US$2 million bribe to the then Prime Minister Mzee Jomo Kenyatta of 
Kenya in the World Duty Free v. Kenya case is illustrative of this point. 
Counsel argued that this payment was understood by the parties involved to be 
a ‘standard business practice’ that was part of the local Kenyan custom of 
harambee, which rendered the payment ‘not only acceptable, but 
fashionable.’19 
The Chinese guanxi custom sees business culture in terms of relationships 
based on honor and respect in contrast to the western transactional approach. 
Guanxi places great emphasis on long-term relationships, and as Burton and 
Stewart in their commentary on business practices in China write:  
‘the idea that taking a job with a company […] cancels obligations toward 
people with whom someone has had a long term relationship and to whom one 
owes much guanxi is seen not only as alien but also has the essence of 
immorality.’20  
The problem of cultural relativism would seem to militate against the 
emergence of a common, cross-cultural definition of corruption. However, 
cultural diversity has collided with the reality of an increasingly integrated 
world market.  To tackle a problem of international dimension there has to be a 
‘common point of departure’21 otherwise there would be little basis upon 
which to achieve a common solution.  
2.2.3 Definition as a Starting Point to Private Remedies 
What, then, is corruption? This fundamental question defines the parameters of 
research into a concerted private law response. Cultural relativism implies that 
a definition of corruption from within one tradition will not necessarily hold 
                                                     
 
18 Transparency International Thailand Country Report 2005 at http://www.transparency-
thailand.org/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=40.  
19 World Duty Free Company Ltd v. The Republic of Kenya, 46 ILM., 2007, p. 339, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, Para. 120.  
20      See F. Burton, S. Stewart, ‘Crossing the cultural divide’, Business Spectator, 19 January 2008, 
available at http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Crossing-the-cultural-divide-
AWUGN?OpenDocument. 
21 F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-
Dialectical Perspective, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992, p. 149.  
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true for all. A definition that is valid across cultures has to be reached by a 
process of consensus and would have to assume a higher ranking than, or even 
displace, domestic understandings. In the absence of such a supranational 
consensus, there is a ‘chaos of meaning’22, and there would be no basis upon 
which to pose the question addressed in this research project. Simply put, there 
has to be a starting point, a normative rule that lends coherence, content and 
definition to the question of utilizing private law to fight corruption. Without 
such a starting point, the question of private remedies is not ‘ripe’ enough to be 
asked. At the same time it must be accepted that there is no simple formulation 
that can capture the complexities of corruption and adopting any particular 
definition is done from a pragmatic viewpoint in the understanding that we are 
yet to find an ‘acceptable alternative.’23 
Corruption is generally seen as an abuse of power. This power is mostly 
associated with the state or public officials and the abuse of the citizen’s trust. 
Corruption appears as blight on the social contract. Rose-Ackerman defines 
corruption as ‘an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit that may 
or may not be deserved in the absence of payoffs.’24 Friedrich speaks of 
damage to the group, to the society that results from corruption, and states:  
‘[…] the pattern of corruption may […] be said to exist whenever a power holder 
who is charged with doing certain things, that is, a responsible functionary or 
office holder, is by monetary or other rewards, such as the expectation of a job in 
the future, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the reward and 
thereby damage the group or organization to which the functionary belongs, more 
specifically the government.’25 
However, the Asian Development Bank makes the point that many 
conventional definitions of corruption focus on the abuse of public power. This 
in their view does not ‘give adequate attention to the problem of corruption in 
the private sector or to the role of the private sector in fostering corruption in 
                                                     
 
22 Resorting to Wittgenstein, Hildebrandt writes about the relationship of mutuality between rules 
and action, stating that one does not precede the other. The decision that an act counts as a 
crime is dictated as much by the rule that governs our understanding of the crime as by the 
type of action that we understand as the crime. Hildebrandt emphasizes that norms are implicit 
standards that rule our actions without which we would live in ‘a chaos of meaning.’ M. 
Hildebrandt, Trial and Fair Trial: From Peer to Subject to Citizen, in A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. 
Marshall and V. Tadros (Eds.), The Trial on Trial Judgment and Calling to Account, Hart, 
London, 2006, p. 15. 
23 See R. Harris, Political Corruption in and beyond the Nation State, London Routledge, 
London, 2003, p. 5.  
24 S. Rose-Ackerman, When is Corruption Harmful?, in A. Hedenheimer, M. Johnston (Eds.), 
Political Corruption, Concepts and Context, 3rd edn, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 
NJ, 2009, p. 353. 
25 C. Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective, id., Note 14 above.  
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the public sector.’26 As such, the working definition adopted by the Bank sees 
corruption as ‘[t]he abuse of public or private office for personal gain.’27 In an 
age where the role of the private sector has spilled out into traditionally public 
undertakings and the public sector has become increasingly privatized, private 
power can also abuse the social compact.  
Corruption has also been defined in terms of abusing the promise to serve the 
interests of a group or ideal. Klitgaard comments that ‘[c]orruption exists when 
an individual illicitly puts personal interests above those of the people or ideals 
he or she is pledged to serve.28 Transparency International defines corruption 
the ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’29 A definition that focuses on 
the fact of corruption as a betrayal of trust is that by Eicher, who defines 
corruption as ‘[a]ny act where a trust between the principal, the one whose 
interests are supposed to be protected, is violated by the agent, the one who is 
supposed to be protecting the principal’s interests.30 
Friedrich points out that there is a core meaning to corruption which emerges 
from an analysis of the different meanings and connotations given to the term. 
He remarks that ‘corruption is the kind of behavior which deviates from the 
norm actually prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context, … it is 
deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private 
gain at public expense.’31  
Framing the definition of corruption in ‘public’ or ‘private’ terms creates an 
artificial boundary. The increasing involvement of government in private 
enterprises and of private enterprises in matters of public dimension means that 
the line that could once easily be drawn between public and private corruption 
is not so clear anymore. The traditional divide between public and private 
bribery has been described as having ‘no meaningful distinction’ and deserving 
of similar treatment.32  
                                                     
 
26     Asian Development Bank Website at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/policies/anticorruption/anticorrupt300.asp.  
27     Id.  
28  R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, id., Note 17 above, at p. xiii. 
29  http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ 
30 S. Eicher, Corruption in International Business: The Challenge of Cultural and Legal 
Diversity, Gower, Surrey, England, 2008, p. 4. 
31 C. Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective, id., Note 14 above, at p. 15. 
32       Dorresteijn argues that there is no reason to make a separation between the private and public 
sector when dealing with corruption because the problem is essentially the same, and the 
division of responsibilities between the government and private organizations is no longer 
quite so clear cut especially with the increasing privatization of government services. Quoting 
Wertheim, he states, ‘the 19th century strict division between government and private sectors 
does not seem to be the case in these times.’ Despite this convergence he observes that there is 
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Apart from the inconsistency of the public/private bribery categorization, the 
context of a liberalized and integrated world economy lends credence to the 
argument that corruption ‘can no longer be plausibly analyzed only within a 
national state framework.’33 Harris argues that fractures in the international 
system ‘give political corruption many forms to take and many cracks in which 
to hide.’34 He concludes from this that the way forward in the fight against 
corruption is transnational regulation. It is from a transnational understanding 
across the public/private bribery divide that a global definition of corruption 
can emerge. The challenge facing the international community in fighting 
corruption is to give common content to its essential core. 
2.2.4 Illustrations from Case Study: Cultural Perspectives  
The participants in the case study rejected the notion that corruption is an 
inherent aspect of Nigeria culture. Interestingly enough, there was a general 
reference to ‘corruption’ as the root of social malaise by all the participants. 
However, they were also of the view that this ‘corruption’ was strongly 
rejected by indigenous society. They agreed that while there may be elements 
in local traditions of ‘showing appreciation’ that may bear some semblance to 
the act of giving a bribe, equating this semblance is misplaced. In the view of 
most participants, the tradition of ‘showing appreciation’ is far removed in 
concept and substance from acts of bribery.  
Even within the cultural/ethical context, there were varying nuances. There 
was a noticeable dichotomy between the ‘morality of the society’ and the 
‘morality of this thing they call government’, where the government is seen as 
alien and disconnected from the common man. This distance from government 
and the lack of evidence of paternal care by the state created a free-for-all 
situation where public office or a connection to public power was seen as a 
duty to garner a share for the people ‘back home’ by whatever means.  
From the comments of the participants it was clear that the community sees the 
concrete ‘known’ persons in corridors of power as the primary provider of 
security rather than the abstract State. The result is that governance becomes a 
parody, and election to public office becomes a means of getting a share of the 
                                                                                                                            
 
still a criminal law emphasis in fighting public and private corruption. In his opinion, this can 
be traced to the need to protect the interest of the state, the integrity of public authority and the 
integrity of the master-servant relationship. He asks whether these reasons still justify the 
primarily criminal law approach to corruption. The modern public servant is, in his view, more 
independent and should not be treated any differently from his equivalent in the private sector. 
A. Dorresteijn, Corruptie en Privaatrecht, (Corruption and Private Law), Quint, Gouda, 1994, 
pp. 20-22. 
33       R. Harris, Political Corruption in and beyond the Nation State, id., Note 23 above, at p. 1. 
34       R. Harris id., at p.10. 
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‘national cake.’ This implies a driving force for corruption that is based in 
economic and not cultural imperatives. 
Participant 3: (Tape 1: 00:11:11)…: In Yoruba land it is not so … if people know that 
you have stolen money they will not come to your house; that is not our culture …. The 
Yoruba custom is that your wealth must be with honor. 
Participant 6:  (00:28:33) if somebody steals from the commonwealth at the local level, 
he or she will be ostracized from the community … (29:38) that person will see the instant 
wrath of the community (29:48) if you steal from the Federal government provided you 
bring a part of it home they will see it as God has used you as an instrument of getting their 
own share. 
Participant 4:  (00:06:44) … African system is replete with value, yes we are taught to 
say thank you. We are taught to appreciate older people … but all that is taken in the right 
measure. We are not talking about the same things at all and cultural values are still good 
… I would not want to train my children in western culture….’ 
Participant 1: (Tape 3 00:13:31) If … for instance someone is known to be corrupt or 
a thief, even if all he stole is someone’s goat or chicken, he and his entire family carry that 
stigma for a long time. Now if the same man, the same person now wins an election in the 
Local Government Council … and goes to the Assembly as representing his people, those 
same people will say to him don’t come back empty handed. So you can see that there is in 
the minds of, and we are talking culture now, in the minds of our ordinary local people, 
there is a clear distinction between morality in the society and morality concerning this 
thing that they call government which is really quite remote from them as far as they are 
concerned.  
Participant 2: (Tape 1, 00:11:37) People show appreciation a lot … [This] has also 
been transported to the white collar jobs as well … he does not bring an apple … he says ... 
just out of appreciation take five naira …. I draw a line between that and outright bribery 
where … company ABC is not supposed to get a particular contract but because of my 
relationship with them … I try to do something to make them get it … (Tape 1, 00:13:01) 
the culture sees the bribe I have just described as evil but the culture does not see the thank 
you as evil … the culture expects that … if someone has been nice to you, you go back you 
say thank you.  
Participant 3: (Tape 1, 00:04:14) ... whoever propounded that idea is correct because 
it is a cultural issue. … If I make a profit of one million naira what is wrong in giving a 
hundred thousand out to say thank you or two hundred thousand …. That is in another 
sense.  
Participant 6:  (00:53:17) … the fight against corruption has to be holistic … 
(00:55:30) the fight against corruption cannot draw a rigid dichotomy between the public 
sector and the private sector. The private sector… they often happen to be the giver, the 
public sector, the receiver but quite often if you look at our earlier legislation,… the 
emphasis and the focus of the … anti-corruption war or campaign is almost entirely 
targeted at the public sector where you have those who receive. Whereas you cannot tackle 
the problem effectively by focusing only on the receiver and neglecting the giver and I think 
that is what the international war on corruption is seeking to capture. 
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2.3 Compromised Processes of Governance 
A second challenge presented by corruption is the incapacity it breeds in units 
of governance. Once it takes foot, it is a cancer that undermines the institutions 
of governance and dynamics of the market place. There is broad agreement 
about the detrimental effect corruption has on the economic, social and 
political development of countries.35 This is reflected in the strong perception 
by States that corruption has a debilitating effect on the functioning of 
democratic societies and global security. The 40 signatories of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption link corruption to instability and 
insecurity of societies.36       
2.3.1 The Inefficacy of the ‘Compromised’ State 
Corruption in its many facets is an abuse of the social contract that underlies 
the notion of governance. It runs the whole spectrum from tax deductible 
bribes37 to the complete emasculation of the institutions of governance.38 
Corruption strikes from within, spilled out by the very persons supposed to be 
                                                     
 
35 See M. Paolo, ‘Corruption and growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, Vol. 
110, No. 3, 1995, pp. 681-712; S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, P. Zoido-Lobaton, ‘Corruption, 
public finances, and the unofficial economy’, Policy Research Working Paper Series 2169, 
Washington, DC: World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance, 
1999; J. Hellman, G. Jones, D. Kaufmann, ‘Seize the state, seize the day: state capture, 
corruption and influence in transition’, Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, 
Washington, DC: World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance, 
2000; B. Chong-En, W. Shang-Jin, ‘Quality of bureaucracy and open-economy macro 
policies’, NBER Working Papers 7766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2000; D. 
Reisman, ‘What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-
national empirical research’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 10, June 2007, p. 211; J. 
Graf Lambsdorff, Consequences and Causes of Corruption: What do We Know from a Cross-
Section of Countries?, in S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International Handbook on the Economics 
of Corruption, id., Note 5 above, at p. 3; G. T. Abed, S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, Corruption 
& Economic Performance, Washington, DC, IMF, 2002.  
36  Para. 2 Preamble, UN Convention against Corruption New York, 31 October 2003, in force 14 
December 2005, 2349 UNTS, p. 41; 43 ILM, 2004, p. 37, (hereinafter, the UNCC). 
37 The bribery of foreign officials in several countries used to be a tax-deductible expense. In 
response to this practice the OECD passed the Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials (1996), urging Member countries that allowed the tax 
deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials to deny the tax deductibility of such bribes. 
OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, 
(adopted by the Council on 11 April 1996 at its 873rd session [C/M (96)8/PROV]) C 
(96)27/FINAL.  
38 Mueller describes corruption as an example of ‘a conservative force that maintains or increases 
asymmetries, which in developing countries in particular has seriously hampered social, 
economic and political progress.’ This, he says, results in a weakening of productive capacity, 
the reduction of administrative efficiency, and undermines the legitimacy of the political order. 
G. Mueller, Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts, in P. Williams, D. Vlassis (Eds.), 
Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses, Frank Cass Publishers, 
London, 2001, p. 26. 
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providers of security or competitive players in a market. The susceptibility of a 
market to corruption triggers a chain reaction of bribe giving by competitors in 
a bid to stay competitive. A system beset by corruption has a reduced capacity 
to fix itself because the ‘fixers’ have abdicated governance for private gain. 
This insecurity impacts directly on the ability of governments to govern.39 This 
can lead to a spiral of corruption that creates a deadlock in the societies where 
democratic processes are no longer able to deliver the promises of elected 
representatives. Transnational crimes such as corruption dilute the progress of 
liberalization making strong states weaker and weak states ungovernable.40 
This poses a risk to the rule of law to the eventual detriment of public security 
and governance.  
The scale of the damage inflicted by grand scale corruption is hard to fully 
quantify as this cost manifests itself not just in economic terms but also in the 
distortion of the values and ethics of society. The corrosive effect of grand 
corruption on the fabric of society is a great threat to the stability of liberalized 
world markets. Societies afflicted by grand corruption recede in their ability to 
govern, and such societies become more vulnerable to the breakdown of the 
rule of law with the result that groups may opt out and seek their own 
solutions.41 Unstable societies discourage investment and the gap widens. The 
rule-based system that is essential to international commerce and growth is 
jeopardized. Furthermore, the domestic impact of international corruption does 
not stay confined neatly within local borders but flows out in the form of war 
and economic refugees, international crime, terrorism, environmental pollution 
and other threats to the stability of the international community. 
Speaking with respect to Africa, Hope identifies the compromised state as a 
‘stranglehold’ and the leading factor of corruption. He states: 
                                                     
 
39 Integration has social, cultural, economic and security implications. As Klempner points out 
‘[u]ltimately we are all in the same boat.’ G. Klempner, ‘Philosophy of corporate social 
responsibility’, Philosophy for Business, Iss. 27, 17 March 2006, Electronic Journal available 
at http://www.isfp.co.uk/businesspathways/issue27.html. 
40  Rotberg emphasizes this interrelatedness using the example of failed states when he points out 
that ‘today’s failed states, such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, are incapable of 
projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories 
governmentally empty. This outcome is troubling to world order, especially to an international 
system that demands − indeed, counts on − a state’s capacity to govern its space. Failed states 
have come to be feared as “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder” (in 
the words of political scientist Stephen Walt), as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror. The 
existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they harbor, not only threatens the 
lives and livelihoods of their own peoples but endangers world peace.’ See R. Rotberg, ‘Failed 
states in a world of terror’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, 2002, p. 128. 
41 Garten points out that there are already signs that economic distress is increasing nationalist 
fervor and political instability in hot spots including Pakistan, Turkey, Ukraine and the nations 
of Central Asia, Thailand and Iran. See J. Garten, ‘Stop the Free-Fall’, Newsweek 
International, 22 December 2008, p. 22. 
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‘The first factor contributing to corruption in Africa is that of the total 
exercise by the ruling elite of all power attached to national sovereignty. This 
exercise of state power has led to the supremacy of the state over civil society 
and, in turn, to the ascendancy of the patrimonial state with its characteristic 
stranglehold on the economic and political levers of power, through which 
corruption thrives for it is through this stranglehold that all decision making 
occurs and patronage is dispersed.’42 
2.3.2 Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
Corruption is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Corruption, unchecked will cripple any 
potential for reform. As Nuhu Ribadu once said ‘…if you fight corruption it 
fights back.’43 Corruption decimates the rule of law with the result that the 
normal processes of governance are abdicated with severe consequences for 
the citizens held hostage by these very same processes of corruption. The sheer 
scale of corruption can reduce citizens into a sort of corruption inertia. Smith, 
in his illuminating anthropological study on corruption in Nigeria, speaks of ‘a 
culture of corruption’ and concludes that, ‘[t]o Nigerians, corruption is such a 
common phenomenon that it defines the nation.’44 
Uslaner speaks of the vicious hold of corruption in terms of an ‘inequality 
trap.’ The failure of governance leads to a breakdown of the rule of law with 
resulting inequality as the ‘well-off “redistribute” society’s resources to 
themselves and entrench themselves in power by controlling all of society’s 
institutions.’45 He also states that this inequality breeds corruption by (1) 
leading ordinary citizens to see the system as stacked against them; (2) creating 
a sense of dependency of ordinary citizens and a sense of pessimism for the 
future which in turn undermines the moral dictates of treating your neighbor 
honestly; and (3) distorting the key institutions of fairness in society such as 
the courts, which ordinarily citizens see as their protectors against evil doers, 
                                                     
 
42   K. Hope, Corruption and Development in Africa, in K. Hope, B. Chikulo (Eds.), Corruption 
and Development in Africa: Lessons from Case-Studies, Palgrave, London, 2000, p. 17 at p. 
19. 
43 Nuhu Ribadu was the former Director of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Nigeria). The interview was given in a PBS Frontline Report on The Halliburton Case and 
Corruption in Nigeria, (Minute 9.30), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IhcmwcPf4PY&feature=related. This case is a prime 
example of the incredible scale of bribery in commercial transactions. In September 2003, 
Albert Jack Stanley, the former chairman of KBR Inc., pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate 
the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by arranging payments to Nigerian public officials 
of more than $180 million in order to secure contracts related to the design and building of 
liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island in Nigeria using consultancy agreements.  
44 See D. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in 
Nigeria, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007, p. 230. 
45 See E. Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law, CUP, New York, 2008, pp. 44-
45.  
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especially those with more influence than they have. This leads Uslaner to 
conclude that there is little evidence that countries can escape the corruption 
trap.46 
2.3.3 Illustrations from Case Study: The Cycle of Poverty 
An important insight from the study is the effect of poverty on corruption. The 
cycle of poverty and corruption is so profoundly connected that attempts to 
solve the problem of corruption normatively without tackling the fundamental 
issue of poverty has a very limited chance of success. This is clear in the 
dichotomy between the elaborate system of anti-corruption rules that Nigeria 
has and the high prevalence of corruption in the society.  
Poverty exerts considerable pressure that flows from the poor to those who are 
perceived to be better off and who are related by family, tribe or association. 
The social and cultural expectation that help be proffered is well described by 
the participants in the case study. The pressure to finance social demands in 
amounts that go well beyond a monthly government salary catalyzes the urge 
to corrupt activity. Accolades that follow the doling out of largesse incentivize 
corrupt behavior on a larger and larger scale. The strength of this social 
expectation is profound and the moral pressure to fulfill societal obligations 
turns the value system on its head. What is wrong (engaging in acts of 
corruption to satisfy societal pressures) becomes an act to be praised, and what 
is good (resisting corruption and not being in a position to satisfy societal 
pressures) becomes an act worthy of contempt. This impunity and the absence 
of law-abiding role models further undermine faith in the rule of law and the 
notion of justice.  
The failure of leadership and government policies that favor the ordinary 
citizen create a vicious cycle of poverty and corruption. This failure of 
leadership was attributed by some participants, in part to the colonial systems 
inherited by the Nigeria and the ‘truncation’ of the fledgling democracy several 
times by military rule. Interestingly one participant also traced the failure of 
leadership to the fact that there is no sense of commitment to the concept of 
‘Nigeria.’ A lack of national identity and its influence on political development 
in his opinion, fuels corruption. From this perspective, government is seen as 
an opportunity of a group to take its share from the government treasury.  
                                                     
 
46 He, however, does note the countries he refers to as the ‘Great Exceptions’ − Singapore and 
Hong Kong − which were able to move out of corruption with strong leadership and political 
will. E. Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law, id.  
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The lack of national identity is replaced, it would seem, by an identification 
with the person that ‘God has used’ to help the group to get their share of the 
national cake. In such a context the act of corruption morphs into a laudable 
effort of a member of a community to ‘help’ his people. In this sense, the elite 
group caters to the hangers-on in an exchange based on emotional ties that may 
be more compelling than abstract rules and notions of a distant government. In 
the absence of effective systems of social security the intensity of the pressure 
on persons to engage in acts of corruption to meet the needs foisted on them by 
social expectations results in poor leadership which in turn leads to lack of 
provision of the social security and infrastructure needed to alleviate the effects 
of poverty.  
This leads to a vicious cycle where poverty leads to pressures of social 
expectation, which leads to poor leadership, which leads to lack of social 
security, which leads to poverty and so it goes on. This pressure creates a 
groundswell of corruption that is strengthened by a lack of national identity. It 
flows up to all levels of leadership with the result that effective leadership is 
compromised by rampant large scale corruption. The effects of poor leadership 
lead to a lack of provision of basic infrastructure such as water, power, health, 
education and transportation. This also impacts on job and retirement security. 
The formidable cost of attempting to provide for this security and 
infrastructure privately ensures that a large proportion of society remains mired 
in poverty to exert even more social pressure on their connections in 
government. Thus the cycle continues.  
 
Participant 3: (Tape 2, 00:10:16) When you do not have the control of … enforcement 
there is nothing you can do and those who are supposed to enforce, they are already 
compromised …. People are compromised, those who are to enforce the law, they are 
already compromised. 
Participant 1: (Tape 3:00:23:33) Nigeria as Nigeria only really existed in colonial 
times and that because it was legislated into being. Not because anybody thought … you 
know … that we belonged together. 
Participant 3: (Tape 1, 00:7:24) … If the government policy does not favor the masses 
that is the result (corruption) you normally get. 
Participant 1: (Tape 3, 00:26:46) People now perceive public office as access to the 
opportunity to get something that you really shouldn’t have. It’s an opportunity to the 
treasury and you can go in there and share it out without consideration for the larger 
picture … (Tape 3, 00:28:14) so this development has been one of the most negative 
influences … and of course it is a great fuel for corruption. 
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Participant 5: (Tape 1,00:09:29)There is no social security system that ensures that 
after working for 25 years, 30 years that you have a roof over your head that you can send 
your kids to school, that you can take care of your health. As such, it is very difficult to not 
to get involved in corruption being corrupt ... it is very difficult. 
Participant 5: (Tape 1,00:22:13) So, that is one of the worst parts of the thing, the 
society expects so much from you and in order to live up to that expectation, you have to be 
ingenious in quote about making money and the easiest way to be ingenious about making 
money is being corrupt. 
Participant 6:  (00:05:04) ... Our failure in all these areas can be traced to a failure of 
leadership …. (00:05:48) Hopes and expectations have been raised by people … the 
country has been deceived by a comical and deceitful, and hallow commitment to the fight 
against corruption …. (00:25:33)Basic to all this is the nature of elite rule which with only 
few exceptions has been characterized by riotous opportunism … grabbing individualism. 
Participant 5: (Tape 1, 00:28:57) They need people who will come and contribute 
money, and he is not contributing money because he does not have stolen money because he 
is not corrupt. And the body language will be there and… some of them will even abuse 
him, the drummers will come and abuse him with their drums and you know with the talking 
drum, you know that they are abusing him with the talking drum. So it means he will 
probably have to avoid those functions and for … some people it is difficult to handle that 
because you want to be accepted in your hometown, among your social people among your 
friends and so on.  
Participant 4: (00:02:35) Hope is beginning to wane in this society. For me that is the 
biggest threat we face and you need to talk to the younger generation to know that they are 
not as hopeful as you ordinarily have expected… 
Participant 1: (Tape 1, 00:44:21) Who are the victims of international corruption? 
Well it’s actually the … ordinary person in the market place because eventually what 
happens is that there is either a distortion or a real constraining of the opportunities for 
that individual to express his or her role, productivity, potential because corruption has 
actually the frozen him or her out of that opportunity. So eventually, that’s the real victim. 
 
2.4 Challenge Faced by Business Operators 
A third challenge is the conflict faced by corporations that are emerging as a 
major player in rule making and order in international society.  The world has 
witnessed an explosion in transnational trade with the liberalization of markets. 
Increased foreign direct investment has resulted in increased foreign 
ownership, and a shift of centers of production. A huge amount of trade is 
occurring outside national boundaries, which translates to increasing influence 
on economic, social, cultural and political processes by multinational 
corporations. The transnational nature of trade makes common rules and stable 
trading conditions urgent. Corruption in international transactions has moral, 
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political and social dimensions that affect the relationship between the 
corporations and the societies in which they operate. It also distorts free and 
fair competition to the detriment of corporations and eventually the consumer. 
This puts the corporation in a conflict between the short-term gain of the 
immediate contract and the long-term gain of a more competitive and stable 
business environment.  
2.4.1 The Lure of Functional Corruption 
Eicher speaks of functional corruption.47 This is a real challenge faced by 
corporations. Functional corruption can be seen as part of management strategy 
that increases the profitability of the company. This means that refusing to 
engage in functional corruption results in ‘real losses’ that reduce the 
profitability of a corporation. Charles Prince, the former CEO of the Citigroup, 
has noted in very pragmatic terms: 
‘there is no reward for long-term growth … Nobody cares at all about long-
term sustainable growth outside of the institution itself. It’s one of the harshest 
lessons to learn about business. And why is that? Not because people are bad. 
Investors get rewarded on how much profit they made, how much their 
portfolio grew. Not whether or not they’re investing in something that lasts for 
200 years.’48 
However, the rise of the multinational corruption and its increased visibility to 
the consumer along with increased concerns and awareness about the role 
multinational corporation plays with respect to problems of international 
dimension is leading to a changing social expectations.49 Gradually, the notion 
that the responsibility of corporations is solely to create profits50 is being 
replaced with the notion that a corporation owes some responsibilities to the 
societies in which it operates. The laissez-faire free trade agenda once seen as 
essential to global peace and security, and the focus on dismantling of 
                                                     
 
47       S. Eicher, Corruption in International Business: The Challenge of Cultural and Legal 
Diversity, id., Note 30 above, at p. 5. 
48 Quoted in M. Blowfield, A. Murray, Corporate Responsibility, : A Critical Introduction, OUP, 
Oxford, 2008,  p. 385. 
49  See The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, United Nations, Report by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, 1999. 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiitm21.en.pdf, pp. 1-8.   
50   See, for example, the famous interview by J. Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase its Profits’, Time Magazine, New York, 11 September  1970, available 
at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html. 
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regulatory constraints in the understanding that markets are the best 
determinant of utility, is coming against increased criticism.51 
While the nature or extent of the social responsibility of corporations is the 
subject of much academic discourse,52 there is clearly an increased 
accommodation of the interests of stakeholders such as the suppliers, 
customers, employees, and local communities as opposed to a singular focus 
on satisfying the shareholder.53 The general consensus is that corporations 
should operate within a framework of sustainability that secures the viability of 
future generations.54 Functional corruption for the sake of profit is at odds with 
this changing landscape. 
2.4.2 Illustrations from Case Study: Corruption as an Entry Process 
Some of the participants described corruption as an entry requirement into the 
Nigerian market in a manner that presents a picture not only of the abuse of 
public trust but also of extortion of an otherwise unwilling participant. This 
perception of corruption sees the offender simultaneously as a perpetrator and 
victim. Participants speak of corruption as affecting economic growth, work 
and business ethics. The lack of effective sanctions for persons who have 
committed flagrant acts of corruption incentivizes the practice of corruption. 
The cost of uprightness is perceived as ‘too steep’ in the face of real demands. 
Money is ‘stolen’ with foreign participation from the system in the form of 
                                                     
 
51   See generally J. Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights’, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 
20087, April 2008, available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-
2008.pdf, at Para. 7. Endorsed by the UN as the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, UN 
Human Rights Council, 17th Session A/HRC/17/31.  
52  Eijsbouts remarks that corporate social responsibility is ‘still in search of its paradigm’.  See J. 
Eijsbouts, ‘Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce 
the Licence to Operate’, Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University, 20 October 2011, at p. 12. 
See also J. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility, CUP, Cambridge, 2006, 
pp. 243-298; The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, id., Note 49 above, at 
pp. 18-45; P. Muchlinski, ‘Human rights and multinationals: is there a problem?’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1,  2001, p. 31; M. Blowfield, A. Murray, Corporate 
Responsibility: A Critical Introduction, OUP, Oxford, 2008, pp. 10-90; UN Millennium 
Declaration September 2000, http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm; UN 
Global Compact Principles, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/index.html; OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
53      M.-D.P. Lee, ‘A review of the theories of corporate social responsibility: its evolutionary path 
and the road ahead’, International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 2008, pp. 
53-73.   
54  J. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, id., 
Note 51 above, at Para. 51-81. 
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white elephant projects where billions of dollars have been awarded and there 
is ‘nothing to show for it’. The result is a society with decaying infrastructure, 
a poor work ethic and stymied economic growth. This reality impedes the 
normative effectiveness of laws that prohibit corruption. The laws become 
incidental in a process that is greatly influenced by the need to survive, to 
make ends meet and where there is insufficient deterrence in cases where 
corruption has in fact been exposed.  
Corruption as an entry process into the Nigerian market is further exacerbated 
by the character of the key actors and players in grand scale corruption. . The 
key actors were described as the elite of the society, a ‘minority with an 
enormous capacity to influence the norms and values’ of the general society. 
Under the criminal process it is this same group of government officials and 
the elite who are charged with the implementation and enforcement of the 
criminal laws regarding corruption. This dynamic between the key actors in the 
corrupt exchange creates an almost impermeable wall. In this scenario there is 
a pressure to either play along or get side-lined. 
The view of corruption as an entry process permeates all levels. The victim of 
corruption is the party that needs to ‘perform’ in order to make progress 
whether commercial, economic or social. Here, the participants identified 
several groups of persons as the ‘victims of corruption.’ Not surprisingly, the 
ordinary man on the street is seen as the primary recipient of the negative 
effects of corruption. The losing competitor is also referenced as a victim. 
Interestingly, government officials are also seen as victims as a result of social 
expectations. Furthermore, the multinational corporation is also characterized 
as a victim who has no choice but to ‘play ball.’ As such, the term victim has 
many nuances. 
Participant 3: (Tape 1, 00:03:28) International businesses cannot do business in 
Nigeria without giving money out. …. (Tape 1, 5:14) … If you want to survive as a business 
man in Nigeria, you must be ready to do a deal … No exception. 
Participant 3: (Tape 1, 00:00:56) In Nigeria it is part and parcel of our system … if 
you are coming and you want to do business … want a contract, it’s like a way of life in 
Nigeria and if you do not play that ball the way they do it … the way it is … you will be 
deprived from benefiting from any contract … in a real sense you cannot get any contract 
in Nigeria unless you agree to a percentage 
Participant 1: (Tape 2, 00:11:50) … I mean if you speak with the types of executives 
that come to the School, (Lagos Business School) for instance, for executive seminars, what 
you tend to find is that they say and they believe that the situation is so heavily loaded 
against uprightness that the cost of maintaining uprightness is too steep. And so they tend 
to think that, look it’s better to be in business and succeed in business now and maybe if 
you live long enough there will be a day when you can fight corruption. 
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Participant 1: (Tape 2,00:09:55) It’s very difficult, very difficult because … 
government still has the upper hand on many things such as for instance the granting of 
licenses, … things that have to do with whether you can do business easily or not and 
because of this … business in the private sector tend to do the things that they know will get 
the results they want to achieve and … it means turning the blind eye or even going 
specifically to do something that you know to be irregular or improper, if it gets the results 
… that’s what tends to happen. 
Participant 1: (Tape 2, 00:17:04) The bottom line is very important to the shareholder 
here. Bottom line of the dividend, capital appreciation, Those are the things shareholders 
look for, and therefore the concern with the environment, the concern with the corporate 
social responsibility issues is not a very strong one …. Yes,… even though activism among 
shareholders is now rising, it tends to be to be rising only in respect of whether you are 
succeeding in doing the business in a profitable manner, whether you are a good employer, 
whether you are well regarded in the society. 
 
2.5 Challenge Faced by Judicial Processes 
The co-existence of a comprehensive regulatory framework and significant 
corruption illustrates the limits of a criminal law approach to fighting 
corruption. Corruption is the greatest impediment to the very rules that seek to 
tackle it. The nature of the actors to the corrupt exchange makes them the 
primary beneficiaries of the corrupt exchange and also the primary enforcers of 
the anti-corruption rules. Increased regulation does not resolve this conundrum. 
The problem is not the absence of the rule, but the absence of the capacity to 
enforce it. The strong connection between criminal law, morality and the 
deprivation of liberty creates a strong territorial and local aspect to the criminal 
process. A weak or compromised sovereign can hold the sanctioning process to 
ransom. 
Ashraf Ali al-Baroudy, a president of the High Court of Appeals in Egypt, 
captures the essence of this dilemma. Despite the impressive number of 
oversight and monitoring entities in Egypt, such as the Central Auditing 
Organization (CAO), Administrative Control Agency, Administrative 
Prosecution, Illicit Gains Authority, General Prosecution, Consumer Protection 
Agency and the General Administration for Investigation of Public Funds, a 
part of the Ministry of Interior corruption thrives. ‘How can we have so many 
oversight bodies in Egypt but in spite of that we have so much corruption? 
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That is because these entities are answerable to the Egyptian government, 
instead of monitoring [it]’, says al-Baroudy.55 
While the criminalization of international corruption is an important and 
necessary first step, it presents fundamental conflict of interest problems 
especially in those societies where corruption has taken root. Criminalization 
gives a monopoly to the state on the right to initiate sanction. This, however, 
means that implementation using the criminal process is dependent on 
government officials. The dependence on the apparatus of the state in 
initiating, investigating and sanctioning corruption in criminal prosecutions is a 
grave impediment to fighting corruption. Furthermore, in a global market, the 
complexity of the transactions, the character of the actors and fluidity of 
movement of money across borders present serious challenges for the criminal 
process. This fractures the sanctioning environment in a manner that 
encourages risk taking and undermines the effectiveness of international rules. 
Furthermore, criminalization takes the victim, who is motivationally an 
important catalyst for redress, out of the loop of offense and sanction. Indeed, a 
victim seeking remedies must surmount the monopoly on initiating sanction 
held by the state.  
The conflict of interest, which is inherent in the criminal process of sanctioning 
corruption, particularly in those states that are the most badly affected by 
corruption, implies that effective strategies to tackle international corruption 
must not only define and give content to the offense of corruption by 
criminalizing corrupt acts, but must also address the monopoly on initiating 
sanction given to the state under the criminal process where the capacity of that 
very same state to effect redress is undermined by corruption. There is an 
urgent need to develop strategies in the fight against corruption that can 
circumvent the compromised state. 
A central thesis of this book is that, while criminalization represents an 
important and significant first step, the criminal law approach has three 
fundamental ‘fault lines’, which impede its effectiveness as a sanctioning 
process: (a) the monopoly of the State on initiating sanction; (b) the 
incentivized risk inherent in contract left standing; and (c) the narrowness of 
the criminal law approach as compared to the breadth of actors and 
transactions that feature in the typical exchange involving international 
corruption. 
                                                     
 
55    Comments of al-Baroudy during the release of the ‘Transparency International Report on 
Legislation in Egypt: An Analysis of Compliance with the UN Convention against 
Corruption’. Quoted by Abdel Rahmen Hussein in ‘Impotent Oversight Agencies Stymie Fight 
against Corruption’, Al-Masry Al-Youm Newspaper, 7 July 2011, available at 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/475135.  
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A further challenge to initiating sanction is the lack of information. The nature 
of corruption means that it is a significantly difficult activity to prove. The 
traditional burden in a criminal trial of proof beyond reasonable doubt is 
somewhat lessened in a civil trial that is based on the preponderance of 
evidence. However, accessibility of this evidence across jurisdictions may be 
problematic. Freedom of information, particularly in countries where 
corruption is endemic, is often illusory. This presents the party seeking 
remedies with a formidable challenge in meeting the burden of proof. This is a 
stumbling block to an efficient fight against corruption. The need for effective 
access to information about corruption is a challenge that the sanctioning 
process must overcome.  
This conflict of interest points to the need for alternate paths of initiating 
sanctions for corrupt acts. Shearing recognizes the blurring of roles between 
the public and private sectors in his discourses on governing security. He 
strongly criticizes the continued focus on the state as the primary provider of 
security in the face of the de facto reality of private government that has 
resulted from an explosion of ‘mass private property.’56 This is particularly 
true in respect of corruption in a global world where the diminishing power of 
the state and increasing influence of the multinational corporation motivate a 
need to map out new ‘nodes of governance.’57 The path to progress in the fight 
against corruption may therefore lie in devising strategies that are pro-active 
rather than merely reactive. Applying this to corruption, the question to be 
asked is maybe not so much how to eliminate corruption by punishing 
offenders but rather how to make its commission the least attractive option. As 
van Boom remarks, efficacious remedies would be those that have the capacity 
to encourage good behavior.58   
A related problem is the fact that contracts involving multinational 
corporations may in fact lie beyond the reach of national courts. The 
combination of the commercial and international elements means that resulting 
contracts will in most cases contain an international arbitration clause that 
effectively removes the contracts in question from the jurisdiction of national 
courts. This implies that international arbitration tribunals have a role to play in 
the fight against corruption. 
                                                     
 
56 C. Shearing, Reflection on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in J. Wood, B. 
DuPont (Eds.), Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, CUP, Cambridge, 2006, 
pp.11-32, at p. 26.  
57 C. Johnston, C. Shearing, Governing Security Explorations in Policing and Justice, Routledge, 
London, 2003, pp.145-148. 
58 See W. van Boom, ‘Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort’, Inaugural lecture 21 April 
2006, Erasmus University Rotterdam, at p. 4. 
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2.5.1 Illustrations from Case Study: Access to Justice and Information 
Participant 3: (Tape 2, 00:10:53) The truth of the matter is that, that is for the western 
world, not in Nigeria. A victim of corruption … you may not be able to get justice. If it is 
outside the country, maybe. That is why in most cases if you prepare an international 
agreement, even the international partners will never agree that the law of Nigeria should 
govern their business. They prefer either the law of the UK or America or any other country 
rather than to agree to the law of Nigeria because they believe that you have to pay for 
justice in Nigeria. You have to buy it. 
Participant 3: (Tape 1, 00:09:10) The laws are there, they are good laws there is no 
doubt about it …. In Nigeria, because of corruption you cannot get the proper enforcement. 
Participant 2: (Tape 1, 00 09:48) In the western world, the laws work … the laws can 
be circumvented more easily in developing lands … in Nigeria they know if I get caught I 
can still wrangle my way through if I have the right connections … and the right quantity of 
money to dole out to those who are supposed to be prosecuting me. 
Participant 7: (Tape 1, 00:42:37) We need to find a way of making sure matters do not 
stay in courts for too long. … by the time the mill of justice is moving very fast people will 
think twice because right now when people want to do something … they sit down and tell 
themselves … ‘don’t worry − by the time we finish at the high court we will have spent 
some six years at the court of appeal by and large … another four years at the supreme 
court another seven years so in totality I can buy some 15 years successfully … go ahead 
and do it.’ With that confidence they go ahead and perpetrate evil. 
Participants 1 (Tape 2, 00:06:23) local legislation, regulatory bodies here have not yet 
developed the kind of machinery that enables them to police the regulations that they are 
trying to enforce. So, it’s very difficult for you to be able to establish that something has 
happened that should have not have happened, but let’s remember that in the last couple of 
years there have been specific cases here, Siemens for instance, Halliburton, so those things 
are beginning to happen here as well. 
Participant 7: (Tape 1, 00:17:40) You can only intervene in something when you know 
it is happening. …. Corrupt practices are done under the cloak of silence, under the cloak 
of confidentiality. It is only where there is a breakdown of relationship between those who 
are doing it that you get to know of it … so most times it goes undetected. 
Participant 7; (Tape 1, 00:18:30) Information flow is one of the hardest things to come 
by − everything is covered by the cloak of state security, national security; … (Tape 
1,00:19:05) look at it. In the last couple of years now the information Bill has been at the 
national Assembly, they have been playing games with it … bill that will empower citizens 
with information that will assist NGOs to be able to track these criminal activities they have 
refused to pass it. 
Participant 7: (Tape 1, 00:30:33) NGOs are working effectively … there are quite a 
number of high quality NGOs that are doing a good job …. The name of the game is 
collaboration networking between NGOs. That way the local NGO, who is conversant with 
the terrain, and the foreign NGO, who is able to bring  technical expertise, because they 
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have faced such situation and are able to replicate it here … to bring pressure on the 
system. 
 
2.6 New Ordering of International Society 
These aforementioned challenges are exacerbated by assumptions of 
legitimacy derived from notions of a sovereign state with a monopoly on 
violence.59 The environment of international corruption knows no such 
sovereign, is premised on the power of agreements rather than a monopoly on 
violence, and is peopled by a shifting collection of artificial persons, state 
officials, and persons who suffer the social and economic consequences of 
corruption. In this environment, the idea of the state as a provider of security60 
is blurred, and the notion of the private sector must be redefined in the face of 
the public effects of its activities. The existing public/private divide cannot be 
said to reflect the ordering of rights in international society. A conceptual basis 
for fighting corruption that moves beyond traditional taxonomies and classical 
theories of moral culpability is necessary to articulate the purpose and 
motivations for remedies in a global environment. At this level, traditional 
divisions between the public and private sectors, public and private law are 
more nuanced.61 
 
                                                     
 
59 M. Weber, (1919), Politik als Beruf, in M. Weber, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 17, J.C.B. Mohr/Paul 
Siebeck, Tübingen, 1992, pp. 157-252. Translation available at Sociosite 
http://www.sociosite.net/topics/weber.php.  
60 Backer speaks of the increasing tendency of states to substitute actions in the private law realm 
with regulatory (or sovereign) activity. Backer argues that ‘Modern globalization has 
effectively introduced a global advance toward free movement of capital. States have sought to 
act more energetically as private as well as public actors. In a global legal order in which the 
value of state sovereignty has diminished as the cross-border element of transactions has 
increased, states can extend their authority as private actors to an extent difficult when they 
seek to regulate as sovereigns.’ See L. Backer, ‘The private law of public law: public 
authorities as shareholders, golden shares, sovereign wealth funds, and the public law element 
in private choice of law’, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2008, p. 62.  
61 Johnston and Shearing’s remark that ‘[I]t is now virtually impossible to identify any function 
within the governance of security in democratic societies that is not, somewhere and in some 
circumstances, performed by non-state authorities as well as by state ones,’ is even more true 
of international society. L. Johnston, C. Shearing, Governing Security, Routledge, London, 
2002, p 32. Dorn speaks of ‘glocality’, where local and global issues are intertwined, and 
argues that the vertical segmentation of ‘multi-level’ governance structures are being 
challenged by the more horizontal notion of ‘multi-source’ governance, where states inhabit a 
broad policy arena alongside multilateral forums, powerful market interests, and cosmopolitan 
actors. See N. Dorn, Conceptualizing Security: Cosmopolitan, State, Multilateral and Market 
Dynamics, Boom, The Hague, 2008, p. 8. 
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2.6.1 Corruption in an Increasingly Integrated World 
Cheap transportation, the internet and direct access of individuals to each other 
has radically changed the structure of societies. The state is faced, on an 
increasing scale, with the cross-border activities of private actors. Jobs are 
outsourced, corporations have divisions scattered over diverse continents and 
individuals have gone global. Corruption in an integrated world knows no 
borders. 
The flattened world62 is witnessing a corresponding seepage of threats to 
security such as environmental pollution, cyber-crime, terrorism, pandemic 
risks, human trafficking, global financial distress and corruption across the 
level field. Instances of corruption occurring in such an integrated environment 
assume an international dimension, as the consequences of corruption can no 
longer be safely contained within particular national boundaries. As a result, 
the path to solving the problem of corruption in today’s integrated world must 
adapt to this changing environment.   
2.6.2 The Shifting Public/Private Divide 
Fighting corruption in an international environment is a more complex 
proposition because there is no clear nexus of governance, and sovereignty is 
dispersed. In the international environment the homogeneity of norms and 
singularity of government that is present in national systems is absent. The 
state as the primary provider of security is limited in the terrain beyond the 
state. This is the terrain in which the fight against corruption occurs today. 
These complexities notwithstanding, the deleterious effects of corruption is 
and remains the catalyst for the emergence of an international consensus 
repudiating corruption. This provides a framework to govern interactions in 
public and private relationships of transnational society. The implication of this 
state of affairs is clear. On the one hand, methods of fighting corruption that 
are state-centered may need to be reconstructed. On the other hand, the 
regulation of corruption in deterritorialized space is an urgent matter. Private 
law, based as it is on relationships between persons, may provide regulatory 
opportunities better suited to this environment.  
 2.6.3 Illustrations from Case Study: The ‘Trickle Down’ Effect 
The participants suggested that there is a domestic impact of the international 
anti-corruption rules. The perception is that compliance checks and strategies 
                                                     
 
62  Expression from T. Friedman, The World is Flat, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005. 
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being implemented by multinational corporations are influencing Nigerian 
companies who want to present themselves as viable business partners. Some 
participants saw a trickle-down effect into domestic laws as well as a ‘no 
choice factor’ as more international aid is tied to transparency and 
accountability. The effect of international rules and increased awareness were 
also seen in attempts to hold the Nigerian government accountable to the 
obligations it has assumed under international conventions. Increasing 
globalization and the integration of world markets means that domestic 
leadership is increasingly sensitive to outside influence. The need for investors 
to have security for their investments also encourages a harmonization of 
standards and greater insistence on the rule of law.   
Participant 6: (00:54:15) The fight against corruption has gone beyond … the realm of 
a national project. In that both within IMF, World Bank they have made it an article of 
faith … issues like that which before appeared to be no-go areas so that sensitivities and 
sensibilities are not unduly ruffled are no longer shielded from scrutiny. In fact there are 
guidelines regarding World Bank loans which aim to ensure transparency and 
accountability. 
Participant 5: (Tape 2, 00:01:51) They would want to do business with the Americans. 
They want to be rated as international companies are being rated. … because they want to 
be classified in a way that suggests that they are ready for more international business that 
they can be treated at the same level and they have the same kind of ethic as the foreign 
companies; I think that will happen.  
Participant 4  (00:02:35)…one is increasingly becoming globalised. There cannot be a 
system peculiar to Nigeria …. We are all beginning to look at a global standard in certain 
kinds of transactions. 
Participant 6:  (00:53:24) Happily it trickles down even to national legislation … if you 
look at our own ICPC Anti-Corruption Act it seems to have captured that trend inasmuch 
as it is not talking about you receiving alone but also the person who gave so both the giver 
and the taker … that trust is already being assimilated into national legislation.  
Participant 6: (00:57:16) The international fight against corruption is unstoppable .... 
(57:43) We cannot afford to be indifferent to it. We now have conventions − UN 
Convention, the OECD Convention − and we are part of the international community and 
it cannot be business-as-usual within the country. At any rate, the distinction between what 
is national and what is international is now a fine one. Borders are crumbling, sovereignty 
is having a reduced significance … There are even people within Nigeria, the NGOs being 
led by Femi Falana, who wrote to the prosecutor of the ICC seeking his view whether 
corruption is not a crime against humanity … so that somebody can be brought before the 
ICC ….– At least an effort to use an international machinery to confront corruption. 
Participant 6:  (00:59:30) Government actions are being measured with reference to 
the UN Convention on Corruption. I have been seeing statements in the media ‘this is 
incompatible with our obligations under the UN Convention.’ 
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Participant 6: (00:60:12) We may not even have much choice again in this matter … 
the accountability principles are being built into some World Bank loans. Now [the] IMF 
has also been issuing guidelines to its country officials …. Really if you take a loan from 
the WB their own accountability principles will be brought in monitoring the way you use it 
… after all, in the past some of the accusations have been that some of those loans have 
gone into private pockets. If a body like the Worlds Bank … OECD … if they are now 
building accountability principles and norms into their loan policy, so long as you want to 
take advantage of those then you have to comply. So you can really see that it is impacting. 
Participant 4: (00:13:20) One immediate benefit would be these foreign banks … 
being ready havens for stolen funds … these days you can be tracked, you can be traced …. 
At least let’s take it step-by-step, you can be caught. The Abacha thing reminds us that even 
as tough as the Swiss were, they cracked under international pressure … the UK as well. 
.... If you step this up it actually gives impetus to the genuine fight against corruption on the 
demand side. … Now that they see some kind of partnership developing with the supply side 
beginning to tighten its belt … yes, I think that it hands out hope … early days yet, but I 
think it hands out hope. 
 
2.7 The Path Ahead 
The case study on Nigeria provided helpful perspectives as to the path ahead in 
the fight against corruption. It would seem that the emergence of an 
international rules tackling supply-side corruption does have downstream 
effects.  These rules  introduce an element of hope, however slight, that there is 
a partner in the fight against corruption that can assist and empower a domestic 
movement to curb corruption. It is interesting that this window of hope is the 
result of pressure from the outside. The building of transparency and 
accountability into foreign aid and development support; the freezing and 
repatriation of assets; the arrests and repatriation of persons by foreign 
governments and institutions are helping to create a climate that at least 
tempers the hemorrhage of stolen funds to the west. Where these funds, even if 
acquired as a result of corruption, are forced to remain within an economy, the 
jobs and economic growth that result go some way to addressing the issue of 
poverty.  
Corruption is seen by some as a necessary entry requirement into a market. 
The slow pace of the judicial process, the lack of security, the paucity of 
information and the lack of effective prosecution are seen as factors that make 
a choice not to be corrupt a rather expensive and probably a bad business and 
social choice. While a traditional culture may be ‘replete in value’, this culture 
is not immune to the overriding need for ‘survival.’  
The issues highlighted by participants in the case study suggest that strategies 
to fight corruption must address the problem of poverty and provide for 
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infrastructural development. To this end, strategies that enable and empower 
leadership further from the center and closer to the community (by using 
private actors such as NGOs, for example) may have a greater chance of 
promoting reaching leaders that are committed to developing their 
communities and providing basic social infrastructure.  
This case study on Nigeria shows anecdotally, that developments in the fight 
against corruption at the international level have had a positive influence on 
the domestic fight against corruption in Nigeria. The complexities of the issues 
discussed by the participants accentuate the difficulty of finding purely 
domestic solutions. Foreign pressure can play a positive and complementary 
role. This emphasizes the need for the international community to continue to 
refine and develop strategies that create an environment which encourages 
compliance with the international rules. Such an environment must address the 
conflict of interest problem inherent in the criminal law approach as well as the 
issue of transactions resulting from or tainted by international corruption. 
These are areas where the private law provides a window of opportunity. 
Creating an environment where both the private and public law present a 
coherent response to the offenders and the transactions involved in the 
corruption exchange will push the frontiers of the fight against international 
corruption.  
2.7.1 Illustrations from Case Study: Moving Forward 
Participant 5: (Tape 2, 00:33; 26) One way forward is to have a society that can 
assure the average worker of a future. The average Nigerian I believe is not corrupt or 
greedy naturally. If there is assurance that after 20 years when he retires, he will have a 
places to retire to, health, his children will have a good decent school, I think most people 
will not be corrupt and they would not care if others are corrupt and others are living big. 
Because that was the society we had before where you could not come into a social group 
and say that you have made money. People would say whose child is this, where is he from, 
what is his pedigree? Where did he get his money from? Today we do not ask those 
questions You’ve made It! God let me make it too! Before it was important that you were 
honest and that was what mattered most. I think that if we sort out the financial issue in 
terms of security, I think we will probably move back to that and I hope we will. 
Participant 1: (Tape 3, 00:34:29) Well the tendency is to give up and say we can’t 
solve it and yet my personal belief is that what it takes is a few years of the right quality of 
leadership in sensitive strategic positions, just a few years… (Tape 3, 00:36:30) The 
democratic process is capable of doing it now right now if you are to take a look at how the 
States are operating as opposed to the Federal Govt…. You can see for instance that there 
is new spirit of fresh discipline in Lagos. Lagos is beginning to talk about things they never 
spoke of before. If you go to Niger state, the governor is beginning to do things that make 
people think... oh it is still possible to do certain things.  
Participant 1: (Tape 3, 00:37:22) Now what I am saying is perhaps it is too much to 
expect that Nigeria-wide we are going to be able to come up with that kind of leadership 
because the compromises we have to make are too many… Mainly because we’ve broken 
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ourselves up into so many little units and the tension between the interest of all these units is 
really something we do not have the machinery to deal with. But in those individual units it 
is possible for leadership to begin to correct some of these things and probably over a 
generation or two if there can be sustenance of whatever initiatives start in those units we 
can begin to see differences. 
Participant 1: (Tape 2, 00:03:08) …but wherever the overseas companies has returned 
to majority shareholding and particularly sent in perhaps a chief executive and a finance 
director who are both from the home country and the tendency is for them to do only those 
things that they can explain to their own shareholders at home. 
Participant 3: (Tape 2, 00:14:20) when …Ribadu was the chairman of 
EFCC…because Ribadu was in link with international community … people …were 
…..afraid to take money abroad because they knew that Ribadu and his group would chase 
you …. as at that time everybody started keeping their money within Nigeria, the stock 
market was booming, real estate was booming, because they could not take the money 
out…. The economy was improving. …(Tape 2,00:15:53) …,You cannot keep the money in 
your bedroom; you still have to invest it … (Tape 2,00:16:28) If the enforcement is really 
very effective particularly internationally, even if they have stolen the money they will invest 
the stolen money in Nigeria and it will still benefit the citizenry that is sure. 
Participant 7: (Tape 1, 00:41:20) Holistically review the criminal justice system and 
create a place for civil society to be energized within that system. … 
Participant 6:  (00:38:08) We are underrating the capacity of a minority to build 
certain values in society… don’t let us underrate the influence of all this radio ,TV and all 
this other media of mass communication in terms of the impact they can have on people’s 
values, people’s orientation and so on.  
Participant 7: (Tape 1, 00:20: 10) If you want to go to court as an NGO to say that we 
want this to be investigated or you even want to lodge a petition with the police … if we 
have that opportunity for you to be able to go into an office and say “you have concluded 
this bid exercise”. We want to know what all the parties submitted …if in Angola they… 
paid 1.5 for that same project …even in Ghana it was 1.6…. and you come to Nigeria and 
find it 5.6 eyes will be opened that something is wrong. …but why are you able to assess 
that? Because you have seen that information….we have debilitating structures in our 
judiciary, why complicate it again with no information? 
Participant 6:  (00:61:54) There is a basis for sustained optimism that sooner or later 
the national efforts and the international efforts will coalesce, … Even Switzerland that was 
reputed to be a safe haven and other Western countries …(66:16)…if you go by what you 
see now, Britain, Switzerland in respect of the Abacha funds…how these are being 
returned… how some public officials have been arrested and charged with money 
laundering there is a basis for a shift in our perception …   
Participant 6:  (00:68:15) Whether or not we feel that the anti-corruption fight is 
sincere…… For the first time we are seeing former top government functionaries being 
charged to court… handcuffed…. … Governors so far about eight or so…charged…. If our 
existing machinery can be used ... it means that the public law approach or machinery is not 
as weak as we have thought. 
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Participant 6:  (00:16:13) The democratic space has been opened, there is no doubt 
about that… (16:34) to the extent that under civil rule and with the constitution we operate 
there is more openness, transparency and demand for accountability … than we had under 
the military. 
Participant 4: (00:29:58)… … the gap will be filled by injury lawyers and I think that 
that time is fast approaching… (00:30:24) the criminal justice system is notoriously slow… 
(00:30:48) those who are directly affected never really heal and it is for the benefit of those 
ones that civil actions must be taken because they get compensated. You cannot truly 
replace their losses but you can at least assuage their feelings. 
Participant 6:  (00:70:30) … Is it the only weapon that we have (public law approach) 
in the fight against corruption? I will say no it is not … but it is a viable weapon … it can be 
complemented… people are also talking about restitution… somebody’s property finds its 
way into your hands whereupon you are under the obligation to return so that that will 
bring in the question of civil remedy… which it doesn’t appear we have been using… it is 
not just a case of charging people to court …civil remedies might even encourage people 
more. 
Participant 4: (00:41:20) Advocating for less and less government. Because when you 
have less government power begins to shift to the private sector and if it is going to be via 
mainly large publicly quoted companies then you are going to have a strong market …. In 
which case you can narrow down on people who are corrupt in government, isolate them …. 
Participant 2: (Tape 1, 00:23:56) The person to tackle it is me…when I say me I am 
talking of the common man unfortunately I am not empowered. …when I say I, I am also 
talking about the common man, (Tape 1, 25:57) if there is anyone who is going to stop it I 
think the common man would do a lot more than the law enforcement agencies …that is why 
I say that the person who can stop it is not empowered to stop it.. which then means that he 
needs some empowerment and he needs some source of support. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Corruption is normatively complex, far reaching in its consequences and truly 
permeates all areas of society and governance. This is the motivation, but also 
the challenge, in tackling corruption. As a multi-faceted problem a plurality of 
strategies are needed to address its various aspects. Research into corruption 
must necessarily be a convergence of ideas reflecting different aspects of 
study, from law, to political science, to criminology, to economics to name a 
few. Contextualizing the problem of corruption helped to provide this 
researcher with a better understanding of the interrelatedness of corruption 
research issues and the limitations of a single viewpoint. 
The findings of this illustrative case study also helped this author to motivate 
the research question tackled in this book by illustrating that where the process 
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of criminal sanctions for corruption is compromised by historical, political, 
economic or social factors, an approach centered on alternative methods of 
tackling corruption must be explored. There is no supranational body that can 
enforce anti-corruption laws. In the absence of global governance, methods of 
bypassing the compromised state become the logical way forward in the fight 
against corruption. Private remedies, private actors and public/private 
partnerships create the opening that enables the consequences of corruption to 
be challenged independently of government.  
An important insight provided by this illustrative study is the effect of the 
environment on compliance. Businesses do not exist in a vacuum but are 
responsive to their environment. Challenging the status quo, by opening up 
new points of intervention, following the money, empowering the private 
litigant, challenging resulting contracts and encouraging negotiated settlements 
may help to foster an environment where the intelligent choice for long term 
profitability by corporations is compliance with anti-corruption rules. If 
corruption is an entry mechanism into a market, the choice for corruption can 
only be outweighed by reactions from that same environment that make such a 
choice a risky one. This is an argument that runs through this book i.e. 
changing business practices by creating incentives to do so can tilt the balance 
in the fight against corruption in favour of compliance.  
Finally, corruption is not ‘another people’s’ problem. In a world that is 
ultimately a closed system, no country is an island that is immune to its 
devastating consequences. However, for such a formidable foe it is naive to 
think that there can be a simple all-embracing solution. Corruption is 
existential and progress is probably best measured not in claims of eradication 
but rather in the continued determined effort to stem its growth and the spread 
of its deleterious consequences. This book acknowledges the intractable nature 
of corruption and examines the potential of the private law to act as one agent 
for change. It is hoped that this line of inquiry will add ‘new meaning’ to 
the anti-corruption discourse.63 
                                                     
 
63 Van Oer points out that ‘contextualizing actually is a process of adding new meaning to a 
given situation in order to characterize this situation in terms of what could (or should) be 
done, and by the same token to exclude (for the time being) alternative interpretations of the 
required mode of acting.’ See B. Van Oer, ‘From context to contextualizing’, Learning and 
Instruction , Vol. 8, No. 6, 1998, pp. 473, at p. 482. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FROM THE FCPA TO AN INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARD 
‘For the first time, a country made it criminal to corrupt the officials of another country.’ 
Justice Noonan1 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Historically, the first obstacle to an international response to corruption has 
been the absence of a common understanding of what corruption is. In the 
absence of a normative baseline, there is no basis for common intervention. 
The challenge in a world of diverse values is to find a common standard of 
legality that can create a level playing field across jurisdictions. To engage in 
an international fight against corruption, domestic standards of legality, 
reflecting national norms and values have to, in some shape or form, give way 
to a common standard. This chapter charts the evolution of a domestic US 
norm from an expression of outrage of the American people to an international 
mandatory standard repudiating corruption in business transactions.2 
Even though most countries have laws prohibiting corruption and bribery, it is 
only in recent times that the de jure prohibition of corruption has translated 
                                                     
 
1   J. Noonan Jr., Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, CA, 1987, p. 680. 
2  Eijsbouts describes this process as the ‘crystallization of social norms’ of which the anti-
bribery norm is an excellent example.  He states:  
‘since 1976, when it left the area of non-regulation and was first codified in the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinationals, the substantive social norm to not bribe foreign 
officials thus found its way in various types of regulation: (individual or collective) 
self-regulation, soft law, civil law, administrative law and, finally, criminal law. It 
travelled many international and national routes ending in many instances in the 
strongest form of regulation, criminal law, which by its nature is national state law, 
although the extraterritorial effect enlarges its reach beyond state boundaries.’  
See J. Eijsbouts, ‘Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to 
Reinforce the Licence to Operate’, Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University, 20 October 2011, 
at p. 22. 
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into the de facto processes of business operations. Bribery used to be shrugged 
off as an inevitable aspect of doing business. There was no baseline of legality 
demarcating corruption from accepted business practices. Double standards, 
uncertainty, and incoherence of law and policy created an environment where 
there was little basis on which to assert that corruption in international 
transactions or beyond local borders was a criminal act.3 Bribery was 
something that took place ‘somewhere else’ and its negative effects remained 
safely behind someone else’s borders. 
The inevitable seepage of corruption through the matrix of connected societies 
has changed the global attitude to corruption. Moral condemnation has given 
place to a real concern that unbridled corruption is everyone’s problem and 
that for economic, social and political reasons it must be curtailed. From an 
emphasis on domestic, territory-based, demand-side corruption, the anti-
corruption agenda is now driven by a focus on foreign, transnational, and 
supply-side corruption. Corruption in international business, once tolerated, is 
now vigorously attacked, and finding a solution is a major driver of policy and 
strategy, both in government and business affairs.4  
By engaging in acts of corruption, processes are set into motion that 
undermines the stability of the business environment and indeed the very 
structure of the state. In a pre-global world, the incongruence between rules 
repudiating corruption and business practices that encouraged corruption could 
be managed more easily. This incongruence is very aptly demonstrated by the 
tax deductibility of bribes in leading economies that used to be commonplace.5 
                                                     
 
3    The comments of the House Committee in respect of the FCPA puts this incongruence very 
clearly when stating, ‘although a vast number of questionable corporate payments have been 
disclosed, subsequent management changes have been attendant only to disclosures of 
domestic bribery. The reason is obvious: domestic bribes are clearly illegal whereas foreign 
bribes are not.’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: House Report, 95-640, 95th Congress, 1977, p. 
6. (Hereinafter House Report). 
4   The United States, the world’s most powerful economy, in its response to the peer review 
questionnaire of the OECD states with regard to the link between international business and 
global corruption that ‘the bribery of foreign government officials in international business 
transactions is a serious threat to the development and preservation of democratic institutions.’ 
See (OECD) U.S. Response to Phase 1 Questionnaire DAFFE/IME/BR (98)8/ADD1/FINAL 
Sec. 0.1. 
5   Despite the almost universal existence of national laws prohibiting domestic corruption, the 
general attitude to commercial corruption occurring outside national borders seems to have 
been that anything goes. Bribes were treated as tax deductible expenses in many countries. In 
response to this practice, the OECD passed the Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, which calls on:    
‘member countries that allowed the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public 
officials to re-examine this treatment with the intention of denying this deductibility. 
Such action may be facilitated by the trend to treat bribes to foreign public officials as 
illegal with a view to denying the tax deductibility of such bribes.’  
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The globalization of the corruption discourse has changed the landscape of the 
fight against corruption.6 The fact that in a globalized world, the effects of the 
consequences of corruption, such as poverty and crime, do not stay safely 
within one jurisdiction but migrate with the flow of goods and markets across 
the globe, has increased the sensitivity toward this issue. 
For corruption in international business, a normative baseline has been 
established. A domestic US law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is 
singularly responsible for the internationalization of the anti-corruption 
discourse.7 By creating a modality where a domestic standard condemning 
corruption would have worldwide application, and by lobbying aggressively to 
ensure that this standard will also apply to non-US companies, a normative 
space has been created by the FCPA in which the development of international 
and national strategies to fight corruption can take place.8   
The characterization of foreign bribery under the FCPA as an uncompetitive 
practice has changed the thrust of the argument against corruption from one of 
moral condemnation to an issue of economic consideration.9 The 
                                                                                                                            
 
See OECD ‘Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials’, 
(adopted by the Council on 11 April 1996 at its 873rd session [C/M (96)8/PROV]) C 
(96)27/FINAL. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,2340,en_2649_34551_2048174_119672_1_1_37447,00.h
tml . 
6   Several factors have been identified as having led to this change of attitude. These include the 
end of the cold war; the increasing integration of Europe; the increase in international mergers; 
the recognition of the economic costs of corruption; and the emergence of a borderless global 
market. Also key are the links that have been made between international corruption and the 
lack of sustainable development, poverty and organized crime. B. George, K. Lacey, J. 
Birmele, ‘On the threshold of the adoption of global anti-bribery legislation: a critical analysis 
of current domestic and international efforts toward the reduction of business corruption’, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 32, 1999, p.17; See also G. Abed. S. Gupta 
(Eds.), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance, Washington, D.C., International 
Monetary Fund 2002; S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences 
and Reform, CUP, Cambridge, 1999. 
7   The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 USC Sec. 78dd-1, et seq., 1977. (Hereinafter, the 
‘FCPA’). 
8  The US in its self-evaluation report on the implementation of the OECD Convention refers to 
its push to internationalize the FCPA standard and notes that ‘[S]ince 1977, the United States 
has outlawed bribery of foreign officials in commercial transactions by its nationals and 
companies organized under its laws. In addition, the United States has worked with other 
countries and in various international fora, including the OECD, the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, and the Organization of American States, to encourage the enactment of 
similar prohibitions by other major trading countries. See the 1998 U.S. Response to Phase 1 
Questionnaire DAFFE/IME/BR (98)8/ADD1/FINAL, Sec. 0.1. 
9  Mauro, in a review of empirical studies, states that they show that corruption discourages 
investment, limits economic growth, and alters the composition of government spending, often 
to the detriment of future economic growth. See P. Mauro, ‘Why worry about corruption’, 
Economic Issues, No. 6, International Monetary Fund, 1977, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues6/index.htm.  
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accommodation that corruption once enjoyed in international trade has all but 
disappeared.10 The link to international business and fair trade has galvanized 
state as well as non-state private actors, international organizations, 
multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations to establish 
rules and standards regarding international corruption.11 
This chapter looks at the emergence, content and method of the FCPA which 
catalyzed and remains the driving force of the international regulation of 
corruption.12 Equally important, and also examined, is the method of enforcing 
the FCPA. The sanctioning process of the FCPA has evolved into a carrot and 
stick mechanism that encourages compliance by allowing evidence of 
compliance to play a role in the final determination of punishment. This model 
of fighting corruption uses corporate culture as an integral tool of the 
sanctioning process.13 It involves the corporation in the process of prevention, 
detection and sanctioning of corruption in a private-public partnership. The 
focus of sanction is not just the particular offender but the environment that 
produces the offender. The last part of this chapter looks at the 
internationalization of the FCPA standard and the emergence of an 
international definition of international corruption in the principal 
international instruments that have emerged in the wake of the FCPA. It also 
identifies the essential elements of international corruption that they establish. 
3.2 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – The Genesis 
The FCPA can be described as the hub of anti-corruption regulation. 
International rules, corporate codes and various national initiatives reflect 
                                                     
 
10 P. van Duyne, Corruption: Acts and Attitudes, in B. Huber (Ed.), Combating Corruption in the 
European Union, Academy of European Law, Trier, 2002, p. 1, at p. 13. 
11  Pieth, gives an insightful description of the genesis and development of the legal framework to 
combat corruption and notes that the local political agenda in the United States marked the first 
step in legislative action against transnational bribery. See  M. Pieth, L. Low, P. Cullen (Eds.), 
The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary, CUP, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 6-9. 
12    This chapter is based on the article: A. Makinwa, ‘The rules regulating transnational bribery: 
achieving a common standard?’, International Business Law Journal, Iss. 1, 2007, p. 17. 
13  Ruggie speaks of states beginning to use ‘corporate culture’ in deciding corporate criminal 
accountability and explains that the state uses:  
‘[a] company’s policies, rules and practices to determine criminal liability and 
punishment, rather than basing accountability on the individual acts of employees or 
officers. These principles may be invoked at the liability stage, or during sentencing 
and in exercising prosecutorial discretion. Both incentivize companies to have 
appropriate compliance systems.’   
J. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 20087 April 2008, 
Available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf, at Para. 31.  
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FCPA provisions and its method to varying degrees.14 The FCPA was a unique 
occurrence in the history of the fight against corruption.15  In the words of 
Justice T. Noonan:  
‘For the first time in the history of the world a measure for bribery was 
introduced into law that was universal as far as those subjected to the law 
were concerned. For the first time, a country made it criminal to corrupt the 
officials of another country.’16   
Understanding the FCPA is the key to understanding the new legal and 
normative order that exists today regarding corruption. The process of 
implementing the FCPA continues to cast a long shadow over the direction of 
anti-corruption strategy.17 This book on private remedies for corruption is 
arguably only possible because of the foundation set by the FCPA and the 
subsequent internationalization of the FCPA standard. As such, a discussion on 
private remedies for corruption is well served by starting with a clear 
understanding of the method and provisions of the FCPA.  
The events that led to the worldwide repudiation of corruption occurred in the 
early seventies in the aftermath of the Watergate Scandal.18 A congressional 
investigation was instituted into political espionage carried out on the orders of 
the then President Nixon of the Republican Party. This inquiry into a break-in 
at the offices of the Democratic Party at the Watergate building complex on 17 
                                                     
 
14  Bill Shaw asserts that the principles articulated by the FCPA as adopted and elaborated upon in 
subsequent international agreements represent a sort of ‘Habermasian general will’ and have 
become ‘morally unassailable.’ See B. Shaw, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and progeny: 
morally unassailable’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 33, 2000, p. 689, at pp. 706-
709. 
15    M. Biegelman, D. Biegelman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Handbook, Wiley 
and Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2010, p. 332.  
16   J. Noonan Jr., Bribes, id., Note 1 above, at p. 680.  
17  Cohen and Marriot write that ‘[I]t is impossible to understand global anti-corruption efforts 
today without appreciating the FCPA’s role in getting those efforts started. It is impossible to 
discuss the development of international anti-corruption instruments … without understanding 
that the FCPA provided a spur to their enactment. And it is impossible − or at least highly 
impractical −to consider anti-corruption compliance and best practices without drawing on the 
extensive examples offered by companies dealing with the FCPA.’ P. Cohen, A. Marriot 
(Eds.), International Corruption, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2010, p. 73. 
18  Farnsworth has an extensive collection of Watergate Material in his web-based databank on the 
Watergate Scandal. He describes ‘Watergate’ as a general term used to describe a complex 
web of political scandals between 1972 and 1974. The word refers to the Watergate Hotel in 
Washington DC. In addition to the hotel, the Watergate complex houses many business offices. 
It was here that the office of the Democratic National Committee was burgled on 17 June 
1972. The burglary and subsequent cover-up eventually led to moves to impeach President 
Richard Nixon. Nixon resigned the presidency on 8 August 1974. For detailed information of 
the Watergate scandal see M. Farnsworth, Collection of materials at the Watergate Info 
Database, http://watergate.info/background/. 
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June 1972, revealed a web of political and corporate commercial corruption.19 
The discovery that more than 400 US companies had admitted to making 
overseas payments in excess of US$300 million in a bid to secure contracts and 
other favors, led to the ‘moral outrage’ of the American people.20 The 
Watergate scandal was the launching pad for the eventual passage of the FCPA 
that would establish common rules for parties engaging in soliciting for 
business in foreign countries. 21  
The FCPA represents the ‘values’ of the American people regarding corruption 
in the conduct of corporate affairs. With specific regard to the interaction 
between corporations and foreign officials, the FCPA introduces an ethical 
imperative, namely that bribery is an unacceptable method of acquiring 
business. This establishes a boundary not just for the American corporation but 
for parties dealing with that corporation. This means that interactions between 
the American corporations and officials of foreign countries are no longer 
governed simply by the domestic laws of the country in which the transaction 
is taking place, but are subject to the FCPA provisions. The FCPA, by design, 
could reach and sanction corruption occurring in other countries.   
3.2.1 Protecting the Public Interest 
The FCPA tackles the issue of corruption by criminalizing a particular form of 
activity. This is the bribery of foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining a 
                                                     
 
19  Lowell Brown, commenting on the Senate and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
investigations, remarks that the SEC investigation resulted in enforcement actions against 
United Brands, Gulf Oil Corporation, Ashland Oil Company, Boeing Company and Lockheed 
Corporation, among others, and that in all more than 400 companies admitted making overseas 
payments in excess of US$300 million and that 117 of these companies were in the Fortune 
500. H. Lowell Brown, Bribery in International Commerce, Thompson/West, Eagan, MN, 
2003, p. 2. 
20  The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported that:  
‘[M]ore than 400 corporations have admitted making questionable or illegal 
payments. The companies, most of them voluntarily, have reported paying out well in 
excess of $300 million in corporate funds to foreign government officials, politicians, 
and political parties. These corporations have included some of the largest and most 
widely held public companies in the United States; over 117 of them rank in the top 
Fortune 500 industries. The abuses disclosed run the gamut from bribery of high 
foreign officials in order to secure some type of favorable action by a foreign 
government to so-called facilitating payments that allegedly were made to ensure that 
government functionaries discharge certain ministerial [sic] or clerical duties. Sectors 
of industry typically involved are: drugs and health care; oil and gas production and 
services; food products; aerospace, airlines and air services; and chemicals.’  
See House Report, id., Note 3 above, at p. 4. See also the United States Senate, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, ‘Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and 
Practices’, (12 May 1976). (Hereinafter SEC Report). 
21  A. Makinwa, ‘The rules regulating transnational bribery: achieving a common standard?’, id., 
Note 12 above, at pp.17-19. 
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concession, business or other advantage. There is a clear commercial context22 
to its framing of the fight against corruption. It addresses offers and 
inducements that are meant to distort free competitive processes on a grand 
scale and not the petty routine small payment. Not surprisingly, it is directed 
primarily at the principal actors in such grand scale corruption, namely, 
multinational corporations and government officials.  
The US Congress was faced with a choice when deciding on the strategy to 
adapt with regard to foreign bribery. On the one hand was a strategy that 
focused on the disclosure of improper payments and the imposition of criminal 
penalties for failure to disclose. On the other hand was a strategy that directly 
criminalized such payments.23 The House of Representatives chose the latter 
strategy and decided to criminalize bribery in foreign transactions because it 
determined that: 
‘… disclosure can never be an effective deterrent because the anticipated 
benefit of making a bribe, such as winning a multimillion dollar contract, 
generally exceeds the adverse effect, if any, of disclosing one year later a 
lump sum figure without names, amounts or even countries. Criminalization, 
on the other hand, has proven an effective deterrent.’24  
The House Committee was of the view that criminalization would be no more 
difficult to enforce than disclosure as both approaches would involve ‘proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the same factual and legal elements.’25 The 
Committee, however, reasoned that ‘criminalization would be far less 
burdensome on business. A disclosure scheme, unlike outright prohibition, 
would require US corporations to contend not only with additional 
bureaucratic overlay but also with massive paperwork requirements.’26 Thus, 
the more fundamental step of stigmatizing foreign bribery payments as being 
criminal was taken. 
There are two broad planks to the anti-corruption strategy of the FCPA. The 
first is normative anti-bribery provision that criminalizes the bribery of foreign 
                                                     
 
22   Emphasis added. 
23    See House Report, id., Note 3 above, at p.6. See also comments of the Minority at p. 19 where 
it is stated that: 
‘The criminalization approach is contrasted with the approach recommended by 
Former Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson which would have required 
disclosure of improper payments. We believe that adoption of the disclosure approach 
would, in no way, imply that payoffs will be condoned as long as they are disclosed. 
Rather, we believe that this approach would prove ultimately to be a much more 
effective deterrent than would the provisions of H.R. 3815.’  
24   House Report, id., Note 3 above, at p. 6. 
25   Id. 
26   Id. 
CHAPTER 3 – FROM THE  FCPA TO AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
72 
 
officials.27 The second, is the creation of a means to detect and control the 
giving of bribes by establishing requirements for books and records, as well as 
internal and accounting controls that provide reasonable assurance that 
financial reports are accurate.28 As such, the FCPA criminalizes two types of 
conduct: firstly, acts of bribery that distorts honest competition, and secondly, 
false accounting practices that can be utilized to cover up the corrupt activities 
of corporations.29 
The commercial context of the FCPA should not be dissociated from the very 
clear public interest that it caters to. The FCPA is codified in Title 15, Chapter 
2B of the United States Code, which deals with Commerce and Trade. It is in 
fact an amendment of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.30 The 1934 Act was 
enacted to regulate the secondary trading of securities, often through brokers. 
Such transactions, usually conducted through securities exchanges and over-
the-counter markets, were considered by the US Congress to be affected with a 
national public interest, which made it ‘necessary to provide for regulation.’ 31  
The motivation for the 1934 Securities Exchanges Act identifies the public 
interest that the FCPA is supposed to protect. Sec. 78b explains that the 
necessity to protect the public interest arises from the fact that securities 
transactions involve the general public on a large scale.32 Securities may 
originate from outside the state where the exchange or over-the-counter market 
is located, involve the use of credit and be carried out by mail or other 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. As such they are considered an 
important aspect of interstate commerce that can directly impact (a) the 
financing of trade and industry; (b) transportation in interstate commerce; (c) 
the volume of interstate commerce; and (d) the national credit.33 The 
manipulation of or speculation in such securities can trigger national 
emergences which produce ‘widespread unemployment and the dislocation of 
                                                     
 
27   15 USC Sec. 78dd-1, 15 USC Sec. 78dd-2, 15 USC Sec. 78dd-3.  
28   15 USC Sec. 78m. 
29    The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs remarked that:  
‘In the past, corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification of corporate 
books and records. Title I removes this avenue of cover-up, reinforcing the criminal 
sanctions which are intended to serve as the significant deterrent to corporate bribery. 
Taken together, the accounting requirements and criminal prohibitions of Title I 
should effectively deter corporate bribery of foreign government officials.’  
See US. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: Foreign Corrupt 
Practices and Domestic Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, Senate Report, No. 95-114, 1977, (Hereinafter Senate Report), at p. 3. 
30   The Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977 enacted a new Sec. 30A of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 codified as 15 USC Sec. 78a - 78mm of the USC. 
31  15 USC Sec. 78b.   
32       15 USC Sec. 78b(1). 
33   Id. 
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trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and 
adversely affect the general welfare.’34  
This public interest motivates the need for regulations that protect against 
‘impediments’ and ‘perfect the mechanisms’ of the national securities market 
so as to safeguard such securities and funds.35 The public interest points to the 
fact that the corruption tackled by the FCPA has a cost not just to the parties to 
these transactions but more importantly to the ‘indirect victims’ who suffer the 
long-term consequences of such transactions. 
It is interesting to note the acceptance implicit in these provisions that in the 
laissez-faire world of corporate activity, public interest provides a clear 
boundary to acceptable corporate behavior. The FCPA is an example of a 
regulation whose objective is the protection of the public interest by 
criminalizing and ruling out bribery as a means of acquiring business. While 
the above provisions deal more specifically with the trading of stocks and 
shares and not foreign bribery, the underlying message is of the need for 
intervention by the state to protect citizens who may suffer the catastrophic 
consequences of private corporate acts. Such reasoning underlies the 
intervention by the US government regarding corruption in international 
business.36 The House Committee noted that the:  
‘[B]ribery of foreign officials by some American companies casts a shadow on 
all U.S. companies. The exposure of such activity can damage a company’s 
image, lead to costly lawsuits, cause the cancellation of contracts, and result in 
the appropriation of valuable assets overseas.’37  
Further motivation for the FCPA given by the committee was that:  
‘it was not necessary to pay bribes to have a successful export program; the 
fact that the resulting adverse competitive affects were entirely domestic as 
payments were often made not to out-compete foreign competitors but rather 
                                                     
 
34   See Title 15 Chapter 2B Sec. 78b: Necessity for Regulation Paras 1-4. 
35  Id. 
36   The House Report states:  
‘[T]he payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, 
foreign political parties or candidates for foreign political office is unethical. It is 
counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public. But not only is 
it unethical, it is bad business as well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity of 
the free market system. It short-circuits the marketplace by directing business to those 
companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or service, or too lazy 
to engage in honest salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading marginal products. In 
short, it rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical 
enterprises to lower their standards or risk losing business.’  
House Report, id., Note 3 above, at pp. 4-5.  
37  See House Report, id., at p. 5. 
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to gain an edge over other US manufacturers; bribery creates severe foreign 
policy problems for the United States when they came to light.’38  
The Committee also felt that a strong anti-corruption law would help US 
corporations to resist corrupt demands by enabling them to cite a US law 
which stated that they are not allowed to give a bribe.39 
By tackling corruption in other countries, the US Congress sought to protect its 
own local business culture and environment. The FCPA is a recognition of the 
fact that the domestic business environment is not shielded from the negative 
effects of foreign corruption. This linking of the negative consequences of 
corruption occurring in other countries with domestic public and corporate 
interests was a watershed in the annals of the anti-corruption movement. 
3.3 The FCPA: The Prohibitions 
The purpose of the FCPA is summarized by the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce as:  
‘designed to prohibit the corrupt use of the mails or other means and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce by U.S. corporations, directly or 
indirectly, to bribe foreign officials, foreign political parties, or candidates for 
foreign political office.’40  
The original Act was passed in 1977. This was subsequently amended by the 
Omnibus Trade Competitiveness Act of 1988, which created an exemption for 
facilitation payments, as well as affirmative defenses for payments that were 
lawful under the written laws of a foreign country and payments that were 
reasonable bona fide expenses.41 In 1998 the FCPA was further amended to 
implement the provisions of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials. The 1998 amendments extended coverage of the 
                                                     
 
38   The House Report gives several examples as follows:  
‘… in 1976, the Lockheed scandal shook the Government of Japan to its political 
foundation and gave opponents of close ties between the United States and Japan an 
effective weapon with which to drive a wedge between the two nations. In another 
instance, Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands was forced to resign from his official 
position as a result of an inquiry into allegations that he received $1 million in pay-
offs from Lockheed. In Italy, alleged payments by Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil Oil, and 
other corporations to officials of the Italian Government eroded public support for 
that Government and jeopardized U.S. foreign policy, not only with respect to Italy 
and the Mediterranean area, but with respect to the entire NATO alliance as well.’  
See House Report, id., Note 3, at p. 5.                   
39   House Report id., at p. 5. 
40  House Report id., at p. 4. 
41   Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, (Pub. L. No. 100-418), Sec. 5003, 102 
Stat. 1107, 1416-17, codified as 15 USC Sec. 78dd (1)-(3), 78ff. 
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FCPA to all foreign persons or companies (all other persons apart from US 
companies or persons) that have engaged in any act in furtherance of an FCPA 
violation while in the territory of the United States.42 The 1988 amendments 
also included an alternative jurisdiction for US nationals or companies 
organized under US Laws, extended the meaning of foreign official to include 
public international organizations, and expanded the scope of the act to include 
payments made to obtain an improper advantage.43 
The implementation of the FCPA is carried out by the US Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and, with respect to companies that are quoted on US Stock 
Exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).44 The DOJ is 
responsible for the criminal enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Provisions while 
the SEC along with the DOJ share responsibility for civil enforcement of the 
anti-bribery provisions. The SEC administers the internal control provisions of 
the Books and Records with respect to issuers. 
3.3.1 The Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The Anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are found in sections 78dd-1; 78dd-2 
and 78dd-3 of Title 15 Chapter 2 of the US Code. The FCPA provides that 
persons to whom the act applies are prohibited from: 
‘Using of the mails or other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay or authorization 
of the payment of any money, to any foreign public official, any foreign 
political party, official of a political party or candidate for political office to 
any other person while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of 
value given to that person would be offered, given, or promised, directly or 
indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official 
thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of  
(i)  influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his 
official capacity;  
(ii)  inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in 
violation of the lawful duty of such official; or  
(iii)  securing any improper advantage; or  
(iv)  inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign 
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act 
or decision of such government or instrumentality 
                                                     
 
42   See 15 USC Sec. 78dd-3.   
43   See International Anti-Bribery & Fair Competition Act of 1998, (Pub. L. No. 105-366), Sec. 
2(b), 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-03.  
44   See the Department of Justice FCPA website at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/; 
the Securities and Exchange Commission Litigation page, which provides information about 
SEC FCPA enforcement in respect of issuers at http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml.  
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in order to assist any person to whom the act applies in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.’45  
The FCPA prohibition is directed at a very specific set of occurrences. First of 
all, it applies to bribes or other inducements that occur in an international 
business context. The purpose for which the bribe or other inducement is 
given, must be for the obtaining or retaining of business. This commercial 
context, as well as the category of actors to which the act refers circumscribes 
a very specific type of grand scale bribery between international businesses, 
foreign government officials or officials of international organizations.  
The basis of liability rests in the giving of a bribe or other inducement whether 
directly or indirectly, knowing that it will influence a public official in a 
manner that will result in the acquisition of business for the person offering the 
inducement. The following sections examine the various aspects of the FCPA 
as follows: (a) the purpose of the bribe or other inducement; (b) the persons to 
whom the act applies; (c) territorial and alternative jurisdiction; (d) payment to 
a foreign official; and (e) and the basis of FCPA liability.  
3.3.1.1 Purpose of the Bribe or Other Inducement  
The FCPA stipulates that the offer of payment or other inducement must be 
intended to affect the conduct of a foreign official or instrumentality in a 
manner that illegally benefits the party offering the inducement. The purpose 
must either be to (a) influence the decision making process of a foreign 
official, (b) induce the foreign official to do or omit doing a lawful duty, or (c) 
secure an improper advantage. The gift or inducement may also be for the 
purpose of inducing the foreign official to use his or her influence with a 
foreign government or instrumentality to influence any act or decision by such 
a government or instrumentality in favor of the party offering the payment or 
other inducement.46 In all these instances the purpose of influencing the 
foreign official is in order to obtain or retain business.  
This raises the question whether corrupt payments that did not have the 
purpose of obtaining or retaining business fall within the purview of the 
FCPA? This question came up in the case of the United States v. David Kay 
and Douglas Murphy.47 The question before the court was whether the FCPA 
was restricted to payments that were directly related to the acquisition of 
business or whether the act would also apply to any illicit payments made by 
                                                     
 
45   See 15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(a); 78dd-2(a); 78dd-3(a). 
46   See 18 USC Sec. 78dd-1(a); 78dd-2(a); 78dd-3(a). 
47 United States v. David Kay and Douglas Murphy 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir., 4 February 2004). 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
77 
 
the category of persons to whom the act applied. In this case a former chief 
executive officer of American Rice Inc. was charged with violating the FCPA 
by paying bribes to Haitian customs officials to accept false bills of lading and 
other importation documents so as to obtain lower custom duties. The question 
was whether these payments to foreign officials to reduce the custom duties 
and sales taxes a company owed the Haitian government, were payments to 
‘assist’ the company in ‘obtaining or retaining business’ within the meaning of 
the FCPA.   
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the 
lower court held that:  
‘…congress meant to prohibit a range of payments wider than only those that 
directly influence the acquisition or retention of government contracts or 
similar commercial or industrial arrangements.’48  
The court was also of the opinion that ‘Congress intended that the FCPA 
prohibit all illicit payments that are intended to influence non-trivial official 
foreign action in an effort to aid in obtaining or retaining business.’49 
Accordingly, any act that assists directly or indirectly in the obtaining or 
retaining of business will come within the purview the FCPA. This broad 
standard arguably effectively covers any inducement that affects the decision 
making process regarding a business opportunity in favor of the person 
offering the inducement. The Supreme Court denied the defendants appeal for 
review and as such the Kay case remains authoritative on the scope of the 
FCPA.50  
In general, while the FCPA has a very broad ambit, the traditional practices of 
lobbying are therefore excluded from the scope of ‘illicit’ payments that the 
FCPA applies to. 
The House Conference noted that:  
‘… the reference to corrupt payments for ‘retaining business’ in present law is 
not limited to the renewal of contracts or other business, but also includes a 
prohibition against corrupt payments related to the execution or performance 
of contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as a payment to a 
foreign official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment. The 
                                                     
 
48      Id. 
49 Id. 
50   David Kay v. United States, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6775 (US, 6 October, 2008).   
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term should not, however, be construed so broadly as to include lobbying or 
other normal representations to government officials.’51  
The House Conference, in its considerations regarding the 1988 amendments to 
the FCPA, clearly intended an expansive interpretation but drew the line at the 
boundary of the practice of lobbying which is, still to this day considered a 
normal and acceptable business practice. 
3.3.1.2 Persons to Whom the Act Applies 
The FCPA has extensive jurisdictional reach. The FCPA applies to any 
company quoted on a US Stock Exchange, to any private US company, citizen, 
national, or resident as well as to any foreign companies or natural persons 
who carry out an act in furtherance of an FCPA violation while operating 
within the US. These are described as issuers, domestic concerns and persons 
other than issuers or domestic concerns while in the territory of the United 
States as follows:  
Issuers: These are public companies that offer, register and sell securities for 
the purpose of financing their operations on US Stock Exchanges. As such, the 
term issuer applies to every company that has a class of securities that must be 
registered and which is required to file annual reports and other documentation 
under the Securities Exchange Act. The term issuer includes any ‘officer, 
director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting 
on behalf of such issuer.’52 This would also include any subsidiaries or 
business units of the issuer.  
Since many corporations operate through subsidiaries abroad, the question 
arises whether the bribery of foreign officials by such subsidiaries comes 
within the purview of the FCPA. A foreign subsidiary of an ‘issuer’ that is 
organized under the laws of another country will come within the purview of 
the FCPA when the act in furtherance of a bribe takes place within US 
territory. Furthermore, it must be noted, that the parent company will also be 
liable for the acts of a foreign subsidiary when it can be established that the 
parent company or its employees authorized, directed or controlled the activity 
in question.  
                                                     
 
51   Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: No. 100-576, 100th Congress, pp. 918-919. 
(Hereinafter the House Conference Report). 
52  15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(a). 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
79 
 
A recent case that illustrates this is the case of United States v. ABB Inc.53 
ABB Ltd was a corporation headquartered and incorporated in Switzerland 
with sponsored shares publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).ABB Ltd admitted that one of its companies based in Sugar Land, 
Texas, ABB Network Management (ABB NM), paid bribes from 1997 to 2004 
that totalled approximately $1.9 million to officials at Commission Federal de 
Electricidad (CFE), a Mexican state-owned utility company. ABB NM’s 
primary business was to provide products and services to electrical utilities, 
many of them foreign state-owned utilities, for network management in power 
generation, transmission and distribution. In exchange for the bribe payments, 
ABB NM allegedly received contracts worth more than $81 million in 
revenue. ABB Inc. admitted that the bribe payments were made through 
various intermediaries, including a Mexican company that served as ABB 
NM’s sales representative in Mexico on its contracts with CFE.54 
Since the parent company ABB Ltd issued and maintained a class of publicly 
traded securities registered pursuant to Sec. 12(g) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 781) and was required to file periodic reports with 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission under Sec. 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 78m),  ABB Ltd was accountable to 
the US government for these activities by its subsidiary as an ‘issuer’ within 
the meaning of Sec. 78dd-l (a) of the FCPA.55  
Foreign multinationals fall within the scope of the FCPA because of a 
jurisdictional link as issuer on a US Stock Exchange.56 A US listing is 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over acts involving the listed company that 
take place entirely outside the US. An example is the Statoil case. In 2006, the 
US brought a criminal action against the foreign Norwegian energy company 
Statoil, which is listed on the NYSE. Statoil and certain high-level executives 
were charged with attempting to bribe Iranian officials through an offshore 
consulting company owned by a UK person. Corrupt payments to the Iranian 
officials made by this UK concern were characterized as ‘consulting fees’ in 
                                                     
 
53  United States v. ABB Inc. Court Docket Number: 10-CR-664, Filed in S.D. Tex., 29 September 
2010. 
54  ‘ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will 
Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties Company to Pay More Than $58 Million in Criminal 
and Civil Penalties, Disgorgement and Interest’, DOJ Press Release, 29 September 2010, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html.  
55  Plea Agreement, United States v. ABB Inc., Court Docket Number:10-CR-664, (S.D. Tex. 
2010), attachment A-1 (ABB Inc.), Statement of Facts, at Para. 2. 
56  Eleven of the twenty corporate matters brought in 2010 involved non-U.S. companies. These 
were Alcatel-Lucent, BAE, Daimler, Innospec, Noble, Panalpina World Transport, Royal 
Dutch Shell, Snamprogetti/ENI, Technip, and Transocean. See Recent Trends and Patterns in 
FCPA Enforcement | Shearman & Sterling LLP, 2011, at p. 5. 
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Statoil’s books and records. Statoil agreed to fines exceeding $10m, and three 
senior executives resigned.57 
Individuals working for listed companies will also fall under the jurisdiction of 
the FCPA. In the 2007 US v. Sapsizian case58 an executive of one of Alcatel’s 
subsidiaries was charged in connection with the alleged bribery of Costa Rican 
officials. Jurisdiction over Mr. Sapsizian was based on the fact that the shares 
of Alcatel S.A. established under the laws of France and headquartered in Paris 
are registered and traded in the US.  
Domestic concerns: The FCPA defines a domestic concern as (a) any 
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and (b) 
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal 
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of 
a state territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.59  
A recent example of a bribery transaction involving a domestic concern is that 
of United States v. The Mercator Corporation.60 Mercator is a merchant bank 
headquartered and incorporated in New York. Mercator was to be paid 
‘success fees’ with respect to contracts it had successfully closed in its role as 
advisor and counsellor to the government of Kazakhstan concerning oil and 
gas transactions. Between 1995 and 2000, Kazakhstan paid Mercator 
approximately $67 million in success fees for its work. From these fees, the 
chairman of the company James Giffen paid bribes to three senior officials of 
the Kazakh government who could influence whether or not Mercator obtained 
and retained lucrative business and also the authority to ensure that the 
merchant bank was paid.61 In August 2010, the defendant merchant bank 
                                                     
 
57      United States v. Statoil, Court Docket Number: 06-CR-960, (S.D.N.Y., 13 October 2006).   
58  United States v. Sapsizian and Valverde Acosta, Court Docket Number: 06-CR-20797-PAS 
(S.D. FLA., 19 December 2006). See also DOJ Press Release (19 December 2006). Sapsizian 
was sentenced to 30 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of 
$261,500 for bribing employees of the state-owned telecommunications authority in Costa 
Rica. 
59  15 USC Sec. 78dd-2(h). 
60   United States v. Mercator Corp, S3 03 Cr. 404 WHP (S.D.N.Y., 6 August 2010).  
61   See United States v. The Mercator Corporation, S3 03 Cr. 404 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/35488290/Mercator-Corporation-S3-Information.  
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pleaded guilty to making corrupt payments in violation of the FCPA.62 James 
Giffen also pleaded guilty on a related tax violation charge.63 
The definition of a domestic concern is broad enough to cover foreign 
subsidiaries of non-listed US companies. The House Committee remarked that 
this construction of the term ‘domestic concern’ was designed ‘to reach not 
only all US companies other than those subject to SEC jurisdiction, but also 
foreign subsidiaries of any U.S. corporation.’64 The committee noted that:  
‘it was appropriate to extend the coverage of the bill to non-U.S. based 
subsidiaries because of the extensive use of such entities as a conduit for 
questionable or improper foreign payments authorized by their domestic 
parent.’65 
The House Committee remarked that such an extension to foreign subsidiaries 
was necessary to ‘avoid a massive loophole’ though which ‘millions of bribery 
dollars would continue to flow.’66 As such, the FCPA will also apply to 
foreign subsidiaries of non-listed US companies that engage in actions 
violating the FCPA.   
Persons other than issuers or domestic concerns while in the territory of the 
United States: When the FCPA was first passed it applied only to US issuers, 
domestic concerns, citizens, nationals or residents. In the I998 amendments to 
the FCPA, the scope of its provisions was extended to any person67 that 
committed an act in violation of the statute while on US territory.68 The FCPA 
prohibits persons who are not issuers or domestic concerns ‘while in the 
territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance 
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any 
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of 
anything of value’ to commit an FCPA offense. This includes any natural 
person other than a national of the United States or any corporation, 
                                                     
 
62   ‘New York Merchant Bank Pleads Guilty to FCPA Violation: Bank Chairman Pleads Guilty to 
Failing to Disclose Control of Foreign Bank Account’, DOJ Press Release, 6 August 2010, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crm-909.html. 
63   United States v. James H. Giffen, Court Docket Number S4 03 Cr. 404 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2 
April 2003). 
64    House Report, id., Note 3 above, at p. 11. 
65   Id. 
66   Id. 
67  Emphasis added. 
68 Emphasis added. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 USC, as amended by the 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, (Pub. L No. 105-366, signed on 
10 November 1998). This act added a new Sec. 78dd-3 to Title I of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977.  
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partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the law of a foreign nation 
or a political subdivision thereof.69 
There has to be a territorial link for persons other than issuers or domestic 
concerns to fall within the direct scope of the FCPA. A foreign company or 
person will not be subject to the FCPA if there is no act in furtherance of an 
FCPA violation that took place while such a person was within the territory of 
the US.70 However, the use of a US or the mails or instrumentality need only 
be incidental to bring a foreign person or company under FCPA jurisdiction. 
The legislative history of the FCPA shows that the words ‘in furtherance’ used 
in this provision were deliberately used to broaden the scope of the statute. As 
originally worded, the FCPA would have required that ‘the mails or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce be directly used to offer or make the 
prohibited payment.’71 The provision was modified to provide that the mails or 
interstate facility need only be used in furtherance of the illicit payment.72 In a 
recent case four former ABB employees were accused of offering, approving, 
and paying bribes to Nigerian officials. They were suspected of using wire 
transfers in the United States to help secure a $180 million contract to provide 
equipment for an oil drilling project in Nigeria’s offshore Bonga Oil Field. 
The former employees agreed to settle the charges without admitting or 
denying the allegation.73 The wire transfers in furtherance of illicit payments 
were sufficient to found FCPA liability. 
The 2002 case of United States v. Syncor Taiwan also shows how the ‘in 
furtherance’ provision can be used to extend FCPA rules to foreign 
subsidiaries. The SEC alleged that Syncor International’s foreign subsidiaries 
in Taiwan, Mexico, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France gave about $600,000 in 
bribes to doctors employed by hospitals controlled by foreign authorities so as 
to use these illicit payments to influence the doctors’ decisions in favor of 
                                                     
 
69  15 USC Sec. 78dd-3(f)(1). 
70  It must be reiterated that even where there is no territorial nexus a parent company can be held 
responsible for acts of a foreign subsidiary that occurred with its ‘knowledge’ or authorization.  
71   House Report id., Note 3 above, at p. 18. 
72   Id. 
73 SEC v. J. Samson, J. Munro, I. Campbell, and J. Whelan, Civil Action No. 06 CV 
01217(D.D.C.), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19754.pdf;  see also 
SEC Litigation Release, No. 19754, 5 July 2006, available at 
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19754.htm;  see also the 2005 case of SEC v. Yaw 
Osei Amoako, Civil Action No. 05-4284 (GEB) (D.N.J.), the Regional Director for Africa at 
ITXC Corp violated the FCPA by arranging for ITXC to make wire transfers from the United 
States totaling $166,541.3 1 to a senior official at the government-owned telephone company 
Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (‘Nitel’), SEC Litigation Release No. 19356, 1 
September 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19356.pdf.  
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business opportunities for Syncor.74 The SEC alleged that cash payments were 
found to have been authorized by the Chairman of the Board of Syncor Taiwan 
while he was traveling in the United States. Using the 1998 amendments, the 
SEC founded jurisdiction on the new Sec. 78dd-3 of the FCPA. Syncor Taiwan 
pled guilty to the charge and agreed to pay a $2 million criminal fine.75 
The Alcatel Lucent case also provides a good example of the effect of 
committing acts in violation of the FCPA by ‘any person while in the territory 
of the US.’ Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., formerly known as Alcatel, S.A., is a 
French corporation headquartered in Paris, France. Alcatel’s American 
Depository Receipts (‘ADRs’) were registered with the Commission pursuant 
to Exchange Act Section 12(b) and traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
As such, Alcatel was required to file reports with the Commission under 
Section 13 of the Exchange Act76 and was an ‘issuer’ within the meaning of 
the FCPA.77 
Alcatel conducted its commercial transactions through its subsidiaries. Alcatel 
CIT, S.A. was a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcatel, and was incorporated in 
France.78 From the 1990s to late 2006 Alcatel pursued its business activities 
around the world using subsidiaries like Alcatel CIT SA. This subsidiary was 
responsible for contracting with telecommunications providers, including 
many telecommunications providers owned by foreign governments. Alcatel 
CIT and its employees had regular meetings with Alcatel personnel in the US 
office in Florida. These meetings involved, among other things, discussions 
about payments to third-party consultants, and who passed on some or all of 
such payments to foreign officials in exchange for obtaining or retaining 
business. Alcatel CIT also maintained at least one bank account in the United 
States through which it paid money to third-party consultants that it knew were 
going to pass on some or all of that money to foreign officials in exchange for 
obtaining or retaining business. As such, Alcatel CIT fell directly within the 
scope of the FCPA as a person other than an issuer or domestic concern that 
                                                     
 
74 SEC v. Syncor International Corporation, Case No. 1:02CV02421 (U.S.D.C., D.D.C) SEC 
Litigation Release No. 17887, 10 December 2002, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17887.htm. 
75 United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No. 02-CR-1244-ALL (C.D. Cal. 5 December, 2002). 
76   15 USC Sec. 78m. 
77  15 USC Sec. 78dd-l. 
78   In 2006 this subsidiary merged with Lucent Technologies in the US and changed its name to 
Alcatel-Lucent France S.A. After the merger, Alcatel-Lucent shares were traded on the Paris 
Euronext exchange and as ADRs on the NYSE. 
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engaged in acts in furtherance of an FCPA violation while in the territory of 
the United States.79 
In the recent Siemens case, Siemens AG was held accountable for the acts of 
Siemens Argentina, Siemens Venezuela and Siemens Bangladesh, all of which 
were foreign subsidiaries headquartered in other countries. These companies, 
although organized under the laws of foreign countries, were caught in the 
FCPA web as a result of meetings in the US, where discussions were held 
about improper payments, as well as moneys paid via US bank accounts.80  
Since the FCPA prohibits domestic concerns from engaging in any acts in 
furtherance of a bribe, a US company may be liable for FCPA violations by 
foreign incorporated subsidiaries where a chain of authorization can be 
established. Even if the foreign subsidiary itself does not fall within the scope 
of the FCPA as a result of the absence of a territorial link, the parent company 
may still be held accountable for improper payments by such a subsidiary 
where it can be established that the parent company or its employees 
authorized, directed or controlled the activity in question.81 The FCPA 
imposes liability on U.S. companies and their employees for prohibited 
payments to or through third parties (agents, consultants, sales representatives, 
or other intermediaries) while ‘knowing’ the payment would be for the 
purposes of assisting the firm in obtaining or retaining business.82 This would 
include a prohibited payment made by a foreign incorporated subsidiary where 
the necessary ‘knowledge’ can be established. 
Knowledge about corrupt payments may be implied in cases where the US 
company is the decision making center for the foreign company and can be 
deemed to be the foreign company’s alter ego. In such instances the US 
Company may be held directly liable for the acts of the subsidiary or foreign 
company. A case in point is SEC v. Monsanto Company.83 Here, the SEC 
alleged that from 1997 to 2002, Monsanto inaccurately recorded approximately 
$700,000 which were used by two Indonesian entities, owned or controlled by 
Monsanto, to influence about 140 current and former Indonesian government 
officials and their family members. These bribes were channeled through a 
                                                     
 
79  United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., et al. Court Docket Number: 10-CR-20906 S.D. 
FLA., 27 December 2010. 
80   See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action No. 08 
CV 02167 (D.D.C.). 
81  H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1998, 
50 Baylor L. Rev. p. 1, at pp. 7-9. 
82  15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(a)(3) et seq. 
83   SEC v. Monsanto, No. 1:05CV00014 (U.S.D.C., D.D.C), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19023.pdf. See also SEC Litigation Release No. 
19023/ 6 January 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19023.htm. 
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Jakarta-based investment consulting firm and were paid to affect the repeal of 
an environmental impact assessment decree that was adverse to Monsanto’s 
interests. Additional bribery payments were made via a network of Monsanto’s 
Indonesian affiliates. According to the SEC, a senior Monsanto manager told 
the Indonesian firm employee to ‘incentivize’ the senior environment official 
with a $50,000 cash payment. The fact that a senior US Monsanto manager 
based in the United States had authorized and directed an Indonesian 
consulting firm to make an illegal payment to a senior Indonesian ministry 
official was sufficient to establish FCPA liability. Without admitting or 
denying the Commission’s charges, Monsanto, the parent company, consented 
to pay a $500,000 penalty. 
Again, companies in a group may fall within the reach of the FCPA where one 
member of the group falls under the definition of domestic concern. For 
example, a US domestic concern of a group of companies may open the door 
to FCPA liability for all members of the group. The Vetco case84 illustrates this 
point. In 2007 the US brought an action against a UK company and four 
subsidiaries, only one of which was a US company, for bribing Nigerian 
customs officials. The US company opened the door to the other subsidiaries 
within the group. This is instructive as it shows that even the slightest of 
contacts will suffice to drag a group of related subsidiaries within the reach of 
the FCPA. If the decision making structure of a group of companies lies in a 
US company, such a company runs the risk of being held liable on the basis of 
the ‘knowing’ requirement for the improper acts of any such linked companies.    
3.3.1.3 Alternative Jurisdiction 
Issuers, domestic concerns and any other person while on US territory are 
prohibited from offering a bribe or other inducement using any instrumentality 
of state commerce. Interstate activity creates the nexus that triggers the 
applicability of the FCPA as federal law. The FCPA provides that the term 
‘interstate commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, or 
communication among the several states, or between any foreign country and 
any state, or between any state and any place or ship outside thereof; this term 
includes the intrastate use of (a) a telephone or other interstate means of 
communication, or (b) any other interstate instrumentality.85 Any contact with 
the American market by a foreign corporation will suffice as an 
instrumentality of state commerce that renders the FCPA applicable. Prior to 
1998 there was a territorial requirement for FCPA jurisdiction. The issuer, 
domestic concern, or other person had to have made use of the mails or 
                                                     
 
84  United States v. Vetco Gray Controls et al., Case No. 07-cr-004 (S.D. Tex. 5 January 2007). 
85   15 USC Sec. 78dd-2(h)(5); Sec. 78dd-3(f)(2)(5). 
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instrumentality of interstate commerce for the FCPA to be triggered into 
application.  
However, in 1998, amendments to the FCPA provided an alternative basis for 
jurisdiction for issuers, and US persons.86 Issuers and US persons that are 
operating completely outside the United States and who make no use of any 
instrumentality of state commerce also fall within the scope of the FCPA. The 
FCPA states that it is:  
‘…unlawful for any [Issuer or United States Person] to corruptly do any act 
outside the United States in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, 
or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, 
or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any of the persons or 
entities set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) of this section 
for the purposes set forth therein, irrespective of whether such [Issuer or 
United States Person] makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality 
of interstate commerce in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or 
authorization.’87  
A US person for the purpose of this section is defined as a national of the 
United States or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock 
company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship 
organized under the laws of the United States or any state, territory, 
possession, or commonwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision 
thereof.88 
Thus even where there has been no use of an instrumentality, the FCPA can 
still apply by virtue of the alternative jurisdiction clause.89 The FCPA applies 
to any improper payments made by companies, or US employees companies 
that are made completely outside the US with no nexus to the United States via 
the mails or other instrumentality of interstate commerce. There is no 
requirement for a territorial link.90 Any US issuer or national involved in 
international corruption anywhere would be subject to the penalties of the 
FCPA regardless of the country in which the act took place.91 The case of 
                                                     
 
86 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 USC, as amended by the International Anti-Bribery 
and Fair Competition Act of 1998, (Pub. L 105-366, signed on 10 November 1998). This 
added a section giving alternative jurisdiction based on nationality to the Title 15 of the USC 
in Sec. 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i). 
87  Emphasis added. 15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(g)(1); Sec. 78dd-2(1)(2). 
88   15 USA Sec. 78dd-1(g)(2). 
89   15 USA Sec. 78dd-1(g)(1) Sec.78dd-2(1)(1).  
90  15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(g); 78dd-2(i). 
91 Id. 
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United States v. Giffen, for example, involved conduct that took place entirely 
outside the United States.92 
3.3.1.4 Payment to a Foreign Official 
The term ‘foreign official’ covers four categories of persons. It applies to: (1) 
officers and employees of foreign governments or instrumentalities; (2) 
officers and employees of public international organizations; (3) any person 
acting in an official capacity either for a foreign government or 
instrumentality; or (4) for public international organizations.93 A ‘foreign 
government’ is a fairly straightforward concept,94 as is a ‘public international 
organization.’95 However, the expression ‘instrumentality’ is less clear. This 
term is not defined in the FCPA and the position of the US government as 
reflected in its OECD Self-Evaluation report provides that: 
‘the United States has consistently applied to the FCPA to cover bribery of 
officials of public enterprises. State-owned business enterprises may, in 
appropriate circumstances, be considered instrumentalities of a foreign 
government and their officers and employees to be foreign officials.’96  
The report further adds that there is no ‘red line’ test that has been adopted by 
the US Government in coming to this result. However, the factors that are 
taken into consideration are:  
‘the foreign state’s own characterization of the enterprise and its employees, 
i.e., whether it prohibits and prosecutes bribery of the enterprise’s employees 
                                                     
 
92    See  p. 78 above. United States v. James H. Giffen, Court Docket Number S4 03 Cr. 404 
(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2 April 2003). 
93  15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(f)(1)(a); Sec. 78dd-2(h)2(a); Sec. 78dd-3(f)2(a) provide that the term 
‘foreign official’ means any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person 
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, 
or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization. 
94   Title 18 Chapter 2 Sec. 11 of the USC provides that the term ‘foreign government’ includes 
any government, faction, or body of insurgents within a country with which the United States 
is at peace, irrespective of recognition by the United States. 
95   15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(f)(1)(b); Sec. 78dd-2(h)2(b); Sec. 78dd-3(f)2(b) provide that for purposes 
of subpara (A), the term ‘public international organization’ means (i) an organization that has 
been designated by Executive Order pursuant to Sec. 1 of the International Organizations 
Immunities Act (22 USC Sec. 288); or (ii) any other international organization that is 
designated by the President by executive order for the purposes of this section, effective as of 
the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register. 
96  US Response to OECD Questions Concerning Phase I, at Sec. A.1.1.   
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as public corruption, the purpose of the enterprise, and the degree of control 
exercised over the enterprise by the foreign government.’97 
In the recent case of United States v. Carson98, judicial guidance was given 
regarding the meaning of the term instrumentality. Stuart Carson was CEO of a 
US domestic concern that designed and manufactured control valves for use in 
the nuclear, oil and gas and power generation industries worldwide. The 
company sold its products to both state-owned and private companies in thirty 
countries around the world. Stuart Carson designed a company policy (friend-
in-camp) as a sales model where employees and agents cultivated special 
relationships with employees and agents of state and private customers. 
Corrupt payments were alleged to have been made under this sales model to 
the sum of approximately $4.3 million to officers and employees of state-
owned companies and $1.8 million to officers and employees of private 
companies. Carson, charged with FCPA violations, sought a dismissal of the 
charges arguing that employees who allegedly received the bribes worked for a 
state-owned company and therefore did not fall within the scope of the FCPA’s 
definition of a foreign official.   
The court dismissed the motion and held that ‘the question of whether state-
owned companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA is a question of 
fact.’99 The court set out several factors that should be taken into consideration 
in determining whether a business entity constitutes a government 
instrumentality. These include the foreign state’s characterization of the entity 
and its employees; the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity; the 
purpose of the entity’s activities; the entity’s obligations and privileges under 
the foreign state’s law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or 
controlling power to administer its designated functions; the circumstances 
                                                     
 
97  Id.   
98  United States v. Carson et al., No. 09-77 (C.D. Cal. 8 April 2009); See also similar challenges 
in U.S. v. Noriega et al., No. 10-1031 (C.D. Cal. 20 April 2010), where the court found that a 
state-owned enterprise the Mexican Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) was an 
instrumentality under the FCPA. More recently in August 2011 Carlos Rodriguez, the 
executive vice president of a US-based Telecommunications Corporation, was convicted for 
bribing officials of the state-owned Haiti Telecommunications Corp (Telco). See United States 
v. Joel Esquenazi et al., court docket number: 09-CR-21010-JEM, which was filed on 4 
December 2009 in the S.D. FLA. Subsequently Rodriguez sought a release pending appeal of 
his 15-year sentence claiming that employees of a state company should not properly be 
regarded as foreign officials and that the lower court in its instruction to the jury had 
improperly broadened the reach of the statute. See Brief of the Appellant in United States v. 
Joel Esquenazi et al., Case: 11-15331 which was filed on 5th September 2012 in the S.D. FLA 
See also C. Matthews, ‘The Big test for the FCPA’s Foreign Official Definition?’, Corruption 
Currents, The Wall Street Journal Blogs, 3 January 2012, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/01/03/the-big-test-for-the-fcpas-foreign-official-
definition/. 
99   Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Carson et al., No. 09-77, (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
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surrounding the entity’s creation; and the foreign state’s extent of ownership of 
the entity, including the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, 
special tax treatment, and loans).100 The court further held that entities such as 
banks and railroads have long been used to carry out governmental objectives, 
as this added weight to the fact that such entities could be considered 
government instrumentalities.101 
3.3.1.5 Basis of FCPA Liability  
The FCPA makes it unlawful for a person to whom it applied: ‘to make use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly’102 
in furtherance of an (1) offer, gift or other inducement directly to a foreign 
pubic official, (2) the authorization of such a gift or other inducement or (3) the 
payment to any person while knowing103 that all or a portion of such money or 
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any 
foreign official to influence such a public officer for the purpose of acquiring 
business.104 As such, the FCPA imposes liability on persons to whom it applies 
for making or authorizing prohibited payments to or through third parties 
(agents, consultants, sales representatives, or other intermediaries) while 
knowing the payment would be for the purposes of assisting the firm in 
obtaining or retaining business. 
The FCPA rules do not define what is meant by the term ‘corruptly’ but does 
provide a definition for the standard of liability required under the ‘knowing’ 
standard.105 It is however clear that there is a requirement for intentionality and 
that the FCPA only applies where the persons to whom it applies intended the 
consequences of the actions in furtherance of a bribe. The Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in their consideration of the FCPA 
Bill stated that:  
‘[t]he word ‘corruptly’ is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, 
promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official 
position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payer or his client, or to 
obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The word ‘corruptly’ 
connotes an evil motive or purpose, intent to wrongfully influence the 
                                                     
 
100   Id at p. 5.  
101  Id pp. 8-10. 
102  Emphasis added. 
103  Emphasis added. 
104   15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(a)(3); 78dd-2(a)(3); 78dd-3(a)(3). 
105   See D. Burns, E. Sullivan, ‘Navigating the FCPA’s Complex Scienter Requirements’, 
Bloomberg Finance, L.P. (April 2009), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Burns-Sullivan- 
NavigatingTheFCPAComplexScienterReq.pdf.  
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recipient. It does not require that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in 
producing the desired outcome.’106 
In United States v. Liebo, the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the instruction of the lower court that ‘corruptly’ meant that:  
‘the offer, promise to pay, payment or authorization of payment, must be 
intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position or to influence 
someone else to do so,’ and that ‘an act is “corruptly” done if done voluntarily 
and intentionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful 
end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.’107 
On the other hand, the FCPA does define the meaning of the term ‘knowing’ 
and states that:  
‘…a person’s state of mind is knowing, with respect to conduct, a 
circumstance or a result if (i) such person is aware that such person is 
engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is 
substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such 
circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. When 
knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an 
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high 
probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually 
believes that such circumstance does not exist.’108  
It is important to note that the FCPA does not require ‘actual knowledge.’ The 
standard is much looser than that. Knowledge is established if a person is 
aware of a ‘high probability’ of the existence of such circumstance. This is a 
much lower standard of liability and requires a more proactive stance on the 
part of the corporation. If a corporation is doing business in an area of endemic 
corruption, such as Nigeria or Kazakhstan, where there is a very high 
probability of FCPA violations, or in a high risk industries such as arms or 
mining for example, ‘knowledge’ sufficient to render the parent company 
liable to the acts of its subsidiaries or agents may be established by the 
existence of circumstances that indicate the high probability of the act of 
bribery occurring. 
The House Conference Report describes the ‘knowing’ standard as covering: 
 ‘…both prohibited actions that are taken with ‘actual knowledge’ of intended 
results as well as other actions that, while falling short of what the law terms 
                                                     
 
106   See Senate Report, id., Note 29 above, at p.10. 
107  United States v. Liebo, 923 F. 2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991) at 1312.   
108  15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(f) (2). Sec. 78dd-2(h) (3). Sec. 78dd-3(f) (3). 
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‘positive knowledge,’ nevertheless evidence a conscious disregard or 
deliberate ignorance of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one 
to the high probability of violations of the Act.’109  
The US legislators sought to use this standard to circumvent claims of 
ignorance by parent or related companies. The report states: 
‘…the so called “head-in-the-sand” problem – variously described in the 
pertinent authorities as “conscious disregard,” “willful blindness” or 
“deliberate ignorance” – should be covered so that management officials 
could not take refuge from the act’s prohibition by their unwarranted 
obliviousness to any action (or inaction), language or other “signaling device” 
that should reasonably alert them of the “high probability” of an FCPA 
violation.’110  
A company can be held liable under the FCPA if it can be established that the 
corporation should have known about the violations of foreign subsidiaries, 
agents or joint venture partners or where internal controls are found to have 
been inadequate to detect material illegality. The Akzo Nobel case111 illustrates 
how this threshold of imputed knowledge can be met. The SEC alleged that 
from 2000 to 2003, two of Akzo Nobel’s subsidiaries authorized and made 
$279,491 in kickback payments in connection with their sales of humanitarian 
goods to Iraq under the U.N. Oil for Food Program. These kickbacks were 
labelled as ‘after-sales service fees.’ The SEC maintained that Akzo ‘knew’ or 
was ‘reckless in not knowing’ that improper payments were offered or paid, 
and secondly that Akzo failed to maintain a system of internal controls 
sufficient to prevent or detect FCPA violations as the company’s accounting 
for the Oil for Food Program transactions failed to properly record the nature 
of the company’s kickback payments. As a result Akzo agreed to pay a civil 
penalty of $750,000 plus $2.2 million in disgorgement of profits, including 
pre-judgment interest. 
A company may be deemed to have ‘known’ of the alleged violations on the 
part of a subsidiary, joint venture or agent, where a director sits on the board or 
serves as an officer of such a subsidiary joint venture or agency; where the 
center of decision making rests with a person to whom the FCPA applies; 
where the decision making process involves a person to whom the FCPA 
applies. It is important to note that trends in FCPA enforcement suggest that 
traditional concepts of corporate liability and the firewalls that can be built by 
corporate structures and level investment holdings are not an impediment to 
                                                     
 
109  House Conference Report, id., Note 51 above, at p. 920. 
110  Id. 
111  SEC v. Akzo Nobel, N.V., Civil Action No. 07-02293 (D.D.C. 20 December 2007). 
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DOJ/SEC prosecution. What is key is the ‘authorization of’ or ‘knowing of’ 
the acts in question.  
In summary, a ‘knowing’ standard can be used to link the acts of persons to 
whom the FCPA applies to foreign companies even where no aspect of the 
FCPA violation occurred in the United States. This knowing standard can be 
met where there is an element of supervision by the US company over such a 
foreign company. The FCPA will also hold a person to whom it applies 
accountable for any FCPA violations which it can be said to have authorized or 
directed. Such authorization can be implied where the decision making aspects 
of the transaction in question took place within the structures of parties to 
whom the FCPA applies.112  
3.3.2 Exceptions to the Application of the FCPA 
There are some exceptions to the prohibitions made under the FCPA. These 
exceptions are very limited in number. 
3.3.2.1 Facilitating Payments for Routine Governmental Actions 
The FCPA provides an exception for routine governmental action. It provides 
that the provisions of the FCPA: 
 ‘… shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign 
official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or 
to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign 
official, political party, or party official, to a foreign official, political party or 
party official the purpose of which is to expedite or secure the performance of 
a routine governmental action.’ 113   
Such ‘grease’ or ‘facilitating’ payments to expedite or secure non-discretionary 
routine governmental action by a foreign official do not fall within the 
category of unlawful payments.  
The US legislators were very deliberate in seeking to ensure that payment to 
which the FCPA provisions applied should be clearly distinguished from 
                                                     
 
112  This is a further incentive for the corporation to be able to demonstrate that it has taken all 
possible measures to prevent the violation from occurring. This is referred to in the Ruggie 
Report as avoiding complicity. He states that ‘the relationship between complicity and due 
diligence is clear and compelling: companies can avoid complicity by employing due diligence 
processes … not only to their own activities but also to the relationships connected to them.’ J. 
Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, id., Note 
13 above, at p. 21 Para. 81. 
113 15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(b); 78dd-2(b); 78dd-3(b).  
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facilitating payments. The legislative history notes that by providing for the 
requirement of intentionality the FCPA applies to payments that are made 
‘corruptly’ to distinguish:  
‘… payments which cause an official to exercise other than his free will in 
acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those payments which 
merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which 
do not involve any discretionary action.’114 
Accordingly, the FCPA provides that the term ‘routine governmental action’ 
does not include any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms to 
award new business to, or to continue business with, a particular party, or any 
action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process. 
The key factor in determining whether or not a payment is a facilitating 
payment within the meaning of the FCPA is the absence of the exercise of 
discretion with regard to obtaining or retaining business. US legislators 
intended that any ‘gratuity’ paid to a customs official to ‘speed up the 
processing of customs documents,’ payments to ‘secure permit or licenses,’ or 
duties that are essentially ministerial or clerical in nature and which must be 
‘performed in any event,’ are not payments to which the FCPA applies.115 The 
FCPA details payments that will fall within the exception as follows: 
‘The term routine governmental action means only an action which is 
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in (i) obtaining 
permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do 
business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers, such as 
visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and 
delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or 
inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone 
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting 
perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a 
similar nature.’116 
The FCPA focuses on bribes that are intended to influence the outcome of a 
business transaction. What matters is not the size of the bribe but whether the 
bribe is given to influence the decision making process with respect to a 
business opportunity. This interpretation is consistent to a certain degree with 
the distinction between petty and grand corruption.117 In general terms it can 
                                                     
 
114  House Report, id., Note 3 above, at p. 8. 
115   Id. 
116  15 USC Sec. 78dd-(f)(3)(A); 78dd-2(h)(4)(A); 78dd-3(f)(4)(A). 
117 Petty corruption is of an administrative or bureaucratic nature, while grand corruption affects 
higher levels of decision making and is also referred to as political corruption. See V. Tanzi, 
Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, in G. Abed, S. Gupta 
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therefore be said that the FCPA rules apply to grand as opposed to petty 
corruption. 
Recent opinion procedures released by the US Department of Justice provide 
helpful pointers as to what activity will fall within the purview of routine 
governmental activity. In FCPA Opinion Release 07-02, for example, the 
Department issued an opinion in response to a query from a private insurance 
company in the United States regarding domestic expenses for a trip by six 
officials from an Asian government for an educational program at the 
company’s U.S. headquarters. The company represented that the purpose of the 
visit would be to familiarize the officials with the operation of a U.S. insurance 
company; that it would not select the officials who would participate; that it 
would pay costs directly to the providers; and that it had no non-routine 
business pending before the agency that employs the officials.  
The DOJ in its Opinion stated that, based on all the facts and circumstances, as 
represented by the Requestor, and consistent with prior opinions, the expenses 
contemplated were reasonable under the circumstances and directly related to 
‘the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of [the Requestor’s] products or 
services.’ Therefore, the Department did not intend to take any enforcement 
action with respect to the planned program and the proposed payments 
described.118 It is important to note that in instances where the Department 
indicated that it ‘did not intend to take any enforcement,’ there was no non-
routine business pending before the relevant government agency, or the US 
company did not conduct operations in the foreign official’s country.119 
3.3.2.2 Affirmative Defenses 
The FCPA provides two more exceptions to the operation of the FCPA in the 
form of so-called affirmative defenses. The first is the defense that the payment 
was lawful under the laws of the country where it was made. FCPA provides 
that: 
‘[I]t shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (g) of 
this section that (1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value 
                                                                                                                            
 
(Eds.), Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, id., Note 6 above at pp. 24-26. 
However, see Salbu who cautions that ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ are not respectively synonymous 
with payments prohibited by the FCPA because small payments could also be made for non-
routine dispensations. S. Salbu, ‘A delicate balance: legislation, institutional change, and 
transnational bribery’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 33, 2000, pp. 657-665. 
118   DOJ Opinion Procedure Release, 30 June 2011. 
119  See US Department of Justice Opinion Releases Fraud Section (FCPA0) 2011 Opinion 
procedure Release 11-01, 07-01 and 07-02, available at  
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/. 
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that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the 
foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or candidate’s country.’120 
For the payment to be considered as lawful there must be a positive law that 
establishes this. The legislative history makes it clear that ‘…the absence of 
written laws in a foreign official’s country would not by itself be sufficient to 
satisfy this defense.’121   
The FCPA also allows for reasonable ‘promotional’ expenses made in the 
process of conducting international business.122 It states that it is: 
‘an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) or (g) of this section 
that or (2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was 
made, was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging 
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or 
candidate and was directly related to (A) the promotion, demonstration, or 
explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or performance of a 
contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.’123 
To make use of this defense, expenses must truly be ‘reasonable.’ Excessive 
travel and lodging expenses, for example, may trigger an FCPA violation. In 
United States v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., a US domestic concern was found to 
have paid costs, travel, lodging and other expenses as well as paid an inflated 
per diem allowance covering an Egyptian government official to influence the 
Government of Egypt to support contracts and contract extensions to the 
benefit of M&E. A consent agreement was entered with M&E agreeing to pay 
a fine of $400,000 plus an additional $50,000 as costs for the investigation.124   
Similarly in the Schnitzler Steel case125, the company spent approximately 
$138,000 on gifts and entertainment for managers of customers over a period 
of five years. Pens, perfume, and jewellery were provided as adornments to 
some of the payments to managers, and while the value of those gifts was 
                                                     
 
120   15 USC Sections 78dd-1(c)(1); 78dd-2(c)(1); 78 dd-3(c)(1). 
121  House Conference Report, id., Note 51 above, at p. 922. 
122   The House Conference Report states in respect of reasonable expenditure that payment of 
reasonable and bona fide expenses associated with promotional activities would also be a 
defense to prosecution, and explicitly includes ‘execution’ of a contract as well as 
‘performance.’ If a payment or gift is corruptly made, in return for an official act or omission, 
then it cannot be a bona fide, good-faith payment, and this defense would not be available. See 
House Conference Report, p. 922. 
123   15 USC Sec. 78dd-1(c)(2); 78dd-2(c)(2); 78 dd-3(c)(2). 
124 See United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. (D. Mass. 14 December 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/Appendices/Appendix%20E(i).pdf . 
125  United States v. SSI-Korea, Court Docket Number: 06-CR-398 (D. Or. October 2006); see also 
DOJ ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.’ (September 25, 
2006). 
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generally less than $350, ‘… more substantial gifts, ranging in value from 
$400 to $8,000, were also given.’ For example, the company allegedly gave 
officials access to the company’s golf club and corporate condominium, 
$10,000 in gift certificates, and a $2,400 luxury watch. This was all held to be 
in violation of the FCPA. 
3.3.3 Books and Records Provisions 
The books and records provisions are found in Sec. 78m of Title 15 Chapter 2 
of the US Code.126 These provisions provide that every issuer which has a class 
of securities registered on a US stock exchange is required to file reports 
pursuant to such registration. Issuers must accurately and fairly reflect how 
company assets are being utilized so as to enhance the confidence of the 
general public and in particular investors.127 As such, every issuer is required 
to file information, documents and annual reports as the SEC Commission 
prescribes to provide proper protection for investors and to ensure fair dealings 
in their registered securities.128 The US Congress believed that the imposition 
in the FCPA of requirements on issuers (1) to maintain books and records 
which accurately and fairly reflected the transactions of the corporation as well 
as (2) to design an adequate system of internal controls to assure that assets 
were used for proper corporate purposes, would significantly influence the 
prevention of the use of corporate assets for corrupt purposes.129 
3.3.3.1 Adequate System of Internal Controls 
The necessity for effective internal controls in the fight against corruption is 
emphasized in the Senate Report. The Senate noted that:  
‘[A] fundamental aspect of management’s stewardship responsibility is to 
provide shareholders with reasonable assurances that the business is 
adequately controlled. Additionally, management has a responsibility to 
furnish shareholders and potential investors with reliable financial information 
on a timely basis. An adequate system of internal accounting controls is 
necessary to management’s discharge of these obligations.’130  
 
                                                     
 
126   The FCPA provisions amend Sec. 13 (Periodical and Other Reports) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding to Para. 13 (b) on the Form of report, books, records and 
internal accounting; directives, Paras. 13(b)(2)-(5). 
127  Senate Report, id., Note 29 above, at p. 7. 
128   15 USC Sec. 78m(a). 
129   Senate Report, id., Note 29 above, at p. 7. 
130   Id. 
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To meet the obligation for effective internal controls, issuers are mandated to:  
(a) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets 
of the issuer;  
(b) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that  
 (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general 
or specific authorization;  
 (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary;  
 (1) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria 
applicable to such statements; and  
 (II) to maintain accountability for assets;  
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization; and  
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken 
with respect to any differences.131  
 
The terms ‘reasonable assurances’ and ‘reasonable detail’ are defined as 
meaning ‘such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent 
officials in the conduct of their own affairs.’132 
3.3.3.2 Prohibition against False Accounting 
In addition to a requirement for effective internal control, the FCPA contains a 
direct prohibition against the making of false and misleading statement 
designed to cover up corrupt activity. The FCPA provides that ‘[N]o person 
shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of 
internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or 
account.’133 The legislative history shows that:  
‘the term “knowingly” connotes a “conscious undertaking.” Thus these 
paragraphs proscribe and make unlawful conduct which is rooted in a conscious 
undertaking to falsify records or mislead auditors through a statement or 
conscious omission of material facts and not behavior that is merely 
negligent.’134  
The Senate committee explained that the inclusion of the ‘knowingly’ standard 
is appropriate because of the danger inherent in matters relating to financial 
recordkeeping that inadvertent misstatements or minor discrepancies arising 
                                                     
 
131  15 USC Sec. 78m(b)(2). 
132  15 USC Sec. 78m(b)(7). 
133   15 USC Sec. 78m(b)(5). 
134    Senate Report, id., Note 29 above, at p. 7. 
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from an unwitting error in judgment might be deemed actionable. However, 
the committee was very clear that:  
‘the use of the term knowing is not intended to provide a defense for those who 
shield themselves from the facts. The knowledge required is that the defendant 
be aware that he is committing the act which is false not that he knows that his 
conduct is illegal.’135  
As such, where the SEC can prove that there has been a failure to maintain 
effective internal controls or that any other of the obligations imposed by the 
accounting books and record provisions have not been met by a corporation, 
this will suffice to establish FCPA liability.136 
This imputes a standard of ‘knowing’ on parent companies for the actions of 
their subsidiaries. As the report points out, the FCPA does not on the face of it 
reach those corrupt overseas payments where, for example, payments are made 
by foreign nationals acting solely on behalf of foreign subsidiaries and there is 
no nexus with US interstate commerce and where the issuer, reporting 
company or domestic concern has no knowledge of the payment.137 However, 
looking the other way will not serve as a defense for a US company with 
regard to bribes made by a foreign subsidiary because of the requirement that 
companies must devise and maintain adequate accounting controls. ‘Under the 
accounting section, no off-the-books accounting fund could be lawfully 
maintained, either by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary, and no improper 
payment could be lawfully disguised.’138 
To implement the requirements of the FCPA, the SEC has adopted two 
regulations under the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).139 Rule 13b2-1 deals 
with the ‘Falsification of Accounting Records’ and provides that ‘No person 
shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or 
account subject to Sec. 13(b) (2) (A) of the Securities Exchange Act.’140 The 
responsibility is placed on the issuer to ensure that the system of internal and 
accounting controls is sufficiently robust to provide the assurance that 
                                                     
 
135   Id. 
136  The Senate Report states ‘… in this limited instance, in order to prove that falsification of 
corporate accounting records or deception of auditors is ‘knowingly’ committed, the 
Commission will be required to establish this element in actions arising under new Paras. 13(b) 
(3) and 13(b)(4).’ See Senate Report, id., Note 29 above, at p. 9. 
137  Id., at p. 11. 
138   Id. 
139  Code of Federal Regulations (General Rules and Regulations promulgated under the Securities 
Act of 1933). (Hereinafter CFR). 
140   17 CFR 240.13b2-1 is codified as 15 USC Sec. 78m(b)(2)(i). 
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transactions that are undertaken by the issuer are executed in accordance with 
the general or specific authorization of management.141 
The second rule 13b2-2(a) deals with ‘Representations and Conduct in 
Connection with the Preparation of Required Reports and Documents.’ It 
prohibits the making of misleading or false statements to the company’s 
internal auditors or accountants and provides: 
‘No director or officer of an issuer shall, directly or indirectly: (1) Make or 
cause to be made a materially false or misleading statement to an accountant 
in connection with; or (2) Omit to state, or cause another person to omit to 
state, any material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading, to 
an accountant in connection with: (i) Any audit, review or examination of the 
financial statements of the issuer required to be made pursuant to this subpart; 
or (ii) The preparation or filing of any document or report required to be filed 
with the Commission pursuant to this subpart or otherwise.’142  
Rule 13b2-2(b) prohibits officers, directors or any person acting under their 
direction from directly or indirectly taking any action ‘to coerce, manipulate, 
mislead, or fraudulently influence any independent public or certified public 
accountant engaged in the performance of an audit or review of the financial 
statements of that issuer that are required to be filed with the Commission 
pursuant to this subpart or otherwise if that person knew or should have known 
that such action, if successful, could result in rendering the issuer’s financial 
statements materially misleading.’143 
The FCPA holds parent public companies responsible for ensuring that the 
accounting books and records of foreign subsidiaries comply with FCPA 
requirements.144 An example is the 2003 case of SEC v. Schering-Plough 
Corporation,145 where the corporation was found liable for violations of the 
FCPA books and records and internal controls provisions resulting from the 
actions of its Polish subsidiary. The SEC alleged that the internal controls of 
the parent company had been inadequate to prevent or detect the payment of 
donations to a charity headed by a government official. Those donations were 
allegedly made to induce the government official to purchase Schering-Plough 
pharmaceutical products for his constituency’s health fund. Schering-Plough 
                                                     
 
141   Id. 
142  17 CFR 240.13b2-2(a). 
143   17 CFR 240.13b2-2(b). 
144 15 USC Sec. 78m(b)(2).     
145 See SEC v. Schering-Plough Corporation, Case No. 1:04CV00945 (D.D.C. 9 June 2004), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18330.htm. 
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did not admit or deny its liability but agreed to pay a $500,000 civil penalty in 
settling the claim.146   
The legislative history does show that Congress was sensitive to the limitations 
of a minority owner to a complete monitoring of the books of a subsidiary. As 
such it provides that ‘where an issuer … holds 50 per cent or less of the voting 
power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm,’ the requirement is that ‘the 
issuer proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under 
the issuer’s circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise 
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with 
paragraph.’147 
3.4 FCPA Penalties 
3.4.1 Criminal Penalties for Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The FCPA provides that any issuer or domestic concern that is not a natural 
person or foreign entity that violates a provision of the FCPA shall be fined not 
more than $2,000,000.148 In addition to this, the general sentencing provisions 
applicable under criminal procedure may apply to increase the levels of 
punishment prescribed under the FCPA. The USC Alternative Fine Provisions 
provide that in general ‘an individual who has been found guilty of an offense 
may be fined not more than the greatest of (1) the amount specified in the law 
setting forth the offense; or (2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of 
this section….’149 Subsection (d) provides for an alternative fine based on gain 
or loss. It provides: 
‘[I]f any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results 
in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be 
fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, 
unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or 
prolong the sentencing process.’150  
The FCPA does not exempt its provisions from the Alternative Fine 
provisions151 and as such the FCPA penalty for an organization or (if greater) 
                                                     
 
146 See U.S. SEC Litigation Release No. 18740 (9 June 2004).  
147  15 USC Sec. 78m(b)(6). 
148  15 USC Sections 78dd-2(g)(1); Sec. 78dd-3(e); Sec. 78ff(c)(1).    
149  18 USC Sec. 3571(b). 
150  18 USC Sec. 3571(d). 
151   18 USC Sec. 3571(e) provides a ‘Special Rule for Lower Fine Specified in Substantive 
Provision,’ and states that:  
‘If a law setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine that is lower than the fine 
otherwise applicable under this section and such law, by specific reference, exempts 
 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
101 
 
twice the gross pecuniary gain to the defendant or the gross loss suffered by a 
person other than the defendant (i.e. the victim of the crime) may apply in the 
sentencing of FCPA violations.  
Any individual officer, director, employee, or agent of a domestic concern, or 
stockholder acting on behalf of entities that are subject to the FCPA provisions 
who commit an FCPA violation can be fined up to $100,000 or face 
imprisonment for five years or both.152 Under the Alternative Fine Provisions, 
this sum may be increased to the higher penalty of $250,000 for an individual 
or (if greater) twice the gross pecuniary gain to the defendant or the gross loss 
suffered by a person other than the defendant (i.e. the victim of the crime).153  
 3.4.2 Civil Penalties for Anti-Bribery Provisions 
Issuers, domestic concerns that are not natural persons and foreign entities 
subject to the FCPA are also subject to a civil penalty of $10,000 dollars in an 
action brought by the Attorney General in the case of non-issuers and by the 
SEC in the case of issuers.154 However, other civil sanctions are applicable to 
persons that violate FCPA provisions. These include prohibitions from 
working, serving on the board or as a consultant, or being involved in any way 
with a defense contract;155 debarment from government contracting;156 
ineligibility for government programs such as the Commodity Credit 
Corporation Facility Guarantee Program157 and the assistance provided under 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.158 Any individual officer, 
                                                                                                                            
 
the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise applicable under this section, 
the defendant may not be fined more than the amount specified in the law setting 
forth the offense.’ 
152  15 USC Sections.78dd-2(g)(2); Sec. 78dd-3(e)(2); Sec. 78ff(c). 
153   18 USC Sec. 3571. 
154  15 USC Sections 78u(c); 78dd-2(g); 78dd-3(e); 78ff(c). 
155  10 USC Sec. 2408 regarding defense procurement contracts. 
156   48 CFR Subpart 9.4 deals with the Debarment, Suspension and Ineligibility of contractors 
regarding government contracts. Rule 9.405 provides that:  
‘Contractors debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment are excluded from 
receiving contracts, and agencies shall not solicit offers from, award contracts to, or 
consent to subcontracts with these contractors, unless the agency head determines that 
there is a compelling reason for such action … Contractors debarred, suspended, or 
proposed for debarment are also excluded from conducting business with the 
Government as agents or representatives of other contractors.’ 
157    7 CFR Subpart C, the Commodity Credit Corporation Facility Guarantee Program, provides 
government guarantees for opportunities or projects that improve the handling, marketing, 
processing, storage, or distribution of imported agricultural commodities or products. Sec. 
1493.270 dealing with Certifications provides that to qualify it must be shown that ‘…[T]here 
have not been and are no arrangements for any payments in violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, as amended, or other U.S. Laws … ’ 
158   Sec. 237(l) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, General Provisions Relating to Insurance 
Guaranty, and Financing Program provides in Sec. 237(l) that:  
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director, employee, or agent of a domestic concern, or stockholder acting on 
behalf of entities that are subject to the FCPA provisions who commit an 
FCPA violation can be fined and in addition be subject to a civil penalty of not 
more than $10,000 imposed in an action brought by the Attorney General in 
the case of non-issuers and by the SEC in the case of issuers. Whenever a fine 
is imposed on any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of a 
domestic concern, this fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such 
domestic concern.159 
3.4.3 Criminal Penalties for Books and Records Provisions 
Any person who willfully violates the books and records provisions or who 
willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any 
application, report, or document required to be filed, or any statements that are 
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be 
fined of up to $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.160 If 
the person willfully making false and misleading statements is not a natural 
person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed.161 Again under the 
Alternative Fine provisions the defendant may also be fined not more than the 
greater of twice the gross pecuniary gain or twice the gross pecuniary loss 
resulting from the offense.162 
3.4.4 Civil Penalties for Books and Records Provisions 
The SEC may also seek monetary penalties for violations of the books and 
records provisions. The Commission may bring an action in a United States 
district court to seek a civil penalty, which the court shall have jurisdiction to 
impose, to be paid by the person who committed the violation. For each 
violation, the amount of the penalty shall not exceed the greater of (I) $5,000 
for a natural person or $50,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of 
pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation.163 If the violation 
involves fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a 
                                                                                                                            
 
‘…No payment may be made under any insurance or which is issued under this title on 
or after the date of enactment of this subsection for any loss occurring with respect to a 
project, if the preponderant cause of such loss was an act by the investor seeking 
payment under this title, by a person possessing majority ownership and control of the 
investor at the time of the act, or by any agent of such investor or controlling person, 
and a court of the United States has entered a final judgment that such act constituted a 
violation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.’ 
159   15 USC Sections 78dd-2(g)(3); Sec. 78dd-3(e)(3). 
160    Sec. 78ff(a). 
161   Id. 
162   15 USC Sec. 3571. 
163   15 USC Sec. 78u(d)(3)(B)(i). 
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regulatory requirement, the amount of the penalty for each such violation shall 
not exceed the greater of (I) $50,000 for a natural person or $250,000 for any 
other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a 
result of the violation.164 If the violation described involves fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement, 
and directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant 
risk of substantial losses to other persons, the penalty for each such violation 
shall not exceed the greater of (I) $100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 
for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such 
defendant as a result of the violation.165  
3.4.5 SEC Powers of Subpoena and Injunction 
The SEC has civil subpoena authority with respect to any books and records 
investigations. The Commission or any officer designated by it is empowered 
to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their 
attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, 
correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the Commission deems 
relevant or material to the inquiry. Such attendance of witnesses and the 
production of any such records may be required from any place in the United 
States or any state at any designated place of hearing. 166 
The SEC also has civil injunction powers. Whenever it appears to the 
Commission that any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or 
practices constituting a violation of any books or records provisions it may in 
its discretion bring an action in a US District Court for a permanent or 
temporary injunction or restraining order.167  
3.5 FCPA Guidance and Opinions by the Attorney General  
The FCPA required that within six months of 23 August 23 1988, the Attorney 
General was first to consult with major stakeholders such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and all 
interested persons through public notice and comment procedures, and 
afterwards to determine to what extent compliance with the FCPA would be 
enhanced and the business community would be assisted by further 
clarification of guidelines about how to comply with the FCPA. These 
                                                     
 
164   15 USC Sec. 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
165   15 USC Sec. 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii). 
166   15 USC Sec. 78u(b). 
167    15 USC Sec. 78u(d). 
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guidelines were to describe what specific types of conduct associated with 
common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts, would be 
in compliance with the FCPA and, very importantly, what precautionary 
procedures domestic concerns may use on a voluntary basis to make their 
activities FCPA compliant.168 The DOJ ultimately did not issue any guidelines 
as required under the FCPA.169  
The FCPA also required that the Attorney General establish a procedure to 
provide issuers and domestic concerns responses to specific inquiries 
concerning whether or not specific activities complied with the requirements of 
the FCPA. An Opinion Procedure was established by the Department of Justice 
to ‘… enable issuers and domestic concerns to obtain an opinion of the 
Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective − not 
hypothetical − conduct conforms to the Department’s present enforcement 
policy regarding the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977.’170 Within 30 days of receiving a request, the Attorney General 
provides an opinion that states whether or not the prospective conduct would 
for the purposes of the DOJ’s enforcement policy violate the FCPA.171 A 
rebuttable presumption that conduct for which the Attorney General has issued 
an opinion is in conformity with the FCPA is created by such an opinion.172  
3.6 Enforcement of the FCPA 
The challenge facing the US government in seeking to fight foreign bribery 
was not underestimated. As a member of Congress puts it:  
‘… the legislation will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. 
Payments falling within the scope of the legislation would include payments 
made on foreign soil to foreign officials and most of such payments certainly 
require the active cooperation of foreign individuals and governments. 
Without such cooperation, the difficulties of obtaining witnesses and evidence 
                                                     
 
168  15 USCA Sections 78dd-1(d), 78dd-2(e). 
169   The department of Justice issued a statement to the effect that: 
‘After consideration of the comments received, and after consultation with the 
appropriate agencies, the Attorney General has determined that no guidelines are 
necessary … [C]ompliance with the [anti-bribery provisions] would not be enhanced 
nor would the business community be assisted by further clarification of these 
provisions through the issuance of guidelines.’  
See Department of Justice, Anti-Bribery Provisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 28694 (12 July 1990). 
170  57 Fed. Reg. 39600 (Order No. 1620-92, 57 FR 39600, 1 September 1992) Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Opinion Procedure.  
171  Id., 80.8. 
172  Id., 80.10. 
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to successfully investigate and prosecute the case would be 
insurmountable.’173 
A two-pronged approach was adopted by the US Congress for the enforcement 
of the FCPA. On the one hand the Department of Justice operates as the 
traditional prosecutor of crimes against the public interest and, on the other 
hand, the Securities and Exchange Commission is responsible for maintaining 
standards of transparency and information on the part of listed corporations.174 
By integrating the strengths of the two institutions, the FCPA has been able to 
provide a ‘unified approach’ that allows the requirements for ‘accurate 
accounting by corporations to be part of a statutory policy that enables an 
effective approach toward corporate bribery.’175 The Senate Report emphasizes 
the importance of SEC involvement in enforcement, stating that: 
‘The SEC has been the principal agency of the Government taking the lead in 
the investigation of foreign bribery. This is as it should be for the bribery of 
foreign officials often violates our securities laws to the extent the payment is 
not disclosed to investors. The SEC has thus developed considerable expertise 
in investigation [sic] corrupt overseas payments. This same expertise can be 
put to work in investigating potential violations of the anti-bribery provisions 
of this legislation.’176  
Apart from the expertise the SEC has developed, the Senate Committee noted 
that a unified approach also reduces the investigative costs involved in fighting 
                                                     
 
173  The House Report quotes the reservation of the Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal who 
stated: 
‘I have always felt a criminal statute such as this one will not be easy to enforce, 
particularly because it does involve acts that take place in other countries, the whole 
question of extra territoriality and gets you into questions of availability of witnesses, 
gets you into the question of acts taken in other jurisdictions in which the laws are 
different ... we must not underestimate the difficulties of enforcement that in any case 
will result from this kind of legislation.’  
See Minority Views to H.R. 3815, Unlawful Corporate Payments Act, House Report, id., Note 
3 above, at p. 19.  
174  A Letter from the Department of Justice dated 20 April 1997 to the Hon. Harley O. Staggers, 
Chairman, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, House of Representatives, 
Washington D.C, House Report, id., Note 3 above, at pp. 17-18, states: 
‘The Department fully recognizes the expertise developed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission over the past several years in the area of illicit foreign 
payments and believes they must play a vital role in any future attempt to deter and 
eradicate once and for all bribery of foreign officials by American issuers. Through 
their voluntary disclosure program they have performed a vital public service in 
exposing the pervasive and apparently longstanding practice of some businesses to 
engage in such illicit practices. Their proposed Rules governing corporate record 
keeping, if promulgated, should further thwart attempts by issuers to conceal such 
payments and will presumably result in many fertile investigative leads.’  
175  Senate Report, id., Note 29 above. at p. 7. 
176   Id., at p. 11. 
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corruption by using investigative capacity already developed by the SEC and 
not duplicating it in the Justice Department.177  
3.7 Effect of Other US Laws and Provisions 
There are other US Laws and provisions that impact the enforcement of the 
FCPA. These have contributed to the increase in anti-bribery prosecution of 
both US and non-US companies by making it easier to find evidence of 
corruption, and, secondly, by creating a big incentive for companies to self-
disclose. The combined effect of these laws provides a carrot that encourages 
companies to co-operate with the DOJ and SEC, in the understanding that this 
co-operation may be rewarded with an exercise of prosecutorial discretion that 
may favor a company. This inspires companies to self-police and self-report 
incidences of corruption. It also acts as a big incentive for companies to set up 
effective compliance and ethics programs, robust internal controls, good 
training programs, anti-corruption policy and company codes, and involves all 
levels of company management and in particular the highest levels. 
The criteria that lead to an exercise of discretion in the company’s favour with 
regard to cases of corruption that violate the FCPA include the following:  Did 
the company share the results of its review, as well as all relevant  
documentation?; Did the company disclose information that was not requested 
and otherwise might not have been discovered?; Did the company produce the 
details of its internal investigation, including notes and transcripts of 
interviews?; Did the company decline to invoke the attorney-client privilege, 
work product protection or other privileges or protections with respect to any 
facts uncovered in the investigation? Did the company have in place an 
adequate compliance program? Did the company take effective remedial 
actions? The extent of disclosure is quite extensive and probably comparable to 
what state investigators would have uncovered with much more difficulty. 
The carrot that makes this option attractive to companies is the opportunity to 
avoid a criminal prosecution and the possibility of debarment from government 
contracting, the management of its public image by the positive message such 
actions send to the public of a responsible company that is seeking to repair 
damage done by errant employees, as well as the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement with the authorities. The primary US laws that encourage such 
public-private partnering in the implementation of the FCPA are the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Memos of US attorney Generals and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines discussed below. 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002178 requires companies to establish effective 
internal controls and ensure that their accounts and financial statements 
accurately reflect the current financial status of the company. The onus is 
placed directly on chief executive (CEO) and chief financial officers (CFO) as 
well as company auditors to certify the accuracy of financial reports, including 
an annual statement regarding the status of internal company controls. The 
financial statement must identify any ‘material weaknesses’ that affects the 
internal controls (including findings of suspicious and illegal transactions) and 
must do so promptly. Severe criminal penalties are imposed on CEO’s and 
CFO’s of companies that render false statements in the form of fines of up to 
$5 million and up to twenty years in prison. Furthermore, the personal liability 
of the CEO and CFO makes it important that any suspicious transactions are 
quickly investigated and disclosed.179  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) Thompson Memo on Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, 20 January 2003. In this memo the 
DOJ advises prosecutors to take the following factors into consideration when 
deciding on whether and how to prosecute companies for FCPA violations. 
These factors include: the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing; its willingness to co-operate in the investigation of its agents; the 
waiver, where necessary, of corporate attorney-client and work-product 
protection; the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance 
program; the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts (i) to 
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an 
existing one, (ii) to replace responsible management, (iii) to discipline or 
terminate wrongdoers, (iv) to pay restitution, and (v) to co-operate with the 
relevant government agencies. The Thompson Memo makes it clear that under 
certain circumstances, companies may be able to avoid prosecution 
altogether.180 
                                                     
 
178   The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, Pub.L. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745, enacted July 29, 2002. 
179  15 USC Sec. 7241 (civil provision) 18 USC Sec. 1350 (criminal provision).  
180    See http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. There have been several 
Guidance Memos issued by Attorney Generals regarding the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in determining when and how to prosecute FCPA violations. These include the 
Holder Memo (1999) – Federal Prosecution of Corporations by Deputy Attorney General Eric 
Holder JR, http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/Holder_Memo_6_16_99.pdf; The 
Thompson Memo (2003) – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations – by 
Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson; The McNulty Memo (2006) – Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations – by Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty, 
www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; and the Filip Memo (2008) – 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations – by Deputy Attorney General 
Mark Filip, www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf. 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Sec. 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission 
Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement 
Decisions, 23 October 2001. Under Sec .21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 the SEC has a discretion whether or not to investigate whether a person 
has violated the provisions of the Act. The factors that the SEC will take into 
consideration in making this determination are listed in the afore-mentioned 
Report where the SEC decided not to take enforcement action against a parent 
company, the Seaboard Corporation, for accounting violations by one of its 
divisions.  The report lists the many factors the SEC  
‘will consider in determining whether, and how much, to credit 
self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation - from 
the extraordinary step of taking no enforcement action to bringing 
reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or including mitigating 
language in documents we use to announce and resolve 
enforcement actions.’ 
A company that co-operates fully with the investigation could in fact have no 
enforcement charges brought against it.   
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, issued by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission and applicable to criminal violations of all federal 
statutes such as the FCPA, require federal courts handing down criminal 
sanctions to take into account the existence or absence of effective corporate 
compliance programs. The presence of an effective compliance program can 
significantly reduce a corporation’s sentence, in some cases by as much as 
95%, while the absence of such a program can increase the sentence. These 
guidelines offer incentives to organizations to reduce and ultimately eliminate 
criminal conduct by providing a structural foundation from which an 
organization may self-police its own conduct through an effective compliance 
and ethics program.  
The Sentencing Guidelines set out minimum criteria for a compliance program 
to be deemed effective: (1) Compliance standards and procedures must be 
established to deter crime; (2) High-level personnel must be involved in 
oversight; (3) Substantial discretionary authority must be carefully delegated; 
(4) Compliance standards and procedures must be communicated to 
employees; (5) Steps must be taken to achieve compliance in establishment of 
monitoring and auditing systems and of reporting systems with protective 
safeguards; (6) Standards must be consistently enforced; (7) Any violations 
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require appropriate responses, which may include modification of compliance 
standards and procedures and other preventive measures.181 
3.8 Loopholes in the FCPA 
The prohibition under the FCPA extends only to corrupt payments to a foreign 
official, a foreign political party or party official, or any candidate for foreign 
political office. A ‘foreign official’ means any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department or agency, or any person acting in an official 
capacity. Wells and Ahmed show in recent research that US, European and 
Japanese companies have devised sophisticated insider partnerships with 
relations and friends of developing country leaders with current-payoff-and-
deferred-gift structures that give in return for no capital investment by such 
persons an equity position that results in a dividend flow.182 Such arrangements 
technically do a not infringe FCPA provisions, which apply only to gifts to 
foreign officials and do not mention friends, business associates, or relatives of 
such persons. 
3.9 Encouraging a Public-Private Partnership 
The effect of the FCPA provisions along with the aforementioned laws and 
initiative that work alongside it is the creation of a unified system of 
enforcement for the FCPA, which encourages a private-public partnership 
between the government agencies responsible for implementing the FCPA and 
the business corporations which it monitors. This is a logical strategy because 
the government does not have effective access to the internal records of 
complex multi-national corporations, while corporations are motivated to 
voluntarily co-operate with the authorities by the promise of reduced sanction. 
It is a marriage of convenience for all concerned and is proving to be a 
pragmatic and realistic strategy. Bribery occurs in the shadows and is difficult 
to expose and prosecute.183 
                                                     
 
181  See www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual.../Chapter_8.htm. 
182  See L. Wells, R. Ahmed, Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property Rights and National 
Sovereignty, OUP, New York, 2007, quoted in T. Moran, ‘Combating Corrupt Payments in 
Foreign Investment Concessions: Closing the Loopholes, Extending the Tools’, Center for 
Global Development, January 2008. 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/15197_file_CombatingCorruption.pdf. 
183   The comments of the Department of Justice are instructive of the US experience in this regard. 
In a letter from the Department it is stated that the:  
‘...experience in combating domestic political corruption, coupled with our own recent 
efforts to develop prosecution [sic] involving the bribery of foreign officials amply 
demonstrates the difficulties of gathering sufficient credible and admissible evidence 
to support prosecution. By its very nature the bribery of public officials is covert and 
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This enforcement model makes it possible for companies, rather than risk the 
negative effects of a public prosecution and significant sanctions being played 
in public view, to co-operate in seeking a deferred prosecution agreement 
worked out in private. This produces a carrot-and-stick scenario. The stick of 
the FCPA and related US laws and initiatives mean that it is even more difficult 
now to ignore the far-reaching effects of the FCPA and the need to integrate 
effective compliance mechanisms into company operations. The carrot is the 
possibility to mitigate the potential damage that may result from anti-bribery 
violations by the corporation by active participation in the detection and 
sanctioning processes.184 By adopting a carrot-and-stick approach to 
implementation, the US authorities have been able to engage the private sector 
to actively participate in the process of uncovering and tackling corruption in 
international business. 
Given the increasing tempo of anti-bribery prosecutions the world over, the 
increased co-operation between governments as well as the political will to 
prosecute foreign companies shown by the DOJ and the SEC, companies can 
expect a higher likelihood of prosecution to follow from any FCPA violations. 
The financial penalties for FCPA anti-bribery violations are quite onerous. In 
addition, companies may risk being barred from government support in the 
form of facilities and participation in government programs. This is quite apart 
from the financial fall-out of attendant bad publicity. What is of significance is 
the increased prosecution of individuals for anti-FCPA violations. The 
personal exposure including the risk of a jail term of individual directors and 
employees is much higher in today’s regulatory climate. 
Apart from the direct effect of penalties and fines, there are several indirect 
consequences that are equally undesirable for the corporation. The general 
public is now more sensitive to ‘corrupt’ multinationals. There is an increasing 
demand for responsible corporate practice. Shareholders and the public at 
large are sensitive to companies that have acquired a ‘bad reputation’ or have 
acted ‘irresponsibly.’ Negative publicity may expose the company to further 
consequences in form of shareholders actions. A recent example is the case of 
                                                                                                                            
 
generally involves consensual parties who go to great lengths to conceal the 
transaction. When the official involved is a representative of a foreign government 
and most of the critical acts take place outside of the country, the problems of 
detection, investigation and prosecution are necessarily compounded.’  
See Letter from the Department of Justice dated 20 April 1997 to the Hon. Harley O. 
Staggers, Chairman, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, House of Representatives, 
Washington DC, House Report, id., Note 3 above, at p. 17. 
184   Cassin writes that the idea is to ‘punish, don’t kill.’ The FCPA framework offers companies 
that want to co-operate alternatives in the form of negotiated settlements. The idea he states is 
that ‘no company is beyond redemption.’ See R. Cassin, Bribery Everywhere, Chronicles 
From the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2009 (based on posts from the FCPA Blog) 
http://www.fcpablog.com/. 
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the shareholders of British Aerospace, who brought a civil action against the 
directors of the company for damages resulting from their failure to detect and 
prevent corrupt behavior on the part of the company.185 Furthermore, civil 
boycotts or other unforeseen actions from an increasingly militant public 
translate into financial losses for the company. The toleration bribery and 
corruption once enjoyed is now completely a thing of the past.  
The effects of the FCPA are in no way restricted to the United States. From 
inception it was designed to tackle corruption occurring outside the United 
States. Under the new international regulatory framework regarding 
corruption, countries are required to co-operate with one another and offer 
mutual legal assistance in the collection of evidence of anti-corruption 
violations. The US DOJ and the SEC seem to be using these avenues of 
cooperation to bring more prosecutions against non-US companies. In addition, 
other OECD countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Norway and the 
Netherlands have increased the tempo of their anti-bribery enforcement. Apart 
from US prosecution, therefore, there is a chain-reaction of anti-bribery 
prosecution that is moving across to Europe and other parts of the world. The 
European Commission is also encouraging more active prosecution of corrupt 
practices.186 
3.10 Internationalization of the FCPA Standard 
The FCPA was the manifestation of the negative sentiments of the American 
public toward acts of bribery on the part of their public corporations. However, 
the international context of the FCPA meant that the standard it set would have 
to exist within the dynamics of multi-jurisdictional, multicultural transactions. 
The imposition of the FCPA standard on American companies gave them a 
handicap compared to competing companies to whom no such standard 
applied. The fact that only the United States had rules prohibiting transnational 
bribery placed it at a competitive disadvantage in the global market place.187 
The question was ultimately whether this American standard would become a 
universal standard or whether, in the face of business realities, the Americans 
would reconsider their domestic standard.  
In the 30-odd years since the passage of the FCPA, the moral outrage of the 
American people has been recast as a fair competition argument. American 
                                                     
 
185  City of Harper Woods Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Oliver, 577 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 2008).  
186  See Seventh Activity Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006 of the European 
Anti-Fraud Office at p. 64. 
187 Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat is reported to have stated that U.S. businesses lost 
contracts worth $30 billion from mid-1997 to mid-1998 because of corruption, S. Nathan, ‘Tie 
Loans to Corruption: Weigh Bribery in Aid Decisions’, U.S.A. Today (17 February 17 1999).  
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companies, saddled with domestic restrictions against foreign bribery, argued 
forcefully that the standard imposed by the FCPA would be their Waterloo if it 
did not apply to all companies trading in the international market.188 The fact 
that the American standard has prevailed189 and become a global norm is 
testament to the realities of the integration of world markets, to the need for 
common standards to ensure fair competition, and ultimately to the economic 
power of the United States.190 The repudiation and moral outrage felt by the 
American people against foreign corruption was transformed into an economic, 
social and political issue of international dimension.191 
3.10.1 World-Wide Criminalization: The Consensus against Corruption 
For over two decades the FCPA remained an American oddity. The standards 
it proclaimed applied only to American companies. Other countries had no 
rules against the bribery of foreign officials and in several countries it was in 
fact a tax-deductible expense.192 The US started a vigorous international 
campaign to redress the situation. Two decades later there is now a significant 
array of international rules to combat transnational bribery. The regulation of 
international bribery has become a central issue in the quest for free and fair 
international trading conditions. The international legal framework regulating 
transnational bribery is a dynamic patchwork of instruments operating at 
international, regional and intergovernmental levels. However, rather than 
                                                     
 
188  See S. Sporkin, ‘The worldwide banning of schmiergeld: a look at the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act on its twentieth birthday’, Northwestern Journal of International Law and 
Business, Vol. 18, 1997-1998, p. 269, at p. 271; S. Lochner, ‘The criminalization of American 
extraterritorial bribery: the effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977’, New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 13, 1980-1981, p. 645, at pp. 645-
653; J. Duncan, ‘Modifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: the search for a practical 
standard’, Northwestern University Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 4, 1982, 
p. 203. 
189  D. Gantz, ‘Globalizing sanctions against foreign bribery: the emergence of a new international 
legal consensus’, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 18, 1998, p. 
457, at pp. 466-468. 
190  See B. Earle, ‘The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD anti-bribery 
recommendation: when moral suasion won’t work, try the money argument’, Dickson Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 14, 1996, p. 207; L. Low, ‘New antibribery rules create new 
compliance responsibilities’, International Business Lawyer, Vol. 26, 1998, p. 272. 
191   C. Corr, J. Lawler, ‘Damned if you do, damned if you don’t?: the OECD convention and the 
globalisation of anti-bribery measures’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 32, 
1999, p. 1249, at p. 1253; T. Snider, W. Kidane, ‘Combating corruption through international 
law in Africa: a comparative analysis’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 40, 2007, p. 
691, at p. 697. 
192 In response to this practice the OECD passed the Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials (1996), urging Member countries that allowed the tax 
deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials to deny the tax deductibility of such bribes. 
See ‘OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials’, 
(adopted by the Council on 11 April 1996 at its 873rd session [C/M (96)8/PROV]) C 
(96)27/FINAL. 
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opening the door to a variation in standards, this chapter shows that the 
international rules have mostly been faithful to the spirit of the FCPA.193  
The first of these was the Inter-American Convention against Corruption 
(IACAC) of the Organization of American States.194 It was adopted by the 
Organization of American States in 1996. The momentum then moved to the 
industrialized West. In 1997 the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development195 adopted a Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention.).196 As its 
name implies, this convention principally addresses the issue of transnational 
bribery.  
Still in 1997, on 26 May, the Council of the European Union took measures to 
tackle corruption amongst European Community Officials. Even though it does 
not make express reference to transnational bribery, the Convention of the 
Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or 
Member States of the European Union ‘EU Convention,’197 defines the act of 
giving or receiving bribes across member states and other corrupt activity by 
European Union officials as a punishable offense. In 2003, this prohibition was 
extended to private sector bribery with the Council Framework Decision on 
combating bribery in the private sector.198 The preamble to the Decision notes 
that the member states of the EU ‘attach particular importance to combating 
                                                     
 
193  Bukovansky describes the emergence of the international anti-corruption regime with a focus 
on its normative dimensions and warns that this regime ‘attempts to unreflectively 
internationalize moral codes without inviting broader, inclusive public discourse on the nature 
and applicability of this normative baggage to diverse societies.’ M. Bukovansky, Corruption 
is Bad: Normative Dimensions of the Anti-Corruption Movement, Working Paper, No.2002/5 
Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1962, pp. 5-21. 
194 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 29 March 29 1996, 35 ILM, p. 724, adopted at 
Caracas, Venezuela, entered into force on 6 March 1997. The United States signed the 
Convention on 29 March 1996 and ratified it on the 27 July 2000. For details of ratification 
and implementation status see http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html (Hereinafter 
referred to as the IACAC Convention). 
195 The OECD is an international organization of states based in Paris. Its goals are the pursuit of 
global economic growth and stability. The 30 members of the OECD account for 2/3 of world 
trade in goods and services. 
196 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Paris, 27 November 1997, in force 15 February 1999, 1998, 37 ILM , p. 1. The 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have ratified the Convention and 
enacted implementing legislation. For details of implementation status see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.htm. 
(Hereinafter referred to as the OECD Convention). 
197 Convention drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3(2)(c) Treaty on European Union on the fight 
against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member 
States of the European Union, Official Journal C 195, 25 June 1997, p. 0002-0011, not yet in 
force. (Hereinafter referred to as the EU Convention). 
198   Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, not yet in force, Official Journal L 192, 31/07/2003 p. 0054-0056. 
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corruption in both the public and the private sector, in the belief that in both 
those sectors it poses a threat to a law-abiding society as well as distorting 
competition in relation to the purchase of goods or commercial services and 
impeding sound economic development.’ As such, Art. 2 requires that member 
states take the necessary measures to ensure that ‘intentional’ active or passive 
bribery in the private sector shall constitute a criminal offense. 
January 1999 saw the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption.199 Like the EU Convention, this convention 
criminalizes active and passive corruption. However, the Criminal Law 
Convention is of wider application. It applies not only to EU officials but also 
to officials of ‘any other State.’200 In 1999 the Council of Europe also adopted 
the Civil Law Convention on Corruption.201 This Convention contains a very 
broad definition of corruption that applies to every type of corrupt activity 
including transnational bribery.   
The international regulation of transnational bribery continued with the 
adoption on 15 November 2000 of the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTC),202 the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUC) adopted on 11 July 2003,203 
and finally the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
                                                     
 
199 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Strasbourg, 27 January 1999, in force 1 July 2002, 
173 CETS. The Convention has been ratified by 43 states including the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. It has been also signed by the United States as a non-member state of the 
Council of Europe. For details of ratification and implementation status see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG 
(Hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Law Convention). 
200 Art. 5 Criminal Law Convention. 
201 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Strasbourg, 4 November 1999, in force 1 November 
2003,174 CETS. The Treaty has been ratified by 34 States including the Netherlands. It has 
been signed but not ratified by the United Kingdom. It has not been signed by the United 
States. For details of ratification and implementation see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=174&CM=8&DF=7/13/2006
&CL=ENG (Hereinafter referred to as the CLC). 
202 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November, 
2000, in force 29 September 2003, 2225 UNTS; (2000), 40 ILM, p. 353. The Convention has 
165 parties and has been signed by 147 including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. For details of ratification and implementation status see 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html (hereinafter referred to 
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203 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 43 (1) ILM, p.1. As of 
April 2006, 10 of the 53 member states of the African Union − Burundi, Comoros, Libya, 
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union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/offTreaties_Conventi
ons_&_Protocols.htm (Hereinafter referred to as the AUC). 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
115 
 
(UNCC).204 The net effect of all these agreements is that there is now a new 
‘hyper norm’ repudiating corruption that ‘transcends national boundaries’ and 
global consensus on the criminalization of transnational bribery.205   
Arriving at a general consensus condemning corruption in international 
business was an important milestone in the development of transnational 
strategy toward corruption. The transnational nature of the consensus puts in 
place a common ‘moral’ standard that serves as a platform for international 
anti-corruption policy and rule-making.206 This platform also serves to 
characterize corruption in international business as a legal wrong. This has 
immediate implications for national rules governing the rights of persons to 
seek remedies for harm suffered as a result of corruption in international 
business. It also has far-reaching implications for the status of transactions that 
result from the illegal infractions of anti-corruption rules. Furthermore, it 
fundamentally changes the environment in which grand corruption now takes 
place. As Wrage points out:  
‘Prior to the adoption of these conventions and the national laws they 
produced, a government official and whoever sought to bribe him could have 
had a reasonably open and moderately civilized conversation about the 
payment the official expected. … While bribe negotiations certainly continue 
today, they tend to be more furtive, they have been forced into the darkened 
corners of restaurants. They are rarely routine. This is reflected in the 
elaborate measures taken to obscure the paper trail….’207 
3.10.2 Categories of Instruments 
The international instruments fall essentially into three categories. First are 
instruments devoted solely to the issue of corruption in international business 
in a similar vein to the FCPA. The second category is those instruments that 
deal with corruption in general but contain provisions covering the issue of 
corruption in international business. These instruments adopt the ideas of the 
FCPA to varying degrees but move beyond the specific issue of corruption in 
                                                     
 
204 United Nations Convention against Corruption, New York, 31 October 2003, in force 14 
December 2005, 2349 UNTS, p. 41; (2005), 43 ILM, p. 37. The Convention has 158 parties 
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market economy.’ M. Bukovansky, Corruption is Bad: Normative Dimensions of the Anti-
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international business to a host of other acts of corruption. The last category of 
instruments deal with corruption and mention corruption in international 
business but do not define it as an offense. 
The OECD Convention follows the footsteps of the FCPA quite closely and is 
exclusively devoted to corruption in international business. The IACAC 
Convention, EU Convention, Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law 
Conventions against Corruption, the UNTAC and UNCC can be described as 
general conventions. They deal with corruption in its broad sense but also 
contain specific provisions that deal with corruption in international business. 
The AU Convention does not define corruption in international business as an 
offense. It however calls on state parties in the ‘spirit of international 
cooperation’ to ‘collaborate with countries of origin of multi-nationals to 
criminalize and punish the practice of secret commissions and other forms of 
corrupt practices during international trade transactions.’208 
The international instruments repudiating corruption have been implemented 
as required by member states under their domestic laws. The OECD 
convention, for example, provides in respect of corruption in international 
business that ‘… each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish that it is a criminal offense under its law ….’209 The 36 state parties to 
the OECD Convention have enacted implementing legislation criminalizing 
corruption in international business.210 The EU Convention is also mandatory 
in its approach. It states that each member state ‘shall’ take the necessary 
measures to criminalize the active bribery of EU officials.211 It permits no 
exceptions in this respect.212 The UN Convention against Corruption, which 
has been signed by 140 countries, calls on parties to take measures establishing 
the act of corruption in international business as a criminal offense, subject to 
the principle of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of other states.213 
The provisions dealing with corruption in international business deal with a 
very specific aspect of corruption and circumscribe this area with a certain 
degree of accuracy. They establish the substantive content of the crime of 
corruption where it has an international dimension. For this reason it can be 
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referred to as international corruption.214 For an international system of 
commerce confronted with varying legal traditions and standards, 
criminalization is arguably a necessary first step. It establishes the normative 
definition of international corruption that makes possible the identification and 
enforcement of infringed rights. In the absence of this first step, the very notion 
of civil remedies would flounder in a sea of relativism. 
3.11 Key Elements of International Corruption 
The identification and circumscribing of the key elements of international 
corruption has resulted in a comprehensive international normative 
framework.215 The global reach of these rules implies a consensus of values in 
respect of international corruption. Within this normative framework the moral 
outrage of the American people has morphed into the common good of 
mankind. The domestic response to the violation of American norms has given 
way to a singular norm of global scale. The mandatory nature of the rules and 
the international dimension of international corruption converge in issues of 
public policy and public interest. This is the normative framework that makes 
possible the discussion on private remedies for corruption. The key elements of 
the rules regarding international corruption closely reflect the framework 
established by the FCPA. These common elements constitute the core 
definition of international corruption. A factor that is central to all the 
provisions is the existence of a foreign element. Some of the conventions also 
link the commercial context in which the international corruption occurs. 
Beyond this minimum core there is some variation regarding passive and 
active bribery, the exclusion of facilitation payments and permitted bribery.  
3.11.1. Active Bribery Directed at a Foreign Official 
International corruption involves a foreign element. Bribery itself is a 
reciprocal act with two or more actors. When such actors are habitually 
resident or domiciled in different countries, this amounts to international 
corruption. This foreign element is clearly stated in some of the international 
rules. For example, provisions speak in terms of an inducement to ‘officials of 
                                                     
 
214  Emphasis added. All further references in this book to international corruption are with 
respect to corruption in international business affairs. 
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another state,’216 a ‘foreign public official,’217 a ‘public official of any other 
state,’218 a ‘foreign public official or international civil servant,’219 or ‘any 
foreign public official or official of a public international organization.’220 
Other provisions call for collaboration with ‘countries of origin of multi-
nationals.’221 In the case of the EU Convention, the foreign element is implicit. 
Art. 1 makes reference to ‘proceedings involving a member state’s official 
initiated by another member state.’222 In a similar way, the foreign element can 
be deduced in respect of the Civil Law convention. The Explanatory Report 
explains that the purpose of its very broad definition of corruption is to ensure 
‘that no matter would be excluded from its scope’223 and that this represents 
part of the broad strategy of the Council of Europe’s comprehensive approach 
to the fight against corruption which it sees among other things as ‘a threat to 
international business ....’224 In this perspective, international corruption can be 
said to occur when natural or legal persons in more than one country enter into 
the transaction associated with the bribe.  
Bribery may be active, i.e., the act of giving a bribe, or it may be passive, i.e., 
the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe. Of the various instruments, the OECD 
Convention follows most closely the approach of the FCPA and does not deal 
with passive bribery of foreign officials. The Inter-American Convention deals 
with this issue indirectly by calling for the criminalization of ‘the solicitation 
or acceptance’ of a bribe by a public official.225 However, this provision is 
separate from its provisions on international corruption. The other instruments 
are even more encompassing. They deal with corruption in general, including 
passive bribery.  
In a very general sense, passive bribery can be described as international 
corruption where the transaction in question involves a foreign element. 
However, the problem the FCPA sets out to cure is not passive bribery 
occurring within the jurisdictional reach of domestic laws, but rather active 
bribery directed at recipients in a foreign country. The need for the 
extraterritorial application of US law was the central motivation for the 
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mechanism of the FCPA to sanction the active bribery of giving bribes to 
foreign public officials. In the absence the jurisdictional link created by the 
FCPA, it is difficult to see how the courts of the ‘supply side’ country of the 
party offering the bribe will have jurisdiction over the recipient foreign official 
of another country. As such, international corruption is essentially concerned 
with the act of active rather than passive bribery.226  
From this perspective, the passive bribery of foreign officials effectively 
amounts to a form of domestic bribery and as such, strictly speaking, will not 
fall within the ambit of a strict definition of international bribery that envisages 
the extraterritorial application of laws to prosecute bribes offered outside 
national territories. The fact that passive bribery is generally covered by the 
rules dealing with domestic bribery is implied from comments of the 
Explanatory report on the Criminal Law Convention. This Convention calls for 
the criminalization of active and passive corruption of foreign officials.227 
However, the Report notes referring to this requirement for criminalization of 
passive bribery say that ‘… contracting parties … will already be covered by 
Art. 3 [dealing with domestic bribery].’ It explains that ‘the inclusion of 
passive corruption of foreign officials in Art. 5 seeks to demonstrate the 
solidarity of the community of states against corruption wherever it occurs.’ 
This inclusion is motivated by the fact that ‘corruption is a serious criminal 
offense that could be prosecuted by all Contracting Parties and not only by the 
corrupt officials own state.’228  
The linking of passive bribery to domestic bribery is also reflected in the 
UNCC which calls on state parties to ‘consider’ the criminalization of passive 
bribery.229 The Interpretative Notes to the Convention show that this was not 
due to any condonation or tolerance of the solicitation or acceptance of bribes 
by foreign officials, but rather because passive bribery is already addressed 
under provisions dealing with domestic bribery which require that state parties 
criminalize the solicitation and acceptance of bribes by their own officials.230      
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The inclusion of passive bribery in the discourse surrounding international 
corruption would broaden the moral reach of international corruption to all 
corruption in business transactions whether domestic or international. 
However, it is important to note that the core definition of international 
corruption centers on a mechanism that renders acts of corruption committed in 
a country punishable by national courts in a country other than the country 
where the act of corruption took place. 
3.11.2 A Commercial Context  
The context in which the transnational bribery takes place is also specified in 
some of the rules. This is in keeping with the spirit of the FCPA, which 
prohibits the offer of a bribe that will influence the ‘obtaining or retaining of 
business.’231 The IACAC Convention stipulates that the act of bribery has to be 
in connection with an ‘economic or commercial transaction.’232 This 
formulation is very broad. Keeping more with the clearer limits set by the 
FCPA, the OECD Convention and the UNCC state that the purpose of the 
bribe should be to ‘obtain or retain business or any other undue advantage in 
relation to the conduct of international business.’233 The EU Convention, 
UNCTC and Criminal Law Convention do not specify any such economic or 
business context for the act of international corruption. Under these systems, 
the scope of application is therefore much broader than that anticipated under 
the FCPA.  
3.11.3 Exclusion of Facilitation Payments and Permitted Bribery 
The OECD Convention excludes from the ambit of its application, small 
‘facilitation’ payments made in some countries to induce public officials to 
perform their functions.234 This exclusion is mentioned in the Commentary to 
the Convention rather than in the Convention itself. The Commentary states 
that while facilitation payments are a corrosive phenomenon, they are one that 
should be regulated under domestic law rather than by international 
regulation.235 This is a reflection of the provision of the FCPA which excludes 
facilitation payments from the ambit of the Act. There is, however, no similar 
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express exclusion of facilitation payments under the other international 
agreements.  
It is interesting to see that some OECD countries in their domestication of the 
OECD Convention have nonetheless penalized facilitation payments. The 
British government, for example, in its anti-bribery legislation, implementing 
the OECD Convention, made facilitation payments illegal.236 In response to 
criticism from British Industry, the British Government stated that there was 
no basis for excluding such payments and commented that ‘a culture of 
facilitation payments hinders those overseas governments who are trying to 
fight both grand and small-scale corruption in their countries.’237 
Permitted bribery also falls outside the scope of the international rules. Clearly 
where the use of a bribe to procure an undue advantage is permitted by the 
laws of the country in question, the question of culpability is moot. The OECD 
Convention allows an affirmative defense when an act of international 
corruption ‘was permitted or required by the written law or foreign regulation 
of the public official’s country including case law.’238 This affirmative defense 
is more theoretical than real given the fact that most countries do prohibit 
bribery. This is, however, in keeping with the model provided by the FCPA. 
There is no such affirmative defense allowed under the other international 
agreements.  
3.11.4 Effect, Nature and Intent of the Bribe  
Under the FCPA, the decision about what constitutes an international bribe 
depend on its effect on the decision making process relating to a business 
opportunity. The FCPA speaks in terms of a bribe that causes the official in 
question ‘to do or omit to do’ an act, in violation of his or her lawful duty.239 
This language is echoed to varying degrees throughout the international 
instruments. These speak of offers of international bribes to public officials ‘in 
exchange for an act or omission in the performance,’240 ‘to act or refrain from 
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acting,’241 or in a fashion that ‘distorts the proper performance,’242 of the 
decision making process relating to the business opportunity in question.  
An international bribe may take the form of an offer, a promise or a grant and 
must, in the language of the OECD Convention, the UNCTC and the UNCC, 
be an ‘undue pecuniary or other advantage.’243 This raises the question of 
what constitutes an ‘undue advantage,’ which opens the door to the differences 
that may exist in business cultures. It is also a subjective valuation. In the 
absence of any supra-national court charged with international corruption-
related dispute resolution, such cases have to be resolved in domestic courts. 
What may be considered ‘undue’ in one jurisdiction may well be accepted as 
necessary and very much ‘due’ in another. It certainly raises the burden of 
proving that, in the context of each particular transaction, a particular offer, 
promise or grant is ‘undue.’ The IACAC does not use such open-ended 
language and speaks simply of the ‘exchange’ of any ‘… article of monetary 
value or other benefit such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage.’244 Similarly, 
the EU Convention uses the expression: ‘gives … an advantage of any kind.’245 
Here the onus of proof is clearly on the offeree, who has to show that the 
exchange was bona fide. 
Another element that distinguishes a bribe is the requirement in the OECD 
Convention, the UNCTC and the UNCC that the act of international corruption 
should have been committed ‘intentionally’246 to procure an advantage. This is 
in keeping with the provisions of the FCPA, which require an intention to 
corrupt in order for the Act to apply.247 This forces prosecutors to establish that 
there was active knowledge of the corrupt purposes behind the bribe. The 
IACAC and EU Convention do not indicate whether intention is a necessary 
element of the offense of international corruption. This leaves open the 
question whether there is a requirement to prove criminal intent under these 
rules.  
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3.11.5 Territorial and Nationality-Based Jurisdiction  
The matter of jurisdiction is a key issue in the regulation of international 
corruption. The subject matter of the transaction affected by international 
bribery, the parties involved, and the location where the event took place will 
usually fall under different jurisdictions. Under the principle of territoriality, the 
anti-corruption instruments generally call for states to assume jurisdiction when 
an offense is committed within its territory. The IACAC Convention, for 
example, provides that parties should take measures to establish jurisdiction 
when an offense is committed within its territory.248 The OECD Convention and 
the Criminal Law Convention in a similar vein provide that a state shall take 
measures as may be necessary in order to establish its jurisdiction over the 
bribery of a foreign public official when ‘committed in whole or in part in its 
territory.’249 The OECD Convention also states that this territorial basis for 
jurisdiction is to be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection 
to the act of bribery is not required.250 The UNCTC and UNCC provide that 
territorial jurisdiction should be established when the offense is committed in a 
member state territory or when committed aboard a vessel or aircraft flying the 
flag of, or which is registered under the laws of a member state.251  
Jurisdiction based on territoriality limits the ability to regulate international 
corruption. The main motivation of the FCPA, and the instruments in its wake, 
is to bring acts of transnational bribery (which by definition occur outside the 
limits of territorial jurisdiction) within the jurisdictional reach of the state from 
which the bribe was supplied. This enhances the prosecution of offenses 
involving international bribery and avoids the uncertainties of domestic legal 
systems and politics. The international agreements acknowledge this and call 
upon members to adopt provisions to make possible extraterritorial jurisdiction 
for offenses outside their own territory. Thus, apart from territorial jurisdiction, 
the international rules require member states to extend jurisdiction to bribery 
offenses committed by their nationals abroad. Such extraterritorial jurisdiction 
makes it possible to establish jurisdiction in all cases involving whatever the 
ability, resources or laws of the state where the bribe is accepted by public 
officials.  
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is not as commonly accepted as territorial 
jurisdiction. The provisions relating to nationality-based extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are phrased in more flexible terms as compared to the provisions 
relating to territorial jurisdiction, which are generally phrased using mandatory 
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language i.e. the parties ‘shall’ adopt such measures as to ensure territorial 
jurisdiction. The IACAC Convention for example states that state parties ‘may’ 
adopt measures establishing jurisdiction in transnational bribery cases ‘where 
the offense is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who habitually 
resides in its territory.’252  
The OECD Convention, on its part, calls on parties that already embrace 
principles of jurisdiction based on nationality to extend their jurisdiction to 
offenses involving international corruption. It states that a party that has 
jurisdiction to prosecute nationals for offenses committed abroad shall take 
‘such measures, as may be necessary, to establish its jurisdiction to do so in 
respect of the bribery of a foreign public official, according to the same 
principles.’253 Although the OECD Convention recognizes that not all countries 
apply principles of nationality-based jurisdiction, parties to the Convention are 
expected to review their jurisdictional rules to assess whether they are effective 
(in the fight) against the bribery of foreign public officials.254 If not, they are to 
take remedial steps.  
The UNCTC and UNCC also use permissive rather than mandatory language 
regarding nationality-based jurisdiction and provide that state parties ‘may also 
establish’ nationality-based jurisdiction.255 The UNCC has the broadest 
formulation of jurisdiction based on the principle of nationality. It states that 
member states can take measures to establish jurisdiction where a national of 
that state or a stateless person who resides in its territory commits the 
offense.256 The EU Convention and Criminal Law Convention, on their part, 
use mandatory language regarding the assumption of nationality-based 
jurisdiction. They, however, also make provision for the fact that not all states 
may have such nationality-based jurisdiction by allowing those states to 
reserve the right not to apply its rules.257 
3.11.6 Mandatory and Permissive Aspects of Normative Order 
A comparison of the key elements of the various rules dealing with 
transnational corruption and of their methodology of adoption suggests two 
models of international regulation. A strict mandatory model and a permissive 
liberal model. The strict model of regulation is epitomized by the OECD 
Convention. The OECD Convention provides that ‘… each Party shall take 
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such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offense 
under its law…’258 The word ‘shall’ is mandatory in character. It is interesting 
to note that the 36 state parties to the OECD Convention have enacted 
implementing legislation criminalizing international corruption.259 The EU 
Convention is also mandatory in its approach. It states that each Member state 
‘shall’ take the necessary measures to criminalize the active bribery of EU 
officials.260 It permits no exceptions in this respect.261 
This contrasts with the position of the other international conventions under 
which there is some degree of flexibility. The IACAC Convention, for 
example, makes the adoption of its provisions by a state party ‘subject to its 
constitution and fundamental principles of its legal system.’262 Only when a 
state has established international corruption as an offense, does such bribery 
constitute an act of corruption for the purposes of the Convention.263 In other 
words the IACAC Convention regulates international corruption only if it is 
regulated under the domestic laws of its member states.264 Similarly, the 
UNCC makes the adoption of measures establishing the act of international 
corruption as a criminal offense, subject to the principle of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.265 The Criminal 
Law convention, on its part, gives signatory states the power to grant 
themselves the right not to establish a particular corrupt conduct as a criminal 
offense under domestic law.266 In a similar fashion, UNCTC states that state 
parties ‘should consider’ adopting provisions criminalizing transnational 
corruption.267  
The above provisions show that the international conventions are for the most 
part permissive rather than mandatory in nature. With the exception of the 
OECD and EU Convention, the adoption of the international rules is left to the 
discretion of the member states. Yet, the relative harmonization in the local 
                                                     
 
258 Art. 1 OECD Convention.  
259 See OECD Website for details of the Implementation of OECD Convention. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
260 Art. 3(2) EU Convention. 
261 Art. 15(2) EU Convention. 
262 Art. VIII Para. 1 IACAC.  
263 Art. VIII Para. 2.  
264 See E. Lagos, ‘The Future of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption’, Inter-
American Development Bank Conference: Transparency and Development in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 4 May 2000. He comments that ‘In regard to international corruption and 
illicit enrichment, this has not been generally incorporated into domestic law. Nevertheless, 
there is growing awareness that nontransparent financial transactions, excessive regulations, 
and untrained and underpaid public officials promote and constitute an incentive to bribery and 
fraud.’ http://www.iadb.org/leg/Documents/Lagos%20Eng.pdf at p. 4.  
265 Art. 4 UNCC. See further on this point Chapters 8 and 9 of this book. 
266 Art. 26 Criminal Law Convention.  
267 Art. 8(2) UNCTC.  
CHAPTER 3 – FROM THE  FCPA TO AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
126 
 
domestication of international rules regarding international corruption is 
important to achieve the objective of fair competition in international trade. 
This fact is acknowledged in the commentaries to the OECD Convention. Here 
it is stated that while uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a 
Party’s legal system are not required,268 the convention establishes a standard 
to be met by members, by providing a definition of what should be 
criminalized.269  
Under the OECD Convention the achievement of a certain equality of 
application is important. The Convention states that ‘achieving equivalence 
among measures to be taken by the parties is an essential object of the 
convention, which requires that the Convention be ratified without derogations 
affecting this equivalence.’270 While this idea of a minimum standard or 
equivalence may be true of the OECD Convention, it is not the case with the 
other agreements. The inclusion of provisions subjecting domestication to 
constitutional requirements, to the principle of sovereignty or to a system of 
reservations, contradicts the idea of a minimum standard.  
However, such divergence may be more cosmetic than real. The ratification of 
the UN Convention by 140 countries and the criminalization of public bribery 
in domestic laws worldwide place it in the same class as mandatory rules 
prohibiting anti-competitive practices, environmental spoliation, money 
laundering and terrorism, i.e. laws which must be applied regardless of the 
agreement between the parties. Such laws curtail and in fact remove the 
freedom to contract at will, ensuring a movement toward convergence.  
3.12 Self-Regulation and Best Practices  
While international corruption is often thought of in terms of the ‘envelope 
under the table’ or ‘suitcase full of cash’ offered to a foreign official, the fact is 
that activities that are more nuanced may also fall foul of anti-corruption 
provisions. Consulting fees, commissions, finder’s fees, referral fees paid to 
third parties such as consultants, agents, lobbyists or distributors, gifts, training 
                                                     
 
268  Such flexibility is identified as a positive indicator of acceptability and ultimately of the 
success of a Convention. See G. Aiofi, M. Pieth, How to Make a Convention Work: The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Recommendation and Convention 
on Bribery as an Example of a New Horizon in International Law, in C. Fijnaut, L. Huberts 
(Eds.), Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp. 
349-360. 
269 Art. 1 Sections 2 and 3 Commentaries OECD Convention, id., Note 234 above.  
270 Preamble to the OECD Convention. See also discussion on the principle of Functional 
Equivalence by M. Pieth, Introduction, in M. Pieth, L. Low, P. Cullen (Eds.), The OECD 
Convention on Bribery, CUP, Cambridge, 2007, p. 27.  
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costs, entertainment, educational sponsorship, goodwill payments, discounts, 
performance bonuses, bad debts, and marketing funds are all strategies that 
may be used as vehicles to ‘facilitate’ the acquisition of business. For 
multinationals the chance that such strategies will be discovered and penalized 
are more likely in today’s regulatory climate than it was ten years ago.  
In this new regulatory environment, the emphasis is as much on avoidance of 
corrupt practices as it is on instituting and implementing internal compliance 
systems. The existence and consistency of application of compliance systems 
can have a dramatic effect on the negotiating ability of a company where an 
infringement of anti-corruption laws does occur. The presence or absence of an 
effective compliance system may also significantly increase or reduce the 
severity of punishment. It is therefore not only desirable but a matter of 
responsible management to establish monitoring and compliance systems 
within a corporation. Indeed the corollary is true − a multinational corporation 
in today’s business climate that does not have a robust monitoring and 
compliance structure in place could well be liable for a breach of duty to its 
shareholders. It is not surprising therefore that the last two decades have seen 
multinational corporations setting up compliance departments at a rapid pace 
and taking steps to incorporate anti-corruption strategy into their daily 
operations. There is a plethora of self-regulation, voluntary codes and sector 
initiatives encouraging voluntary adoption of anti-corruption policies by 
corporations. A few principal initiatives are mentioned in closing this chapter. 
3.12.1 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises provides voluntary 
principles and standards from the state members of the OECD to multinational 
corporations. Principle 7 deals specifically with corruption. Enterprises are 
encouraged not to engage in active or passive bribery, or use third parties such 
as agents to channel bribes or other undue advantages to public officials, or to 
employees of their business partners or to their relatives or business associates. 
Companies are advised to develop adequate internal controls, ethics and 
compliance programs or measures to prevent and detect bribery and to ensure 
fair and accurate books and financial records.  
Furthermore, companies are encouraged to enhance the transparency of their 
activities in the fight against bribery by making public commitments against 
bribery and disclosing the management systems and the internal controls, 
ethics and compliance programs or measures adopted by enterprises in order to 
honor these commitments. Enterprises should also foster openness and 
dialogue with the public so as to promote its awareness of and cooperation 
with the fight against bribery, bribe solicitation and extortion. Enterprises are 
also encouraged to enhance the transparency of their activities in the fight 
against bribery through training programs and disciplinary procedures. In 
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addition, enterprises are encouraged not to make illegal contributions to 
candidates for public office or to political parties or to other political 
organizations. Political contributions should fully comply with public 
disclosure requirements and should be reported to senior management.271 
3.12.2 The OECD Good Practice Guidance 
In 2009 the OECD Council made a Recommendation for Further Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.272 
This Recommendation includes as an annex the Good Practice Guidance on 
Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance. The Guidance is a voluntary non-
binding guidance to assist companies with developing effective internal 
controls, ethics and compliance programs or measures for preventing and 
detecting foreign bribery. It covers the role of senior management, the need for 
a clearly articulated corporate policy, self-evaluation of compliance and ethics 
programs, and clear rules that apply to all company staff as well as entities 
over which a company has effective control including subsidiaries with regard 
to gifts, hospitality, customer travel, political contributions, charitable 
donations, facilitation payments, solicitation and extortion.  
The Good Practice Guidance also requires companies to take steps to ensure 
that ethics and compliance programs or measures designed to prevent and 
detect foreign bribery are applicable where possible to third parties such as 
agents and other intermediaries, consultants, representatives, distributors, 
contractors and suppliers, consortia, and joint venture partners. In particular 
such compliance measure should be taken with regard to risk-based due 
diligence pertaining to the hiring of business partners, informing business 
partners of prohibitions against bribery and seeking reciprocal commitments. 
Companies are encouraged to develop effective systems of financial and 
accounting procedures, and internal controls to ensure the maintenance of fair 
and accurate books and records to ensure that they cannot be used for the 
purpose of hiding foreign bribery payments. The Guidance also covers issues 
of training, communication of anti-corruption policy, appropriate disciplinary 
measures, internal guidance and confidential reporting.273  
                                                     
 
271   See generally the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html . 
272  See http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_34859_39884109_1_1_1_1,00.html 
for further details. 
273   See generally, ‘Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions’, 26 November 2009 (With 
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3.12.3 The United Nations Global Compact 
The United Nations Global Compact is ‘a strategic policy initiative for 
businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with 
ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, 
environment and anti-corruption.’ The Compact calls on companies to 
voluntarily align their activities around a core of 10 principles that cover areas 
of international dimension such as Human Rights, Labor, the Environment and 
Anti-Corruption. Principle 10, dealing with corruption, states that ‘[b]usinesses 
should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and 
bribery.’274 
3.12.4 The International Chamber of Commerce Rules 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Conduct on Extortion 
and Bribery in International Business Transaction provides guidelines to 
companies formulating an anti-bribery code of conduct and corporate 
compliance programs. Developed in 1977 by the Shawcross Committee, it was 
revised in 1996 and again in 2005.275 The Rules of Conduct are ‘intended as a 
method of self-regulation’ for businesses against the background of applicable 
domestic laws.276 The Rules call on enterprises to prohibit bribery (offering a 
bribe) and extortion (demanding a bribe) at all time and in any form whether 
directly or indirectly through agents and other intermediaries.277 It makes 
special provisions regarding vehicles though which such bribery and extortion 
may occur, i.e. agents and other intermediaries, joint ventures, political and 
charitable contributions and sponsorships, gifts, hospitality, expenses and 
facilitation payments.278    
The Rules call on companies to implement comprehensive policies or codes 
reflecting the ICC Rules of Conduct and include four key elements to be 
incorporated into such company codes or policies. Guidance and training, 
provision of confidential channels for whistle blowers, inclusion of 
disciplinary procedures to sanction misconduct, and an indication that they will 
apply to all controlled subsidiaries whether foreign or domestic.279 Guidelines 
                                                                                                                            
 
amendments adopted by Council 18 February 2010 to reflect the inclusion of Annex II, Good 
Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance). 
274  See Website of the Global Compact at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. 
275   F. Heimann, F. Vincke (Eds.), Fighting Corruption: International Corporate Integrity 
Handbook, ICC, 2003, pp. 11-15. 
276  See Introduction Part 1: ICC Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery. (Hereinafter 
ICC Rules). 
277  Art. 1 ICC Rules. 
278  Art. 2-6 ICC Rules. 
279  Art. 7 ICC Rules. 
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relating to financial records and auditing procedures are included with 
requirements for proper and fairly recorded books of accounts available for 
inspection by boards of directors and auditors if available; prohibition of off-
the-books or secret accounts; the need for independent systems of auditing; and 
compliance with national tax laws.280 The Rules also detail the responsibilities 
of the Board of Directors and in particular the audit committee of reasonable 
steps that can be taken to ensure compliance with the rules, including making 
sure that resources are available, supporting management, establishing proper 
systems of control, sanctioning violations and making appropriate public 
disclosure. 
3.12.5 The Partnering against Corruption Initiative  
The Partnering against Corruption Initiative (PACI) is an initiative of the 
World Economic Forum along with Transparency International and the Basel 
Institute of Governance. It is a self-regulatory effort by corporations to take a 
stand against corruption in a peer-reviewed, mutual evaluation process. The 
PACI Principles first issued in 2004 for the engineering and construction sector 
were broadened to be adopted by all companies who commit to a zero-
tolerance approach to bribery and corruption and to put in place an effective 
program to counter bribery.281 
The PACI initiative uses the basis of the World Economic Forum to bring 
companies together to fight corruption. It is a private sector initiative that tries 
to respond to the legal, social and economic needs of society. It provides 
companies with practical guidance and encourages the companies that sign up 
to ensure that all companies or suppliers that interact with these signatories 
also buy into the anti-corruption strategy. The notion of PACI is to create a 
platform where the private sector takes the initiative in drawing up a plan of 
action against corruption independently of states. The key to the PACI is that 
sufficient companies sign up for the initiative to create a culture change in 
global contracting; by so doing this will help to create a level playing field for 
all companies.  
The PACI Principles prohibit bribery in any form and covers areas such as 
political contributions, facilitation payments, gifts, hospitality and expenses. It 
sets out the minimum requirements that a company should meet when 
implementing the program. This covers the role of the Board of Directors, 
business relationships with subsidiaries, joint venture partners, agents, 
                                                     
 
280  Art. 8 ICC Rules. 
281   See http://www.weforum.org/issues/partnering-against-corruption-initiative for more 
information. 
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contractors and third parties. It also covers issues of human resources and 
training as well as whistle blowing mechanisms and communication of anti-
bribery programs. The principles cover the need for effective internal controls 
and audit as well as self-assessment and review. 
3.13 Observations 
The FCPA has set the baseline in the fight against corruption. It remains the 
primary motivator, catalyst and driving force of the international anti-
corruption movement. The most important lessons that have resulted from the 
implementation of the Act are (1) the establishment of a world-wide standard 
repudiating corruption occurring in foreign countries, (2) the development of 
the notion of international corruption and its precise definition, (3) a carrot-
and-stick approach to sanction, (4) the notion of the fight against corruption as 
a private/public partnership, and (5) the acceptance of the need for external 
intervention in bribery occurring in other countries.  
The stark and difficult to control reality of the consequences of corruption has 
meant that moving toward a more consistent standard repudiating corruption in 
business transactions was probably an inevitable outcome of globalization. 
Regardless of its genesis or its motivations, the FCPA is the catalyst that 
produced such a baseline of legality. The FCPA provides a credible method of 
tackling grand scale corruption and inspired a standard that prevails over 
national norms and interpretations. This standard applies across the public and 
private sectors and creates an integrated unified approach that draws public and 
private processes into the fight against corruption. Whatever its shortcomings, 
it represents a watershed in the fight against corruption and has on balance had 
a positive effect. 
In the almost 35 years since the passage of the FCPA, the regulatory 
environment of international business has continued to change. The process of 
integrating world markets is erasing economic borders and the growth of the 
multinational corporation has greatly impacted the international and domestic 
law and policy. The clear cut roles of the private and public sectors have 
become blurred as a result of the changing role of the sovereign state and the 
formidable economic clout of the transnational enterprise. While the FCPA 
refers solely to the bribery of foreign public officials, in the 35 years since its 
passage, for the type of international grand scale corruption to which the FCPA 
applies, the boundaries between public and private corruption have all but 
collapsed.  
Grand scale corruption knows no sectors and international business knows no 
boundaries. Grand scale corruption is by definition a marriage between the 
private sector givers of the bribe and public or private sector receivers of the 
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bribe. The regulation of bribery in the private sector at the national level is 
therefore also inextricably linked to the foreign business which that company 
transacts. Companies with worldwide operations and contacts with the 
American market are exposed to the risk of far-reaching anti-bribery sanctions 
triggered by the FCPA. These corporations are the messengers of the FCPA 
message of ethical business and the repudiation of corruption across the 
globe.282 
The implementation of the FCPA across the public and private sectors is the 
engine that drives the progress of the anti-corruption movement today. The 
FCPA model of implementation is characterized by public and private co-
operation that is underpinned by soft and hard law elements. The international 
framework of rules that has emerged as a result the FCPA has converged to 
establish grand corruption as a legal wrong. This legal fact has both public and 
private law consequences. Indeed, the issue of private remedies is only made 
possible by the baseline of legality established by this framework.  
While the focus of the FCPA is the criminalization of foreign bribery, the 
effect of criminalization is not limited to the punishment of the offender but 
also has effects on associated transactions. As a result the FCPA and the 
international framework of rules that have emerged criminalizing grand 
corruption on a global scale have created by the same token the foundation to 
challenge the transactions that result from illegal corrupt transactions across 
the public-private divide. The international consensus on the illegality of 
corruption in business affairs empowers parties who have suffered damage as a 
result of corruption to seek remedies wherever there is a jurisdictional link in 
the shape of assets or persons. The international consensus positively 
influences the substance of anti-corruption laws as well as the public policy 
against corruption that influences dispute settlement processes.  
This is the great strength of the FCPA model. By adopting a unified approach 
of enforcement using the DOJ and SEC, it acknowledges the limits of the 
criminal law in the fight against as complex an issue as grand scale corruption. 
Nonetheless by adopting the path of criminalization it can use the associated 
stigma and sanction as the launching pad for private sector co-operation. It 
uses this baseline of legality though the mechanism of the FCPA itself, through 
complementary laws and initiatives, as well as the international consensus 
                                                     
 
282  The process of sanction that is emerging in the implementation of the FCPA is very dynamic. 
It cuts across a range of sources of regulation. This affirms the observation that: 
‘a substantive social norm can leave the territory of non-codified social norms and 
migrate back and forth among different forms of regulation and even return to the 
territory of noncodified social norms.’ 
See J. Eijsbouts, id Note 2 above at p.22. 
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against grand corruption, as an incentive to draw multinational corporations 
into schemes of voluntary disclosure and compliance. The effect of the FCPA 
does not stop with US companies because by creating a ‘real sanction’ for 
violations and being aggressive in its implementation, it has set the stage for 
compliance wherever international business takes place that involves US 
issuers, domestic concerns or non-US entities that have engaged in acts in 
furtherance of bribery while in the United States. This model of 
implementation is pragmatic in that it adapts to the reality of the transacting 
environment rather than vice versa.283 Given the economic clout of the US, this 
is a truly global mechanism and gives the FCPA world-wide application.284 
3.14 Conclusion 
The regulation of international corruption has become a central issue in the 
quest for fair international trading conditions and economic growth. In addition 
to the work of governments, international institutions such as the World Bank 
are adopting vigorous anti-corruption policies.285 Transparency International is 
in the forefront of NGOs committed to ensuring more transparency in business 
practices by publicizing information about companies engaged in corrupt 
practices. Despite the plethora of instruments discussed in this chapter, it is 
clear that there is a minimum standard contained in the international rules. The 
differences that exist such as the burden of proof, the context in which 
international bribery occurs, passive bribery, the exclusion of facilitation 
payments and permitted bribery, are more formal than substantial.  
                                                     
 
283   Aiofi and Pieth make a similar analysis with regard to the OECD Convention. See G. Aiofi, M. 
Pieth, ‘How to Make a Convention Work: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Recommendation and Convention on Bribery as an Example of a New Horizon 
in International Law’. id., at Note 267 above. 
284  For this reason the position of the Department of Justice is to be encouraged. Assistant 
Attorney Lanny Breuer, the head of the Criminal Division, recently stated:  
‘I am aware that there have been a number of efforts made this year to amend the 
FCPA, by the Chamber of Commerce and others. We in the Justice Department are 
always open – and I personally am – to working with Congress on ways to improve 
our criminal laws. That said, I want to be clear about one thing with respect to these 
proposals: we have no intention whatsoever of supporting reforms whose aim is to 
weaken the FCPA and make it a less effective tool for fighting foreign bribery.’  
L. Breuer, 26th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2011 FCPA 
Conference, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-
111108.html. 
285  In 2008 the World Bank has said that it will implement the recommendations of the Volcker 
Report and create an independent advisory board composed of international anticorruption 
experts and a consulting unit to help bank staff guard against fraud and corruption hitting their 
projects. See Word Bank News Site, 23 January 2008, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21622074~pagePK:6
4257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
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There is a divergence between strict and permissive models of regulation. The 
mandatory strict model applied by the OECD Convention is probably the most 
effective approach. In contrast, more liberal models of regulation are found in 
other instruments that grant more discretion in implementation. In this sense, 
the rules regulating international corruption fail to achieve a common standard 
in application.  
However, from a pragmatic point of view, it may well be that although a 
common standard in content and application is the best method of ensuring the 
uniformity essential to fair competition, the existence of more liberal models is 
the glue that holds the regulatory system together. Such flexibility allows 
countries to participate at the level of their particular legal, social and political 
conditions. The absence of a common standard may in fact result in greater 
participation with varied but incremental steps toward a common standard. By 
accommodating jurisdictional and cultural differences, a liberal model plays an 
important role in pushing the international market toward free and fair 
competition. 
The necessity for a level playing field in international business has triumphed 
over cultural differences and domestic conditions in the fight against 
corruption in commercial transactions. The global consensus on the criminality 
of corruption in international business has implications for transactions that are 
centered on such illegal activity. This means that the discussion about private 
remedies for damage suffered as a result of corruption now occurs within an 
international framework where the illegality of grand scale corruption has 
become established as a rule of law. 
.
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4.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines private remedies for corruption under US Law. Federal 
and state laws criminalize bribery in commercial transactions and by so doing 
establish public policy against corruption that shapes judicial decision making 
in private claims. The first part of the chapter looks at the laws that provide the 
foundation for the private remedy for corrupt acts. The principal federal laws 
that serve as a backdrop to private claims by individuals are the FCPA as well 
as US antitrust and securities legislation. Other potential avenues for private 
claims are the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the 
False Claims Act. Also within this framework is federal law prohibiting the 
bribery of domestic public officials as well as state commercial bribery 
statutes. These rules are the launching pad for the private claim for corruption. 
The second part of this chapter examines the questions of transaction validity 
and the right to institute legal proceedings.  Particular focus is placed on the 
extent to which the Art. 35 UNCC stipulation for a right to institute legal 
proceedings can be equated with a private right of action under US law. The 
position of the US Senate with regard to Art. 35 UNCC, as well as the response 
of US courts to attempts to exercise a private right of action in respect of anti-
corruption rules, are examined. With regards to transaction validity, the effect 
of public policy against corruption and in particular the response of the US 
courts to the primary and secondary contracts tainted by corruption is 
analyzed. In addition, instances where parties have sought to institute legal 
proceedings for damage suffered as a result of corruption are discussed.  This 
provides a taxonomy of the types of private remedies for corruption that are 
possible under the US system. 
In view of the federal structure of US government, where necessary, the laws 
of the State of New York are used as illustrative of state law because it is the 
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state with the longest history of anti-bribery laws.1 Furthermore, the American 
Law Institute’s Restatements of the Law of Contract, Torts, Agency, Unfair 
Competition, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment are referred to as they 
represent a codification of US common law principles regarding the contracts 
tainted by corruption and in particular questions of enforceability and 
restitution.2 
4.2 The Normative Framework 
4.2.1 International Instruments 
The US is a party to the major international anti-corruption instruments.3 In a 
broad sense, these international conventions can be described as the ‘offspring’ 
of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.4 The US Senate has consented to the 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption. As a non-member state of the 
Council of Europe, the US has signed but not ratified the Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. It has however not signed or ratified 
the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption.5 The OECD 
Convention and UNCC have been signed and incorporated into US law. These 
two instruments are the most far reaching of the international instruments 
against corruption that the US is a party to and are the focus of the rest of this 
chapter. 
                                                     
 
1. Noonan remarks that New York was the pioneer in the criminalization of bribery of private 
persons making it a misdemeanor in 1881 to give a ‘gift’ to an agent, employee or servant.’ 
See J. Noonan, Bribes, MacMillan, New York, 1984, p. 578. See also a historical viewpoint on 
the development of the bribery offense in J. Lindgreen, ‘The elusive distinction between 
bribery and extortion: from the common law to the Hobbs Act’, UCLA L. Rev., Vol. 35, No, 
815, 1988, p. 889. Lindgreen notes that ‘[s]ince this statute [New York] is broadest in scope, 
has been more widely enforced than any other, and has served as a prototype for the legislation 
of several other states.’ 
2. As a federation of states, contract, tort, agency and unjust enrichment laws in the US are found 
in state case law and statutes. However, the American Law Institute in producing the 
Restatements of US Law has codified the common law in these areas. See Chapter 1 Note 77 
for full references of the various Restatements used in this chapter. 
3. For an overview of US involvement in international agreements relating to the Bribery of 
Foreign Officials, See the Department of Justice at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/  
4. As noted by Senator Feingold, ‘But with the signing of the OECD Convention ... the rest of the 
industrialized world, along with several key lesser developed countries, is finally beginning to 
follow America’s lead. What this convention does is initiate significant steps to raise the 
standards of our major trading partners to the level established by the FCPA.’ Congressional 
Record – Proceedings and Debates of the 105th Congress Second Session Vol. 144, Part 13, 
Senate, 31 July 1998 to 8 September 1998, United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1998, pp. 18327-19630, at p. 18510. 
5. See Chapter 7 below. For chart of signatures and ratifications see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=174&CM=8&DF=22/11/2010
&CL=ENG.  
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The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions was incorporated into US law by the 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.6 This Act 
amended the FCPA to make it OECD-compliant by (1) removing the need for a 
territorial nexus,7 introducing the possibility of criminal liability for foreign 
national agents or employees of US corporations8 and (2) broadening the 
definition of ‘foreign official’ to include employees of international 
organizations.9  
The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCC) criminalizes international 
corruption.10 In addition to this prohibition, it broadens the scope of the legal 
response to corruption by requiring the establishment of civil liability for the 
offenses of corruption established under the Convention.11 Very importantly, 
the Convention requires in Art. 35 that members of the convention ensure that 
                                                     
 
6. Pub. L 105-366, signed on 10 November 1998. This act added a new Sec. 78dd-3 to Title I of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
7. The Amendments of 1998 remove the requirement that a means of interstate commerce must 
be used in the commission of the act of bribery. This means that there is no need for a 
territorial nexus where US individuals and corporations engage in prohibited conduct. Acts by 
such persons occurring outside the United States would fall under the ambit of the FCPA. See 
15 USC Sec. 78dd-2(i)(1), which provides that:  
‘It shall be unlawful for any United States person to corruptly do any act outside the 
United States in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of 
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the 
giving of anything of value to [a foreign official] … irrespective of whether such 
United States person makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce in furtherance of such offer, gift, payment, promise, or 
authorization.’  
8. 15 USC Sec. 78ff (c)(2) provides that:  
‘(A) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stockholder acting on 
behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates subsection (a) or (g) of Sec. 78dd–1 of 
this title shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, 
or both. (B) Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, or stockholder 
acting on behalf of such issuer, who violates subsection (a) or (g) of Sec. 78dd-1 of 
this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an 
action brought by the Commission. (3) Whenever a fine is imposed under Para. (2) 
Upon any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder of an issuer, such fine 
may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such issuer.’ 
9. 15 USC Sec. 78dd-(f)(1)(A) provides that:  
‘The term ‘foreign official’ means any officer or employee of a foreign government 
or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such 
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such 
public international organization.’ 
10. Art. 15-25 UNCC. 
11. Art. 26(1) UNCC provides that ‘Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for 
participation in the  offenses established in accordance with this Convention. Art. 26(2) UNCC 
stipulates that subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons 
may be criminal, civil or administrative.’ 
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their domestic laws provide for the right of private remedies for persons 
harmed by acts of corruption by stipulating that states ensure that parties have 
the right to institute legal proceedings.12 The UNCC also requires that states 
consider the validity of transactions that result from corrupt acts.13 The United 
States signed the UNCC on 9 December 2003 and ratified it on 30 October 
2006.  
4.2.2 Federal Law 
There are no laws that are specifically directed at providing private remedies 
for victims of corruption. However, claimants have resorted to using 
provisions in rules that seek to ensure fair trading mechanisms, disclose full 
information for investors, provide accountability in government projects and 
fight organized crime as launching pads for private action to be taken for 
damage suffered as a result of corrupt activity. Enterprising claimants have 
used the private rights of action granted under these instruments to found 
corruption-related claims. Apart from this, wherever a corrupt activity is 
criminalized, this has implications with regard to the transactions that result 
from the legal wrong. As such, laws that establish bribery as a legal wrong as 
well as those that provide for private rights of actions, serve as a foundation for 
bribery-related claims.  
The primary federal prohibitions of international and public bribery are found 
in the FCPA14 and the Bribery, Grafts and Conflicts of Interest Statute.15 These 
instruments establish international and national public corruption as legal 
wrongs. Apart from these principal instruments there are other federal and state 
laws that impact on corrupt activity.16 Examples of such statutes are the 
                                                     
 
12. Art. 35 UNCC.  
13. Art. 34 UNCC. 
14. See Chapter 3 above.  
15. Title 18 USC, Chapter 11, Bribery Graft and Conflicts of Interest. 
16. Henderson and Guida in their overview of Private Commercial Bribery in the United States list 
the relevant statutes as including the following: The Travel Act (1961), Title 18 USC Sec. 
1952, Pub. L. 87-228 Sec. 1(a), 13 September 1961, 75 Stat. 498, which makes it an  offense to 
commit bribery in violation of the laws of the state in which it was committed; The Anti-
Kickback Act (1946 as amended), Title 41 USC Sec. 53, which prohibits kickbacks involving 
contractors under federal contracts; The Federal Securities Act (1934) and State ‘Blue Sky’ 
Laws, which prohibit fraud in connection with the sale of securities and enable the purchaser to 
make a reasoned decision based on reliable and adequate information; the Mail and Wire Fraud 
statutes (1948), Title 18 USC Sec. 1341, and Title 18 USC Sec. 1343. These laws prohibit the 
use of mail and wire facilities for fraudulent purposes; The Racketeering Influenced and 
Corrupt Organization Act, RICO Act (1970), as amended Title 18 USC Sec. 1962, which 
enables persons financially injured by a pattern of criminal activity to bring a RICO claim in a 
federal or state court and to obtain damages three times the amount of their actual harm, plus 
attorney’s fees and costs; The Clayton Anti-Trust (1914) and Robinson-Patman Acts (1936), 
Title 15 USC Sections 13(c), which seeks to prevent sellers and brokers from yielding to the 
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various antitrust instruments and anti-racketeering rules.17 These statutes allow 
for a private right of action and introduce notions of compensation and the 
payment of aggravated damages. An Act which deserves mention for the 
opportunities it offers to incentivize the potential plaintiff is the False Claims 
Act18, which rewards a plaintiff with a share of the damages recovered by 
government prosecutors. Carrington argues that the False Claims Act can in 
fact serve as a model of private intervention in circumstances where 
corruption renders government institutions ineffective in the fight against 
corruption. He states:  
‘The relevance of the American practice of privatized law enforcement to the 
corruption problem results from the historical fact that it is a product of a 
nineteenth-century culture sharing very limited trust in government and its 
officers. Its cultural situation thus bears some resemblance to the situations 
both in impoverished lands and in the community of nations hoping for 
enforcement of international law prohibiting corrupt practices. It is a system 
of law enforcement that reduces the law’s dependence on the integrity of 
judges, prosecutors, and other public servants. Wherever public integrity is in 
great doubt, the American experience may offer useful instruction.’19 
4.2.2.1 18 USC Chapter 11 Bribery Graft and Conflicts of Interest 
Abusing public trust for private gain is a criminal offense under US law. The 
Bribery, Graft and Conflicts of Interest statute is a federal law that criminalizes 
active and passive bribery of US public officials acting for or on behalf of the 
US government.20 It provides that whoever directly or indirectly corruptly 
gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official with the intent 
of influencing the public official in his public duties shall be fined not more 
than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is 
greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be 
                                                                                                                            
 
economic pressures of large buying organizations by granting unfair preferences in connection 
with the sale of goods; The Economic Espionage Act (1996), Title 18 USC Sec. 1832, which 
criminalizes the theft, unauthorized appropriation, or acquisition, by fraud or copy, of 
protected interests; The Tax Fraud and Internal Revenue Code (1954 as amended), Sec. 7201 
of the Internal Revenue Code; Bribery in Procurement of Bank Loans (1984 as amended), Title 
18 USC Sec. 1344; Sports Bribery (1964 as amended), Title 18 USC Sec. 224; Bribery of 
Witnesses and Perjury (1962 as amended), Title 18 USC Sec. 201; Bribery within Employee 
Benefit or Pension Plans, Title 18 USC Sec. 1954. See K. Henderson, K Guida, The United 
States, in G. Heine, B. Huber, T. Rose (Eds.), Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of 
National and Supranational Legal Structures, Paris, ICC, 2003, pp. 479-557. 
17. The principal regulations in this regards are the antitrust instruments in the Sherman Act 
(1890), Clayton Act (1814), Robinson-Patman Act (1936), and the RICO Act (1982).  
18. Codified at 31 USC Sec. 3729-3733.  
19. P. Carrington, ‘Law and transnational corruption: the need for Lincoln’s law abroad’, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 70, 2007, p. 109, at p. 112. 
20. 18 USC Sec. 201(a). 
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disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.21  
The statute also criminalizes the soliciting of a bribe by a public official, and it 
stipulates that any public official who corruptly demands, seeks, receives, 
accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any 
other person or entity, in return for being influenced in the performance of a 
public duty, shall be fined not more than three times the monetary equivalent 
of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than 
fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of 
honor, trust, or profit under the United States.22 Not only must US public 
officials not solicit or receive bribes, they must not participate in any bribery-
related scheme. Sec. 208 of the same statute prohibits any public officer or 
employee of a US authority from participating in the decision, approval, 
disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or 
otherwise, in a judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or 
other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or 
other particular matter in which such an officer has a financial interest. 
4.2.2.2 Antitrust Law 
US antitrust laws have been used with respect to bribery-related claims.23 The 
US Supreme Court has commented that antitrust laws are:  
‘designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the 
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the 
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing 
an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions.’24  
The payment of a bribe may distort healthy competition in the market place. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 addresses the issue of anti-competitive 
                                                     
 
21. 18 USC Sec. 201(b)(1). 
22. Id., 201(b)(2). 
23. Gevurtz points out that commercial bribery claims that are predicated on the Sherman Act are 
coming before the courts with increasing frequency. See F. Gevurtz, ‘Commercial bribery and 
The Sherman Act: the case for per se illegality’, U. Miami L. Rev., Vol. 42, p. 365; see also F. 
Gevurtz, ‘Using the antitrust laws to combat overseas bribery by foreign companies: a step to 
even the odds in international trade’, Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, 1987, 
p. 211. 
24. See Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), at p. 4. See also J. Zamansky, 
‘Preferential treatment, payoffs and the antitrust laws: distortion of the competitive process 
through commercial bribery’, Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 83, 1978, p. 558, at p. 563.  
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
 
143 
 
practices that may occur in the setting up of cartels or monopolies. Sec. 1 of 
the Act provides that ‘[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.’25 Sec. 2 of the Act 
stipulates that:  
‘Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony ....’26 
The Sherman Act directs itself ‘not against conduct which is competitive, even 
severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition 
itself.’27 The door to the private claimant in antitrust claims was opened by the 
Clayton Act enacted in 1914 to supplement the Sherman Antitrust Act.28 This 
Act allows for a private right of action for persons who have suffered antitrust 
injury and provides in Sec. 4 that: 
‘any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue in any district court of the 
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has 
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.’29 
As such, under US antitrust laws, private persons may sue for treble damages 
where they have suffered an injury as a result of an antitrust violation. 30 The 
                                                     
 
25. 15 USC Sec. 1. 
26. 15 USC Sec. 2. 
27. See US Supreme Court in Spectrum Sports Inc. et al. v. McQuillan et vir, DBA Sorboturf 
Enterprises, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), at p. 458. 
28. 15 USC Sec. 15 (1983 & Supp. 1990).  
29. Clayton Act, Ch. 323, Sec. 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) as amended Pub. L. 96-349, Sec 4(a)(1), 94 
Stat. 1156 (1980); Pub. L. 97-393, 96 Stat. 1964 (1982) (current version at 15 USC Sec. 15 
(1983 & Supp. 1990).  
30. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, (1977), at pp. 484-489. The 
court held that for plaintiffs in an antitrust action to recover treble damages on account of Sec. 
7:  
‘[Clayton Act] violations, they must prove more than that they suffered injury which 
was causally linked to an illegal presence in the market; they must prove injury of the 
type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes the defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury must reflect the anticompetitive 
effect of either the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the 
violation.’  
Similarly in J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981) at p. 568, the 
court held that:  
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US Supreme Court has noted that this is meant to encourage the private 
claimant to support the government in tackling antitrust violations. The court 
stated:  
‘[C]ongress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their 
actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by 
an antitrust violation. By offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery 
in three times the amount of their damages, Congress encouraged these 
persons to serve as ‘private attorneys general.’31 
Private claims based more specifically on allegations of commercial bribery 
have also been brought on the basis of the Robinson-Patman Act.32 This Act, a 
1936 amendment to Sec. 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, was designed to curb 
price discrimination caused by the practices of chain store buyers who used 
‘dummy’ brokerage (commission) fees as a means of securing price rebates to 
buy products at lower prices.33 The stores required sellers to pay a ‘brokerage’ 
to persons employed by the stores. These persons had rendered no service, and 
would simply pay over the commissions to their employers.34 Payment of 
commissions by a seller to an employee of the buyer for which no service was 
rendered was little more than a thinly cloaked bribery scheme. This led to an 
uncompetitive situation. As a consequence the Robinson-Patman Act was 
enacted.  
                                                                                                                            
 
‘By its terms Sec. 2(a) [of the Clayton Act] is a prophylactic statute which is violated 
merely upon a showing that “the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to 
lessen competition.“ … “As our cases have recognized, the statute does not require 
that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition….” Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act, in contrast, is essentially a remedial statute. It provides treble damages to 
“any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . .” To recover treble damages, then, a plaintiff must 
make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were 
designed to prevent.’ 
31. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972), at p. 262. The US Supreme 
Court notes that ‘the purpose of giving private parties treble damage and injunctive remedies 
was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing 
the antitrust laws.’ 
32. In Federal Trade Commission v. Henry Broch & Co, 363 U.S. 166 (1960), at note 6, to the 
judgment the US Supreme Court referring to the 80 Cong. Rec. 7759-7760, 8111-8112, stated 
in obiter that ‘although not mentioned in the Committee Reports, the debates on the bill show 
clearly that Sec. 2(c) was intended to proscribe other practices such as the ‘bribing’ of a 
seller’s broker by the buyer.’  
33. For historical overview see K. Allen, M. Williams, ‘Commercial bribery, antitrust injury and 
Sec. 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act’,  Gonzaga L. Review, Vol. 26, 
1990/91, p. 167, at pp. 170-173. 
34. Per Weis J. in Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 371 (3rd Cir. 1985), at 
p. 371. 
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Sec. 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act35 prohibits the payment of such 
commissions where there has been no service rendered in respect of a sale of 
goods. It provides that it is unlawful for: 
‘any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or 
grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, 
or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except 
for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, 
or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, 
representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is 
acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of 
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such 
compensation is so granted or paid.’ 
Treble damages can be recovered where the plaintiff suffers an injury that the 
antitrust laws were established to prevent. Such a brokerage payment may 
constitute an antitrust injury that can found a private action under Sec. 4 of the 
Clayton Act.36 The courts have in fact applied the Robinson-Patman Act to 
cases of bribery in sales transactions.37 There are however several limitations 
to the potential plaintiff regarding the use of the Robinson-Patman Act as a 
means of seeking remedy. Firstly, it only applies to transactions involving the 
sale of goods, and secondly, it only applies where the defendant has been 
‘engaged in commerce.’ Thus in the case of bribes paid to influence the 
acquisition of business by bribing public officials, as is the case with 
international corruption, there may be little scope for the application of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. 
 
 
                                                     
 
35. 15 USC Sec. 13(c). 
36. Clayton Act, id., Note 29 above.  
37. See for example Grace v. E J Kozin Company, 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976), where events 
constituting commercial bribery were held to come within the terms of 2(c); and Rangen, Inc. 
v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 936, where 
it was held that Sec. 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act encompasses 
cases of commercial bribery tending to undermine the fiduciary relationship between a buyer 
and its agent, representative, or other intermediary in a transaction; in Environmental Tectonics 
Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F.Supp. 1381 (D.N.J. 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 
847 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1988), 493 U.S. 400 (1990), the Court held that it is generally agreed 
that a direct competitor of a company that obtains a contract through commercial bribery has 
standing to press a 2(c) claim against the briber; in Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 
770 F.2d 367, 371 (3rd Cir. 1985) the Supreme Court affirmed that as a general matter, 
commercial bribery is actionable under 2(c), but that a plaintiff must show that the illegal 
payments in question crossed the line from buyer to seller or vice versa for the Robinson-
Patman Act to apply. 
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4.2.2.3 Securities Acts 1933 and 1934 
Corporate wrongdoing often results in harm to the corporation, which 
adversely impacts the interests of shareholders. There is also increased public 
activism and shareholder awareness about the links between corporate 
governance and issues such as human rights, corruption, environmental 
pollution, conditions in the workplace, animal welfare and sustainable 
development. Corporate scandals such as Enron, Siemens, BAE, and 
Halliburton have focused attention on mechanisms to manage corporate 
wrongdoing and increase accountability in corporate decision making. This is a 
driver for efforts to influence the decision making processes of corporations in 
a manner that protects the interest of shareholders in particular, as well as a 
broader range of stakeholders in general. An important vehicle for shareholders 
to redress harm occasioned to the corporation or to their interests is to institute 
legal proceedings against or on behalf of a corporation by way of derivative or 
class-direct actions. 
Such actions may be based on allegations of inaccurate or misleading 
information to shareholders. Engaging in secret acts of corruption that are not 
disclosed to shareholders may constitute information that may have influenced 
the investment decisions of a shareholder. The Securities Exchange Act of 
193338 requires that shareholders receive complete and accurate information 
before they invest. Sec. 10(b) of the Securities Act 1933 requires that a 
prospectus for the protection of investors must not include any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact.39 Sec. 11-12 
provides for civil liability on account of false registration statements and 
enables any shareholder to sue company executives for damages.40 Violation of 
                                                     
 
38. Codified at 15 USC Sec. 77a et seq. 
39. Codified at 15 USC Chapter 2A Sec. 77j, which deals with information required in a 
prospectus and provides in Sec. 77j (b) that:  
‘[t]he Commission may at any time issue an order preventing or suspending the use 
of a prospectus permitted under this subsection, if it has reason to believe that such 
prospectus has not been filed (if required to be filed as part of the registration 
statement) or includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any 
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein, 
in the light of the circumstances under which such prospectus is or is to be used, not 
misleading.’  
40. Securities Act 1993, Sec. 11(a) Codified at 15 USC Chapter 2A Sec. 77k provides that:  
‘in case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of 
such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—(1) every person who signed the 
registration statement; (2) every person who was a director of (or person performing 
similar functions) or partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the 
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the registration requirements can lead to civil liability for the issuer and 
underwriters.41 Sec. 20 provides that the court may impose civil penalties on 
persons who have committed violations of the Securities Act of between 
$5,000-$100,000 for a natural person and $50,000-$500,000 for any other 
person or the gross pecuniary gain made by the defendant, whichever is the 
greater.42 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also allows for the possibility of private 
actions by investors.43 The 1934 Act is the umbrella Act for the FCPA and was 
enacted to regulate the secondary trading of securities, often through brokers. 
Such transactions, usually conducted through securities exchanges and over-
the-counter markets, were considered by the US Congress to be affected with a 
national public interest which made it ‘necessary to provide for regulation.’44 
The intervention of the state was considered necessary to protect citizens who 
may suffer the ‘catastrophic consequences’ of private corporate acts. Sec. 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: 
‘it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange … [T]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based 
swap agreement …, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.’45  
The securities laws are provided for the protection of the private investor and 
the rules give such private investors a private right of action. Sec. 20(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Act provides for private right of action for 
securities violation and states: 
                                                                                                                            
 
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted; (3) every person 
who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to 
become a director, person performing similar functions or partner; (4) every 
accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to 
a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having prepared 
or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified 
any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement, 
with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, 
which purports to have been prepared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with 
respect to such security.’   
41. See Sec. 11-12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2) Securities Act of 1933. 
42. See Sec. 20(d) Securities Exchange Act 1933 Codified at 15 USC Sec. 77t(d)(2). 
43. Codified at 15 USC Sec. 78a et seq. 
44. Title 15 Chapter 2B Sec. 78b: Necessity for Regulation. 
45. Codified at 15 USC Sec. 78j(b). 
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‘any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations 
there under by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of 
material, non-public information shall be liable in an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the 
purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such violation, has 
purchased (where such violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold 
(where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) securities of the 
same class.’  
Penalties may range from between $5,000-$100,000 for a natural person and 
$50,000-$500,000 for any other person or the gross pecuniary gain made by 
the defendant, whichever is the greater.46   
4.2.2.4 The RICO Act 1970 
Violations of the FCPA are a predicate act under the 1970 Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act47 and may give rise to a 
private cause of action. Victims harmed by the acquisition or investing 
activities of a racketeering enterprise which has engaged in a ‘pattern or 
racketeering activity’ may sue for treble damages.48 Racketeering activity is 
defined to include any threat or act involving among other things bribery.49 
The US courts have affirmed that the right of the plaintiff to private redress 
under RICO includes persons who have suffered damage as a result of 
commercial bribery.50    
The RICO Act provides that it shall be:  
‘unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an 
unlawful debt … to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 
                                                     
 
46. Emphasis added. Sec. 20 Securities Exchange Act 1934 Codified at 15 USC Sec. 78t(a). 
47. Codified at 18 USC Sec. 1961-1968. ‘Racketeering activity’ is defined in 18 USC Sec. 1961(1) 
by listing predicate offenses that are considered racketeering activity. The list includes acts 
made punishable by state law, such as ‘murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, 
extortion,’ and certain drug offenses; as well as specific federal offenses including mail fraud 
and interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United 
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) at Para. 74.  
48. 18 USC Sec. 1964(c).  
49. 18 USC Sec. 1961(1).  
50. In Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) at Para. 
88, the Court stated:  
‘the broad remedial purposes of RICO clearly permits private lawsuits by a firm 
forced to pay bribes or kickbacks of any kind. [Plaintiff] was directly injured if, as 
alleged, it paid for services it never received, the proceeds of which were used to pay 
off [its] employees and to bribe union officials. RICO was addressed to the precise 
form of racketeering activity which allegedly took place here.’  
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income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or 
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.’51  
A pattern of racketeering activity is defined as ‘at least two acts of racketeering 
activity’ which occurred within ten years of one another, with one of the acts 
occurring after the effective date of the RICO Act.52 Also prohibited is the 
acquisition of any interest in or control of any enterprise53 or for an employee 
or person associated to conduct or participate54 in the activities of which affect 
interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt. 
4.2.2.5 The False Claims Act 
Private parties are enabled to file actions against government contractors or 
other recipients of government money in the name of the US government 
under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act of 1986.55 Any person 
who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim 
for payment or approval is liable to the United States Government for a civil 
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the 
amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that 
person.56  
A person (referred to as a relator) may bring a civil action for a violation of the 
False Claims Act provisions for the person and for the United States 
Government. The action is brought in the name of the Government. The action 
may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written 
consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.57 If the Government 
proceeds with the action, the relator initiating the claim shall receive at least 15 
per cent but not more than 25 per cent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person 
substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action.58 
                                                     
 
51. 18 USC Sec. 1962(a). 
52. 18 USC Sec. 1961(5). 
53. 18 USC Sec. 1962(b). 
54. 18 USC Sec. 1962(c). 
55. Codified at 31USC Sec. 3729-3733.  
56. 31USC Sec. 3729(a). 
57. 31USC Sec. 3730(b). 
58. 31USC Sec. 3730(d). For more on the potential of the qui tam action see P. Carrington, 
American Law and Transnational Corruption: Is There a Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad?, in 
O. Meyer (Ed.), Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, Nomos Verlag, Baden Baden, 2009, 
p. 37. 
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Carrington notes that about $15 billion were recovered by the United States in 
the 9,000 false-claims cases pursued from 1987 to 2005, and that of this 
amount about two-thirds were recovered in qui tam cases initiated by citizen-
relators. He notes that the median recovery in such private qui tam cases was 
$784,597, and the median relator’s share was $123,885.59  
4.2.3 State Commercial Bribery Laws 
The aforementioned federal laws only relate to public bribery as there is no 
federal law relating to private commercial bribery.60 This is left to the states.61 
The state laws derive from common law prohibitions on misconduct by 
                                                     
 
59. P. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad, id., 
Note 19 above, p. 109, at p. 127. 
60. The FCPA does not provide for the criminalization of commercial bribery. 
61. For a listing of state laws that outlaw commercial bribery see Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 
37 (1979), Notes 9 & 10. Fourteen States have statutes which outlaw commercial bribery 
generally. The statutes are currently codified at Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 53a-160, 53a-161 (West 
1972) (enacted 1905); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14.73 (West 1974) (enacted 1920); Mass.Gen.Laws 
Ann., ch. 271, § 39 (West 1970) (enacted 1904); Mich.Comp.Laws § 750.125 (1968) (enacted 
1905); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-11-11, 97-11-13 (1973) (enacted 1857); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-
710 (1975) (enacted 1907); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 180.00-180.03 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) 
(enacted 1905); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-353 (1969) (enacted 1913); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, § 
4108 (Purdon 1973) (enacted 1939); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-7-3, 11-7-4 (1970) (enacted 1881); 
S. C. Code § 16-17-540 (1977) (enacted 1905); Vt. Stat .Ann., Tit. 13, § 1106 (1974) (enacted 
1904); Va. Code § 18.244 (1975) (enacted 1950); Wis. Stat. § 134.05 (1978) (enacted 1905).… 
the Court added that ‘[a]n additional 28 had adopted more narrow statutes outlawing corrupt 
payments to influence private duties in particular fields, including bribery of agents, common 
carrier and telegraph company employees, labor officials, bank employees, and participants in 
sporting events. The current codifications of the statutes are found at Ala. Code § 134-9 (1977) 
(sports); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 42.20.110 (1976) (telegraph agent); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-243 
(1974), § 13-2309 (1978) (alcoholic beverages, sports); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3288 (1977), § 
67-707 (1966) (sports, banking); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 337b-337e, 641 (West 1970) and 
Cal. Fin. Code Ann. § 3350 (West 1968) (sports, telegraph agent, banking); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
18-5-403 (1978) (sports); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 28, §§ 701-704 (1975) (sports); Fla. Stat. § 
838.12 (1976) (sports); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-880 (1976) (sports); Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, §§ 29-
1 to 29-3 (1977) (sports); Ind.Code §§ 35-18-10-1, 35-18-10-2, 35-18-12-1, 35-18-12-2 (1976) 
(common carrier, sports); Iowa Code § 722.3 (1979) (sports); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 244.600 (1972), § 
518.040-050 (1975) (alcoholic beverages, sports); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 3601 (1965) 
(labor); Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, §§ 24, 25 (1976) (sports); Minn.Stat. § 609.825 (1964) 
(sports); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 570.155 (1978) (sports); Mont.Code Ann. § 94-35-221 (1978) 
(telegraph agent); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 614.140, 707.120 (1973) (labor, telegraph agent); N.J.Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2A:91-1, 2A:93-7, 2A:93-10 (West 1969) (banking, labor, sports); Ohio Rev.Code 
Ann. § 2915.06 (1975) (sports); Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, §§ 399, 400 (1971) (sports); Ore.Rev.Stat. 
§ 165.515 (1977) (telegraph agent); S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. § 36-18-28 (1967) (architects); 
Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-821, 39-824 to 39-826 (1975) (common carriers, sports); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. §§ 32.43, 32.44 (1974) (attorneys, sports); Wash.Rev.Code §§ 49.44.020, 
67.04.010 to 67.04.080 (1976) (sports, labor); W.Va.Code § 61-10-22 (1977) (sports). Since 
1961, of the eight States which had not adopted nonpublic official bribery statutes, Georgia, 
Kansas, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming now have such statutes. 
Moreover, a number of the States which did not have a commercial bribery statute in 1961 do 
so today.’  
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agents.62 For example, as far back as 1881, the State of New York criminalized 
private bribery in Sec. 439 (now Sec. 180) of its Penal Law. Sec. 180 of the 
New York Penal Law prohibits active and passive private commercial 
bribery.63  
Sec. 180.00 of the New York Penal Law penalizes active bribery in 
commercial transactions and provides that: 
‘a person is guilty of commercial bribing in the second degree when he 
confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or 
fiduciary without the consent of the latter’s employer or principal, with intent 
to influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or principal’s affairs. 
Commercial bribery in the second degree is a class (A) misdemeanor. Where 
the value of the benefit conferred or offered or agreed to be conferred exceeds 
one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or principal 
in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars this is commercial bribery in 
the first degree which is a class E felony.’ 
The New York Law also prohibits passive commercial bribery and states that:  
‘an employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe receiving in the 
second degree when, without the consent of his employer or principal, he 
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an 
agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in 
relation to his employer’s or principal’s affairs.’64  
Certain key elements are found in the definition of commercial bribery. It 
relates to bribery in the course of business transactions, involving a party who 
secretly receives a payment or other inducement to act against the interest of a 
principal or employer. This has economic and social implications. Russell C.J. 
in People v. Davis has remarked that the: 
‘Significance of Sec. 439 of the Penal Law, taken as a whole, is this, namely, 
that secret commissions are to be contended because they prompt a servant to 
betray his master, and thus prejudice the master’s interests in consideration of 
pay received from others. Obviously the gravamen of this charge lies in the 
secrecy of such transactions. The master believes, and has reason to believe, 
that he is being served without stint or qualification by his employee, who is 
devoting the full measure of his time and attention, without diminution to his 
                                                     
 
62. The substantive law relating to civil and criminal actions which allege commercial bribery 
finds its origins in the common law. The common law recognized that the misconduct of an 
agent by concealment or neglect of duty entitled the principal to the equitable remedy of 
rescission. 
63. Sec. 180.10-180.30 (bribery involving labor officials), Sec. 180.35-180.51 (sports bribery), 
Sec. 180.52-180.53 (pair mutual betting), and Sec. 180.54-180. 57 (rent gouging). 
64. Sec. 180.05 N.Y. Penal Law. 
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employer’s interests exclusively. The evil aimed at is in the service of two 
masters, whose interests are necessarily and forever antagonistic.’65 
The role of the state in combating such practices is pre-eminent. Russell C.J. 
further states:  
‘Business experience demonstrates the necessity for such a statutory bulwark 
of fidelity. Without such a statute, under the fierce competition of modern 
life, purchasing agents and agents to employ labor can be lured all too readily 
into the service of hopelessly conflicting interests.’66  
He concludes that provisions such as Sec. 439 of the old New York Penal law 
are ‘zealous to banish the very appearance of evil, and requires of such an 
agent complete and unswerving devotion to his one master.’67 Commercial 
bribery statutes cover both private as well as public bribery. The court in State 
v. Prybil68 remarked that commercial bribery statutes reach:  
‘private as well as public employees. In its relationship to private employees it 
is a commercial bribery statute. As to public employees it fits in the scheme 
of statutes prohibiting commercial bribery.’  
The basis of liability under these statutes is the breach of the duty of loyalty or 
fiduciary duty owed by the agent or employee to the principal or employer.  
4.3 The Private Right of Action 
4.3.1 Position under Treaty Law 
While the federal laws discussed above may be used to found a private claim, 
there is no express private right of action for damage suffered as a result of 
corrupt acts under these laws. Is there is an express private right of action that 
results from the ratification by the US of the UNCC, which provides that states 
should facilitate the right of private parties to institute actions for damage 
suffered as a result of corruption? 
Art. 35 UNCC provides that state parties ‘shall take such measures as may be 
necessary, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a 
result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against 
those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation.’ At first 
                                                     
 
65. People v. Davis, 33 N.Y. Crim. 460, 160 N.Y.S. 769, (1915), at p. 776. 
66. Id., at p. 778. 
67. Id.  
68. State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, (Iowa 1973, 17 October 1973). 
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glance, the mandatory nature of Art. 35 UNCC for participating states is 
established with the use of the word ‘shall’ with respect to the requirement that 
state parties provide persons with a right to initiate legal proceedings against 
those responsible for damage suffered as a result of an act of corruption. This 
provision has not been accepted into US Law. 
This apparent mandatory nature of Art. 35 UNCC and its seemingly broad 
scope was a matter of concern for the US Congress, which stated during Senate 
hearings on the Convention that Art. 35:  
‘could be read to require or encourage a State to open its courts to civil suits 
unrelated or only tangentially related to that State, and for acts only 
marginally related to acts of corruption…’69  
The final wording of Art. 35 does not contain any caveat limiting the category 
of persons against whom an action relating to corruption can be brought. It 
gives the right to any entity or person who has suffered damage to seek redress 
against ‘those responsible for the damage.’ In the opinion of the US 
representatives in its present form, Art. 35 would seem to suggest that ‘every 
person’ who ‘suffers’ damage has a ‘right’ to redress. As framed, recourse may 
be the direct offender who perpetrates the act of corruption but could also 
include persons ‘associated’ with the direct perpetrator.70  
Art. 35 UNCC was, in the view of the US Congress, too broad and it was a 
departure from the historical record of the Convention. In their opinion, the 
Travaux Préparatoires showed much more flexibility to Art. 35. In the opinion 
of the committee, the Travaux Préparatoires clarified that Art. 35 is only 
intended to be applied to legal proceedings against those who commit acts of 
corruption, rather than those who may be associated with others who may 
commit acts of corruption. In other words, private legal proceedings could be 
brought ‘only’ against those who directly commit the act of corruption itself.71 
This potential broad application of Art. 35 was disquieting to the Senate 
Committee, which was of the opinion that the Travaux Préparatoires showed 
that the intention was to: 
                                                     
 
69. Senate Treaty Documents Nos. 1-8, 109th Congress-1st Session 4 January - 22 December  
2005, US Congressional Serial Set Serial Number 14941, US Government Printing Office 
Washington, 2006, at p. 10. 
70. US Congress noted that Art. 35 could be interpreted to include ‘those who may be associated 
with others who commit acts of corruption,’ id.  
71. Id. 
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‘provide the State Parties significant flexibility in its implementation. It does 
not restrict the right of a State Party to decide the precise circumstances under 
which it will make its courts available, nor does it require or endorse a 
particular choice made under this article.’72  
A broad interpretation of Art. 35 was firmly rejected by the Senate Committee 
on two principal grounds. Firstly, because the US Congress felt that US laws 
provided sufficient redress to the private claimant, and secondly, that 
corruption should not be seen as a ‘stand-alone violation’ of international law 
that could found a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act.   
On the issue of sufficiency, the Congress stated that US law was sufficient to 
meet the objectives of Art. 35 stating that:  
‘The current laws and practices of the United States are in compliance with 
Art. 35 and the United States does not construe Art. 35 to require any 
broadening or enhancing current US law and practice in any way. US 
jurisprudence permits persons who have suffered from criminal acts such as 
bribery to seek damages from the offenders under various theories. These 
remedies are sufficient to comply with this Article.’73 
Also rejected by the US Congress was the possibility of using the Art. 35 
UNCC as a basis to bring an anti-corruption claim under the Alien Tort 
Statute.74 This statute gives U.S. District Courts original jurisdiction in any 
civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States. A lawsuit based on a violation of the UNCC 
could constitute such a violation. However, this would only occur if corruption 
is considered a ‘law of nations’ violation in keeping with the U.S. Supreme 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.75 In that case, the court held that the 
Alien Tort Statute only permits actions based on a limited set of claims of 
international law violations and essentially limited actionable claims under the 
Act to serious ‘law of nations’ violations such as genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, slavery-like practices, torture, disappearance, 
summary execution, and prolonged arbitrary detention.76  
                                                     
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. 28 USC Sec. 1350. 
75. Senate Treaty Documents Nos. 1-8, 109th Congress-1st Session 4 January - 22 December  
2005, id., Note 69 above, at p. 10. 
76. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004), Alvarez alleged that the fact that the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration had instigated his abduction from Mexico for criminal trial in the 
United States as the basis of a claim against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. He sought to recover damages under the Alien Tort Statute. The Supreme Court rejected 
this argument and held that:  
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The US Congress was of the view that corruption does not fall within the 
category of international crimes, stating that the UNCC:  
‘does not itself suggest that corruption is a stand-alone violation of 
international law (but rather is something that States parties should prohibit 
under their domestic law). Accordingly, this Convention does not signify that 
corruption is a norm that is specific, universal and obligatory for the purposes 
of the Alien Tort Statute.’77  
In view of its objection to the scope of Art. 35, the US Congress advised that 
an express declaration should be made in the resolution of declaration and 
consent to the UNCC to the effect that the provisions of the Convention were 
not self-executing and did not convey a private right of action. This reservation 
to the operation of Art. 35 was duly made, and the US has declared:  
‘that the provisions of the Convention … are non-self-executing. None of the 
provisions of the Convention creates a private right of action.’78  
4.3.2 Position under the FCPA 
The question has arisen whether private claimants have a right of action under 
the watershed FCPA. The FCPA is silent about the right of private individuals 
to bring an action based on its provisions. This silence and the attempts by 
parties to file suits based on the FCPA have brought the issue of the 
availability of such a private right of action before the courts. The US courts 
have in general affirmed the denial of a private right to seek a remedy under 
the FCPA.79  
The key case in this regard is Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc.80 Philip Morris and 
British American Tobacco purchased tobacco for their products from 
American as well as foreign markets. The plaintiffs, Lamb and Willis, local 
producers of tobacco in Kentucky, were therefore, as suppliers to the 
                                                                                                                            
 
‘at the time of enactment [of the ATS] the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear 
claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized as 
common law. We do not believe, however, that the limited, implicit sanction to 
entertain the handful of international law cum common law claims understood in 
1789 should be taken as authority to recognize the right of action asserted by Alvarez 
here.’   
77. Senate Treaty Documents Nos. 1-8, 109th Congress-1st Session 4 January  - 22 December  
2005, id., Note 69 above, at p. 10. 
78. Id.  
79. A correlation can be drawn between the responses of the US Senate to the provisions of Art. 35 
UN Convention and the position of the US Supreme Court with regard to the notion of a 
private right of action under the Alien Tort Statute codified under 28 USC Sec. 1350. 
80. Lamb v. Philip Morris Inc, 915 F.2d 1024, (6th Cir. 24 August 1990).  
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defendants, in direct competition with other producers in foreign markets. The 
trading conditions under which the foreign tobacco was sold to the defendants 
had a direct effect on the opportunities for sale of the plaintiff’s tobacco to the 
defendants.  
Philip Morris and British American Tobacco entered into arrangements in 
Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua that resulted 
in price controls on tobacco, elimination of controls on retail cigarette prices, 
as well as assurances that existing tax rates applicable to tobacco companies 
would not be increased. The modality for acquiring this agreement in 
Venezuela was through the use a Phillip Morris subsidiary known as C.A. 
Tabacalera National and a B.A.T. subsidiary known as C.A. Cigarrera Bigott, 
SUCS. In 1982 these subsidiaries entered into a contract with La Fundación 
Del Niño (the Children’s Foundation) of Caracas, Venezuela. This agreement 
was signed by the organization’s president, who was the wife of the then 
President of Venezuela. The two subsidiaries agreed to make periodic 
donations to the Children’s Foundation totalling approximately $12.5 million 
dollars in exchange for the price controls arrangement.  
The plaintiffs, not surprisingly, saw this arrangement between Philip Morris, 
BAT and the wife of the Venezuelan president as an unlawful inducement 
designed and intended to restrain trade. The damage to the plaintiffs was the 
artificial depression of tobacco prices in Venezuela to the detriment of US 
tobacco growers, while ensuring lucrative retail prices for tobacco products 
sold abroad. The plaintiffs brought an action seeking treble damages and 
injunctive relief under the antitrust laws for the reduction in the domestic price 
of tobacco. They also later amended their action to include a claim under the 
FCPA.   
The court stated that the issue before them was to determine whether or not 
there was an intention on the part of the legislature to confer a private right of 
action under the FCPA.81 In coming to a determination on this point, the court 
stated that the intent of the Congress was the ultimate deciding factor. The 
court held that ‘unless this Congressional intent could be inferred from the 
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the 
essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply [would] not 
exist.’82 
 
                                                     
 
81. Emphasis added. 
82. Lamb v. Philip Morris 915 F.2d 1024, (6th Cir. 24 August 1990), at p. 1028. 
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The four factors the court took into consideration in determining the intent of 
Congress were: 
1. Whether the plaintiff was among ‘the class for whose especial benefit’ 
the statute was enacted; 
2. Whether the legislative history suggested congressional intent to 
prescribe or proscribe a private cause of action;  
3. Whether implying such a remedy for the plaintiff would be ‘consistent 
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme’; and  
4. Whether the cause of action was ‘one traditionally relegated to state 
law, in an area basically the concern of States, so that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action.’  
 
On the issue of whether the plaintiffs fell within the class of ‘especial 
beneficiaries’ of the FCPA, the court found that the FCPA was an effort by 
Congress to ‘aid federal law enforcement agencies in curbing bribes of foreign 
officials.’ They noted that in the history of the FCPA it was clear that the US 
Congress was concerned about ensuring a strong enforcement effort in 
implementing the new rules criminalizing foreign bribery. In short, the court 
was in agreement with arguments by the defendants that the FCPA was 
designed with the assistance of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to aid federal law enforcement agencies in curbing bribes of foreign 
officials. These parties the SEC and Justice Department are in this sense the 
‘especial beneficiaries’ contemplated by the legislators in passing the FCPA. 
On the issue of congressional intent derivable from the legislative history of 
the FCPA, the court summarized the motivations expressed in the Senate 
Record. These motivations were (1) to restore confidence in the financial 
integrity of American corporations, (2) to restore the efficient functioning of 
American capital markets, (3) to improve the stability of overseas business and 
(4) to improve the domestic competitive climate.83 As such, the court found 
that the purpose of the FCPA was not to prevent the use of foreign resources to 
reduce production costs as argued by the plaintiffs in the case, but rather to 
‘protect the integrity of American foreign policy and domestic markets.’84   
Furthermore, the court found that the issue of a private right of action was 
barely mentioned in the legislative history before the House of 
Representatives. They did acknowledge the supportive reference the plaintiffs 
identified in the record,85 but noted it as significant that the Senate committee 
                                                     
 
83. Id., at p. 1029. 
84. Id. 
85. ‘The committee intends that courts shall recognize a private cause of action based on this 
legislation, as they have in cases involving other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, on 
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had deleted this provision.86 They further found that the availability of a 
private right of action apparently was never resolved (or perhaps even raised) 
at the conference that ultimately produced the final bill that was passed by both 
houses and signed into law. Neither the FCPA as enacted, nor, as the 
conference report mentions, as such a cause of action. As such, the court 
concluded that the fact that the final legislative compromise contained no 
mention of a private right of action inferred that Congress intended no such 
result.87 
In addition, the court was of the opinion that the underlying legislative scheme 
of the FCPA was to encourage compliance in preference to prosecution. In 
their view the fact that the Attorney General was required to ‘establish a 
procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries’ by issuers of securities 
and other domestic concerns regarding ‘conformance of their conduct with the 
Department of Justice’s [FCPA] enforcement policy  ...,’88 as well as the fact 
that the Attorney General was to furnish ‘timely guidance’ concerning the 
Department of Justice’s FCPA enforcement policy to potential exporters and 
small businesses, showed a preference for compliance in lieu of prosecution. 
As such, the introduction of private plaintiffs interested solely in post-violation 
enforcement, rather than pre-violation compliance, would be inconsistent with 
congressional efforts to protect companies and their employees concerned 
about FCPA liability.89 The court found that the introduction of a private right 
of action would directly contravene the carefully tailored FCPA scheme 
presently in place.  
Finally, the court looked at what other alternative avenues of redress existed in 
its bid to determine whether there was congressional intent for the creation of a 
private right of action under the FCPA. The plaintiff’s argument that a private 
cause of action under the FCPA constituted the only viable mechanism for 
redressing anticompetitive behavior on a global scale, was countered by the 
potential for private recovery under federal antitrust laws. The court held that 
                                                                                                                            
 
behalf of persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate bribery.’ See House 
Report No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, (1977). 
86. See Senate. Rep. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1976). 
87. Lamb v. Morris 915 F.2d 1024, (6th Cir. 24 August 1990) at p. 1029. 
88. Id. 
89. Portnoy argues that this reasoning:  
‘resonates in prosecutorial patterns today. US prosecutors routinely and publicly 
highlight the leniency afforded to companies who voluntarily report findings of 
suspicious activities and take remedial measures within their organizations. Also 
consistent with this theme is the overwhelming predominance of non-prosecution 
agreements in the United States in lieu of formal prosecution.’  
See A. Portnoy, J. Murino, ‘Private Actions under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An 
Imminent Front?’, International Litigation News Newsletter, International Bar Association 
Legal Practice Division, April 2009, at p. 31. 
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this potential for recovery under federal antitrust laws belied the plaintiffs’ 
contention that an implied private right of action under the FCPA was 
imperative. Based on these factors the court concluded that there was no basis 
for a private right of action under the FCPA. The FCPA was an instrument 
geared, in the opinion of the courts, to aid state initiated processes of criminal 
prosecution.90 
In recent times there has been an attempt to include a limited private right of 
action under the FCPA. The Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 
200891 sponsored by US Representative Ed Perlmutter sought to introduce a 
limited private right of action under the FCPA for violations by foreign 
concerns that damaged US domestic business. This bill was to be limited to 
foreign concerns that were not subject to the Sec. 30 of the Securities 
Exchange, i.e. they were not affiliated with the US securities market, nor 
domestic concerns, nor were they US legal persons.92 The proposed Foreign 
Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008 provided that: 
‘any foreign concerns which violated the anti-bribery and records falsification 
provisions in Sec. 30A of the Securities Exchange Act would be liable in an 
action brought … in any court of competent jurisdiction … for damages 
caused to such issuer, domestic concern, or other person by the violation.’93 
A plaintiff under the Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act would be 
required to prove that the defendant foreign concern violated the anti-bribery 
and records falsification provisions of the Securities Exchange Rules and that 
                                                     
 
90. In another case an attempt by a plaintiff implicated in a bribery conspiracy to establish a 
private right of action under the FCPA in a bid to clear his name was rejected. See McLean v. 
International Harvester Co. 817 F.2d 1214, (5th Cir. 2 June 1987), at p. 1219, where Grazia J. 
remarked that ‘[…] we find it inappropriate to imply a private cause of action from the statute. 
The statute on its face shows no congressional intent to create a private action. Moreover, no 
legislative history exists referring to such an intent.’ The court in Citicorp International 
Trading Co. Inc. v. Western Oil & Refining Company Inc.., 771 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 22 
July 1991) at 607 held that the attempt to use the FCPA to support a private tort action would 
not be allowed as the ‘law is not necessarily intended to protect individual businesses from the 
backlash of having an attempted bribe to a foreign official rejected.’   
91. H.R. 6188: Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008, 110th Congress 2007-2008. On 
4 June 2008, H.R. 6188, the Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008 was introduced 
to the House by Rep. Ed Perlmutter; the bill was referred to the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce and the House Committee on the Judiciary; however, the committees never 
reported on the bill, the bill was never voted on, the session expired, and the bill was removed 
from the books. On 28 April 2009, Rep. Ed Perlmutter again introduced an identical bill 
numbered H.R. 2152, the Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009. The bill was 
referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, which further referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security.  
92. Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008, Sec. 2(f) (8). 
93. Id., Sec. 2(1). 
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this violation (i) prevented the plaintiff from obtaining or retaining business for 
or with any person; and (ii) assisted the foreign concern in obtaining or 
retaining such business.94 
The measure of damages which a plaintiff could obtain under the proposed 
Foreign Bribery Prohibition Act was stipulated as follows: general damage 
equal to the higher of the two following amounts that are established by the 
plaintiff’s allegations and proof: (i) the total amount of the contract or 
agreement that the defendant gained in obtaining or retaining business by 
means of the violation of the rules of (ii) the total amount of the contract or 
agreement that the plaintiff failed to gain because of the defendant’s obtaining 
or retaining of business by means of the violation of the anti-bribery rules. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff would be entitled to treble damages as follows: In 
assessing damages the court shall enter judgment for three times the amount 
determined under clause (i) or (ii) of such subparagraph (whichever is greater), 
together with a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs, for any violation of the 
anti-bribery rules.95 This bill never became law.   
It can be concluded that there is no private right of action under the FCPA. 
This demonstrates a consistency with the rejection of the notion of a private 
right of action in the reservation made by the US to Art.35 UNCC. The 
message from Congress and the courts is that the fight against foreign 
corruption is one that concerns federal authorities, and that the rules of the 
international and domestic instruments against corruption are not in any way 
intended to introduce the concept of a private right of action.  
4.3.3 Position under State Law 
The position regarding the private right of action under state law is somewhat 
similar. The Supreme Court of New York in Sardanis v. Sumitomo Corp96 held 
that there is no private right of action under the commercial bribery statutes. In 
this case, the plaintiff, a former chairman of the board of directors of RST 
Resources, a corporate trader in commodities, claimed that employees had 
formed a competing company that had conspired with Sumitomo to drive the 
plaintiff’s company out of business and control the trade of copper in the world 
futures market. The plaintiff sought damages for commercial bribery and fraud 
from the former employees for breach of fiduciary duty, and from the 
corporate defendants for inducement to breach fiduciary duty. 
                                                     
 
94. Id., Sec. 2(2). 
95. Sec. 2(f)(3)(A) Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008. 
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The Court held that commercial bribery of the nature alleged by the plaintiff 
was a felony under New York law but that the statute made no mention 
whether a private right of action was thereby created. In the opinion of the 
court:  
‘The test, in general, for determining whether such a right of action implicitly 
derives from a criminal statute depends upon satisfaction of all of the 
following factors: whether plaintiff is of a class for whose benefit the statute 
was enacted, whether recognition of such a right of action would promote the 
legislative purpose, and whether creation of such a right would be consistent 
with the legislative scheme’97 
The Court went on to state that:  
‘The purpose of this statute was to protect consumers from the higher prices 
and lower quality that would almost inevitably result from pervasive bribery 
in any segment of commerce. RST is not among that class intended to be 
protected. It is possible that permitting such a right of action, thus enabling 
employers to pursue corrupt employees, might enhance the statute’s purpose 
of weeding out such corruption; but such a remedy already exists under tort 
law. More important, the creation of such a right of action under the statute 
would be inconsistent with the existing legislative and remedial scheme, 
which gives the power of enforcement to the District Attorney.’98 
As such, the general rule is that the enforcement of the rules criminalizing 
commercial bribery, whether foreign or domestic, remains the preserve of 
government authorities. No private right of redress is created under the FCPA 
or under the state commercial bribery statutes. However, the normative 
framework does show that despite the absence of an express private right of 
action under the anti-bribery laws, there are other avenues that can found a 
claim for injury suffered as a result of corruption. Bribery has been used by 
enterprising claimants under US antitrust and securities laws. Furthermore, 
there are also opportunities for redress under the RICO and False Claims Act.99 
4.4 Transaction Validity  
The international public policy against corruption in business transactions, the 
criminalization of international commercial bribery and the US federal and 
state laws criminalizing international and domestic commercial bribery create a 
line of convergence between the conduct and the results of the corrupt 
exchange. Where a party who has suffered the damages as a result of 
                                                     
 
97. Id., at p. 229. 
98. Id. 
99. See Section 4.5 below. 
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corruption seeks redress in a court of law, public policy is likely to tilt in favor 
of such a plaintiff.100 The following sections examine the position of such a 
plaintiff from the perspective of the contracts that result from the corrupt 
exchange. Challenging the validity of transactions resulting from corrupt 
exchanges is an important avenue of private remedy for the plaintiff who has 
suffered injury as a result of corruption. 
4.4.1 The Fiduciary Duty  
The act of bribery is an abuse of a relationship where one of the parties 
replaces a duty to act in the best interests of the other party with the pursuit of 
private gain. The opportunity to make a private profit only exists because of 
the nature of the relationship between these parties. Where there is a fiduciary 
duty to act in the best interest of another, this indicates an agency relationship. 
The Restatement (3rd) on Agency notes that ‘within the scope of a relationship 
of agency, the agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal.’101 Agency is 
defined as:  
‘the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) 
manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principals control, and the agent 
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.’102  
This definition makes it clear that under US common law an agency 
relationship ‘creates the agents fiduciary obligation as a matter of law.’103 
Furthermore, it is the law, and not the parties, that determines whether or not a 
relationship is one of agency.104 This is referred to as the general fiduciary 
principle whereby ‘an agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the 
principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.’105 
The US courts generally make a strong connection between contracts that 
result in the breach of this duty of loyalty, otherwise referred to as the fiduciary 
duty, and objectionable conduct that needs to be deterred. 
                                                     
 
100. With regard to the transactions tainted by corruption, the court must consider the relationship 
between the transactions and the prohibitory rules. In Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 284 N.Y. 
(1940) 268, at 272, the court considered the fact that:  
‘[t]he transactions of plaintiff’s … were clearly destructive of the purpose of a statute 
which was enacted “for the protection, health, welfare and safety of the people of the 
state.” … We think those transactions were so far against the public good as to 
disable the plaintiff from invoking the aid of the court ….’  
101. Restatements (3rd) Agency, p. 4. 
102. Sec. 1.01 Restatement (3rd) Agency. 
103. Sec. 1.01 Comment e. Restatement (3rd) Agency. 
104. Comment b. Sec. 8.06 Restatement (3rd) Agency. at p. 324. 
105. Sec. 8.01 Restatement (3rd) Agency. 
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This fiduciary relationship is uberrima fides (utmost good faith), because the 
agent is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of the principal 
on matters within the scope of the relationship.106 Examples of such 
relationships are, for example, the relationship between a government and an 
official negotiating on its behalf,107 or between a company and its employees 
or representatives.108 Any interference with the duty of loyalty that exists in 
these relationships results in a contract that is tainted by the breach of the 
fiduciary relationship and affects the validity of contracts that are associated 
with its violation. Sec. 193 of the Restatement (2nd) Contracts provides: 
‘a promise by such a fiduciary to violate his fiduciary duty or a promise that 
tends to induce such a violation is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy.’ 
Where a fiduciary duty is violated by the taking of a bribe by an agent, such an 
agent is liable to the principal for any harm that results from the breach.109 
There is consistent public policy against the enforceability of any promise that 
induces a party to act in breach of a fiduciary duty.110 Public policy resists the 
juxtaposition of conflicting duties in one person by seeking to deter its 
occurrence. As has been eloquently summarized: ‘[m]ay one serve two 
                                                     
 
106. Sec. 2 Restatement (2nd) Trusts. 
107. Some illustrative examples are discussed in this chapter including Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 
U.S. 261 (1880), where a Consul General of the Ottoman Government took bribes for 
influencing the award of government contracts; Adler v. Republic of Nigeria, Nos. 98-55456, 
98-55460, 9th Cir. 19 May 2000, where a US Citizen engaged in a bribery scheme with 
purported Nigerian government officials; Tool Company v. Norris, 69 U.S. 2 Wall. 45 (1864), 
where a certain Mr. Norris using his connections procured a government arms contract from 
representatives of the government for a private company in exchange for a commission; 
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853), where a private individual 
was contracted to influence the legislators from Virginia to obtain a law to grant a railway 
company a right of way through the state. 
108. Some illustrative examples are discussed in this chapter including Nathan v. Tenna 
Corporation 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 10 August 1977), where a Mr. Nathan contracted to 
represent Lake Eire Industries to procure contracts from International Harvester gave secret 
commissions to the buyer of International Harvester; Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 
App. Div. 384. 108 N.Y.S. 830, where Sirkin bribed an employee of the Fourteenth Street 
Store to purchase his merchandise; McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp, 199 N.Y.S.2d 
(March, 31,1960) 468, where McConnell had contracted to negotiate a contract for distribution 
rights with a motion picture producer and bribed a representative of that producer in order to 
obtain the contract; Colyvas v. Red Hand Compositions Co., 318 F. Supp. 1376 
(S.D.N.Y.1970), where the plaintiff sought a commission for procuring contracts to furnish 
paint supplies and services to Olympic Maritime S.A. and certain other companies of Aristotle 
Onassis obtained as a result paying a bribe to an employee of the Onassis companies. 
109. Sec. 874 Restatement (2nd) Torts. 
110. This has been described broadly as referring to ‘any person who occupies a position of peculiar 
confidence toward another. It refers to integrity and fidelity.’ See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. 
Corbett-Wallace Corp, 138 Tex 565, 160 S.W.2d 509 (1942), cited in H. Reuschlein, W. 
Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership, 2nd edn, West Publishers, St. Paul, MN, 1990, 
p. 125.  
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masters? It is the duty of an agent to act solely and completely for the benefit 
of the principal.’111  
Sec. 8.03 of the Restatement (3rd) Agency provides that:  
‘An agent has a duty not to deal with the principal as or on behalf of an 
adverse party in a transaction connected with the agency relationship’ 
The onus is on the agent to disclose any adverse interest. Only where the agent 
‘discloses all material facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should 
know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgement’ is conduct, such as 
taking a bribe which would otherwise constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, 
exonerated.112 The agent must disclose any adverse interest to the principal to 
enable the principal to have full information about the activities of the agent. It 
is the secrecy of the agent’s actions that constitutes the breach of fiduciary 
duty. Where a principal is fully informed and consents to the action of the 
agent, there can be no breach of fiduciary duty. This implies that consent must 
be based on full information. There has to be ‘full and fair’ disclosure to the 
principal that is more than a ‘by the way’ notice of the actions of the agent to 
the principal.113 The duty of an agent to be undivided loyal is independent of 
whether or not harm is occasioned by the breach of the duty. Whenever an 
agent takes a bribe, the principal’s interest is compromised. 
4.4.2 The Primary Contract  
The breach of fiduciary duty that results from acts of bribery in commercial 
transactions has an impact upon the validity of the primary agreement (to give 
a bribe) and the secondary contract (which results from the successful bribery 
transaction). The rules criminalizing international corruption and the various 
provisions in the federal and state laws relating to commercial bribery mean 
that offering or receiving bribes or other inducements to acquire business is 
clearly a legal wrong. There is, however, no express declaration in these rules 
about the status of the contract that evidences the corrupt exchange. 
Pronouncements about the status of such contracts are therefore left to the 
judicial process.   
                                                     
 
111. H. Reuschlein, W. Gregory, id., at p. 127. 
112. Sec 8.06 Restatement (3rd) Agency. 
113. ‘Where a fiduciary acts in his own interest in dereliction of his beneficiaries’ interest, more 
than some “by the way” notice is required.’ Ehlen v. Lewis, 984, F.Supp.5. 9 (D.D.C. 1997), 
cited in Comment c. to Sec. 8.06, at p. 331. 
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The duty of the courts to preserve the common good of society acts as a 
counterbalance to the fundamental principles of freedom of contract.114 The US 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts (2nd) groups together contracts that are 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.115 The use of the term 
‘unenforceable’ as opposed to ‘void’ or ‘illegal’ helps to emphasize that there 
need not be inherent illegality in the contract tainted by corruption for it to be 
unenforceable. A perfectly valid contract may, within the context of public 
policy against corruption, be declared unenforceable because of the implication 
of such contracts on the effectiveness of the fight against corruption as well as 
the long-term interest of society. Distinguishing such contracts allows them to 
be considered from the perspective of the link that exists between these 
contracts and the corrupt exchange. 
A contract may in general be considered unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy in two instances:116 firstly, if legislation provides that it is 
unenforceable, or secondly, where interest in the enforcement of the contract is 
outweighed by a public policy against its enforcement. The first situation, 
where legislation expressly provides for unenforceability, is less problematic. 
Enforceability is decided by statute and the question before the court is the 
fairly straightforward one of determining whether or not the contract in 
question falls within the four walls of the statute. The second instance lacks 
such clarity. It is for the courts themselves to determine the enforceability of 
the contract in question by weighing the principle of freedom of contract 
against the public interest of society. Both of these categories are relevant to 
the question about the validity of contracts tainted by corruption.    
 
                                                     
 
114. Sec. 1 of the Restatement (2nd) Contracts defines a contract as a promise or set of promises for 
the breach of which the law gives a remedy. For this reason in Sec. 7 Comment A, it states, ‘A 
promise for breach of which the law neither gives a remedy nor otherwise recognizes a duty of 
performance is often called a void contract. Under Sec. 1 however, such a promise is not a 
contract at all; it is the “promise” or “agreement” that is void is of no legal effect. Inasmuch as 
is possible given the frequent use of the terms void and voidable contract in case law, this book 
describes “void” contracts as agreements that the courts will not enforce.’  
115. Sec. 178-315 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. These include contracts in restraint of trade, 
contracts that impair family relations, and contracts that interfere with other protected interests. 
Of most relevance to the issue of contracts tainted by corruption are the general provisions in 
Sec. 178-185 and contracts that induce an interference with other protected interests in Sec. 
192-196. 
116. Sec. 178 Restatement (2nd) Contracts states that:  
‘A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or if the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the 
enforcement of such terms.’ 
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4.4.2.1 Unenforceability on Grounds of Statutory Illegality 
Federal and state law makes active and passive bribery criminal offenses. 
These provisions clearly prohibit, at various levels, the conduct of giving and 
receiving bribes. They do not, however, actually prohibit the agreement to give 
and receive a bribe or declare that contracts to give or receive such bribes are 
unenforceable. Can these anti-bribery rules be said to provide for the 
unenforceability of an agreement to give or receive bribe? If they did, then the 
courts would be bound to give effect to the ‘legislative mandate.’117 However, 
in the absence of a clear express prohibition of the contract to give a bribe, 
there is, technically, no statutory prohibition, on the basis of which the contract 
evidencing the corrupt exchange will be deemed invalid. In the absence of 
specific express provisions in the anti-bribery rules declaring such contracts 
unenforceable, the question of enforceability is a decision left to the courts of 
law on grounds of public policy. 
4.4.2.2 Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy 
In assessing whether or not a contract is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy, the courts will generally consider whether the interest in the 
enforcement of the contract is outweighed by a public policy against its 
enforcement.118 The context of this decision is not a private-to-private 
paradigm as in a typical contract between individuals, but rather a public-
private paradigm where the interest of the general public is pitted against the 
individual interests of the contracting parties. The principle of freedom of 
contract accepts that within the private-private paradigm, parties are the 
masters of their contracts and the role of the state is to protect and not interfere 
in that freedom. However, the corollary of this is that the state has the duty to 
protect the security of society and that instances may arise where public policy 
will outweigh the notion of enforceability of free promises.  
Sec. 279 of the Restatement (2nd) Contracts identifies the bases of public 
policy against the enforcement of contracts as being derived from (a) 
legislation relevant to such policy and (b) the need to protect some aspect of 
the public welfare. In other words, factors that the court will consider in 
determining whether or not a contract tainted by bribery is an agreement that 
the courts will enforce are the existence of legislation prohibiting such bribery, 
the extent to which non-enforcement will further legislative policy, and the 
                                                     
 
117. See Restatement (2nd) Contracts, Comment (a) to Sec. 178. 
118. Sec S.178 Restatement (2nd) Contracts, which lays out these parameters stating, ‘[…] on 
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the 
enforcement of such terms.’  
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effect of the agreement to give or receive a bribe on the interests of third 
parties.  
As such, in arriving at a decision about the enforceability of the primary 
contract, the court engages in a balancing of interests. This balancing of 
interests is influenced by the (a) strength of public policy against the 
enforcement of the primary contract to give a bribe as manifested by 
legislation or judicial decision: (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the 
primary contract will further legislative policy: (c) the seriousness of any 
misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate: and (d) the 
directness of the connection between the misconduct and the promise.119 The 
balancing of interests is also influenced by the traditional rules that prohibit the 
courts from allowing recovery with respect to illegal acts as well as the body of 
rules that have developed with regard to commercial and international 
corruption. The stronger the connection between objectionable conduct and a 
contract, the greater the chance that such a contract will not be enforceable on 
grounds of public policy. 
The primary contract to give a bribe is evidence of a breach of a statutory 
prohibition as well as evidence of the breach of a fiduciary duty. This means 
that the primary contract is a promise to commit a tort or to induce the 
commission of a tort. Such a contract is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy.120 This falls within the purview of Sec. 192 of the Restatement (2nd) 
Contracts, which provides that a promise involving the commission of a tort or 
to induce the commission of a tort is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy. Furthermore, a promise that induces the violation of the fiduciary duty 
owed by an agent to a principal is also unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy.121 Farnsworth points out that in most instances where the legislation 
expressly prohibits the making of an agreement, the courts will assume that 
such agreements are unenforceable.122 The primary contract is clearly an 
agreement that courts will decline to enforce within this framework of rules. 
                                                     
 
119. Sec. 178 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
120. Sec. 192 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
121. Sec. 193 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
122. He gives as an example the judicial response to invalidate agreements made on a Sunday in 
violation of statutes prohibiting transaction of business on Sundays. He notes that this response 
is not inevitable and that a court may also conclude that the sanction explicitly provided by the 
legislature is adequate to further the statutes underlying policy without the additional sanction 
of unenforceability. The provisions of Art. 2-1-8 of the US Uniform Commercial Code for 
example provides that a failure to comply with a law with respect to the list of transactions 
listed in the article ‘… has only the effect specified in that law.’ See E. Farnsworth, Contracts, 
4th edn, Aspen, New York, p. 335. 
CHAPTER 4 - PRIVATE REMEDIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
168 
 
The US courts have maintained a policy that supports the unenforceability of 
the primary contract to give a bribe. This policy cuts across foreign, public and 
private bribery. For example, the courts in Oscanyan v. Arms Co.123 held that a 
contract to bribe or influence officials of foreign governments will not be 
enforced for public policy reasons. In this case, the plaintiff, the Consul 
General of the Ottoman Government (Turkey), brought an action to recover the 
sum of $136,000 allegedly due as a result of a contract with the defendant, a 
US arms manufacturing company, as commission on the sales of firearms to 
the Turkish government effected through the influence of the plaintiff. 
Winchester, the president of the Winchester Repeating Arms Company of 
Connecticut, the defendant, sought an introduction to the plaintiff: 
‘Said Mr. Winchester to Oscanyan, “Will you be kind enough to call the 
attention of Rustem Bey to my repeating rifle?” “Well,” said Oscanyan, “Mr. 
Winchester, I am receiving commissions from all parties for that favour, and I 
expect commissions for my services, and that is one of the ways by which I 
make my livelihood; if you can compensate me, if you can remunerate me by 
giving me commissions, I will use my influence for you and do all I can for 
you.” “Very well,” said Mr. Winchester, “that is all right. You shall have 
whatever commissions we deem proper and we will talk the matter over and 
agree upon that.”’ 124  
Mr. Justice Field, in determining whether or not this agreement for a 
commission was enforceable by the plaintiff, held that the contract was 
unenforceable because of the nature of its origin and because of the results 
such a contract would encourage. He stated: 
‘[t]he contract was a corrupt one … corrupt in its origin and corrupting in its 
tendencies. The services stipulated and rendered were prohibited by 
considerations of morality and policy which should prevail at all times and in 
all countries, and without which fidelity to public trusts would be a matter of 
bargain and sale, and not of duty.’125 
The notion of fidelity to the public trust outweighed any notions of freedom of 
contract because of what the court viewed as the necessary negative 
consequences of allowing such contracts. The court noted that official 
positions are ‘trusts to be exercised from considerations of duty and for the 
public good. Whenever other considerations are allowed to intervene and 
control their exercise, the trust is perverted and the community suffers.’126 The 
                                                     
 
123. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880), at p. 277. 
124. Id., at p. 270. 
125. Id., at p. 272. 
126. Id., at p. 273. 
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court emphasized the need to protect the public welfare by not allowing such 
contracts to be enforced stating that:  
‘a contract to bribe or corruptly influence officers of a foreign government 
will not be enforced in the courts of this country ... not from any 
consideration of the interests of that government or any regard for its policy, 
but from the inherent viciousness of the transaction, its repugnance to our 
morality, and the pernicious effect which its enforcement by our courts would 
have upon our people.’127  
Similarly, in Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, an illegal contract entered 
into by the plaintiff to bribe Nigerian officials was held by the courts to bar the 
plaintiff’s right to recover on a breach of contract claim. The Court held that 
the actions of Adler rendered the contract one that was not enforceable by the 
court and that the court would not provide a remedy for such corrupt activity. 
Justice Pregerson of the Court of Appeals stated:  
‘Making a judicial remedy available when the bribe fails to accomplish the 
intended result would reduce the risk inherent in paying bribes, and encourage 
individuals such as Adler. In short, public policy favours discouraging frauds 
such as the one perpetrated on Adler, but it also favours discouraging 
individuals such as Adler from voluntarily participating in such schemes and 
paying bribes to bring them to fruition.’128  
Justice Noonan, in the same case, reiterated the fact that the origin of the 
contract rendered it unenforceable stating:   
‘the crux is a contract made with a fictitious person, Chief Abba Ganna, never 
shown to have been an official of the Nigerian government and indeed never 
shown to have existed. The contract was criminal in nature and criminal in 
purpose. It was void under California law.’129 
The fact of a corrupt exchange affects the rights of all parties involved in a 
contract tainted by corruption. The Adler case illustrates how the facts of 
bribery can jeopardize recovery on the part of a claimant whose hands are 
‘unclean.’ In keeping with the maxim, ‘he who comes to equity must come 
with clean hands,’ the contract resulting or tainted by corruption becomes 
unenforceable by a party that has been an instrument in the chain of corruption. 
In the words of the court,   
                                                     
 
127. Id., at p. 277. 
128. Adler v. Republic of Nigeria, Nos. 98-55456, 98-55460 (9th Cir. 17 May 2000).  
129. Adler v. Republic of Nigeria, id., at p. 5231, Justice Noonan added, ‘[t]his disgraceful effort to 
make us parties to a criminal conspiracy should never have darkened our doors. It is time to 
expunge it wholly.’  
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‘[t]his maxim ... is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of 
equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in 
which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the 
defendant.’130  
The plaintiff that is involved is a corrupt process is debarred from reaping the 
fruits of this behavior under the ‘unclean hands doctrine.’    
In Tool Company v. Norris131 the court emphasized that the public policy 
against enforcing a contract to give a bribe is tied to the fact that it is ‘the most 
efficient and economical mode of meeting the public wants ….’132 Agreements 
to give a bribe, in the opinion of the court, tended to ‘introduce personal 
solicitation and personal influence as elements in the procurement of 
contracts,’ and thus directly lead to ‘inefficiency in the public service and to 
unnecessary expenditures of the public funds.’133 In this case, the court 
concluded that:  
‘all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations 
of the government, or the regular administration of justice, or the 
appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void 
as against public policy …, [t]he law looks to the general tendency of such 
agreements, and it closes the door to temptation, by refusing them recognition 
in any of the courts of the country.’134 
In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., compensation was claimed for 
services rendered in procuring the passage of a law. Justice Grier urged the 
rejection of such contracts in the most urgent terms stating:  
‘bribes, in the shape of high contingent compensation, must necessarily lead 
to the use of improper means and the exercise of undue influence … The use 
of such means and such agents will have the effect to subject the state 
governments to the combined capital of wealthy corporations, and produce 
universal corruption, commencing with the representative and ending with the 
elector. Speculators in legislation, public and private, a compact corps of 
venal solicitors, vending their secret influences, will infest the capital of the 
Union and of every state, till corruption shall become the normal condition of 
the body politic, and it will be said of us as of Rome – “omne Romae 
venale.”’135 
                                                     
 
130. Id., at p. 5223. 
131. Tool Company v. Norris, 69 U.S. 2 Wall. 45 (1864). 
132. Id., at p. 54. 
133. Id. 
134. Id., at p. 56. 
135. Per Lord Grier in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853), at p. 335. 
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In general for public policy reasons, the US courts will seek to avoid the 
enforcement of a contract evidencing a corrupt exchange even where there is 
no express provision declaring such a contract invalid. The logic adopted by 
the court is that this is consistent with the need to provide the very protection 
that the rules prohibiting corruption seek to provide. Apart from the need to 
protect the public by acting consistently with criminal prohibitions, the courts 
have also rejected contracts that run afoul of such prohibition by invoking the 
dignity of the court. The courts have noted that:  
‘It is an undoubted principle of the common law that it will not lend its aid to 
enforce a contract to do an act that is illegal or which is inconsistent with 
sound morals or public policy or which tends to corrupt or contaminate, by 
improper influences, the integrity of our social or political institutions.’136  
The court has similarly noted that ‘[t]he principle to be extracted from all the 
cases is that the law will not lend its support to a claim founded upon its 
violation.’137 Thus even where there is no express statutory provision, in which 
case a contract is based on conduct that is illegal under a statute, the courts on 
grounds of public policy will hold such a contract to be unenforceable.  
This means that the court, in considering the primary contract to give or 
receive a bribe, is guided by factors other than the justice between the parties. 
The public trust, the integrity of government and social institutions, as well as 
economic efficiency are determining factors that render the primary contract an 
agreement that will not be countenanced by the courts. In other words, a 
contract made in violation of a penal statute, although not expressly prohibited 
or declared to be void, is prohibited, void, and unenforceable, whether 
executory or executed.138 It has been stated that ‘no court should be required to 
serve as paymaster of the wages of crime, or referee between thieves.’139 Mr. 
Justice Hughes remarks:  
‘Freedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right. There is no 
absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The 
guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide 
department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to 
government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the 
                                                     
 
136. Per Lord Grier in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 57 U.S. 314 (1853), at p. 314. 
137. Coppell v. Hall, 74 U.S. 542 (1863), at pp. 558-559. 
138. See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, (8 October 1889), at p. 511; ‘No one shall be permitted to 
profit from his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon 
his own iniquity, or to acquire any property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by 
public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and 
have nowhere been superseded by statute.’ 
139. See Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E. 2d 571 (1948), at p. 572. 
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absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and 
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.’140 
When a court is faced with a contract to give and/or receive a bribe, it is faced 
with a contract that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy because the 
anti-corruption rules regarding private and public bribery clearly provide for 
the unenforceability of such conduct. By engaging in a contract to give or 
receive a bribe, the parties are committing the very conduct prohibited by the 
law.  
4.4.2.3 Effect of Unenforceability of Primary Contract 
There is no recourse for a party who seeks performance of a promise that is 
contrary to public policy. Nor will the court order restitution, specific 
performance or another remedy. The court will ‘leave both parties as it finds 
them even though this may result in one of them retaining a benefit that he has 
received as a result of the transaction.’141 Sec. 197 of the Restatement (2nd) 
Contract states that ‘a party has no claim in restitution for performance that he 
has rendered under or in return for a promise that is unenforceable on grounds 
of public policy unless denial of restitution would cause disproportionate 
forfeiture.’142 This allows the defendant, who may be the party at fault, to walk 
away from the transaction without paying any penalty. Indeed it may leave the 
defendant enriched at the cost of the plaintiff.143 A few cases illustrate this 
point.  
In Nathan v. Tenna Corporation, the plaintiffs sought to recover commissions 
purportedly due under the terms of a contract with the defendant that amounted 
to an illegal kickback scheme. The court held that the illegal acts undertaken 
by the plaintiff in performing the contract rendered the contract unenforceable 
and further stated: 
‘Nathan’s conduct constituted the crime of commercial bribery under Illinois 
law. Criminal conduct of this degree cannot be ignored by a court asked to 
                                                     
 
140. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911), at p. 567. 
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enforce a contract, even if the promise sought to be enforced is severable from 
that performed illegally. Nathan, the party who engaged in illegal conduct, is 
the plaintiff seeking enforcement of the contract. We share the district court’s 
expressed disdain for the plaintiff’s audacity in suing on a contract which he, 
at least partially, performed by engaging in criminal acts. We agree with the 
court’s conclusion that public policy dictates that the plaintiff’s suit be 
dismissed.’144 
In McMullen v. Hoffman, the parties had committed a fraud in combining their 
interests and concealing this fact in the process of submitting bids, which they 
presented as separate bids on the understanding that they will share the income 
equally if either of them won the bid. The court of appeal stated that: 
‘The authorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously hold that no 
court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an 
illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove 
the illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, 
nor will they enforce any alleged rights directly springing from such contract. 
In cases of this kind, the maxim is “Potior est conditio defendentis.”’145   
In Coppell v. Hall, a rebellion and civil war in the City of New Orleans led to 
military occupation by the United States forces. Parties from different sides 
entered into a contract in violation of a treasury regulation prohibiting 
commercial intercourse with localities beyond the lines of military occupation 
by the United States forces. The contract was declared ‘contrary to public 
policy, to the law of nations, to the act of Congress, to the proclamation of the 
President, and to the regulations of the Treasury Department.’146 Mr. Justice 
Swayne, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:  
‘The defense [of illegality] is allowed, not for the sake of the defendant, but of 
the law itself. The principle is indispensable to the purity of its administration. 
It will not enforce what it has forbidden and denounced [and that] [w]henever 
the illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side or the other, 
the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent of the defendant can neutralize 
its effect. A stipulation in the most solemn form to waive the objection would 
be tainted with the vice of the original contract, and void for the same 
reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys. The principle to be 
extracted from all the cases is that the law will not lend its support to a claim 
founded upon its violation.’147 
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The policy that underlies the refusal to enforce contracts that are in violation of 
statutory prohibition is emphasized by the court in McMullen v. Hoffman as 
follows: 
 ‘The more plainly parties understand that when they enter into contracts of 
this nature, they place themselves outside the protection of the law so far as 
that protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less 
inclined will they be to enter into them. In that way, the public secures the 
benefit of a rigid adherence to the law.’148   
For the same reasons, parties to a contract to give a bribe are outside the 
protection of the law and will receive no assistance pursuant to a contract that 
offends the dignity of the court and contaminates the ‘pure fountains of 
Justice.’149  
There are some exceptions to the strict rules against restitution for illegal 
contracts. A party may be granted restitution where such a party has a claim for 
performance rendered in return for a promise that is unenforceable on grounds 
of public policy, and the party was excusably ignorant of the facts or of 
legislation or was not equally in the wrong.150 In the case of the primary 
contract between the party who pays the bribe and the party who receives the 
bribe, both parties act in full knowledge that their actions are contrary to what 
is in the best interest of the principal. It is hardly likely that the exception will 
be of any application in such a case.  
However, it would seem that the primary contract to give or receive a bribe is 
not void ab initio. The federal law on the bribery of public officials,151 for 
example, criminalizes the giving of bribes, but makes it clear that the contracts 
that result are not automatically void. It provides that in ‘addition to other 
remedies provided by law’ a government authority may declare void and 
rescind any contract or instrument ‘in respect of which there has been a 
criminal conviction for bribery, graft or conflict of interest.’152 This is an 
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149. Wade cites the colorful words of Lord Chief Justice Wilmot regarding a contract tainted by 
illegality as follows: ‘Ye shall not stipulate for iniquity. All writers upon our law agree in this, 
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150. Sec. 198 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
151. 18 USC Chapter 11 Bribery Grafts and Conflict of Interest. 
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administrative action that makes it clear that the contract can survive a 
conviction for bribery. While this is with respect to the bribery of public 
officials, the same reasoning can apply in the absence of specific provisions to 
contracts that are tainted by corruption. Indeed the case law cited above shows 
that the courts do not consider such contracts void ab initio. In leaving the 
parties where they found them, the agreement between the parties is not 
automatically voided by the court and can subsist. 
4.4.3 The Secondary Contract 
A distinction should be made between the contract to give a bribe and the 
contract that results from the successful bribery transaction. The contract that 
results between the party paying the bribe and the principal of the party, who 
received the bribe, is a contract which is, on its face, a valid contract. The anti-
bribery rules criminalize the conduct of giving and receiving a bribe. The rules 
do not extend to the bribe resulting from the successful violation of the anti-
bribery prohibitions. There is no salutatory prohibition with regard to this 
secondary contract. Yet, these contracts are tainted by the originating act of 
bribery and the question that arises is whether these contracts are enforceable 
by a court of law.153 The courts faced with a contract that has resulted from a 
corrupt exchange must weigh the implications of the rules criminalizing 
bribery against the freedom of the parties to the contract sought to be 
enforced.154 
The contract that results from a bribe follows the commission of a tort but is 
not in itself an agreement that encapsulates a legal wrong, such as the primary 
contract, to give or receive a bribe. It is not a promise to commit a tort. The 
court must take into consideration the justified expectations of the parties to 
the contract, i.e., the bribe-giver and the principal of the agent who took a 
bribe, as well as any forfeiture or unjust enrichment that may result where the 
contract is not enforced.155 At the same time the courts must consider the 
public policy against bribery and whether the refusal to enforce the contract 
that results from the successful act of bribery will further the policy against 
bribery in the acquisition of business.156 Other factors that will be considered 
                                                     
 
153. In Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880), at pp. 271-272, the US Supreme Court posed 
the question in these terms:  
‘The plaintiff claims that these contracts were procured through the recommendations 
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are the seriousness of the misconduct and whether or not the terms of the 
contract are directly connected to the payment of the bribe.157 
The contract that results from the successful act of bribery is directly linked to 
the legal wrong that preceded it. It is indeed the inducement for the 
commission of the act of bribery. As such, it cannot be considered in isolation 
of this originating fact. Farnsworth points out that the policy developed by the 
courts to deny the enforcement of agreements that serve as an inducement for a 
tort or breach of fiduciary duty has a long history.158 Judicial policy extends 
the policy underlying the criminalization of corruption to contracts that result 
from it.    
A few examples illustrate this point. In Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store,159 
Sirkin paid a bribe to an employee of the Fourteenth Street store in a bid to get 
a contract to supply the store with goods. This contract was successfully 
executed but when the store learned about the bribery transaction that had 
preceded the making of the contract, it refused to pay for the goods. An action 
for the price of goods sold and delivered was met with a defense by the 
defendant for dismissal of the claim on the grounds that the contract for sale 
was a result of a bribery exchange between the plaintiff and the purchasing 
agent of the defendant in violation of the then Sec. 384 (current Sec. 439) New 
York Penal Code. The defendant store did not tender back the goods or offer to 
return the proceeds of the goods that it had sold, nor did the defendant assert 
that it had suffered any loss or damage by way of the purchase.  
The court held that the action of the plaintiff in bribing the purchasing agent of 
the defendant was a violation of the penal code, which prohibited the corrupt 
practice of secretly offering bribes to the agents and employees of a servant to 
induce a contract with the master or principal.160 In the opinion of the court, 
the plaintiff had committed a crime in order to obtain the contract upon which 
the action before the court was based.161 The court agreed that the ‘legislature 
has not expressly declared either that the contract to pay the bribe or the 
contract induced by the bribe is void and unenforceable.’162 However, the court 
held that in both instances such a contract is prohibited, void and 
unenforceable whether executory or executed.163 
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The court emphasized that the legislature in criminalizing the act of bribing an 
agent intended ‘to emphasize and extend the public policy of the common law, 
which rendered such contracts by agents for their own benefit void.’164 This 
being the case, the court held that it was the duty of the courts to be ‘guided’ 
by the laws penalizing the bribery of agents in its administration of the law.165 
The focus of the court was on the fact that the plaintiff who brought the action 
had committed a crime and was seeking the assistance of the court in enforcing 
the contract, which he had ‘procured by violating the penal law.’166 
The Sirkin case illustrates the obstacles to the enforcement of a secondary 
contract. If the contract is held to be valid and enforceable, the court is in effect 
rewarding the criminal activity of the plaintiff and acting contrary to the clear 
intention of the legislature in passing laws that criminalize the act of bribery. 
The court in the Sirkin case noted that:  
‘if the court should lend its aid to the enforcement of this contract … it would 
thereby be indirectly compelling a master or employer to reimburse a party for 
moneys expended in bribing his servant, agent or employee in violation of the 
law.’167 
The court felt that simply compelling the payment of the difference of the price 
between what the principal would have paid and the increase in the quantity of 
the bribe paid would not be sufficient.168 The court held that: 
‘[p]ublic policy requires that an agent servant or employee shall perform the 
duties of his employment involving discretion and trust, with a single purpose 
of serving his master or employer; and the master or employer … has a right 
to expect faithful, loyal service rendered with sole regard to his interest.’169  
The ‘vice’ in the opinion of the court was not the difference in price. The main 
motivation for the court’s response was not to restore a breach of contract. 
Rather the court was focused on preventing a situation that rewarded the 
‘making of the agreement without the knowledge of the master.’170 
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In the Sirkin case, the court stated with respect to the secondary contract, that 
‘public policy … forbids the ratification as well as the making of such a 
contract.’171 This is because of the public dimension of such a contract and its 
impact on the general public. The court noted that ‘[u]sually private contracts 
concern only the parties thereto, and it is optional with a person who has 
discovered that he has been defrauded whether to ratify the contract or rescind 
it.’172 In this respect, the court cited Chief Justice Marshall of the US Supreme 
court in Armstrong v. Toler, who stated: 
‘Where a contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with, an illegal 
or immoral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to enforce it. And if the 
contract be, in fact, one connected with the illegal transaction, and growing 
immediately out of it, though it is, in fact a new contract, it is equally tainted 
by it.’173  
Although the defendant in Sirkin admitted that they had suffered no damage, 
the court held that the plaintiff would have been shown ‘to have committed a 
crime in obtaining the very contracts which he asks the aid of the court to 
enforce and should be denied assistance.’174 The court sought more than justice 
between the parties. There was a deterrent purpose to its public policy position. 
The court noted that:  
‘… nothing will be more effective in stopping the growth and spread of this 
corrupting, and now criminal custom, than a decision that the courts will 
refuse their aid to a guilty vendor or vendee, or to anyone who has obtained a 
contract by secretly bribing the servant, agent or employee of another to 
purchase or sell property, or to place a contract with him.’175  
This position has less to do with restoring the rights of parties to a contract 
than it has to do with punishing unacceptable conduct. In Coppell v. Hall, the 
court emphasized that a holding that a secondary contract is not enforceable on 
account of bribery is motivated not by the interests of the parties but for the 
sake of the law, stating:  
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‘[it] is not allowed for the sake of the party seeking to escape his contract, but 
for the sake of the law. The principle is indispensable to the purity of its 
administration. It will not enforce what it has forbidden and denounced .... 
Whenever the illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side or 
the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent of the defendant can 
neutralize its effect .... Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys. The 
principle to be extracted from all the cases is that the law will not lend its 
support to a claim founded upon its violation.’176 
 
Similarly, in McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp, a principal whose 
agent had been bribed pleaded this illegality as a defense for non-performance 
under the contract between the principal and the bribe-giver.177 The defendant 
entered into an agreement to pay McConnell the plaintiff $10,000 plus a 
percentage of the profits if McConnell successfully obtained distribution rights 
to motion pictures for the plaintiff. McConnell succeeded in acquiring the 
distribution rights after paying bribes without the knowledge of the defendant. 
The defendant subsequently defaulted on the contract and refused to pay the 
promised commission or to give him an accounting of the profits.  
The plaintiff argued that:  
‘since the agreement sued upon between the plaintiff and the defendant was 
not in itself illegal, the plaintiffs right to be paid for performing it could not 
be defeated by a showing that he had misconducted himself in carrying it 
out.’178  
 
The court rejected this argument stating that ‘[p]roper and consistent 
application of a prime and long-settled public policy closes the doors of our 
courts to those who sue to collect the rewards of corruption.’179  
Justice Desmond remarked that even though in essence the contract was not 
illegal, the court would deny awards for corrupt performance of contracts.180 
Regarding the question of the unjust enrichment or windfall that such a ruling 
would give to the defendant, the court stated that ‘[i]t is not every minor 
wrongdoing in the course of a contract performance that will insulate the other 
party from liability for work done or goods furnished. There must be at least a 
direct connection between the illegal transaction and the obligation sued 
upon.’181 The court did not intend that its ruling apply to ‘all kinds of 
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corruption, minor and major, essential and peripheral.’182 Rather the court 
distinguished the bribery of the agent of a principal under circumstances such 
as in the McConnell case as:  
‘gross corruption’ which “… consistent with public morality and settled 
public policy” would deny a plaintiff recovery even on a contract valid on its 
face, if it appears that the plaintiff has resorted to “gravely immoral and 
illegal conduct in accomplishing its performance.”’183 
The following cases emphasize the fact that the secondary contract resulting 
from a corrupt exchange will meet the same fate of unenforceability as the 
primary contract. In Colyvas v. Red Hand Compositions Co., 184  the plaintiff 
sought an accounting of income and recovery of commissions for services he 
claimed to have rendered in procuring contracts for the defendant to furnish 
paint supplies and services to Olympic Maritime S.A. and certain other 
companies of Aristotle Onassis. The plaintiff admitted to a bribery agreement 
with an employee of the Onassis companies to ensure that the defendant got 
the contract. The defendant argued that the contract, valid though it may be on 
its face, was wholly unenforceable under the governing law of New York 
because the plaintiff’s admitted course of conduct during the course of his 
alleged performance of said contract was illegal.185  The court upheld the 
defendants claim that the plaintiff’s contract was unenforceable.  
Similarly, in Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Sys.,186 the courts found that a lease 
contracts for photocopiers was unenforceable because they had arisen through 
an illegal bribe.  In Pharm. Sales and Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau 
Co.,187  the courts found that the proof of commercial bribery could be asserted 
to avoid enforcement of a contract. In United States v. Mississippi Valley 
Generating Co.,188  a claim was made against the United States to recover costs 
and damages incurred under a government-terminated contract to construct and 
operate a power plant to provide electric power for the Atomic Energy 
Commission. The Government argued that the contract was unenforceable 
because it resulted from a proposal resulting from negotiations in which the 
Government had been represented by an unpaid, part-time consultant to the 
Budget Bureau, who was at the same time was an active officer of an 
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investment banking company which was expected to profit from the 
transaction by becoming the financial agent for the project.  
The court agreed with the government stating that the consultant violated 18 
USC Sec. 434, and that public policy forbids enforcement of the contract. The 
court added that although the statute did not specifically provide that the 
contract would be invalid, the protection under the statute could only be:  
‘fully accorded only if contracts which are tainted by a conflict of interest on 
the part of a government agent may be disaffirmed by the Government. If the 
Government’s sole remedy in a case such as that now before us is merely a 
criminal prosecution against its agent, as the respondent suggests, then the 
public will be forced to bear the burden of complying with the very sort of 
contract which the statute sought to prevent.’189  
These cases support the view that even in the absence of express legislation 
providing for unenforceability, contracts obtained as a result of bribery, 
although valid on the face of the contract, will not be enforced by the US 
courts for reasons of public policy. This has nothing to do with the position of 
the parties and is not directed at ensuring justice between the parties. Rather 
the focus is on protecting society from the effects of contracts that are a result 
of criminal activity. It is also to protect the institution of the fiduciary by 
refusing to allow the enforcement of contracts that arise as a result of the 
breach of the fiduciary duty. The actions of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce 
such a secondary contract cannot be divorced from the manner in which the 
contract was obtained. As such, both the primary contract to give a bribe and 
the secondary contract that results from the successful bribery exchange will be 
considered promises that are unenforceable under US law. 
4.5 The Private Claim for Corruption 
Private civil actions used to be the most commonly used method of fighting 
corruption in the United States. However, the outcry against the pervasive 
practice of bribery and the perceived limitations of civil actions led many 
states to enact statues outlawing bribery thus moving redress for corruption 
from the private to the public sphere. The fact that bribery is criminalized does 
not rule out the possibility of a civil action based on common law principles.190 
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Judge Davis in the Continental case remarked that the statutory remedy under 
the criminal law ‘is not exclusive and common law rights and remedies 
survive, unless Congress intended the legislative provision to be exclusive.’191 
He noted that the existence of statutes establishing bribery penalties did not in 
any way detract from the right to a civil remedy but rather the criminalization 
of bribery strengthens the case for the civil remedy because ‘it establishes a 
statutory standard of conduct and evidences a strong policy against 
[bribery].’192  
Furthermore, although the US courts have held that that the UNCC, the FCPA 
and the state commercial bribery statutes do not create an express private right 
of action; the creativity of the motivated plaintiff has created a somewhat 
different scenario.193 Redress is being sought by plaintiffs as a consequential 
claim to a FCPA violation.194 Private actions are being instituted by claimants 
using breaches of the FCPA provisions as a trigger to file civil actions. These 
include actions by shareholders under the securities laws, or for breach of 
fiduciary duties by company executives, private claims by foreign government, 
losing competitors, former employees or consumers.  
This section provides a sampling of cases that are illustrative of the attempts 
made to use the private civil process as distinct from public criminal 
proceedings to seek remedies for corruption in business transactions. 
4.5.1 Actions by Principal of Disloyal Agent  
The principal-agent relationship is the primary relationship that is the subject 
of private claims for corruption. It is generally accepted that the corruption of 
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an agent can be the basis for a civil action. A fundamental motivation for the 
courts in cases involving the bribery of an agent is that such actions in breach 
of the fiduciary duty are inimical to the general public interest. In June Fabrics 
v. Teri Sue Fashions, the court held that acts by a third party allegedly 
corrupting an employee or agent of another amount to a wilful tort. The court 
held that in such circumstances the injured party has the right to redress and 
‘has it within his ability to hold one or several or all such wrongdoers 
accountable.’195 An action may be brought by the principal against the agent, 
the bribe-giver or both parties. 
4.5.1.1 Recovery against the Disloyal Agent. 
Commercial bribery is viewed as a deliberate tort. The principal can sue for 
damages in tort and the agent is liable to the principal for losses arising from 
the breach of fiduciary duty as well as the possible loss of employment. Sec. 
910 of the Restatement (2nd) Torts provides that ‘[a] person injured by the tort 
of another is entitled to recover damages from him for all harm, past, present 
and prospective, legally caused by the tort.’  
The principal may in the alternative seek a constructive trust on the profits that 
the agent has made from the act of bribery. As the courts held in Williams 
Electronics Games Inc. v. Garrity,196 where the manufacturer of the video 
game Mortal Combat alleged that two of its suppliers had bribed their 
purchasing agent to purchase goods from them:  
‘The victim of commercial bribery, who usually … is the principal of an agent 
who was bribed, can obtain by way of remedy either the damages that he has 
sustained (the damages remedy) or the profits that the bribe yielded (the 
restitution or unjust enrichment remedy).’197  
The court added that the total profits would consist of the bribe itself, plus the 
revenue that the bribe generated for the person paying the bribe, minus the cost 
of goods sold and any other variable costs incurred in making the sales that 
generated that revenue.198 The Restatement (3rd) Agency, Sec. 407(1), 
provides that ‘If an agent has received a benefit as a result of violating his duty 
of loyalty, the principal is entitled to recover from him what he has so 
received, its value, or its proceeds, and also the amount of damage thereby 
caused.’  
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The principal, as the person to whom the fiduciary duty is owed, is entitled to 
any benefit acquired by the agent or the bribe-giver as a result of the corrupt 
exchange. The measurement is not the loss of the principal but the gain of the 
agent or bribe-giver. The courts have stated that this is the underlying 
motivation for the courts response. The focus is not so much on repairing the 
loss of the victim as it is on deterring commercial bribery. In the Williams 
Electronic Games case, the court stated that the rational for sanction of 
disgorgement:  
‘is to make it worthless to the tortfeasor by stripping away all his gain, since if 
his gain exceeded the victim’s loss a damages remedy would leave the 
tortfeasor with a profit from his act.’199   
As such, the plaintiff may seek the proceeds of the bribe from the agent. In 
United States v. Carter, a case dealing with the corruption of a public official, 
Justice Lurton held that: 
‘[t]he larger interests of public justice will not tolerate, under any 
circumstances, that a public official shall retain any profit or advantage which 
he may realize through the acquirement of an interest in conflict with his 
fidelity as an agent. If he takes any gift, gratuity or benefit in violation of his 
duty, or acquires any interest adverse to his principal without a full disclosure, 
it is a betrayal of his trust and a breach of confidence, and he must account to 
his principal for all he has received.’200  
The US Supreme Court has emphasized that the disgorgement of all corrupt 
gains is the appropriate response to the breach of fiduciary duty. The Court 
held, for example, where a government official made profits from contracts 
under his control that:  
‘government is not limited, in a suit to recover the same and in which it has 
impounded securities, to the traced securities; the officer must account for all 
his gains and, … the government is entitled to a judgment for money had and 
received to its use, and may enforce it against any property of the defendant 
including property in the hands of third parties with notice of how it was 
obtained.’201 
Even where the plaintiff principal has made a recovery against the bribe-giver, 
the principal can also proceed against the agent involved in the bribery 
transaction. A case from the State of Minnesota is illustrative of this point. In 
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Tarnowski v. Resop,202 the plaintiff hired the defendant to advise on the 
purchase of a string of coin-operated music machines. The defendant, Resop, 
was paid a secret commission by the party selling the route to report back to 
the plaintiff that that there were over 75 locations, each with machines less 
than six months old, and that the overall gross income was over $3,000 per 
month. Relying upon the advice of the defendant and the investigation he had 
made, the plaintiff purchased such a business from Phillip Loechler and Lyle 
Mayer of Rochester, Minnesota. The plaintiff paid an $11,000 down payment. 
Six weeks after the purchase, the plaintiff discovered that the representations 
made to him by defendant were false, in that the agent had only investigated 
five locations and some machines were up to seven years old, with the gross 
income much less than the projected $3,000.  
Upon discovering the falsity of defendant’s representations and those of the 
seller’s, the plaintiff rescinded the sale. He offered to return what he had 
received, and demanded the return of his money. When the sellers refused to 
comply, the plaintiff successfully brought an action against the sellers resulting 
in a verdict of $10,000 for the plaintiff.  
The plaintiff also proceeded to sue the defendant (his agent) for collecting a 
secret commission from the sellers in breach of fiduciary duty owed to him and 
sought for (a) the sum of the secret commission and (b) damages for (1) losses 
suffered in operating the route prior to rescission; (2) loss of time devoted to 
operation; (3) expenses in connection with rescission of the sale and his 
investigation in connection therewith; (4) nontaxable expenses in connection 
with prosecution of the suit against the sellers; and (5) attorneys’ fees in 
connection with the suit.203 
The defendant argued that since the plaintiff had recovered against the sellers, 
he was barred from a further action against Resop as agent because (1) that 
plaintiff had elected one of the alternative remedies and cannot thereafter 
pursue another; (2) that successful pursuit of one remedy constitutes a bar to 
another remedy for the same wrong, even though the outcome of the first 
action did not make plaintiff whole in point of actual loss; (3) that the satisfied 
verdict in the rescission case is a bar; and (4) that defendant and the sellers 
were joint tortfeasors, and the discharge of one discharged them all.204  
The court held that with regard to the recovery of the secret commission it was 
well settled that:  
                                                     
 
202. Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W. 2d 801 (Minn. 1952). 
203. Id., at p. 35. 
204. Id., at p. 36. 
CHAPTER 4 - PRIVATE REMEDIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
186 
 
‘the principle that all profits made by an agent in the course of an agency 
belong to the principal, whether they are the fruits of performance or the 
violation of an agent’s duty, is firmly established and universally 
recognized.’205  
The court further held that: 
‘[a]ctual injury’ is not the principle the law proceeds on, in holding such 
transactions void. Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and, as a means of 
securing it, the law will not permit him to place himself in a position in which 
he may be tempted by his own private interests to disregard those of his 
principal.’206   
The court noted that the right of the principal to recover profits made by the 
agent in the course of the agency was not affected by the fact that the principal, 
upon discovering a fraud, had rescinded the contract and recovered the moneys 
which he had spent.207 As such, the court held that the principal had an 
‘absolute right’ to the secret commission irrespective of any recovery resulting 
from the action against the sellers for rescission.208 The court also held that the 
plaintiff could recover any profits made by the agent irrespective of his 
recovery against the sellers as well as any losses flowing directly from the 
agent’s tortious conduct.209  
4.5.1.2 Recovery against the Bribe-Giver 
There are two main planks upon which the court seeks to affect a civil remedy 
on the parties to a corrupt exchange. The first has to do with the breach of the 
fiduciary duty and the second is to give effect to the public policy of the 
statutes criminalizing bribery as criminal behavior. The party who pays a bribe 
is in violation of the rules criminalizing public and private corruption. The US 
courts encourage the right to a remedy for the principal who has suffered 
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from the corrupt exchange between the bribe-giver and the agent of the 
principal. The US Supreme Court in Continental Management, Inc. v. United 
States remarked that ‘the violation of a statutory standard of conduct should 
normally meet with civil sanctions designed to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute infringed.’210 The court added that the:  
‘purpose of the bribery statute—the protection of the public from the 
corruption of public servants and the evil consequences of that corruption—
will obviously be furthered by the recognition of a civil remedy.’211  
Apart from the need to protect the general public, the personal interest of the 
principal is a key element of liability on the part of the bribe-giver. The party 
who pays the bribe is liable to the principal for interfering with the principal-
agent relationship.212 The Supreme Court in the Continental Management case 
held that it is a well-established principle that:  
‘a third party’s inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of duty by 
an agent is a wrong against the principal which may subject the third party to 
liability.’213  
The court added that the broad principle is that an agent’s receipt of secret 
profits injures the principal because it necessarily creates a conflict of interest 
and tends to subvert the agent’s loyalty.214 Any such person who knowingly 
participates in a scheme by which an agent obtains secret profits should be held 
liable to the principal.215 This case is worth examining in some detail, because 
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it basis for liability of the bribe-giver and the measure of damages in such 
cases. 
In the Continental Management case the plaintiff sued the United States for 
sums due to them under contracts of mortgage insurance issued by the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA). The government authority counterclaimed 
seeking to collect from the plaintiffs an amount equal to the sum of bribes paid 
by a former president of the plaintiffs’ predecessor corporation to its 
employees after an FBI investigation uncovered evidence that this company 
had violated federal statutes prohibiting bribery, conspiracy, and the making of 
false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The 
former president of the plaintiff’s predecessor company and four government 
FHA employees pleaded guilty to bribery. 
The question before the court was what sort of proof of damages the 
Government needed to make when bringing a case against the bribe-giver. The 
defendant argued that it was sufficient to show the evidence of bribery and the 
amount of the bribes and that nothing further needed to be alleged or proven by 
way of specific or direct injury.216 The court accepted this argument holding:  
‘[i]n normal course the briber deprives the Government of the loyalty of its 
employees, upon which the Government and the public must rely for the 
impartial and rigorous enforcement of government programs. Bribery of 
officials can also cause a diminution in the public’s confidence in the 
Government, upon which the Government must also rely. The Government 
likewise incurs the administrative costs of firing and replacing the venal 
employees and the costs of investigation, all of which are compensable in 
fraud cases.’217  
In determining the measure of damages, the court alluded to the old maxim of 
the law that ‘where the fact of injury is adequately shown, the court should not 
cavil at the absence of specific or detailed proof of the damages’ and stated 
that while the plaintiffs had engaged in wrongful conduct that clearly hurt the 
Government, significant elements of that harm, such as the injury to the 
impartial administration of governmental programs, are not susceptible to an 
accurate monetary gauge.218 The court found that it would not deny the 
principal government relief because the plaintiff managed to cause injury that 
was not readily traceable or measurable and that the government’s inability to 
attach an exact and provable dollar figure to the harm it sustained would also 
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not result in the exculpation of the plaintiffs.219 On this basis the court held that 
in the absence of ‘a more precise yardstick,’ the amount of the bribe provides a 
reasonable measure of damage on the condition that the principal cannot 
recover the same bribes twice – once from the briber and again from the 
corrupted employee.220   
4.5.2 Shareholder Actions under the Federal Securities Laws  
Although the courts have held that the FCPA does not grant a private right of 
action, victims of corruption have used FCPA indictments as the basis for 
lawsuits under US securities laws.221 Paying a bribe in violation of the FCPA 
can be considered material information that may influence the decision of a 
person to invest in company stock. Reports about a company’s involvement in 
corrupt activity can have an impact of the share price that may impact 
negatively on an investor’s holding. In a derivative action, shareholders can 
file a claim against company executives on behalf of the company. Any 
damages recovered from such an action are paid to the company. This is to be 
contrasted with a direct action where shareholders file a claim against company 
executives for loss suffered as a result of a violation of the securities laws. In 
this instance damage awarded is paid to the plaintiff and not to the company.  
An example of a direct class action is the 2006 case of Re Immucor,222 where 
following the announcement of a formal SEC investigation into allegations of 
an improper payment under the FCPA by the company, shareholders filed a 
class action lawsuit under Sections 10(b)223 and 20(a)224 of the Securities 
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Exchange Act of 1934 alleging losses for material misstatements. The 
shareholders claimed that press releases and statements made by the defendant 
were materially misleading because they presented an unreasonably optimistic 
outlook over the scope and gravity of the FCPA investigation, referring to it as 
an ‘isolated event,’ when representatives of Immucor had in fact committed 
multiple acts of corruption including allegedly paying bribes to obtain 
favorable consideration of contracts in Italy over a period of years beginning in 
1998. This, the plaintiffs alleged, caused an artificial inflation of Immucor’s 
stock price.   
This stock dropped in price225 after the truth regarding Immucor’s Italian 
business became known to the market. This resulted in real economic loss to 
Immucor investors. They alleged that as a result of the corporation’s wrongful 
conduct, they suffered damages as a result of the fraudulent scheme undertaken 
by the defendants and further economic loss when the true facts were revealed 
to the public.226 The plaintiffs sought compensation for all damages sustained 
                                                                                                                            
 
national securities exchange … [T]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement …, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.’ 
224. Sec. 20(a) provides for a private right of action based on contemporaneous trading and states 
that:  
‘[…] Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations 
there under by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, non-
public information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction 
to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is 
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of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) 
securities of the same class.’ 
225. As a result of these back-to-back adverse disclosures impacting the senior management’s 
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$28.61 per share on 25 August 2005, the Company’s stock closed at $23.58 per share on 1 
September 2005, a drop of $5.03 or over 17%, on heavy volume. See In re Immucor Inc. id 
Note 233 above at Para. 8. 
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permit plaintiffs’ counsel to recover from the agreed settlement proceeds – has no impact on 
the Company or its insurer. The Court’s order concludes the Company’s involvement in this 
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as a result of the defendants’ wrongdoing, for their reasonable costs and 
expenses incurred in their action, including counsel fees and expert fees, as 
well as interest on the amount awarded. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied Immucor’s 
motion to dismiss the shareholder claim. The court found that the plaintiffs had 
adequately alleged false or misleading statements that the facts alleged 
regarding the various statements did support the heightened pleading 
requirements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).227 
In the view of the court, this omitted information would have been viewed by a 
reasonable investor as affecting the total mix of information available, and a 
reasonable investor’s investment decision would have been swayed had the 
alleged omitted information been included in the press release. The court 
allowed the claim.228  
A similar case dealing with material misrepresentations which was eventually 
settled out of court, but which is nonetheless instructive to show how FCPA 
investigations can lead to actions under the federal securities laws, is the case 
of Titan Corporation.229 The indictment of Titan Corporation, a San Diego-
based military intelligence and communications company, for the bribery of an 
agent to secure an agreement with the government of Benin to build and 
operate a wireless telephone network as well as a substantial management fee 
for maintaining the system, led to several shareholder actions. 
Titan Corporation made improper payments totalling $3.5 million to the agent 
for the purpose of influencing the upcoming elections in Benin and ensuring 
the support of the incumbent president for Titan’s contract. The agent 
submitted at Titan’s request over $2 million of false invoices to Titan. Titan 
                                                                                                                            
 
litigation and terminates the claims asserted in this litigation as to all class members. 
Management believes this resolution of the litigation has no material adverse effect on the 
Company’s financial condition or results of operations.’ 
227. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (‘PSLRA’) 15 USC Sec 78u-4, imposes 
additional pleading requirements for plaintiffs in securities fraud cases. First, the PSLRA 
requires a plaintiff to specify each statement or omission alleged to be misleading, the reason 
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motion to dismiss. See 15 USC Sec. 78u-4(b)(3)(A). 
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229. In re Titan Securities Litigation, No. 04-CV-0701-K (NLS) U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California, Titan agreed to pay the largest FCPA penalty to date of $28.5 
million. http://securities.stanford.edu/1030/TTN04-01/. 
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falsified its books to conceal these illegal payments. In March 2005 Titan 
Corporation pleaded guilty to one count of FCPA bribery, one count of 
falsifying its books and records, and one count of aiding or assisting in the 
filing of a false tax return, in violation of 26 USC Sec. 7206(2). Titan was 
sentenced to pay a criminal fine of $13 million on the FCPA bribery count and 
was ordered to serve three years of supervised probation. As a condition of its 
probation, Titan was ordered to institute a strict compliance program and to 
implement a system of internal controls designed to prevent future FCPA 
violations. Titan also entered into a consent decree with the SEC agreeing to 
cease-and-desist from future FCPA violations and also entered into a financial 
settlement comprising of disgorgement and prejudgment interest of 
$15,479,000. The aggregate penalty paid by Titan was over $28 million.230 
Several shareholder class actions resulted from these investigations. In April 
2004, two stockholder class action lawsuits were filed against Titan and some 
of its officers, asserting claims under the federal securities laws. In September 
2004, these class action lawsuits were consolidated as In re Titan, Inc. 
securities litigation. The federal securities action was brought on behalf of all 
purchasers of Titan common stock during the period from 24 July 2003 
through and including 22 March 2004. The complaint sought damages for 
artificially inflated prices paid for Titan Stock by the shareholders in reliance 
on the market which had been inflated by Titan’s misleading statements. The 
defendants alleged, among other things, that the defendants violated Sec. 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), and 
SEC Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder, as well as Sec. 20(a) of the 
Exchange Act, by issuing a series of press releases, public statements and 
filings disclosing significant historical and future revenue growth, but omitting 
to mention certain allegedly improper payments involving international 
consultants in connection with Titan’s international operations, thereby 
artificially inflating the trading price of Titan’s common stock.  
The Immucor and Titan lawsuits are examples of instances where the damage 
caused by the breach of criminal laws had translated into private losses for 
shareholders. The recourse to the courts and the availability of remedies in 
these cases show that a private right of action for damages caused by corrupt 
acts while not expressly provided for by the FCPA statute can nonetheless 
arise by operation of law.   
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4.5.3 Shareholder Actions for Breach of Fiduciary Duty   
Another category of FCPA-inspired civil litigation is the actions by 
shareholders who allege that by failing to prevent the bribery of foreign public 
officials, company executives were in breach of their fiduciary duty. For 
example, in April 2004, two stockholder class action complaints were filed 
against certain Titan officers, asserting that these officers breached their 
fiduciary duties to Titan’s stockholders.231 The actions were brought on behalf 
of all holders of Titan common stock as of 7 April 2004 and alleged that the 
defendants breached their fiduciary duties by acquiescing in or condoning 
Titan’s alleged violations of the FCPA by failing to establish adequate 
procedures to prevent the alleged FCPA violations, and by failing, in bad faith, 
to voluntarily report the alleged FCPA violations to government officials. The 
complainants sought compensatory damages in respect of the loss of value 
sustained by Titan stockholders.  
In addition to these shareholder class actions, in June 2004, three shareholder 
derivative lawsuits were filed against Titan directors and certain Titan 
officers.232 The derivative actions were brought for the benefit of Titan, and 
alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the company by 
failing to monitor and supervise management in a way that would have either 
prevented alleged FCPA violations or would have detected the FCPA 
violations. Titan eventually paid $67.4 million to settle the securities law class 
actions and derivative suits pending against Titan in both Federal and State 
courts in California and the Delaware Court of Chancery.233 
4.5.4 Private Actions by Nationals  
Actions for remedies have also been brought by private citizens. In Adler v. 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria,234 James Adler, a U.S. citizen and majority 
shareholder of the Mexican corporation El Surtidor del Hogar, brought an 
unsuccessful claim against the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Adler in 1992 fell 
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victim to a ‘419’235 scheme under which he transferred a total of $2.1 million 
in bribes to Nigerian officials in return for an ‘investment’ opportunity. He 
received a letter from a Chief Abba Ganna Hen George about an investment 
opportunity for which Adler could receive a substantial commission. The letter 
explained that former members of the Nigerian ruling party had used their 
positions to create companies and award themselves for invoiced contracts, and 
that the new Nigerian government had ‘given its blessing for the payment of 
these contracts.’ Adler could receive a commission, the letter explained, by 
arranging for the payment of one of these contracts by providing blank copies 
of El Surtidor’s letterhead and invoice statements, as well as a non-Nigerian 
bank account into which $130 million would be transferred.  
After the transfer, 40 percent of the total would go to Adler; 50 percent would 
go to Nigerian government officials; and 10 percent would go toward 
expenses. Adler sent the letterhead, invoices, and the number of a bank account 
in the Grand Cayman Islands. The deal fell through and Adler sought to 
recover the over five million dollars he had paid to further the illegal contract 
and to bribe the Nigerian government officials.   
The district court held that the transaction involved criminal activity on its face 
and that Adler knowingly and intentionally participated in that activity. Adler 
had paid bribes to Nigerian officials in violation of California bribery law and 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Adler had travelled in interstate commerce 
and used instrumentalities of interstate commerce to make gifts and payments 
to foreign officials or persons he believed were foreign officials for the 
purpose of influencing their decisions to assist him in obtaining business. As 
such the court decided that the unclean hands doctrine barred Adler from 
recovering the money he had paid to the Nigerian government officials. This 
decision was upheld on appeal. Although this claim was unsuccessful, it 
demonstrates the possibility of private parties to file claims to seek a remedy 
for losses suffered as a result of corrupt activity. 
4.5.5 Private Actions by Foreign Governments   
Another set of claimants seeking private remedies for corruption are foreign 
governments. In 2008, for example, in a case brought before the US District 
Court of the Southern District of New York, the Republic of Iraq on behalf of 
                                                     
 
235. The basic fraud, notorious in Nigeria for its practice by skilled confidence men, is known to 
the Nigerian police as a ‘419,’ because it is a violation of the Criminal Code Act of Nigeria, 
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the Citizens of the Republic of Iraq brought a claim against ABB et al.236 The 
case centered upon the United Oil-for-Food Program established in 1996 to 
provide relief to the people of the Republic of Iraq from sanctions the U.N. had 
imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  
The Republic of Iraq claimed that the previous government of Saddam Hussein 
had corrupted the program by imposing surcharges on sales of Iraqi oil and 
demanding kickbacks on purchases of humanitarian goods to obtain hard 
currency for the Iraqi Treasury in violation of the terms of the program and the 
underlying sanctions. Iraq claimed to have been injured by such payments and 
sought to recover as damages three times the amount of surcharges and 
kickbacks paid with regard to commercial transactions under the Oil-for-Food 
Program asserting claims for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), conspiracy to commit fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violation of the commercial 
bribery prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), and violation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The action is still before the courts. 
Another significant foreign government private claim was brought by the 
Kingdom of Bahrain state-owned aluminum smelter, Aluminum Bahrain 
against Alcoa Inc. (a company involved in the supply of alumina to the state 
owned company) in the US District Court of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. Aluminum Bahrain alleged that Alcoa bribed one or more of its 
former senior officials as well as officials of the Government of Bahrain to 
induce the plaintiff to cede a controlling interest in that company to Alcoa and 
to overpay for alumina. The bribes were sent through a series of shell 
companies that Alcoa ultimately controlled. Aluminum Bahrain is seeking 
damages in excess of $1 billion. Aluminum Bahrain alleges among other 
claims breaches of the RICO Act and is relying on the alleged illegal payments 
to foreign officials in violation of the FCPA as a predicate act for the RICO 
claim.237 
4.5.6 Private Actions by Losing Competitors  
Apart from the claim arising from the contract tainted by corruption, an 
important type of claim focuses on the effect that the corrupt exchange has on 
other parties involved in the bidding process. These parties suffer damage that 
results from the distortion that the act of bribery has on free and fair 
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237. Aluminium Bahrain v. Alcoa Inc., Complaint (Case 2:05-mc-02025 Document 279 Filed 
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competition. The bribe-giver who wins a contract as a result of a corrupt 
exchange has interfered with the ability of the party who has given no bribe to 
win that same contract. This is a tort of unfair interference in the prospective 
business relations of another who is in competition with the bribe-giver. 
An illustrative case is the Rangen case, where an action was brought by a 
competitor who claimed that Rangen, the defendant, had paid bribes to an 
official of the Idaho State Fish Hatchery as a result of which the Idaho 
Hatchery bought only Rangen fish food. The losing competitor claimed 
damages on the grounds that but for these bribes he would have had a portion 
of the business given to Rangen in the four-year period of the contract. The 
Court granted him treble damages under Art. 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
which was affirmed on appeal. The Court held that the elimination of 
‘commercial bribery’ was one of the purposes of the Act stating:  
‘In our case the bribery not only undermined a fiduciary relationship which 
Congress sought to protect, but gave one seller a grossly unfair advantage 
over a competing seller. Where commercial bribery is associated with evils 
which a particular provision of the antitrust laws was designed to prevent, the 
fact that it was bribery rather than a more defensible arrangement ought not to 
preclude application of the statute.’238 
Another illustrative example is the Environmental Tectonics Corporation 
International (ETC) case. ETC, a Pennsylvania corporation, brought an action 
to recover damages against several defendants who according to ETC had 
obtained a defense construction contract from the Nigerian Government by 
bribing Nigerian officials. ETC claimed to have been injured by the apparently 
successful scheme. The district court declined jurisdiction in the case holding 
that adjudication of ETC’s claims would lead inevitably to an examination of 
the Nigerian government’s motives in awarding the Nigerian contract to 
Kirkpatrick, one of the defendants. The district court was convinced that such a 
finding would be interpreted as criticism of the Nigerian Government and 
concluded that the case presented the type of situation which precludes judicial 
inquiry. In the opinion of the court, the act of state doctrine barred adjudication 
of ETC’s claims and dismissed the action in its entirety.  
On appeal, the court reversed this decision and stated:  
‘The nature of the acts alleged and the number of victims are also important 
considerations in this analysis … ETC claims to have suffered direct 
economic injury from the appellees scheme. By illegally influencing the 
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decisions of appellees public officials, however, appellees have also created 
an even larger class of victims, the citizens of Nigeria. Moreover, because 
bribery of foreign officials by American businessmen diminishes this nation’s 
stature and influence abroad, conduct of the kind here alleged victimizes the 
citizens of this nation as well.’239  
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of appeal and held: 
‘(1) act of state doctrine was not applicable to bar United States court from 
entertaining action alleging that company obtained military procurement 
contract from Nigerian government through bribery of Nigerian officials, and 
(2) act of state doctrine does not establish exception to obligation of United 
States courts to decide cases and controversies for cases and controversies 
that may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that, in process 
of deciding, acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions be 
deemed valid.’240 
Another case involving a losing competitor is Rotec Industries, Inc. v. 
Mitsubishi Corp.241 Although the case did not succeed because of the inability 
of the plaintiff to establish a causal link, it is a useful pointer to the type of 
claim that is possible by a losing competitor. In this case, Rotec brought an 
action against Mitsubishi and other competitors. The plaintiff alleged 
violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and Oregon state law, which prohibits 
intentional interference with economic relations. Rotec claimed that the 
defendants had bribed certain members of the bid evaluation committee as a 
result of which Rotec lost the construction competition.   
The Court of Appeal, agreeing with the lower court, dismissed Rotec’s claims. 
The court noted that in Oregon, the tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations requires Rotec to prove: (1) the existence of a professional 
or business relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a prospective 
economic advantage), (2) intentional interference with that relationship, (3) by 
a third party, (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper 
purpose, (5) a causal effect between the interference and damage to the 
economic relationship, and (6) damages.242 The lower court assumed for 
purposes of its decision that all elements other than the causation element were 
                                                     
 
239. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.J. 1987), affirmed 
on other grounds, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) 2 May 1988, at pp. 1063-1064. Some writers 
argue that there should be a bribery exception to the Act of State Doctrine. See J. Simon, 
‘Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.: should there be a bribery exception to 
the Act of State Doctrine?’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 17, 1984, p. 407. 
240. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Intern. 493 U.S. 400, 110 
Supp. Ct. 701 U.S.N.J., 1990, 17 January 1990. 
241. Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp, 348 F.3d 1116 C.A.9 (Or.), 2003. 
242. Id., at p. 1121. 
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met. It dismissed the action because in its opinion Rotec had failed to 
demonstrate causation between the allegedly improper interference and the 
damage to the economic relationship. 
The court of appeal agreed and held that ‘too many inferences need to be 
drawn to establish a connection between that improper conduct and Rotec’s 
ultimate failure to secure the two contracts won by the defendants.’243 The 
court held that even if it accepted Rotec’s assertions that Mitsubishi essentially 
bought the votes of two members of the Evaluation Committee and that these 
two members caused the sixty-member Evaluation Committee to act as it did, 
the court could still not identify a linkage between the Committee’s actions and 
CRNC’s decision to execute a contract with the defendants.244 
An example of a claim for the intentional tort of bribery based on unfair 
competition law is the case of Korea Supply Company v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp.245 Korea Supply was in a competitive bid with Lockheed Martin to 
supply military equipment to the Republic of Korea. Although Korea Supply 
put in a lower bid, Lockheed Martin won the contract with anticipated profits 
of approximately $10,000,000.246 Korea Supply sued Lockheed Martin under 
California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL),247 alleging that Lockheed Martin 
was awarded the contract by unlawfully bribing South Korean officials, in 
violation of the FCPA and also in tort for unlawful interference with 
prospective economic advantage. The Californian Supreme Court accepted that 
the plaintiff had an action in tort but limited the scope of the remedy available 
under the UCL disallowing the remedy of non restitutionary disgorgement that 
had been allowed by the court of appeal.  
                                                     
 
243. Id., at p. 1122. 
244. Id., at p. 1123. 
245. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 94142 (Cal. 2003). Korea 
Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. et al., 29 Cal. 4th 1134 (2003). 
246. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 94142 (Cal. 2003) id., at 941.  
247. The Californian Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code) Sec. 17200 
provides: 
‘[A]s used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, 
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or 
misleading advertizing and any act prohibited by unlawful, unfair and fraudulent 
business acts.’ This provision allows plaintiffs to use violations of prohibited acts 
under other rules as a cause of action in court under the Californian rules; Sec. 17203 
permits a court: ‘to make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a 
receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any 
practice which constitutes unfair competition  . . .’ and empowers a court: ‘to make 
such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest 
any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of 
such unfair competition.’ 
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The court of appeal focused on what it described as the deterrent purpose of 
the UCL and held that Sec. 17203 should be construed to provide for the non- 
restitutionary disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains to any plaintiff who could 
demonstrate that those gains had been obtained in violation of the UCL. The 
court ruled that such non-restitutionary disgorgement could be granted whether 
or not the case had been brought as a class action and whether or not any 
money or property had actually been unlawfully acquired from the plaintiff or 
anyone the plaintiff purported to represent.248 
On further appeal to the California Supreme Court, this sweeping interpretation 
was rejected. The Supreme Court Justices found that ‘while restitution was an 
available remedy under the UCL, disgorgement of money obtained through an 
unfair business practice is an available remedy in a representative action only 
to the extent that it constitutes restitution.’249 As such the Supreme Court 
concluded that non-restitutionary disgorgement of profits in an action brought 
by an individual was not an expressly authorized remedy under the UCL. The 
court looked into the history of the legislation to ascertain whether 
authorization for such a remedy could be implied. 
The court noted that from the language of UCL it was ‘… clear that the 
equitable powers of a court were to be used to “prevent” practices that 
constitute unfair competition and to “restore to any person in interest” any 
money or property acquired through unfair practices.’ However, the court 
noted that while the ‘prevent’ prong of Sec. 17203 of the UCL suggested 
that the Legislature considered deterrence of unfair practices to be an 
important goal, the fact that attorney fees and damages, including punitive 
damages, are not available under the UCL was clear evidence that 
deterrence by means of monetary penalties is not the act’s sole objective. 
Indeed in the opinion of the court, the ‘fact that the “restore” prong of Sec. 
17203 [was] the only reference to monetary penalties in this section 
indicates that the Legislature intended to limit the available monetary 
remedies under the act.’ As such, the court concluded that there was 
nothing to indicate that the legislature intended to authorize such a remedy 
in the case of an action brought by an individual that would result in an 
order that to a ‘defendant to disgorge all profits to a plaintiff who does not 
have an ownership interest in those profits.’ 
                                                     
 
248. California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division Four, No. B136410. 
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Private actions also provide avenues for losing competitors to draw upon 
foundations laid by criminal investigations. An example of such a ‘piggy 
back’ action was the landmark class action by US wheat farmers who were 
seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation from the AWB 
Limited relying on a UN Investigation that revealed that the AWB paid 
$290 million in transnational bribes to Saddam Hussein regime officials to 
secure wheat contracts in Iraq. The litigants claim that the AWB were 
‘unfair advantage conspirators,’ whose conduct excluded US wheat 
growers from the Iraqi wheat markets.250 The court dismissed the claim 
stating that the plaintiffs could not show that AWB’s conduct in Iraq was a 
‘proximate cause’ of their injury, which is a required element of antitrust 
standing.251   
4.5.7 Private Actions by Consumers  
An interesting class of claimant is the class action by consumers. In the Ferona 
Wint case,252 Wint had employed a mortgage broker to obtain a mortgage loan 
in connection with the purchase of her new home. The mortgage loan was 
made by ABN Amro, who influenced the mortgage broker Cliffco by paying a 
yield spread premium or deferred premium (‘YSP’). A YSP is a payment made 
by a lender to the borrower’s broker in exchange for the broker deceptively 
exacting approval from the borrower of a mortgage loan with an interest rate 
that is above the ‘par’, or market rate offered by the lender. As a result, Wint 
had to pay thousands of dollars in extra interest.  
The court held that the act of ABN Amro constituted commercial bribery in 
violation of the provisions of New York Penal Law Sec. 189.03. The Court 
further held that commercial bribery constitutes a separate and distinct civil 
cause of action, and reversed the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing the 
appellants case and ordered that the case be certified as a class action 
The court in the case found that a class action for damages and injunctive relief 
for claims of this type is superior to other available methods for a fair and 
efficient determination because the case involved relatively moderate losses to 
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thousands of people, thus making a class action for damages not only the 
superior method, but the only feasible method for resolving this controversy. 
4.6 Observations 
The normative framework for private remedies for corruption in the US is 
composed of international, federal and state rules. The reservation to Art. 35 
UNCC made by the US Congress and the denial of a private right of action 
under the FCPA and state commercial bribery laws means that anti-corruption 
rules do not serve as a direct basis for private actions for redress. The trend, as 
affirmed by the response of the US Congress and courts, would seem to be to 
deny the extension of private rights of redress to individuals for violations of 
anti-corruption laws. 
However, acts of bribery in commercial affairs may act as a trigger for the 
application of other rules particularly under antitrust and securities laws 
designed to encourage free and fair competition as well as to protect investors. 
Also relevant are rules that encourage the private claimant to act as a private 
prosecutor where a fraud has been committed against the government in the 
RICO type claim as well as qui tam actions under the False Claims Act. 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that, the private claimant does not have any 
express right of action under the anti-corruption laws but is restricted to 
incidental opportunities presented under other statutes and common law 
principles. 
Transactions tainted by corruption (whether national or international) benefit 
from the public policy against corruption that emerges from the criminalization 
of public bribery under US federal law as well as private commercial bribery 
under state laws. Judicial policy has developed in response to these statutory 
prohibitions, which affect the validity of the primary contract to give a bribe 
and the secondary contract that results from a successful bribery exchange.  
The primary contract evidences conduct that is prohibited under federal and 
state laws regarding public and private bribery. However, there is no express 
statutory prohibition of the primary agreement. The question of the validity of 
the primary agreement is therefore one that must be decided by a court of law. 
In the absence of an express statutory prohibition, the courts have developed 
judicial policy regarding the enforceability of the agreement to give a bribe. 
This policy is determined by a balancing of public and private interest affected 
by the enforcement of such agreements. 
Public interest weighs against allowing recovery or access to courts for actions 
based on illegal conduct. In this regard, the illegal conduct of an agreement to 
give a bribe is not only a conduct in violation of criminal law; it is also conduct 
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that induces the breach of a fiduciary duty. These elements have resulted in 
policy that supports the unenforceability of the primary contract that evidences 
the agreement to give a bribe. Cases that support this public policy have varied 
from domestic disputes involving private parties (e.g. Tool Company v. 
Norris), to disputes involving public contracts (e.g. US v. Mississippi Valley 
case) as well as disputes involving a foreign national (for example the 
Oscanyan and Adler cases). 
The public policy against the unenforceability of the primary  contract acts in 
the interest of the defendant, as the court will leave the parties as it has found 
them and not lend its assistance in any way to enforcing the rights under the 
contract. The courts act in these instances as custodians of the law and of the 
indirect victims of corrupt acts i.e. the general public. As such, they do not 
offer the protection of the law to parties of the primary contract. There is no 
claim, no restitution, and no enforcement available to the party who 
intentionally enters into a contract to give a bribe. The objective of the courts is 
to deter the commission of such transactions and thereby encourage 
compliance with the anti-corruption rules. 
Judicial policy against enforcement extends to the secondary contract, which 
results from the successful payment of a bribe or other inducement. The courts 
agree that the secondary contract is on its face a valid contract. It is, however, 
inextricably linked to the commission of a tort. The fact that a plaintiff bribe-
giver seeking enforcement of a secondary agreement has committed a crime in 
order to ‘obtain the contract upon which the action before the court is based’ 
led to the important ruling in the Sirkin case that the secondary contract is 
unenforceable. The focus of the courts is not so much on achieving justice 
between the parties as it is on deterring the commission of acts of bribery. In 
this view the courts have discountenanced arguments that such a position will 
lead to the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. 
This public policy plays in favor of the defendant, who can repudiate the 
secondary contract without any cost. 
Furthermore, the bribe-giver and the party receiving the bribe are liable in 
restitution to the party to whom is owed the fiduciary duty that is breached by 
the act of bribery. The principal may seek damages against a bribe-taking agent 
that will minimally consist of the bribe itself. The proceeds resulting from the 
bribe are also payable to the principal, as the objective of the court is to strip 
the wrongdoer of all gain made from the corrupt exchange. The disgorgement 
of all benefit is judged by the courts as the appropriate response to a breach of 
the fiduciary duty by the agent. 
The right of the principal to proceed against the agent is not affected by the 
fact that the principal may have already repudiated the secondary contract. As 
noted by the courts in the Tarnowski case, the principle that the courts proceed 
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on is not based on actual injury. The absolute right to the secret commission 
and benefits accruing to the agent are directed at securing the fidelity of the 
agent and to discourage the temptation of an agent to use the fiduciary 
relationship to further personal private interests.  
The bribe-giver is liable to the principal for interfering with the principal/agent 
relationship. As the courts showed in the Continental Management case, the 
measure of damages is a reasonable measure where the amount of actual injury 
cannot be quantified. Thus in addition to repudiating the contract entered into 
with the bribe-giver with no obligation to provide restitution, the principal may 
also seek damages in at least the sum of the bribe paid against the bribe-giver.  
The taxonomy of private claims for corruption shows that although there is no 
private right of action under the FCPA, this statute has served as a trigger for 
private claims under other laws. FCPA violations have led to derivative and 
direct actions by shareholders under securities laws. FCPA violations have also 
triggered antitrust, unfair competition claims by losing competitors. The breach 
of fiduciary duty that characterizes the act of bribery serves as a foundation for 
claims by the aggrieved principal which includes, for example, shareholders 
against their company executives for failing to prevent the bribery of foreign 
public officials, as well as class actions by consumers against a disloyal broker. 
Another category of claimant is the private individual who seeks remedies for 
damages suffered as a result of corrupt activity, as well as foreign governments 
seeking damages against corporations for engaging in corrupt acts against the 
interests of their people.  
4.7 Conclusion 
In the implementation of the UNCC, a deliberate effort has been made by the 
US legislature to restrict the ambit of Art. 35 based on the assertion that 
existing US rules and practice will meet the objectives of the UNCC. The 
implementation of the international rules under the US law does not 
significantly broaden the scope of remedies for damage resulting from acts of 
corruption in the US. Private remedies for corruption remain circumscribed by 
domestic US law. 
This overview shows that despite the public nature of the offense of 
commercial bribery and offenses under the FCPA, the right of victims to 
exercise a private right of action using the FCPA violations as a launching pad 
for such claims, has been supported by the courts. The implication here is that 
the categorization of ‘commercial bribery’ as a criminal offense does not shut 
the door to the private claim. A right to private remedies for damage suffered 
as a result of corruption has been founded using antitrust, securities, unfair 
competition law as well as traditional public policy principles regarding 
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illegality in transactions and the breach of fiduciary duty. The lack of express 
stipulations in the law notwithstanding, a group of creative plaintiffs is 
emerging using the anti-bribery statutes to trigger civil actions from the ranks 
of employers, shareholders, consumers and losing competitors.  
The role of the courts in influencing the fight against corruption is important, 
as the statutory rules criminalizing acts of corruption are centered on the 
punishment of the offender and are more or less silent on the status of 
transactions that result from the corrupt activity. As such, the issue of 
enforceability or otherwise of resulting transactions is left to the exercise of the 
courts discretion. The resulting effect is that the courts must enter into a 
balancing of interests. This balancing must be viewed in light of the 
international consensus against corruption and the anti-corruption rules under 
US laws. The protection of the society from the negative effects of corruption 
is the singular focus of the courts. The US courts will clearly favor the 
defendant seeking to repudiate the contract tainted by corruption to ensure that 
all benefits that accrue to the wrongdoing agent or bribe-giver or other 
inducement are disgorged in a restitutionary process.  
This overview of the US law shows that the boundaries between private 
and public law are not fixed and definite as regards the pursuit of remedies 
for corruption. The global market has become fundamentally different from 
what it was 30 years ago when the FCPA was enacted. The receding sovereign 
state and the blurring of the lines between the public and private sectors may 
mean that presumptions made about the nature of redress may need to be 
revisited to broaden the notion of remedies to a form that matches a changed 
global environment.253 It may be argued that the victim of corruption is 
gradually moving to the center stage and that the focus in the fight against 
corruption is not just to punish the offender but also, increasingly, to enable 
the victim. This is a desirable course of action because it uses the motivated 
victims as one more point of intervention in the fight against corruption and 
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mitigates its damaging consequences on world markets, on social 
development and on the well-being of citizens. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PRIVATE REMEDIES IN ENGLAND  
‘… in England, historically, the common law has traditionally abhorred the 
corruption by bribery of officers of state, ranking its offence next to high treason. Such 
corruption is more odious than theft; but it does not depend upon any financial loss and it 
requires no immediate victim. Corruption of a state officer by bribery is synonymous with 
the most heinous crimes because it can cause huge economic damage; and its long-term 
victims can be legion.’ 
 
G. Guillaume, A. Rogers, V. Veeder 
Tribunal World Duty Free v. Republic of Kenya1 
 
5.1 Introduction 
London is considered, by some, the international business capital of the world. 
It is also a leading center for the settlement of international commercial 
disputes. This chapter looks at private remedies for corruption from the 
perspective of English Law. The persuasive influence of English law in the 
British Commonwealth makes solutions emerging from the English legal 
system of great relevance.  
English law regarding corruption is spread across the common law and in 
several statutes. The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889, the 
Prevention of Corruption Acts of 1906 and 1916, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act of 2001 and finally the new UK Bribery Act of 2010 set the 
backdrop for the private claim for corruption.2 The new Bribery Act represents 
                                                     
 
1  World Duty Free Company Ltd v. The Republic of Kenya, 46 ILM 339, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, at Para. 173. 
2  These are not the only anti-corruption statutes in the United Kingdom; however for the 
purposes of this book they are the most relevant. Nicholls lists additional sources of anti-
corruption law in England as the Sale of Offices Act 1551, Sale of Offices Act 1809, 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1926, Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925, Licensing Act 
1964 s. 178, Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 5; Local Government Act 1972, s. 117(2), Customs 
and Excise Management Act 1979, s. 15, and Representation of the People Act 1983, ss. 107, 
109 and 111- 115. See C. Nicholls, T. Daniel, A. Bacarese, J. Hatchard, Corruption and 
Misuse of Public Office, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 16. 
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a consolidated scheme of bribery offenses that brings cohesion to UK law on 
corruption and replaces common law and existing statutes.3    
In the last few years there have been some significant developments in the 
prosecution of corruption cases involving British Companies. The Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) reported the first conviction of a UK company, Mabel and 
Johnson, for corruption committed in a foreign country.4 In a statement 
released by the SFO they reported that the prosecution for corruption resulted 
from the ‘company’s voluntary disclosure to the SFO of evidence to indicate 
that the company had sought to influence decision-makers in public contracts 
in Jamaica and Ghana between 1993 and 2001.’5 The company also admitted 
paying kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in connection with the 
United Nations’ Oil-For-Food Program in violation of UN sanctions in 2001 
and 2002. On 10 July 2009, the company pleaded guilty to these charges and 
agreed to pay a settlement of 6.6 million pounds. On this the SFO Director 
Richard Alderman said: 
‘This is a landmark outcome. The first conviction in this country of a 
company for overseas corruption and for breaking the UN Iraq sanctions and, 
satisfyingly, achieved quickly. The offences are serious ones but the company 
has played its part positively by recognising the unacceptability of those past 
business practices and by coming forward to report them and engage 
constructively with the SFO. 6  
In 2008, Neils Tobiasen, the Danish head of CBRN Team Ltd, a British 
security company, was given a five-month suspended jail sentence in the 
Southwark Crown Court in London, after he admitted giving £83,000 to 
Tumukunde and Rusoke, two senior Ugandan officials, to win about £210,000 
worth of business in respect of a contract to provide security training to local 
troops responsible for guarding visiting dignitaries who included the British 
                                                     
 
3   Sec. 3 of the explanatory notes to the UK Bribery Act 2010 states that the purpose of the Act is 
to reform the criminal law of bribery to provide for a ‘new consolidated scheme of bribery 
offences’ to cover bribery both in the United Kingdom (UK) and abroad. The Act replaces the  
offenses at common law and under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (known 
collectively as the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916 which it repeals). The extensive 
history of the Bribery Act is recounted in the 1995 Nolan Committee Report on Standards in 
Public Life; the Law Commission Proposal for Reform in the 1998 Report Legislating the 
Criminal Code: Corruption; the June 2000 Government White Paper CM 4759 on Raising 
Standards and Upholding Integrity: The Prevention of Corruption; and the November 2008 
Law Commission Report No. 313 on Reforming Bribery. 
4  Serious Fraud Office, Press Release dated 29 September 2009, available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009/mabey--johnson-
ltd-sentencing-.aspx; Prosecution Opening Statements available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/41953/sfo-annex2-statement-01-250909.pdf.  
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
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prime minister and the Queen of England.7 This is reportedly the first 
conviction of an individual for a bribe given by a UK company.   
In October 2008 the SFO accepted a £2.25 million settlement from a 
construction company, Balfour Beatty, following an investigation into payment 
irregularities that occurred within a subsidiary of the company in a joint 
venture with an Egyptian company.8 Balfour Beatty accepted that unlawful 
conduct, in the form of inaccurate accounting records arising from certain 
payment irregularities, had occurred within the subsidiary during the 
construction of the Bibliotheca Project in Alexandrina, Egypt. In another 
recent case in 2010, the former vice-president of De Puy, the UK subsidiary of 
US company Johnson and Johnson, was jailed for 12 months for helping 
arrange £4.5 million worth of bribes in Greece.9  
The first section of this chapter examines the foundations for private remedies 
and outlines the anti-corruption laws in England. The second section examines 
the civil law definition of corruption focusing on the essential elements of 
secrecy, and existence of a conflict of interest, which are the distinguishing 
features of bribery from the perspective of English civil law. Section 3 
examines the question of the validity of the transactions that are associated 
with a corrupt exchange, namely the primary contract to give a bribe made 
between the bribe-giver and the bribe-recipient and the secondary contract that 
results from a successful bribery exchange between the bribe-giver and the 
principal of a disloyal agent. The final section examines the types of private 
claims for corruption that are featured under English law. The chapter ends 
with observations and a conclusion about the provision of private remedies, the 
use of such remedies, and the position of the courts with regard to private 
claims for corruption under English law. 
5.2 The Normative Framework 
English law shows the development of rules regulating bribery progressing 
from the public sector to the private sector, and from domestic to foreign 
bribery. As such, it provides an interesting view of the dynamics that occur in 
the regulation of private sector versus public sector bribery and the extent to 
which private law (referred to hereinafter as civil law in keeping with English 
                                                     
 
7  See news report in The Guardian, Tuesday 23 September 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep/23/ukcrime.law.  
8  Serious Fraud Office, Press Release 6 October 2008 http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-
press-releases/press-releases-2008/balfour-beatty-plc.aspx.  
9  Serious Fraud Office, Press Release 14 April 2010 http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-
press-releases/press-releases-2010/british-executive-jailed-for-part-in-greek-healthcare-
corruption.aspx. 
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law terminology) and criminal law enhance and complement each other in the 
fight against corruption.  
The development of the anti-bribery laws in England reflect a ‘needs of the 
moment’ pragmatism. Laws evolved into a ‘piecemeal’ manner as a matter of 
expediency in the particular instance.10 The English rules emerged in four 
stages. The first stage tackled corruption regarding judicial and ministerial 
officers;11 the second stage, political corruption; the third stage, corruption in 
commercial relationships12 and the fourth, more recent stage, foreign bribery.  
Fennel and Thomas record that the Public Body Corrupt Practices Act of 1889 
Act was introduced to curb corruption by ‘local public bodies’ in the ‘wake of 
revelations of corrupt practice made before a Royal Commission appointed to 
inquire into the affairs of the Metropolitan Board of Works.’ 13 They note that 
the 1906 Prevention of Corruption Act was a response to ‘10 years of agitation 
for legislation by the Secret Commission of the London Chamber of 
Commerce’ against the practice of taking secret commissions by agents, and 
that the 1916 Prevention of Corruption Act was ‘passed in the wake of 
scandals regarding the Clothing Department of the War Office’ and created a 
presumption of corrupt intent in cases of bribes regarding public bodies.14 The 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 was on its part, the result of a 
wave of public opinion against foreign corruption that was unleashed in the 
United States by the Watergate Scandal in the 1970s. This wave resulted in the 
US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA), which in turn laid the foundation for 
                                                     
 
10  David Lanham remarks that ‘the law of bribery and corruption in England is the product of a 
hesitant common law and piecemeal and overlapping statutory development.’ D. Lanham, 
Bribery and Corruption, in P. Smith (Ed.), Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of J C Smith, 
Butterworths, London, 1987, p. 92. Abdul Gofur remarks that ‘many of the statutory 
provisions were hasty responses to contemporary scandals.’ See A. Gofur, ‘A panoptic study 
of corruption’, Opticon, Iss. No. 1, p. 1826, available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/opticon1826/archive/issue1/corruption.pdf. 
11  Scheb notes that ‘the concept of bribery dates back to biblical times when it was regarded as 
sinful to attempt to influence the judge with a gift because judge represented the divine. Thus 
when the common law developed the crime of bribery, it sought to penalize only persons 
whose actions were designed to improperly influence those identified with the administration 
of justice. J. Scheb, J. Scheb II, Criminal Law and Procedure, 5th edn, Wadsworth, Belmont, 
CA, 2008, at p. 332.  
12  Leslie James describes the first three stages as judicial, political and commercial corruption. 
See L. James, ‘Bribery and corruption in commerce: the need for harmonization of criminal 
law in European countries’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, 1962, p. 
880.  
13  P. Fennel and P. Thomas state that statistics suggest ‘an historical lack of enthusiasm in 
prosecuting offences of corruption.’ See P. Fennel, P. Thomas, ‘Corruption: an historical 
analysis’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 11, 1983, pp. 167-189, cited in 
C. Nicholls, T. Daniel, A. Bacarese, J. Hatchard, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, id., 
Note 2 above, at p. 24. 
14  Id. 
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the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions. Chapter 12 of the Anti-bribery Act was 
the United Kingdom’s domestication of the rules enunciated in the OECD 
Convention.  
International dissatisfaction with the checkered state of corruption laws in the 
UK and a dismal history of prosecutions15 finally resulted in the 2010 Bribery 
Act, which consolidates all the existing common and statutory law. To a 
certain extent this has been driven by the push for standardization at the 
international level.16 The following sections review the legal framework 
regulating corruption under the English Law. This is the foundation on which 
private rights can be exercised. Although the new Bribery Act has replaced the 
common law offenses and repealed the Prevention of Corruption Acts, a brief 
overview is given of these important building blocks of the normative 
framework of anti-corruption law in England.  
5.2.1 The Common Law Offense of Bribery 
There is no single definition of what is meant by bribery under the common 
law. As Lanham points out, the offense underwent development over centuries 
and is often described in terms of a number of offenses rather than a single 
offense.17 A review of the anti-corruption rules in England shows that for the 
most part the term corruption is synonymous with bribery. The articulation of 
the offense under common law and statute refer consistently to bribery. The 
common law offense of bribery focuses on acts of public officials in their 
                                                     
 
15  In defending the need for new law because of the ‘obscurity’ of the current law, the 
Joint Committee on The Draft Corruption Bill reported that based on the statistics it had 
received from the audit commission very few cases of corruption were reported. According to 
these statistics, on average 21 people were prosecuted in each year between 1993 and 2003 
under the Prevention of Corruption Acts. By comparison on average, some 23,000 defendants 
were prosecuted each year for fraud between 1997 and 2001. See Report and Evidence of the 
Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, 17 July 2003, HL paper 157, HC 705, published 
31 July 2003 by the authority of the House of Lords and the House of Commons, London: The 
Stationery Office Ltd. 1 at Para. 11.  
16  Ruth Winstone reports that the Law Commission has described the state of anti-corruption 
rules in the United Kingdom as ‘obscure, complex, inconsistent and insufficiently 
comprehensive.’ See R. Winstone, Draft Legislation Standard Note: SN/PC/2059 on the report 
of the Joint Committee on the Draft Bill Draft Bill to reform the laws on corruption, 17 July 
2003 (HL Paper 157; HC 705), at p. 2, available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-02059.pdf. 
17  See D. Lanham, Bribery and Corruption , id., Note 10 above, at p. 92. In the United Kingdom, 
the Review of Implementation of the OECD Convention and 1997 Recommendation, Phase 1 
Bis Report states that according to UK authorities, ‘there are different legal opinions as to 
whether there is one common law offence of bribery that applies to a range of different 
offences or functions or a number of common law offences that apply in relation to different 
offence of functions…. It is however certain that there is a common law offence of bribing a 
public official.’ Available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/50/2498215.pdf, at p. 2. 
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official capacity. Stephen’s Codes18, for example, describe bribery and 
corruption under the headings of ‘judicial corruption,19 corruption of other 
public officers,20 corruption of public bodies,21 and embracery.22 The English 
Law Commission in its review of the corruption laws remarked that because 
the common law on bribery has evolved over time, opinions differ as to 
whether:  
‘it is to be regarded as a general offence (i.e. applying to a range of different 
offices or functions) or whether the common law is comprised of a number of 
specific or different offences of bribery.’23  
An often quoted definition of bribery is that found in Russell on Crime: 
‘Bribery is the receiving or offering of any undue reward by or to any person 
whatsoever, in public office, in order to influence his behaviour in office, and 
incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity.’24   
                                                     
 
18  H. Stephen, H. Lushington, A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments), 5th edn, 
Macmillan, New York, 1894. (Hereinafter Stephens’s Codes). 
19  Art. 136 Stephens’s Codes provides about judicial corruption that:  
‘Everyone who gives or offers to any person holding any judicial office, and every 
person holding any judicial office who accepts any bribe is guilty of a 
misdemeanour.’ 
20  Art. 137 Stephens’s Codes provides about corruption of other public officers that: 
‘Everyone commits a misdemeanour who by any means endeavours to force, 
persuade or induce any public officer not being a judicial officer to do or omit to do 
any act which the offender knows to be a violation of such officials duty.’ 
21  Art. 138 Stephens’s Codes provides about corruption of public bodies that: 
‘Everyone is guilty of a misdemeanour … who (a) corruptly solicits or receives, or 
agrees to receive, for himself or for any other person, any reward as an inducement to, 
or reward for, or otherwise on account of, any member, officer, servant of a public 
body, doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction actual 
or proposed in which the public body is concerned; or (b) corruptly gives, promises or 
offers any reward to any person, whether for the benefit of that person or another 
person, as an inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise on account of, any member, 
officer, or servant of any public body, doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of 
any matter or transaction actual or proposed in which the public body is concerned.’ 
22  Art. 139 Stephens’s Codes provides about embracery that:  
‘Everyone commits the misdemeanour called embracery who by any means whatever 
except the production of evidence and argument in open court attempts to influence 
or instruct any juryman, or to incline him to be more favourable to the one side than 
to the other in any judicial proceeding whether any verdict is given or not, and 
whether such verdict if given, is true or false.’ 
23  Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption. A Consultation Paper, Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No. 145, 1997. Para. 2.2. 
24  W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, 12th edn, Stevens, London, 1865, p. 223 
(1964, p. 381). See also H. Stephen, H. Lushington, A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and 
Punishments), 5th edn, Macmillan, New York, 1894, p. 137. ‘Everyone commits a 
misdemeanour who by any means endeavours to force, persuade, or induce any public officer 
not being a judicial officer to do or omit to do any act which the offender knows to be a 
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The phrase ‘undue reward’ leaves undefined what will suffice as ‘undue.’ 
However, early cases show that it is linked to an abuse of trust that results in 
damage to society at large but also to individuals. In R v. Bembridge, Lord 
Mansfield stated:  
‘a man accepting an office of trust concerning the public, especially if 
attended with profit, is answerable criminally to the King for misbehaviour in 
his office; this is true, by whomsoever and in whatsoever way the officer is 
appointed ….’25     
The locus classicus R v. Whitaker makes it clear that the notion of a public 
officer is broadly interpreted. Lawrence J. defines a public officer as ‘one who 
discharges any duty in which the public is interested, and more particularly if 
he receives payments from public money.’26 A public official stands in a 
position of trust. In the words of Best C.J.:  
‘… if a man takes a reward—whatever be the nature of that reward, whether it 
be in money from the Crown, whether it be in land from the Crown, whether 
it be in lands or money from any individual—for the discharge of a public 
duty, that instant he becomes a public officer …’27   
In summary, the common law offense of bribery was directed at public 
officials who corruptly took a reward in the performance of a public duty. The 
essential element was the nature of the responsibility assumed by the carrying 
out of public acts. The responsibility  to use public funds in the public interest 
identified the holder of such a responsibility as a public officer. The common 
law offenses of bribery are now replaced by the offenses created under the 
Bribery Act of 2010. 
5.2.2 Statutory Law 
Statutory law overlaps with the common law to a significant extent. As a 
result, the common law offense of bribery was not often used as the basis of 
public prosecution. Offenses were generally charged under the statutory law. 
                                                                                                                            
 
violation of such officer’s official duty.’ Halsbury’s Laws of England by Lord Halsbury vol. 
ix., p. 484, Sec. 965, ‘every person is guilty of a misdemeanour at common law who bribes a 
ministerial officer, or being a ministerial officer, accepts a bribe, where the object of the bribe 
is to induce such officer to do, or to omit to do, any act which to his knowledge is in violation 
of his official duty,’ id., p. 97.  
25  (1783) 3 Doug K B 327, at p. 332. 
26  R v. Whitaker, 1914, 10 Cr. App. R. 245, at p. 252. 
27  Henley v. Mayor of Lyme Regis, 1828, 5 Bing. 91, at p. 106, reported in J. Bayly Moore, J. 
Payne, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Courts of Common Pleas and 
Exchequer Chamber: With Tables of the Names of the Cases and Principal Matters, Vol. 2, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1828, at p. 302. 
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The statutory law on corruption of public officers was found principally in four 
instruments. These were the 1889 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, the 
1906 and 1916 Prevention of Corruption Acts,28 as well as the 2002 Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act. It was in statutory law that the expansion 
of the duty not to take bribes extended beyond the scope of public officers. 
Nevertheless, the extension of the statutory prohibition to corruption in 
commercial matters is a more recent development. Lesley James points out that 
‘while official and political corruptions were both punishable at common law, 
commercial corruption is the subject of relatively modern statute law only.’ 29 
5.2.2.1 The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 
The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act was passed on 30 August 1889 with 
the intention of ensuring ‘the more effectual prevention and punishment of 
bribery and corruption of and by members, officers, or servants of 
corporations, councils, boards, commissions, or other public bodies.’30 It made 
acts of passive or active bribery by holders of public office a misdemeanor 
under English law.31 Sec. 1 of the 1889 Act criminalized the act of receiving a 
bribe (passive bribery) and made it an offense providing that: 
‘Every person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other 
person, corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive, for himself, or for any 
other person, any gift, loan, fee, reward, or advantage32 whatever as an 
inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise on account of any member, officer, 
or servant of a public body as in this Act defined, 33 doing or forbearing to do 
anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or 
proposed, in which the said public body is concerned, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanour’.   
                                                     
 
28  These Acts may be cited together as the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916. See Sec. 
4 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. These three Acts are now repealed in their entirety by the 
Bribery Act of 2010. See Schedule 2 Repeals and Revocations Bribery Act 2010. 
29  L. James, ‘Bribery and corruption in commerce’, id., Note 12 above, at p. 881. 
30  Preamble Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889. 
31  A misdemeanour is a lesser crime usually punishable by fines under English common Law. ‘A 
felony was the name of all crimes which, whether at common law or by statute, were punished 
with death and forfeiture of property, or were denominated as felonies whatever might be the 
punishment. Treason is a felony, and more. All other crimes are misdemeanors.’ J. Stephan, A 
General View of the Criminal Law of England, 2nd edn, Macmillan,, London, 1890, p. 58. 
32  Sec. 7 Para. 5 of The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 defines ‘advantage’ as 
including any office or dignity, and any forbearance to demand any money or money’s worth 
or valuable thing, and includes any aid, vote, consent, or influence, or pretended aid, vote, 
consent, or influence, and also includes any promise or procurement of or agreement or 
endeavor to procure, or the holding out of any expectation of any gift, loan, fee, reward, or 
advantage, as before defined.’ 
33  Sec. 7 Para. 2 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 act provides that ‘The 
expression ‘public office’ means any office or employment of a person as a member, officer, or 
servant of such public body.’  
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In similar terms Sec. 1(2) of the 1889 Act criminalized the act of active 
bribery, i.e. in respect of the party who gives the bribe The term ‘corruptly’ is 
not defined under English law but is generally taken to mean purposely doing 
an act which the law forbids. Lord Willes has stated ‘the word  “corruptly” in 
this statute means not “dishonestly,” but in purposely doing “an act which the 
law forbids as tending to corrupt.’34  
The 1889 Act referred to the acts of passive and active bribery in respect of 
‘public bodies’ situated within the United Kingdom. It was therefore an act of 
purely domestic jurisdiction. It did not apply in any way to corruption 
occurring in foreign countries. At this stage of the development of anti-
corruption rules, the notion of punishing international corruption did not exist. 
Sec. 7 of the Act made it clear that the Act applied only to public officers 
within the United Kingdom.35   
5.2.2.2 The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 
Where the 1889 Act addressed bribery in the public sector, the 1906 
Prevention of Corruption Act shifted the boundaries of the offense of bribery 
to include not just public sector bribery but also bribery between private 
persons engaged in a business context. The preamble to the Act stated that its 
aim was to ‘better prevent corruption by punishing corrupt transactions with 
agents.’ The 1906 Act defined an agent as including ‘any person employed by 
or acting for another.’36 Such a person will include ‘a person serving under the 
crown or under any corporation or any … borough, county or district council, 
or any board of guardians.’37 The Act criminalized the passive38 and active39 
bribery of agents and provides as misdemeanors.  
Furthermore, the 1906 Act was international in scope inasmuch as it applied 
not only to acts of corruption affecting local public bodies, but also to 
instances where ‘the principal’s affairs or business had no connection with the 
United Kingdom and were ‘conducted in a country or territory outside the 
United Kingdom.’40 Similarly it was also of application where the agents 
                                                     
 
34  Cooper v. Slade (1858) VI House of Lords Cases (Clark’s) 746, at p. 773. 
35  This definition was expanded twice. Firstly by Sec. 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 
1906 to apply to local and public authorities of all descriptions. Secondly by the Sec. 108(3) of 
the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 to include anybody which exists in a country 
or territory outside the United Kingdom and is equivalent to anybody described in the 1889 
Act. 
36  Sec. 1(2) Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
37  Sec. 1(3) Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
38  Sec. 1(1), Para. 1, Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
39  Sec. 1(1), Para. 1, Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
40  Sec. 1(4)(a), Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. 
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function had ‘no connection with the United Kingdom and [was] carried out in 
a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.’41 
5.2.2.3 The Prevention of Corruption Act 191642 
The 1916 Prevention of Corruption Act followed the 1906 Act. This Act 
extended the scope of the 1889 Act from local public bodies to all public 
authorities. It provided in Sec. 4(2) that ‘the expression “public body” 
included, in addition to the bodies mentioned in the 1889 Act, “local and 
public authorities of all description.”’43 In keeping with the 1906 Act, it also 
provided that it applied to ‘authorities existing in a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom.’44 
Under the 1916 Act a presumption of corruption was introduced. The Act 
provided that:  
‘where in any proceedings against a person for an offence under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, or the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices 
Act 1889, it is proved that any money, gift, or other consideration has been 
paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of His Majesty or 
any Government Department or a public body by or from a person, or agent of 
a person, holding or seeking to obtain a contract from His Majesty or any 
Government Department or public body, the money, gift, or consideration 
shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as such 
inducement or reward as is mentioned in such Act unless the contrary is 
proved’.45  
This reversed the burden of proof. Any gift or other advantage given by a 
person who acquired or sought to acquire a contract from a public body was 
presumed to be a bribe. This presumption of corruption did not apply to 
overseas corruption.46  
 
                                                     
 
41  Sec. 1(4)(b), Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
42  This Act may be cited as the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, the Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889, or the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906;  this Act may be cited together 
as the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916. 
43  Sec. 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 provides that ‘In this Act and in the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the expression “public body” includes, in addition to the 
bodies mentioned in the last-mentioned Act, local and public authorities of all descriptions.’ 
44  Sec. 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 uses the phrase ‘including authorities 
existing in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.’ 
45  Sec. 2 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 
46  Sec. 110 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 provides that Sec. 2 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (c. 64) is not to apply in relation to anything which would 
not be an  offense apart from Sec. 108 or Sec. 109. 
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5.2.2.4 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was the response of the English 
Parliament to the internationalization of the fight against corruption and it 
domesticated the provisions of the OECD Convention for the UK. Part 12 of 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 erased the boundary 
between local and foreign acts of bribery. Ordinarily, the 1889, 1906, and 1916 
laws did not apply to acts carried out by UK companies or citizens that 
occurred wholly in foreign jurisdictions. However, Sec. 108(3) of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act amended these laws and gave courts in the 
UK extra-territorial jurisdiction. As long as a transaction involved a national of 
the UK, a corporation incorporated in the United Kingdom or a limited 
partnership,47 such an act – if carried out in the UK – would constitute an 
offense of corruption.48 This meant that criminal liability under UK law could 
arise in respect of corruption that occurred abroad. This Act came into force on 
14 February 2002.  
5.2.3 The New Bribery Act 2010 
The patchwork nature of English anti-corruption laws led to calls for reform.49 
A Draft Corruption Bill by the Law Commission was presented to the 
parliament in 2003 but met with no success.50 A revised bill was introduced 
into parliament in March 2009.51 This resulted in the Draft Bribery Bill, which 
according to the Ministry of Justice was to ‘replace the fragmented and 
complex offences at common law and in the Prevention of Corruption Acts 
1889-1916’ and ‘provide a more effective legal framework to combat bribery 
in the public or private sector.’52 In introducing the draft Bill, Jack Straw 
remarked that:  
‘the current statutory criminal law of bribery is functional: cases are 
prosecuted successfully. However, it is old and anachronistic – dating back to 
around the turn of the twentieth century – and it has never been consolidated. 
                                                     
 
47  Sec. 109 (1)(a) Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act.  
48  Sec. 109 (1)(b) Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act. 
49  Nichols et al. in Chapter 5 of their book trace the reform process through the Radcliffe-Maud 
Committee, the Salmon Committee, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, The Home 
office initiatives, the Law Commission, and the Government Responses to what eventually 
took shape as the Draft Bribery Bill of 2003. See C. Nicholls, T. Daniel, A. Bacarese, J. 
Hatchard, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, id., Note 2 above, at pp. 172-223.  
50  Draft Corruption Bill Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence House of 
Lords papers 2002-03 157 House of Commons papers 2002-03 705 2002-03 Session.  
51  Draft Bribery Bill available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/003/10003.1-7.html#j403ca.  
52  Website of the Ministry of Justice, Bribery Bill, at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/bribery-bill.htm .  
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Consequently there are inconsistencies of language and concepts between the 
various provisions and a small number of potentially significant gaps in the 
law. Furthermore, the exact scope of the common law offence is unclear. The 
result is a bribery law which is difficult to understand for the public and 
difficult to apply for the prosecutors and the courts.’53 
There was no definition of the term ‘corruptly’ that was central to the offenses 
created under the 1889 and 1906 Acts. The absence of definition was on the 
one hand criticized as leaving the law in a state of confusion and disarray, as 
the courts were left to interpret and give content to the term.54 On the other 
hand, some argued that there was merit in not adopting a definition, as it could 
be counterproductive if definition become ‘too complex.’ It was also pointed 
out that most jurisdictions do not have a definition for the term ‘corruptly’ and 
this has not posed significant problems.55 While this may be the case, it would 
seem that, particularly with regard to foreign bribery, the term corruptly 
needed to be defined accurately to provide a base line of what would be 
considered corruption under UK law with regard to foreign transactions.  
The patchwork nature of UK anti-corruption laws has now been streamlined. 
The 2010 Bribery Act was a response to the general dissatisfaction regarding 
the state of English anti-corruption law.56 The Bribery Bill received Royal 
Assent on 8 April 2010 and eventually entered into force in June 2011. The 
new Act brings the UK into the mainstream of anti-corruption rules by 
providing what some say are the most draconian anti-corruption rules for 
corporations. It covers not just public sector but also private sector bribery. 
The new Bribery Act does not use the term ‘corruptly,’ which is found in the 
existing legislation. Nor does it give a definition of the term bribery. Rather it 
provides scenarios in which the offenses of bribery can be said to occur.  
                                                     
 
53  Rt. Hon. J. Straw MP, Foreword to the Draft Bribery Bill, Cm 7570 25, March 2009. 
54  D. Lanham, Bribery and Corruption, id., Note 10 above, at p. 104, states that ‘[t]he most 
difficult question under the 1889 and 1906 Acts is the meaning of ‘corruption.’ The main 
questions are whether the word adds anything to the remainder of the formulation of the 
offence, and if so, what it is that it adds. The cases on these questions are in impressive 
disarray.’ 
55  See Bribery Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO Powers in Cases of Bribery 
of Foreign Officials. A Consultation Paper, available at 
http://www.nio.gov.uk/bribery_consultation_paper.pdf. 
56  It has been pointed out that the ‘UK government has been under pressure to reform its bribery 
laws for a considerable time. Pressure has come from international organisations such as the 
OECD and non-governmental organisations. This is not because the UK is seen as an 
especially corrupt country but because of its poor record in prosecuting offences. Until 2009 
there had not been a single case of a British company being convicted of bribery offences.’ See 
T. Edmonds, O. Gay, Bribery Bill [HL] Bill No 69 Research Paper 10/19 of 1 March 2010, 
House of Commons Library, available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP10-19.pdf; see 
also ‘OECD’s Group Demands Rapid UK Action to Enact Adequate Anti-Bribery Laws’, 16 
October 2008, OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3343,en_2649_34855_41515464_1_1_1_37447,00.html. 
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It also expands the offenses of bribery to new ground by specifically 
addressing the failure of companies to take steps to prevent bribery as well as a 
stand-alone offense of foreign bribery. In addition to this, the Act provides for 
the offense of active and passive bribery and does not recognize facilitation 
payments. An individual committing an offense can be liable to imprisonment 
for up to 10 years.57 Both individuals and other persons can be liable to an 
unlimited fine.58 The following sections outline the main provisions of the new 
Act.   
5.2.3.1 General Bribery Offenses 
The Bribery Act provides six scenarios in which conduct constituting a bribery 
offense is described. Case 1 and 2 scenarios deal with the active act of giving a 
bribe, while Cases 3-6 deal with the passive act of receiving a bribe. Case 1 
scenarios occur where a person offers, promises or gives a financial or other 
advantage to another person, either to induce a person to perform improperly a 
relevant function or activity, or to reward a person for the improper 
performance of such a function or activity.59 A Case 2 scenario occurs where a 
person offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another 
person, and knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself 
constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.60 In both 
Case 1 and Case 2 scenarios, it does not matter whether the advantage is 
offered, promised or given by a person directly or through a third party.61 
Cases 3-6 are scenarios that will result in the offense of requesting or receiving 
a bribe. Case 3 occurs where a person (R) requests, agrees to receive or accepts 
a financial or other advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant 
function or activity should be performed improperly (whether by R or another 
person).62 Case 4 occurs where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a 
financial or other advantage, and the request, agreement or acceptance itself 
constitutes the improper performance by R of a relevant function or activity.63 
Case 5 occurs where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or 
other advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by R or 
another person) of a relevant function or activity.64 Case 6 is where, in 
anticipation of or in consequence of R requesting, agreeing to receive or 
accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is 
                                                     
 
57   Sec. 11 Bribery Act 2010.  
58   Sec. 11(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
59   Sec. 1(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
60  Sec. 1(3) Bribery Act 2010.  
61   Sec. 1(5) Bribery Act 2010. 
62  Sec. 2(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
63   Sec. 2(3) Bribery Act 2010. 
64  Sec. 2(4) Bribery Act 2010.  
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performed improperly by R, or by another person at R’s request, or with R’s 
assent or acquiescence.65 
The Bribery Act specifies the scope of its application by delimiting what 
constitutes a relevant function or activity66 for the purposes of the Act in a two-
step process.67 Firstly, it lists activities that fall within the purview of the Act, 
and secondly, it stipulates conditions that should be met for such an activity as 
listed to constitute a ‘function or activity’ within the meaning of the Act. The 
following functions and activities fall within the Act: (1) any function of a 
public nature; (2) any activity connected with a business; (3) any activity 
performed in the course of a person’s employment; and (4) any activity 
performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or 
unincorporated).68 This shows that the Act applies equally to activities of both 
a public and private nature.  
However, such an activity must meet one or more of the following conditions 
to constitute a relevant activity within the meaning of the act: (A) that a person 
performing the function or activity is expected to perform it in good faith; (B) 
that a person performing the function or activity is expected to perform it 
impartially; or (C) that a person performing the function or activity is in a 
position of trust by virtue of performing it.69 Even where such an activity has 
no connection with the United Kingdom and is performed in a country or 
territory outside the United Kingdom, it remains a relevant function or activity 
within the meaning of the Act when these conditions are met.70 There is no 
distinction between local and foreign bribery. When the relevant activity 
occurs in a foreign country and is expressly permitted under that countries 
domestic law,71 such a foreign law is taken into account. However, mere local 
                                                     
 
65   Sec. 2(5) Bribery Act 2010.  
66   Emphasis added. 
67   Sec. 3(1) Bribery Act 2010. 
68  Sec. 3(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
69   Sec. 3(3)-3(5) Bribery Act 2010. 
70   Sec. 3(6) Bribery Act 2010.  
71   Written law means a written constitution, legislation or judicial decision of the foreign country, 
Sec. 3(3). A defense put forward by the alleged disloyal agent in the Daraydan case was that 
the relationship with his principal Sheikh Mohammed was governed by Qatari law, which 
allows an employee or agent to receive a commission from a third party contracting with his 
employer or principal, unless expressly forbidden by the terms of his contract of employment. 
He was therefore not prevented by any fiduciary duties owed to Sheikh Mohammed from 
receiving the commissions. This defense was rejected by the court because for the most part 
Mr. Khalid’s duties were governed by English law: the oral and written contracts entered into 
with Sheikh Mohammed were when he was an English resident for a contract of employment 
or of agency in England and were consequently governed by English law, and his relationship 
with Daraydan as a project manager was on a contract expressly governed by English law. The 
court however implied that even if Qatari law were found to apply, then English public policy 
would come into play to disapply any foreign custom which validated what would in English 
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customs or practices will not suffice to remove such an activity from the scope 
of application of the Bribery Act.72   
The Act also defines what is meant by improper performance.73 A relevant 
function or activity is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a 
‘relevant expectation.’74 A ‘relevant expectation’ means the expectation that 
the activity will be performed in good faith (for activities to which condition A 
applies) or (in the case of activities to which condition B applies) with 
impartiality. In relation to a function or activity to which condition C applies 
(persons in a position of trust), it means any expectation as to the manner in 
which, or the reasons for which, the function or activity will be performed that 
arises from the position of trust mentioned in that condition.75 The test of 
‘expectation’ is what a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect 
in relation to the performance of the type of function or activity concerned.76 
These defined ‘relevant expectations’ restrict the application of the Bribery Act 
to instances where there is a duty or good faith, or duty to act impartially or in 
the best interests of a person in a position of trust. 
5.2.3.2 Bribery of Foreign Officials 
The Act creates the specific offense of bribing public officials. A person who 
bribes a foreign public official is guilty of an offense77 where the person by so 
doing intended to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of 
business.78 The offense of bribery of a foreign public official only covers the 
active offering, promising or giving of bribes, and not the passive acceptance 
of them.79 The offense of foreign bribery will only occur where the foreign 
public official is permitted by the written law applicable to the foreign official 
to be influenced by the offer, promise or gift.80 A foreign public official means 
an official or agent of a public international organization,81 or a person who 
holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, whether 
appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or 
who exercises a public function for or on behalf of a country or territory 
                                                                                                                            
 
law be regarded as corrupt practices. Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland International Ltd., 
2005, Ch. 119 Para. 72. 
72   Sec. 5(10) Bribery Act 2010.  
73   Emphasis added. 
74  Sec. 4(1) Bribery Act 2010.  
75   Sec. 4(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
76  Sec. 5(1) Bribery Act 2010. 
77   Sec. 6(1) Bribery Act 2010.  
78   Sec. 6(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
79   See Explanatory Notes Para. 35. 
80   Sec. 6(3) Bribery Act 2010.  
81   Sec. 6(5)(c) Bribery Act 2010,  
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outside the United Kingdom or for any public agency or public enterprise of 
that country.82 
5.2.3.3 Failure of Commercial Organization to Prevent Bribery  
A relevant commercial organization is guilty of an offense if a person 
associated with the company bribes another person with the intention of 
obtaining or retaining business or to obtain or retain an advantage in the 
conduct of business for the company. A relevant commercial organization is 
(a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere); (b) any 
other corporate body (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or 
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom; (c) a partnership which 
is formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries 
on a business (whether there or elsewhere), or (d) any other partnership 
(wherever formed) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any 
part of the United Kingdom.83 
A person who performs services for or on behalf of a company is an associated 
person. The capacity in which A performs services for or on behalf of C does 
not matter.84 Accordingly, an associated person may be an employee, agent or 
subsidiary.85 The status of an associated person is determined by reference to 
all the relevant circumstances and not merely by reference to the nature of the 
relationship between the alleged associated person and the company.86  
It is a defense to the new offense of failing to prevent persons associated with a 
company from committing bribery under Sec. 7(1) of the Bribery Act 2010 if a 
company can show that it had in place adequate procedures designed to 
prevent associated persons from bribing another person on behalf of the 
company.87 The Bribery Act does not define what such adequate procedures 
might be. However Sec. 9 of the Act put the onus on the Secretary of State to 
publish guidance about procedures which commercial organizations could put 
in place to prevent persons associated with them from committing bribery.88 In 
                                                     
 
82    Sec. 6(5) Bribery Act 2010.  
83   Sec. 7(5) Bribery Act 2010. 
84    Sec. 8(1)-(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
85   Sec. 8(3) Bribery Act 2010.  
86   Sec. 8(4) Bribery Act 2010.  
87  Sec. 7(2) Bribery Act 2010 provides: ‘But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such 
conduct.’ 
88  Sec. 9(1) Bribery Act 2010 provides: ‘The Secretary of State must publish guidance about 
procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons 
associated with them from bribing as mentioned in section 7(1).’ 
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2010 the Ministry of Justice published the Bribery Act 2010 Guidance on the 
procedures that the relevant commercial organization can put in place to 
prevent persons associated with them form bribing. This Guidance is 
formulated around six guiding principles as follows: Proportionate procedures 
to prevent bribery risks; Top-level commitment of management; periodic risk 
assessment; proportionate and risk-based due diligence; communication and 
training of bribery prevention policies and monitoring and review of measures 
to prevent bribery. 
5.2.3.4 Facilitation Payments  
The Bribery Act goes further than the FCPA with regard to so-called 
facilitating payments. The FCPA has an exception for routine facilitation, or 
‘grease’ payments.89 The Bribery Act does not exempt facilitation payments.90 
In response to the proposed Amendment 5 creating an exception for facilitation 
payments in the hearings leading up to the new Bribery Act, Lord Tunnicliffe 
responded:  
‘[w]e recognise that many UK companies still struggle with petty corruption 
in emerging markets and other countries, facing regular demands for 
“facilitation payments” in circumstances that amount to extortion or 
something very near. The answer is to face the challenge head-on, not to 
create exemptions and defences like those of the United States’ Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, which created artificial distinctions that are difficult to 
enforce and which have the potential to be abused.’91 
He further added: 
‘… a payment, no matter how small, made to a foreign public official in order 
to facilitate the performance of that public official’s function, and in order to 
secure an advantage in the conduct of business, will be a criminal offence 
unless the local written law permits the official to be influenced by the 
payment. The message needs to be clear and unambiguous: bribery, in 
whatever form and whatever the size of the payment, is a crime.’92 
UK law, however, leaves the decision regarding the question of whether or not 
a payment is such that would warrant prosecution to the government 
prosecutor. The prosecutor will determine whether (1) there is a sufficiency of 
                                                     
 
89  See Chapter 3 above. 
90   Sec. 44-45 Guidance of the Bribery Act 2010.  
91  Amendment 5 Bribery Bill Moved by Lord Henley Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of 
Lord Official Report Vol. No. 717 Part No. 36, Tuesday 2 February 2010, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100202-
0004.htm#10020253000424.   
92  Id., 2 February 2010: Column 135. 
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evidence, and, if so, (2) whether a prosecution is in the public interest.93 The 
Bribery Act 2010 Guidance explains that in cases where hospitality, 
promotional expenditure or facilitation payments do, on their face, trigger the 
provisions of the Act, prosecutors will consider very carefully what is in the 
public interest before deciding whether to prosecute.94 As such, the Bribery 
Act 2010 covers payments in both the public and private arenas, with no 
exemption for facilitation payments, relying instead on prosecutorial discretion 
to enforce only the more serious transgressions.  
5.2.3.5 Scope of Application 
The Bribery Act 2010 will apply if an offense under the Act (Sections 1, 2 or 
6) is committed within the UK or if any omission which forms part of the 
offense takes place in the UK.95 The Act will also apply if the relevant activity 
took place outside the UK and the party committing the acts has a close 
connection with the UK.96 A party has a close connection with the UK if, at the 
time the acts or omissions occurred, such a person was a (a) a British citizen, 
(b) a British overseas territories citizen, (c) a British National (Overseas), (d) a 
British Overseas citizen, (e) a person who under the British Nationality Act 
1981 was a British subject, (f) a British protected person within the meaning of 
that Act, (g) an individual ordinarily resident in the UK, (h) a body 
incorporated under the law of any part of the UK, (i) a Scottish partnership.97  
The Sec. 7 offense of failure by a commercial organization to prevent bribery 
is committed where (1) the organization is incorporated in the UK, (2) some of 
its activities are carried out in the UK, (3) or the relevant activity is committed 
by an associated person regardless of whether or not the activity took place in 
or outside the UK.98 There is also no need the associated person committing 
the bribery to have a close connection to the UK.99 As long as the commercial 
                                                     
 
93   Sec. 49 Guidance. 
94   Sec. 50 Guidance. 
95   Sec. 12(1) Bribery Act 2010.  
96   Sec. 12(2) Bribery Act 2010.  
97   Sec. 12(4) Bribery Act 2010.  
98  Sec. 12(5) Bribery Act 2010. 
99   Sec. 12(4) Bribery Act 2010 defines a close connection as occurring where at the time the acts 
or omissions concerned were done or made by one of the following persons: a British citizen; a 
British overseas territories citizen; a British national (overseas); a British overseas citizen; a 
person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 was a British subject; a British protected 
person within the meaning of that Act; an individual ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom; a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom; a Scottish 
partnership. 
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organization falls within the definition of ‘relevant commercial organisation,’ 
that should be enough to provide courts in the UK with jurisdiction.100  
This means that any foreign company that carries out a part of its business in 
the UK falls within the scope of the Act for any of the bribery offenses 
established under the Bribery Act. If a corporation with a subsidiary in the UK 
is engaged via an associated person in the commission of an act in a third 
country (for example paying bribes to Nigerian government officials) and this 
activity took place wholly outside the UK, the fact that the foreign parent 
company has a close connection to the UK via its UK subsidiary would bring it 
within the reach of the Bribery Act. 
The Bribery Act 2010 is now the principal backdrop for the private claim for 
redress under English Law. It establishes public and private bribery as legal 
wrongs that have not just public law but private law consequences.  
5.2.3.6 Self–Reporting/Plea Bargain Agreements 
The Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which is charged with implementing the 
Bribery Act, has adopted provisions that are designed to encourage the self-
reporting mechanism that characterizes FCPA enforcement. In its Guidance on 
Self Reporting101 it emphasizes the benefit to companies that self-report 
stating: 
‘… the benefit to the corporation will be the prospect (in appropriate cases) of 
a civil rather than a criminal outcome as well as the opportunity to manage, 
with us, the issues and any publicity proactively. The corporation will be seen 
to have acted responsibly by the wider community in taking action to remedy 
what has happened in the past and to have moved on to a new and better 
corporate culture. Furthermore, a negotiated settlement rather than a criminal 
prosecution means that the mandatory debarment provisions under Article 45 
of the EU Public Sector Procurement Directive in 2004 will not apply’102 
In the same Guidance the SFO points out the risks to the company where it 
does not self-report: 
‘Self referral together with action by the corporation to remedy the problem of 
corruption will reduce the likelihood that we may discover the corruption 
ourselves through other means. If this happens we would regard the failure to 
self report as a negative factor. The prospects of a criminal investigation 
                                                     
 
100   Sec. 7(3) Draft Bill. See Explanatory Notes Para. 51. 
101  ‘The Serious Fraud Office’s approach to dealing with overseas corruption’, available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/the-sfo's-response/self-reporting-corruption.aspx. 
102   Id., Introduction. 
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followed by prosecution and a confiscation order are much greater, 
particularly if the corporate was aware of the problem and had decided not to 
self report.’103 
The SFO also points out the benefit of a private/public partnership for the 
company. Self-reporting is a preventative measure that can avoid an escalation 
in sanction. This is particularly important since the SFO may well come across 
the information that is not disclosed by a company independently of the 
company to its detriment. The SFO warns that:  
‘Corporations will need to be aware of the length and expense of an 
investigation by the SFO. There will inevitably be considerable publicity and 
disruption to the business of the corporation. … There is also a serious 
prospect that we will learn about the corruption issue from another agency in 
the UK or elsewhere, a whistleblower or a statutory report such as a 
Suspicious Activity Report. We will assume in those circumstances that the 
corporate has chosen not to self report. The chances of a criminal 
investigation leading to prosecution are therefore high.’104 
In July 2009 the SFO released Guidelines for Prosecutors on the Bribery Act 
2010. 105 The Guidelines encourage companies to voluntarily disclose instances 
of corruption. In the decision whether or not to charge a company for offenses 
under the Bribery Act, the SFO will take the following public interest factors 
into account: 
a.   A history of similar conduct (including prior criminal, civil and regulatory 
enforcement actions against it); failing to prosecute in circumstances 
where there have been repeated and flagrant breaches of the law may not 
be a proportionate response and may not provide adequate deterrent 
effects; 
b.  The conduct alleged is part of the established business practices of the 
company; 
c.   The offence was committed at a time when the company had an 
ineffective corporate compliance programme; 
d.   The company had been previously subject to warning, sanctions or 
criminal charges and had nonetheless failed to take adequate action to 
prevent future unlawful conduct, or had continued to engage in the 
conduct; 
e.   Failure to report wrongdoing within reasonable time of the offending 
coming to light (the prosecutor will also need to consider whether it is 
                                                     
 
103  Id ., Para. 24. 
104   Id., Para. 25. 
105  Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and 
the Director of Public Prosecution. 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery%20act%20joint%20prosecution%20guidance.pd
f. 
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appropriate to charge the company officers responsible for the failures/ 
breaches); 
f.   Failure to report properly and fully the true extent of the wrongdoing. 
 
Additional public interest factors against prosecution are: 
 
a.  A genuinely proactive approach adopted by the corporate management 
team when the offending is brought to their notice, involving self-
reporting and remedial actions, including the compensation of victims: In 
applying this factor the prosecutor needs to establish whether sufficient 
information about the operation of the company in its entirety has been 
supplied in order to assess whether the company has been proactively 
compliant. This will include making witnesses available and disclosure of 
the details of any internal investigation; 
b.  A lack of a history of similar conduct involving prior criminal, civil and 
regulatory enforcement actions against the company.; contact should be 
made with the relevant regulatory departments to ascertain whether 
investigations are being conducted in relation to the due diligence of the 
company; 
c.  The existence of a genuinely proactive and effective corporate compliance 
programme; 
d.  The availability of civil or regulatory remedies that are likely to be 
effective and more proportionate: Appropriate alternatives to prosecution 
may include civil recovery orders combined with a range of agreed 
regulatory measures. However, the totality of the offending needs to have 
been identified. A fine after conviction may not be the most effective and 
just outcome if the company cannot pay. The prosecutor should refer to 
the Attorney’s Guidance on Civil Recovery (see ‘Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002: Section 2A [Contribution to the reduction of crime] Joint Guidance 
given by the Secretary of State and Her Majesty’s Attorney General’) and 
on the appropriate use of Serious Crime Prevention Orders; 
e.  The offending represents isolated actions by individuals, for example by a 
rogue director; 
f.  The offending is not recent in nature, and the company in its current form 
is effectively a different body to that which committed the offences – for 
example it has been taken over by another company, it no longer operates 
in the relevant industry or market, all of the culpable individuals have left 
or been dismissed, or corporate structures or processes have been changed 
in such a way as to make a repetition of the offending impossible; 
g.  A conviction is likely to have adverse consequences for the company 
under European Law, always bearing in mind the seriousness of the 
offence and any other relevant public interest factors. Any candidate or 
tenderer (including company directors and any person having powers of 
representation, decision or control) who has been convicted of fraud 
relating to the protection of the financial interests of the European 
Communities, corruption, or a money laundering offence is excluded from 
participation in public contracts within the EU. (Article 45 of Directive 
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts). The Directive is intended to 
be draconian in its effect, and companies can be assumed to have been 
aware of the potential consequences at the time when they embarked on 
the offending. Prosecutors should bear in mind that a decision not to 
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prosecute because the Directive is engaged will tend to undermine its 
deterrent effect; 
h. The company is in the process of being wound up. 
 
This framework provides corporations with an incentive to co-operate with the 
SFO in the detection and sanction of corruption. Co-operation may positively 
influence a decision against prosecution and reduce the level of sanction 
through plea bargaining based on the aforementioned public-interest factors. 
However, the recent ruling in R v. Innospec Limited106 raises questions about 
the direction of plea bargaining in the UK. In March 2010, Innospec Ltd, a UK 
Company and wholly owned subsidiary of Innospec Inc., a US-listed company, 
pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to corrupt under UK law. Innospec 
Ltd had conspired with its directors and various other agents to pay bribes 
totalling approximately $8 million, to secure contracts for the supply of a fuel 
additive, Tetraethyl Lead (TEL), to public officials of the Government of 
Indonesia. In 2005 the US authorities began an investigation into Innospec Inc. 
The independent directors of Innospec entered into discussions with the US 
authorities to seek a ‘global’ settlement with regard to the on-going 
investigations. The SFO along with the DOJ agreed that in light of Innospec’s 
full admission and full co-operation, they would not seek to impose a penalty 
which would drive the company out of business. 
A final settlement of about $40 million dollars (which was a fraction of the 
penalties that properly could have been imposed) was reached subject to the 
approval of the courts in the US and the UK. The court in the US approved the 
settlement, however, the UK court held that the SFO could not enter into an 
agreement under English law with an offender as to the penalty in respect of an 
offense. The court stressed that as a matter of constitutional principle, except in 
cases of minor offenses such as motoring offenses, the imposition of a sentence 
is a matter for the judiciary.107 The court held that for crimes of corruption, it is 
in the public interest for the court to rigorously scrutinize the basis of the plea 
bargain agreement in open courts, in the interest of transparency and good 
governance.108  
The court was of the opinion that the UK portion of the fine was wholly 
inadequate. With considerable reluctance the court, however, allowed the 
agreement to stand for the following reasons: (1) the US courts had already 
agreed to the Settlement; (2) Innospec had admitted guilt, made a full 
confession and provided evidence that would be of significant assistance to the 
                                                     
 
106   [2010] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 462 Crim. L.R. 665 Official Transcript, 2010 WL 3580845. 
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prosecution of other related transactions; (3) the fact that Innospec would not 
have been able to pay the fine payable under the law without entering into 
immediate insolvency which would have affected the innocent employees of 
the company, caused considerable difficulties for the unfunded pension 
liabilities of the company and be detrimental to the agreed ‘clean up’ program 
the company has in place in the UK with respect to the environmental pollution 
it has caused there; furthermore, the court took into consideration the fact that 
(4) the ‘global settlement’ had already been announced to the markets; and 
finally that (5) the US courts had agreed to the plea agreement made in the 
US.109 
The Innospec ruling shows that there is still a way to go before the FCPA 
model influences plea bargaining in England. The FCPA was a watershed in 
the fight against corruption, which serves as a model in its content and its 
implementation. However, it remains very much an American affair, as the rest 
of the world feels its influence but watches guardedly as the US puts into place 
incentives for a global compliance system. The question is whether this model 
shall catch on and change corporate culture and become the new norm. The 
UK Bribery Act suggests that this may become a possibility. However, just as 
the FCPA spent about 25 years in splendid isolation, there may be no instant 
turning of the corner. The coming years will demonstrate whether the Bribery 
Act has the teeth and capacity to introduce in Europe the public-private 
partnership of the US model and live up to the stricter control of corruption 
that it portends.  
5.3 The Civil Law Definition of Corruption 
English civil law relating to corruption is couched primarily in the language of 
the principal-agent relationship.110 A prominent definition of bribery is given 
by Slade J., in Industries and General Mortgage Co. Ltd. V. Lewis.111 He 
remarks that ‘for the purposes of the civil law, a bribe means a payment of a 
secret commission.’112 Slade’s definition highlights the essential fact that the 
civil law on corruption is centered on transactions that involve the payment of 
a commission.113 It is the manner and the purpose for which a commission is 
proffered that distinguishes the illegal bribe from the legitimate commercial 
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commission. The two essential elements that distinguish a commission as a 
bribe are, firstly, the secrecy of the act, and secondly, the conflict of interest 
the transaction engenders. These two elements create a situation that 
jeopardizes the good order of business transactions, and it is this mischief that 
criminal and civil law seek to cure. 
5.3.1 First Essential Element: Secrecy 
A principal’s knowledge that a commission has been paid to his agent is a key 
element in distinguishing a bribe from a valid commission.114 Bowen L.J. 
acknowledges the necessity for the courts to ‘draw with precision and firmness 
the line of demarcation which prevails between commissions … honestly 
received and … [those] taken behind the master’s back.’115   
A commission only becomes a bribe when it is given in secret.116 However, 
bare knowledge that a commission has been paid may not be sufficient. 117 The 
knowledge that is required to dispel the secrecy that distinguishes a bribe from 
a valid commission must entail full disclosure. The case of Hurstanger Ltd v. 
Wilson118 confirms that the meaning of the expression ‘secret’ is broader than 
the literal meaning of something not revealed. A simple revelation of the 
payment of a commission may not, in the principal-agent relationship, be 
sufficient to remove the element of secrecy required to distinguish such a 
commission from a bribe. 
The ruling of the court in the Hurstanger case shows that there is a level of 
knowledge which may be sufficient to remove the element of secrecy from a 
commission but which is nonetheless insufficient to satisfy the requirement of 
knowledge by the principal.119 In the Hurstanger case, a disclosure about the 
possible payment of a commission was contained in one of the loan documents 
signed by the defendants. The relevant document stated: ‘In certain 
circumstances this company does pay commission to brokers/agents.’ Clearly, 
the defendants, in signing this document, had been put on notice that their 
agent may be paid a commission by the party offering them a loan via the same 
agent. In the opinion of the court this revelation was sufficient to negate the 
idea that the commission had been secret. In the words of Tuckey L.J., ‘If you 
                                                     
 
114  Per Slade J., in Industries and General Mortgage Co Ltd. v. Lewis [1949] 2 All E.R. 573, at p. 
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tell someone something may happen, and it does, I do not think the person you 
told can claim that what happened was a secret. The secret was out when he 
was told it might happen.’120 
The court faced a dilemma. Their Lordships held:  
‘... where there has been sufficient disclosure to negate secrecy ... it would be 
unfair to visit the agent and any third party involved with a finding of fraud ... 
or conversely, to acquit them altogether for their involvement of what would 
still be a breach of fiduciary duty unless informed consent had been 
obtained.’121  
This dilemma might have been avoided by adopting a contextual as opposed to 
literal approach to the interpretation of secrecy. ‘Secrecy’ should be interpreted 
in the context of the rules that govern secret commissions. Discussing the 
nature of a bribe, Lord Romer has remarked:  
‘If a gift be made to a confidential agent with the view of inducing the agent 
to act in favour of the donor in relation to transactions between the donor and 
the agent’s principal and that gift is secret as between the donor and the agent 
–that is to say, without the knowledge and consent of the principal – then the 
gift is a bribe in the view of the law.’122  
The expression ‘that is to say’ refers back to the word ‘secret’ and can be said 
to define this term when used in the context of gifts or commissions to agents. 
It identifies two constituents: (1) ‘without knowledge’ and (2) ‘without 
consent.’ This suggests a standard for the negation of secrecy that is not met by 
a mere passive awareness on the part of the principal but which requires a 
positive act of consent. 
This conclusion is supported by dicta to the effect that a broker or agent must 
be able to prove informed consent.123 In the words of Jessel M.R. in the Dunne 
case:  
‘[A] statement which in other cases would be sufficient to put the party on 
inquiry will not be sufficient in the case of principal and agent ... for reasons 
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of policy he must not only put the principal on inquiry, but must give him full 
information and make full disclosure.’124  
The court ruled in the Hurstanger case that the broker’s interest in obtaining a 
further commission for himself from the claimant gave him an incentive ‘to 
look for the lender who would give him the biggest commission.’125 This 
created a conflict of interest on the part of the agent and violated the obligation 
of loyalty owed by the agent to the borrowers. Such a breach of the duty of 
loyalty would justify the granting of equitable remedies such as rescission and 
compensation unless it could be shown that the defendants had consented to 
the transaction.126 The court found that the principal ought to have ‘the fullest 
information given to them and ought not to be driven to inquiry.’127 The agent 
must prove good faith and full information and make it perfectly clear that he 
furnished his employer with the ‘full disclosure of all that he knows.’128  
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal in the Imperial case emphasized that a 
declaration of interest by a person in a fiduciary position is not satisfied by a 
mere declaration that the agent has an interest but rather by declaring the 
nature of the interest to enable the principal to be ‘fully informed of the real 
state of things.’129 A general disclaimer that the principal had ‘studied and 
understood the contents’ of the loan documentation does not displace the 
burden of proof from the claimants to establish informed consent. In the 
Alexander case, the court held that the maxim ‘caveat emptor’ has no 
application in fiduciary relationships.130 
Consent can only be considered as granted where the defendant principal has 
‘full knowledge’131 of all the material circumstances and of the nature and the 
extent of [the brokers’] interest.’132 Not only must the principal know about the 
commission; he must consent to its payment. Bare knowledge of the payment 
of commission was in the opinion of the court not sufficient. 
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The consent of the principal removes the element of secrecy. However, there 
are circumstances where such consent is more problematic. As the Law 
Commission has pointed out: 
‘a private principal can consent to something which would otherwise be 
corrupt but where the functions are of a public nature the principal’s consent 
cannot exonerate. This could give rise to problems where the public/private 
functions are blurred.’133  
This is particularly true of matters involving corruption in business 
transactions whether national or international. Here the public/private divide is 
blurred by the criminal nature of the activity. In the recent case of Imageview 
Management, Mummery L.J., stated:  
‘… in our age it is more important than it ever was for the courts to hold the 
precise and firm line drawn between payments openly, and therefore honestly, 
received by agents, and undeclared payments received by agents secretly, and 
therefore justly liable to all the legal consequences flowing from breaches of 
an agent’s fiduciary obligations.’ 134 
Secrecy is the red flag that is at the core of the misconduct of bribery. This is 
where the ‘precise and firm line’ can be drawn. The full informed consent of 
the principal is necessary. Indeed even if the principal does not suffer a loss, 
the fact that there was a lack of consent is sufficient to found the wrong of 
bribery. As Banks L.J. in Rhodes v. Macalister remarked that:  
‘there seems to be an idea prevalent that a person … acting as agent … of 
another is committing no wrong to his employer in taking a commission … 
from the other side, provided that in his opinion his employer … does not 
have to pay more than if the bribe were not given. There cannot be a greater 
misconception of what the law is … and I do not think the rule can too often 
be repeated or its application more frequently insisted upon.’ 135 
The element of secrecy may also debunk the claim that the secret commission 
is acceptable in a particular line of business. In the Fyffes Group case, the 
defense was made that an ‘address commission’ was acceptable in the 
particular line of business. The courts agreed and stated that there was nothing 
unusual about a ship-owner and ship charterer agreeing that the charterer 
should receive what is misleadingly termed “address commission,” but is in 
reality a discount or rebate on the hire. It was also not uncommon for such 
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“commission” to be paid to a nominee of the charterer. However, the court 
found that in this case there had not been full information. The court held that 
an: 
‘agreement to pay address commission would ordinarily be documented in 
some way between the parties. In this instance, an arrangement, intended not 
to be documented or subsequently mentioned, by which commission was to 
be paid to an off shore company lacking apparent connection to the charterer, 
was not an ordinary arrangement.’ 136 
As such, the defense that this was a usual payment in the course of business 
failed because it was found, despite the attempt to present it otherwise, to be a 
bribery arrangement.137 
The element of secrecy also serves to uncloak bribery transactions that are 
cloaked as ‘introduction fees.’ The defense that a payment was a ‘normal’ 
commission in the course of business was rejected by the courts in the case of 
the Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim. Here the court took their former president 
to court seeking to recover US$1,848,132 paid to him by Bernard Sunley & 
Sons Ltd on 29 January 1980. The plaintiffs claimed that the payment was a 
bribe paid to him when he was acting as their agent in connection with the 
building of their headquarters offices in Abu Dhabi. The building contract was 
signed on 23 January 1980, a few days before the payment was made. Dr. 
Hashim’s evidence was that the payment was a fee for effecting introductions 
and was not dependent in any way upon the introductions resulting in contracts 
nor related to any contract which Bernard Sunley might obtain.  
This defense was rejected by the Court. Evans J. found the coincidence 
between the date of payment and the amount of payment overwhelming and 
that the plaintiffs had discharged their burden of proof. He stated:  
‘… [T]he coincidence factor is powerful, indeed overwhelming; the 
coincidence of date (payment immediately after the contract was signed) and 
the coincidence of amount. … The total Dr.7m. itself is close to 10 per cent of 
the contract amount … There is ample evidence that this was within the range 
of ‘normal’ commission arrangements when that term was used to mean 
‘bribes.’ This bribe was to facilitate a secret arrangement for a ‘bogus tender’ 
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that was concealed from the board of the bank.’138 
5.3.2 Second Essential Element: Conflict of Interest  
A secret nature of a bribe creates a conflict of interest by compromising the 
duty of loyalty owed by the agent to the principal. In the words of Justice 
Slade, the:  
‘… person making the payment makes it to the agent of the other person with 
whom he is dealing; (ii) … makes it to that person knowing that that person is 
acting as the agent of the other person with whom he is dealing; and (iii) … 
fails to disclose to the other person with whom he is dealing that he has made 
that payment to the person whom he knows to be the other person’s agent.’139  
In the Petrotrade case, this is described as the ‘key distinguishing feature’ of a 
bribe. This factor is namely that it ‘gives rise to a conflict of interest on the part 
of the agent.’140 This conflict of interest results in a breach of the fiduciary 
duty owed by the agent to the principal. 
The Courts in Donegel citing Shipway v. Broadwood141 emphasized that the 
mischief to which the law is directed is conduct that is designed to create a 
conflict between an agent’s duty to a principal and his own private interest.142 
The obligation to act in the best interests of the principal is the basis of the 
fiduciary relationship that exists between a principal and his agent. In Bristol 
and West Building Society v. Mothew, Millett L.J. defined a fiduciary as:   
‘… someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a 
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of 
loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his 
fiduciary.’143  
According to Millet, this obligation of loyalty has four primary aspects. These 
are: (1) a duty to act in good faith; (2) a duty not to make a profit; (3) a duty 
not to assume a position where the duty and personal interest of the agent 
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conflict; and (4) a duty not to act for personal benefit or the benefit of a third 
person without the informed consent of the principal.144 
An early case that centered on the effect of bribery on the duty to act in the 
best interest of the principal is the 1874 Panama case.145 A telegraph works 
company agreed with a telegraph cable company to lay a cable. This cable was 
to be paid for in 12 instalments upon certification by the cable company’s 
engineer. The cable company’s engineer subsequently approached the 
telegraph works company and offered to lay the same cable for a sum of 
money. In the course of an attempted re-arrangement of the two companies, the 
contract between the agent and the Works Company came to light. 
The court found that the principal of the engineer agent ‘required honest and 
disinterested advice’ and had relied on the ‘skill and disinterested advice of 
their engineer.’146 Where this same engineer  having arranged a sub-contract 
with that construction company behind their backs for part of what they had 
contracted to do for the purposes of the telegraph company,147 the principal 
plaintiff was, in the opinion of the court, deprived of his services’ and lost full 
benefit of the contract. This breach of the duty to act in the best interests of the 
principal was sufficient ground for the rescission of the contract.148 
Lady Justice Arden of the Court of Appeal has remarked on the importance of 
ensuring that the fiduciary acts in the best interest of the principal. She stated 
in respect of the ‘agency’ problem in company law that: 
‘[t]here is a separation of beneficial ownership and control and the 
shareholders (who may be numerous and only have small numbers of shares) 
or beneficial owners cannot easily monitor the actions of those who manage 
their business or property on a day to day basis. Therefore, in the interests of 
efficiency and to provide an incentive to fiduciaries to resist the temptation to 
misconduct themselves, the law imposes exacting standards on fiduciaries and 
an extensive liability to account.’ 149 
An important question is whether only parties in a formal principal-agent 
relationship fall within the rules regarding fiduciaries. There are traditionally 
four categories of persons recognized as fiduciaries under English law. These 
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are the relationship between a solicitor and client;150 a company director and 
his/her company;151 a trustee and a beneficiary;152 as well as that between an 
agent and a principal.153 There is, however, no all-encompassing definition of a 
fiduciary under English law, and there is a measure of judicial discretion in the 
determination of a fiduciary relationship.154  
It is interesting to note that as far as bribes are concerned, the English courts 
have been willing to classify as fiduciaries persons outside the traditional 
categories. In the Reading case,155 a claim was made against a sergeant in the 
Royal Army Medical Corps stationed in Cairo during the Second World War. 
The sergeant accompanied a truck which was distributing black market alcohol 
wearing his uniform to avoid inspections by the police. For this he received 
about £20,000. Upon arrest, some £2,000 found in his possession was 
confiscated. He later sought the return of this money after being released from 
prison. The question was whether the Crown had a claim on this money.  
Lord Denning of the lower court agreed that ‘this man Reading was not acting 
in the course of his employment; and there was no fiduciary relationship in 
respect of those long journeys nor, indeed, in respect of his uniform.’ Lord 
Denning however still imposed a fiduciary type duty on Reading stating:  
‘[i]f this means, as I think it does, that the appellant was neither a trustee nor 
in possession of some profit-earning chattel, and that it was contrary to his 
duty to escort unwarranted traffic or possibly any traffic through the streets of 
Cairo, it is true, but, in my view, irrelevant. He nevertheless was using his 
position as a sergeant in His Majesty’s Army and the uniform to which his 
rank entitled him to obtain the money which he received.’  
The Court of Appeal agreed that the sergeant was using his position as sergeant 
and the uniform to which his rank entitled him to obtain the money which he 
received. This in the view of the court gave the master a ‘right to receive the 
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money.’156 The court held that the term fiduciary relationship in these settings 
is used in a:  
‘wide and loose sense and include, inter alia, a case where the servant gains 
from his employment a position of authority which enables him to obtain the 
sum which he receives.’157 
This ‘duty to act in the best interest’ can imply a fiduciary relationship even 
where there is no contractual relationship between the party who brings the 
action and the party who took the bribe. In other words, a fiduciary relationship 
can be imputed by the court. A sub-agent, for example, who has a contractual 
relationship with the main agent but no relationship with the principal may 
have a duty of loyalty imputed by the court between the sub-agent and 
principal. An early case in point is the Powell case, where an agent 
subcontracted by the agent to the principal took a bribe without the knowledge 
of these parties. The courts held that even if no privity of contract existed 
between them, the sub-agent stood in a fiduciary relation to the principals, and 
was therefore accountable to them for the commission which he had received 
from the company.158  
This reasoning has been followed in cases where a party, regardless of whether 
or not there was a contractual relationship, is supposed to act in the best 
interests of another.159 The court will look at the ‘factual matrix’ as opposed to 
the documented relationship between the parties in coming to a conclusion as 
to where a fiduciary duty lies. The Daraydan case illustrates this point.160 A 
Mr. Khalid and Sheikh Sultan, owner of Qatar Industrial Services Ltd and a 
senior adviser to Sheikh Mohammed (the deputy Prime Minister of the State of 
Qatar), entered into a contract of employment under which Mr. Khalid was 
appointed as a Properties and Administration Manager in Sheikh Mohammed’s 
Private Office. Under this contract, Mr. Khalid accepted the obligation that 
‘Confidentiality, trust and honesty are the basis of the job … Attention to 
details and maximum cost efficiency in all involvements.’ 
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In the course of his employment with Sheikh Sultan, Mr. Khalid extracted 
from the co-defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Solland and their companies, about £1.8 
million between 1997 and 2001 representing 10% commission on receipts 
from contracts they undertook for the luxurious refurbishment of properties 
belonging to Sheikh Mohammed in London and Qatar. Daraydan, Sheikh 
Mohammed’s company, sought an order that Mr. Khalid was accountable to 
them for this secret commission.  
Mr. Khalid argued that he was not an agent or representative of Daraydan or 
any of the claimants and that he had not played a role in the negotiation of the 
contracts. The Courts found that although Sheikh Sultan was indeed Mr. 
Khalid’s employer, with regard to the ‘factual matrix,’ Sheikh Mohammed 
could be regarded for all intents and purposes as Mr. Khalid’s employer. As a 
result of this factual matrix, Mr. Khalid could be regarded as a fiduciary of 
Daraydan and Sheikh Mohammed, and had used this position to extract ‘very 
substantial payments from the Sollands and their companies in return for his 
influence in obtaining and carrying out the contracts.’161  
Another example of an imputation of a duty of loyalty is the case of Murad v. 
Al-Saraj.162 The Murad sisters entered into an agreement with Al-Saraj that 
they should jointly buy a hotel in London for £4.1 million. Al-Saraj was to 
contribute £500,000 in cash, which he failed to do claiming that it was offset 
by unenforceable obligations of the same amount from the vendor of the hotel 
to Al-Saraj. These obligations included a sum of £369,000, which represented 
Al-Saraj’s commission for introducing the vendors to the Murad sisters. The 
court found that the relationship between the parties was ‘a classic one in 
which [the Murads] reposed trust and confidence in Mr. Al-Saraj by virtue of 
their relative and respective positions’ and that Mr. Al-Saraj was in breach of a 
fiduciary duty in not disclosing to the Murads that he was making his 
contribution by way of set-off.163 
As such, regardless of whether or not there is a formal agency contract 
between the parties, the court may in light of the factual situation between the 
parties impute a fiduciary relationship upon which a claim for damages may be 
founded. In the Petrotrade case, the court held that the proposition that 
remedies of claims in both restitution and in fraud are only available in 
circumstances where a contract between the bribe-giver and the principal is 
untenable. In the view of the court, ‘damage is the gist of the cause of action in 
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fraud and such can clearly be independent of whether it was sustained as a 
result of … a contract.’164  
These cases show that where a bribery transaction is concerned, the categories 
of a fiduciary are flexible. The essential characteristic of a bribe is the fact that 
it is accompanied by the breach of the fiduciary obligation. Thus it can be 
argued that behind every breach of a duty of loyalty lies a ‘fiduciary agent.’ As 
Finn points out, ‘the agent is … not subject to the fiduciary obligations because 
he is a fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them that he is a fiduciary.’165 
The two essential elements of secrecy and conflict of interest distinguish a 
legal commission from an illegal bribe. The following section explores the 
issue of the validity of the transactions associated with the breach of the 
fiduciary duty that a bribe occasions. 
5.4 Transaction Validity 
The loss caused by bribery has been described in terms that move beyond 
issues of restitution, compensation for personal loss or damage that are typical 
of private law claims in the English courts. The civil action for bribery is 
linked to broader social, economic and cultural factors. It is not simply a matter 
of adjudicating private rights. It also has a regulatory function, and therefore 
the civil action for bribery, in this sense, serves as an opportunity to punish and 
deter. In AG v. Reid, Templeman J. describes bribery as:  
‘an evil practice which threatens the foundations of any civilised society. In 
particular, bribery of policemen and prosecutors brings the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Where bribes are accepted by a trustee, servant, agent 
or other fiduciary, loss and damage are caused to the beneficiaries, master or 
principal whose interests have been betrayed. The amount of loss or damage 
resulting from the acceptance of a bribe mayor may not be quantifiable.’166 
The giving of a bribe to influence the acquisition of a contract or other 
advantage is seen by the English courts as an act that corrodes deep into the 
welfare of the society, affects the taxpayer and which is, regardless of the 
particular interests of the parties before the court, a matter of general public 
importance. Brooke L.J. in the Corner House Research case states: 
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‘[O]btaining contracts by bribery is an evil which offends against the public 
policy of this country. When the interests of the taxpayer are involved, the 
question whether or not companies are obliged to provide details of money 
paid to middlemen … is a matter of general public importance.’167 
Even where a case involves private rights, the danger to the general public 
posed by bribery influences the courts response to the exercise of these rights. 
This is well demonstrated in the response of a judge to a plea for mitigation in 
a case where an agent received large sums of money behind the back of his 
employers. The argument was made that a prison sentence should not be 
imposed for this type of case because that ‘the rewards in the terms of the 
money received by the appellant are small in comparison with the gain that the 
company achieved through these contracts.168 The court rejected this line of 
argument stating that:  
‘it would significantly destroy the coherence and propriety of commercial life 
in this country if we were to take a view that a prison sentence should not 
occur in a case of this kind. …. To receive money behind the back of your 
employers who trust you in these amounts must offend not only the law of 
this country but also the concepts the public rightly have of corruption so as 
to justify a custodial sentence.’169   
The English court treats bribery as a grave matter not only because of the 
private rights affected by the act of bribery but more so because of its effect on 
the conduct of governance and trade. In the words of Hirst J., in Marlwood 
Commercial Inc. v. Kozeny:  
‘… bribery is a pernicious practice and a very serious crime of which this 
Court must take a grave view. It can properly be said to be a cancer in 
business and political life, because it is impossible for honest businessmen to 
compete with bribers, and because officials entrusted with making decisions 
on behalf of their principals do so in their own self-interest rather than 
objectively in the best interests of their principal.’170 
This is the framework within which the courts will consider the contract 
tainted by bribery. The public good and the negative consequences of 
corruption on society play an important role on the position the courts take 
with respect to the validity of such contracts. 
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5.4.1 The Primary Contract 
The framework of anti-corruption rules outlined in the previous sections shows 
that bribery whether of a public or a private nature is a criminal offense under 
UK law. The abuse of trust that occurs in both types of transactions is the 
common thread that evokes the response of the legislator and the court. Both 
bribery involving public officials and bribery involving private persons share a 
common basis in the legal wrong that results from the criminalization of 
private and public bribery.171  
A statute may prohibit conduct but also specify the civil law consequences for 
the breach. For example, Sec. 1 of the Life Assurance Act stipulates that ‘no 
insurance shall be made by any person … on the life ... of any person’ in whom 
the insured had no insurable interest.172 The statute, however, also stipulates 
that ‘every assurance made contrary to the true intent and meaning hereof shall 
be null and void.’173 The UK Bribery Act prohibits the making of agreements 
to give or receive a bribe without specifying the civil consequences of a 
violation. The Bribery Act, however, does not expressly state that the contract 
to give or receive a bribe is void.  
The issue that arises therefore is whether there is a prohibition of the primary 
agreement that evidences a bribery transaction. An argument can be made that 
there is. The bribery offenses that are described in the Bribery Act are 
described in language that will cover any agreement174 to give a bribe. The 
scenarios that are presented in Sections 1 and 2 of the Act support this 
viewpoint. The Case 1 scenario, for example, states that the offense of bribery 
occurs where a party ‘offers or promises’ a financial or other advantage to 
induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity.175 This is 
counterbalanced by the Case 3 scenario, which refers to the offense of bribery 
as occurring where a party ‘agrees to receive’ a financial or other advantage to 
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bring about an improper performance by another person of a relevant function 
or activity.176   
The same language prohibiting the offer and agreement to receive, is used with 
respect to Case 2 and 4 scenarios, where the offer and acceptance of the bribe 
in itself constitutes the improper performance;177 the Case 5 scenario speaks of 
the situation where a party ‘agrees to receive’ a financial or other inducement 
as a reward for improper performance of a relevant function,178 while the Case 
6 scenario refers to the offense of bribery occurring where a party ‘agrees’ to 
accept a financial or other advantage in anticipation of improper 
performance.179 
The offer and acceptance of a bribe, which show the mutual assent between the 
parties to offer or receive a bribe, is expressly prohibited by the wording of the 
Bribery Act. As such, a contract that is an agreement to give or receive a bribe 
would arguably fall within the meaning of Sections 1 and 2 of the Bribery Act. 
In this sense, the Bribery Act applies not just to the act of bribery but also to 
the agreement entered into between the parties to give or receive a bribe. In 
Stone & Rolls v. Moore Stephens, Lord Philips commented that: 
‘[t]he court will not enforce a contract which is expressly or impliedly 
forbidden by statute or that is entered into with the intention of committing an 
illegal act … [t]he court will not assist a claimant to recover a benefit from 
his own wrongdoing.’180  
The English courts will not enforce the performance of an illegal contract 
either in law or at equity.181 The effect of the prohibitions that expressly 
prohibit the bribery of public officers, agents and foreign officials is to render 
any transaction that breaches this prohibition illegal.182 
Even if this argument is rejected on the grounds that the Bribery Act does 
not expressly refer to a contract resulting from a violation of the statute, 
there is a clearly implied prohibition of the primary agreement. The effect 
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whether express or implied is the same. In St. John Shipping Corporation v. 
Joseph Rank Ltd,183 the court distinguished between contracts expressly 
and impliedly prohibited by statute. The distinction, the court noted, is not 
as to enforceability because in both cases the courts will not enforce such a 
contract.184 The distinction between express and implied prohibition in the 
words of the Justice is that:  
‘[i]n the former class you have only to look and see what acts the statute 
prohibits; it does not matter whether or not it prohibits a contract; if a contract 
is deliberately made to do a prohibited act, that contract will be 
unenforceable. In the latter class, you have to consider not what acts the 
statute prohibits, but what contracts it prohibits; but you are not concerned at 
all with the intent of the parties; if the parties enter into a prohibited contract, 
that contract is unenforceable.’ 185  
In Ali Mohamed v. Alaga & Co., the court referred to the unenforceability of a 
contract where the relevant legislation (in this case the Solicitors’ Practice 
Rules) prohibited the actions embodied in the contract stating that: 
‘there are substantial reasons why, in the public interest, such agreements 
should be outlawed [and that] if the court were to allow its process to be used 
to enforce agreements of this kind, the risk would inevitably arise that such 
agreements would abound … to the detriment of the public.’186 
Another case in point is Re Mahmoud & Ispahani.187 Here the plaintiff sought 
damages for the defendant’s non-acceptance of linseed oil, which due to the 
absence of a mandatory license, the defendant was actually not licensed to buy. 
The plaintiff was not aware of this illegality. In this case, the court found that 
there was an express prohibition of the contract in question stating:  
‘here it appears … that the particular contract was expressly prohibited by the 
terms of the order which imposes the necessity of a compliance with the 
licence…. When one looks at the licence one finds an express prohibition 
against the plaintiff selling to the defendant as the latter had not a licence.’188 
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Apart from unenforceability due to violation of statutory prohibition, the 
contract to give a bribe is also unenforceable on grounds of public policy and 
for breach of fiduciary duty. In Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd v. African Middle 
East Petroleum Co. Ltd the court refused to enforce a contract under which an 
intermediary was obliged to use personal influence so as to obtain a contract in 
Qatar as contrary to public policy and general principles of morality.189 The 
contract to give a bribe is unenforceable in a court of law and this means that 
with regard to claims by a plaintiff, the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio will apply. 
It is a defense to a claim by the plaintiff that the contract is illegal. This 
defense is not to achieve justice between the parties but rather to protect the 
public interest. This will clearly work out in favor of the defendant where a 
plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract to give a bribe. In Nayyar & Ors. v. Sapte 
& Anor.,190 the claimants − a joint venture in the travel agency business − 
sought damages against the defendants for negligence and/or breach of 
contract and/or breach of fiduciary duty in relation to the sum of £383,259 paid 
by the claimants to the senior solicitor of the defendants, a Ms. Advani,  in 
anticipation of the appointment of their joint venture, Maharaja Travel 
Limited, by Air India as its exclusive Global Sales Agent (GSA) for the UK 
and Ireland. The appointment was to be for a minimum of 4½ years.  
Ms. Advani encouraged the claimants to pursue the GSA and they were 
informed that to obtain the GSA would cost £2 million: an upfront payment or 
deposit of £400,000 and a balance of £1.6 million payable in two instalments, 
including £250,000 in legal fees. This proposal was introduced to Ms. Advani 
by a Mr. Ashkok Yadav, a former Tourism Minister for the State of Utter 
Pradesh who had connections in the aviation industry in India and with the 
then Aviation Minister, Mr. Hussain. Acting on the advice of Ms. Advani, the 
claimants paid sums totalling £383,259 to acquire the GSA. The claimants 
were not awarded the GSA and, despite repeated demands, the deposit was not 
recovered. The claimants brought a court action to seek the loss of the deposit 
and wasted costs as damages against Ms. Advani and the defendant company. 
The court found that the claimants ‘knew, that the payment was made in order 
to get the GSA, and to get the GSA regardless of the merits of the claimants 
“application” either in itself or by comparison to that of other actual or 
potential applicants. As they knew, there was no proper application….’191 
Furthermore, the court held that ‘it is obvious and was appreciated by them 
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that a contract of this nature and significance should only be awarded on the 
basis of the merits of the application made. In this case, as they knew, it was 
going to be awarded on the basis of a third party payment.’192 The judge held 
that: 
‘[I]n the light of the above findings I am satisfied that the payment of 
£400,000 was intended to be a bribe in civil law terms. It was made with the 
intention of procuring that whoever was mandated to grant the letter of 
appointment, and thereby in effect the GSA, would grant it to the claimants, 
and do so on the basis of a payment rather than of the merits of the 
application. That would involve a breach of fiduciary duty by that mandated 
person and it was a payment made in order to induce a breach of such duty.’193  
The court further held that ‘proof of a payment which is intended to be a civil 
law bribe is sufficient to engage the ex turpi causa principle. It is not necessary 
to establish that the intended illegal purpose has been effectively carried 
out.’194 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim holding that the defendants 
had successfully made out their defense of ex turpi causa and the claimants’ 
claim accordingly had failed. 195 
The court in Tinsley v. Milligan emphasized that the ex turpi causa principle is: 
‘not a principle of justice; it is a principle of policy, whose application is 
indiscriminate and so can lead to unfair consequences as between the parties 
to litigation. Moreover the principle allows no room for the exercise of any 
discretion by the court in favour of one party or the other.’196  
In Holman v. Johnson, Lord Mansfield remarked:  
 ‘The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and 
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not 
for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in 
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, 
contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I 
may say so. The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur 
actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon 
an immoral or an illegal act.’197  
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Thus where the influence of a party has been used to obtain a government loan, 
the promise of commission made to such a party in respect of getting such a 
loan cannot be enforced.198 In Marlwood Commercial Inc. v. Kozeny, the court 
held that ‘window dressing’ will not change the essential nature of a contract to 
give a bribe. Hirst J., stated:  
‘the bribery would, in my judgment taint all the contracts. The contractual 
undertaking recorded in them that there would be no acts of corruption … 
would turn out simply to be window-dressing for the outside world. The real 
but unstated agreement was that the parties knew and expected that bribery 
was taking place. The contracts should be treated as providing that bribery 
was not only permitted but intended. No contract containing any such 
provision could conceivably be enforced.’ 199 
5.4.2 The Secondary Contract 
The central question regarding the contract that comes into being between the 
bribe-giver and the principal of the agent who received the bribe (referred to in 
this book as the secondary contract) is whether the contract is the result of the 
legitimate exercise of authority by the agent who negotiated the contract. Only 
where a secondary contract results from a legitimate exercise of authority by 
an agent will such a contract be binding on the principal. 
Bowstead & Reynolds point out the authority of an agent is actual (express or 
implied) where it ‘results from a manifestation of consent that he should 
represent or act for the principal expressly or impliedly made by the principal 
to the agent himself ’200 This authority extends to doing ‘whatever is necessary 
for, or ordinarily incidental to, the effective execution of his actual 
authority.’201  
It stands to reason that the grant of authority to an agent by a principal will not 
extend to authority to act in the agent’s interest rather than in the principal’s 
interest. Lightman J. has stated that: 
‘The grant of actual authority to an agent would not normally include 
authority to act for the agent’s benefit rather than that of his principal so that, 
without agreement, the scope of actual authority will not include this. The 
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grant of actual authority should be implied as being subject to a condition that 
it is to be exercised honestly and on behalf of the principal.’202  
He further states, ‘if an act is carried out by an agent which is not in the 
interests of his principal …, then the act will not be within the scope of the 
express or implied grant of actual authority’. There cannot be actual authority 
and ‘[t]he transaction is therefore void unless the third party can rely on the 
doctrine of apparent authority.’203 
Ordinarily, even in the absence of express authority, a principal can be bound 
where the agent is perceived by a third party to hold such authority. However, 
the transaction resulting from the act of bribery by the agent is clearly an act of 
an agent acting outside the authority granted by a principal with the knowledge 
and complicity of the third party who extend the bribe to the agent. Bowstead 
and Reynolds argue that such a transaction is void at common law unless the 
third party can rely on the doctrine of apparent authority stating: 
‘Where a person, by words or conduct, represents or permits it to be 
represented that another person has authority to act on his behalf, he is bound 
by the acts of that other person with respect to anyone dealing with him as an 
agent on the faith of any such representation, to the same extent as if such 
other person had the authority that he was represented to have, even though he 
had no such actual authority.’204  
However, in the situations where the third party is actually involved in the 
agent’s breach of duty, there can usually ex hypothesi be no apparent authority. 
As Lord Scott points out in Criterion Properties plc. v. Stratford UK 
Properties LLC, a third party cannot claim to have relied upon the apparent 
authority of an agent if he knew that the agent had no actual authority: 
‘…If a person dealing with an agent knows that the agent does not have actual 
authority to conclude the contract or transaction in question, the person 
cannot rely on apparent authority. Apparent authority can only be relied on by 
someone who does not know that the agent has no actual authority. And if a 
person dealing with an agent knows or has reason to believe that the contract 
or transaction is contrary to the commercial interests of the agent’s principal, 
it is likely to be very difficult for the person to assert with any credibility that 
he believed the agent did have actual authority. Lack of such a belief would 
be fatal to a claim that the agent had apparent authority.’205 
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Similarly in Lysaght Bros and Co Ltd v. Falk, Griffith CJ stated:  
‘…If the agent has acted in his own interest, he does not bind his employer. 
But there is an exception to this rule in the case of a person dealing bona fide 
with the agent without knowledge of the limitation of his authority. That is 
based on the principle of estoppel; but there can be no estoppel if the person 
dealing with the agent knows the actual facts, and knows that the agent is 
acting in his own interests and not in the interests of his employer…’206 
This viewpoint is supported by Slade L.J. in Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) 
Ltd v. British Steel Corporation, who states:  
‘If ... a person dealing with a company is on notice that the directors are 
exercising the relevant power for purposes other than the purposes of the 
company, he cannot rely on the ostensible authority of the directors and, on 
ordinary principles of agency, cannot hold the company to the transaction.’207   
The lack of authority of the agent renders the secondary contract 
unenforceable. The question has arisen whether this contract is void ab initio 
or merely voidable at the instance of the principal. The proposition that the 
contract between the briber and the principal is void ab initio is summed up by 
Nourse J., who states: 
‘where an agent is known by the other party to a purported contract to have no 
authority to bind his principal, no contract comes into existence. The agent 
does not purport to contract on his own behalf and the knowledge of the other 
party unclothes him of ostensible authority to contract on behalf of the 
principal. Whether or not such a transaction is accurately described as a void 
contract, it is plainly not voidable. If no contract comes into existence, there is 
nothing to avoid or rescind, nor can any property pass under it.’208 
In a similar vein, Cockburn C.J., in Smith & Sorby has held: 
‘of a party with whom an agent is negotiating on the part of another agreed to 
give and does give the agent a secret gratuity and that gratuity does influence 
the mind of the agent directly or indirectly, in assenting to anything 
prejudicial to his employer in making the contract, the contract is vitiated.’ 209 
However, this can produce a harsh result. For reasons of fairness the courts 
have indicated that the secondary contract resulting for the breach of the duty 
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of loyalty by the agent is not void but voidable at the instance of the aggrieved 
principal. In the words of Lord Hatherly, a contract that is induced by bribery 
‘is one that can be impeached and which would be set aside in a court of 
equity.’210   
One of the earliest cases dealing with this right of rescission is the 1874 
Panama case.211 Following the discovery of a bribe taken by their agent, the 
principal sought to have the entire agreement rescinded, the recovery of all 
moneys paid under the contracts as well as the repayment of the commission 
paid to the agent. The Court in granting this relief stated that:  
‘the right of the plaintiff to the relief which they have asked and which has 
been given to them is a matter of course, according to the view of the law 
which I have learnt as student, practitioner, and Judge for nearly half a 
century.’212   
The court found it as a matter of ‘…common sense, common honesty and 
common equity … that the plaintiff was entitled to have the contract 
rescinded.’213 
In a now famous dictum, James L.J. gives authority to the position that ‘any 
surreptitious dealing between one principal and the agent of the other principal 
is a fraud on such other principal.’ He goes on to state that such a defrauded 
principal:  
‘if he comes in time, is entitled, at his option, to have the contract rescinded, 
or, if he elects not to have it rescinded, to have such other adequate relief as 
the Court may think right to give him.’214   
In Logicrose v. Southend United Football Club, Millet J. makes it clear that the 
contract between the bribe-giver and the principal of the disloyal agent is not 
void ab initio. He states that the principal who discovers that his agent in a 
transaction has obtained or arranged to obtain a bribe or secret commission 
from the other party to whom the transaction is entitled, in addition to other 
remedies which may be open to him, may elect to rescind the transaction ab 
initio or, if it is too late to rescind, to bring it to an end in the future.215 The 
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choice is clearly that of the principal, who may be left in a very unfair position 
should the contract be considered void ab initio. This would mean that the 
bribe-giver could be placed in the position where after having deceived the 
principal, the bribe-giver would still hold the upper hand in being able to walk 
away from a contract that in the eyes of the law does not exist. Lord Millet in 
Logicrose clearly identifies this when he states: 
‘the principal, having been deprived by the other party to the transaction of the 
disinterested advice of his agent is entitled to a further opportunity to consider 
whether it is in his interests to affirm it.’216 
The tribunal in the World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of 
Kenya cited with approval the words of Millet J. in Logicrose and added that:  
‘The contract is not void ab initio, and remains valid unless and until steps are 
taken to set it aside. There is nothing wrong with it as a contract, the position 
being simply that the circumstances in which it was made require that the 
injured party should be given the opportunity to relieve himself from its 
burdens.’217 
However, the Tribunal noted that the right of the injured party to rescind the 
contract will depend on the extent to which such a party had ‘knowledge of the 
relevant circumstances.’218 It is clear that the secondary contract would remain 
valid at the instance of the principal, who retains the prerogative to set the 
tainted transaction aside.219 As such, it can be concluded that the secondary 
contract that comes into being between the bribe-giver and the principal of the 
disloyal agent is unenforceable as a result of an unauthorized act at the instance 
of the principal. 
5.5 The Private Claim for Corruption 
The following sections outline the main types of private claims for bribery that 
have been brought under English Law. As may be expected, the major claims 
and remedies are those directed by the principal at the disloyal agent and the 
bribe-giver. Within the framework of English civil law, the victim of 
corruption is found primarily within the principal-agent relationship. The direct 
victim of the acts of corruption is the principal whose trust has been breached. 
The defining feature of the principal-agent relationship is the existence of a 
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217   World Duty Free v. Kenya 46 ILM 339 (2007), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 
2006, at Para. 164. 
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fiduciary relationship. In a general sense, when this fiduciary relationship is 
breached, there is a right to redress in contract and in tort.  
A private claim can also be brought in respect of bribery under other heads of 
tort. Prominent examples are (1) the tort of misfeasance in public office where 
the abuse of office by a public officer is an actionable tort, (2) the unlawful 
interference with contract where the unlawful offer of a bribe to an agent will 
result in a breach of the agent’s contract, and (3) the tort of unlawful 
interference with trade where the acts of the bribe-giver may result in loss to 
the plaintiff who has as a result entered into less favorable conditions of trade. 
Also discussed in this chapter are claims by public interest litigators and 
shareholder litigation. These last two categories are still in a very nascent stage 
of development. 
Private remedies for harm suffered as a result of bribery should be 
distinguished from the civil law mechanisms that are increasingly being used 
to recover the profits of crime. Nicholls notes several examples, including the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which allows for forfeited cash to be paid to its 
rightful owner; the Asset Recovery Agency, which has the power to institute 
civil proceedings in rem to recover moneys or other assets as the proceeds of 
crime; as well as the power of the criminal court to order a person convicted of 
an offense to compensate a victim for loss suffered. These strategies seek to 
strip offenders of the proceeds of their crimes. Nicholls points out that these 
mechanisms are ‘primarily designed to deprive the offenders of the proceeds of 
their crimes, not to compensate persons who have lost their property as a result 
of crime.’220  However, these mechanisms nonetheless emphasize the 
intertwined nature of public and private law in cases involving bribery. From 
this perspective, the purpose of private remedies and civil sanctions is not 
merely to restore the damage done to parties but also to protect society from 
the negative consequences of corruption. 
5.5.1 Claim by Principal for the Bribe and Resulting Profits  
What remedies can a wronged principal claim? There are two aspects to the 
injury suffered by a principal. The first is the injury resulting from the breach 
of the duty of loyalty owed to him by his agent and the second the injury 
suffered as a result of the acts of the person offering the bribe. The principal 
can bring a claim against the agent as well as against the party who paid the 
bribe. 
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5.5.1.1 Claim against the Agent 
At common law a bribe is recoverable as money had and received by the agent 
to the use of the principal.221 By receiving a bribe the agent causes the 
principal to enter into a contract that is disadvantageous to him of her, at least 
to the extent of the bribe.222 In the words of Smith L.J.:  
‘If a vendor bribes a purchaser’s agent, of course the purchase money is 
backed by the amount of the bribe … In this case the purchase money was 
£28,000 in which was included the £700 given to the purchaser’s agents. Of 
course the vendor would have sold the goods for £28,000 less £700. Therefore 
he has in his pocket £700 money of the purchaser. That £700 he must 
disgorge.’ 223  
In the case of Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim, Evans J. summarizes the basis 
of this common law liability. Drawing on dicta from the Hovenden, Mahesan 
and Anangel cases, he states:  
‘in a case … where the employer has paid the contractor the full amount due 
under a contract which was induced by a bribe paid to the employer’s agent, 
the employer is entitled to recover the amount of the bribe from the contractor 
(on a restitutionary basis as distinct from a damages claim) and that the 
reason for the contractor’s liability is that he has received a greater sum than 
what was the true price between them and must restore the balance.’224 
In equity, the principal also has a claim against the disloyal agent for the bribe 
received.225 The legal owner of the inducement that is given as a bribe is the 
                                                     
 
221  Per Bowen L.J. in Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell (1888), 39 Ch.D. 339, at p. 
337: 
‘the law implies a use, that is to say, there is an applied contract, if you put it as a 
legal proposition – there is an equitable right, if you treat it as a matter of equity – as 
between the principal and agent that the agent should pay it over, which renders the 
agent liable to be sued for money had and received, and there is an equitable right in 
the master to receive it, and to take it out of the hands of the agent, which gives the 
principal a right to relief in equity.’  
222    In Salford Corp v. Lever (No.2) (1890), WL 9774 [1891] 1 Q.B. 168, the court held that:  
‘where an agent, who has been bribed so to do, induces his principal to enter into a 
contract with the person who has paid the bribe, and the contract is disadvantageous 
to the principal, the principal has two distinct and cumulative remedies: he may 
recover from the agent the amount of the bribe which he has received, and he may 
also recover from the agent and the person who has paid the bribe, jointly or 
severally, damages for any loss which he has sustained by reason of his having 
entered into the contract.’ 
223  Hovenden and Sons v. Milhoff (1900), 83 L.T. 41,at p. 42. 
224  Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No.9) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 543, at p. 565. 
225  Attorney-General v. Goddard (1926), 98 L.J.K.B. 743, at p. 746 per Rowlatt J., Reading v. The 
King [1948] 2 K.B. 268; Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid [1993] 3 W.L.R. 1143; 
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person who receives the bribe. However, since this bribe occasions the breach 
of a duty of loyalty held to a principal, the receipt of the bribe creates a debt to 
the principal in equity to the amount of the bribe.226 In Boston Deep Sea 
Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell Bowen, L.J. explains that:  
‘it is because it is contrary to equity that the agent or the servant should retain 
money so received without the knowledge of his master. Then the law implies 
a use, that is to say, there is an implied contract, if you put it as a legal 
proposition – there is an equitable right, if you treat it as a matter of equity – 
as between the principal and agent that the agent should pay it over, which 
renders the agent liable to be sued for money had and received, and there is an 
equitable right in the master to receive it, and to take it out of the hands of the 
agent, which gives the principal a right to relief in equity.’227 
While the principal may have a right at common law and at equity to the bribe, 
the question whether the plaintiff also has a proprietary claim to benefits 
arising from the bribe. Millet asks the fundamental question ‘should a 
proprietary remedy be available at all to a plaintiff who is not merely seeking 
to recover his own property?’ His answer to this question is in the affirmative 
and is in his words based on principles of equity and policy. This policy, he 
states, has been settled for over two hundred years. Millet points out that the 
object of the law is not compensatory. The principal is not given a remedy in 
order to compensate him for loss; he is entitled to recover whether or not he 
has suffered loss. Rather, the principal is given this remedy:  
‘because it is considered necessary to enforce the high standards which equity 
demands of a fiduciary. A fiduciary that fails to observe then must be stripped 
of every advantage which he has obtained thereby; better that the principal 
should receive a windfall than that the fiduciary (or his creditors) should 
benefit.’228  
The ‘stripping away of every advantage’ obtained by the disloyal agent in 
breach of a fiduciary duty creates in the words of Millet ‘proprietary rights out 
of personal obligations.’229 Early case law, however, rejected such a 
proprietary claim and maintained that the relationship between a principal and 
a disloyal agent was merely that of a debtor to a creditor and that the principal 
had only a personal claim against the agent.  
                                                     
 
226   M. Cope , Ownership, Obligation, Bribes and the Constructive Trust, in M. Cope (Ed.), Equity: 
Issues and Trends, Federation Press, Sydney, 1995, p. 91. 
227  Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co v. Ansell (1888), L.R. 39 Ch. D. 339, at pp. 367-369. 
228  Sir Peter Millet, Remedies: The Error in Lister v. Stubbs, in P. Birks (Ed.), The Frontiers of 
Liability, Vol. 1, OUP, New York, 1994 (Reprint 2002), p. 51, at p. 56.  
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In the leading case of Lister v. Stubbs230 it was alleged by the plaintiffs that 
their foreman had received secret commissions which he had invested in land 
and other investments.231 The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant 
to recover the secret payments and also claimed to be entitled to follow such 
moneys into the investments that the disloyal agent had made. They sought 
interlocutory relief to prevent him dealing with the land he had invested the 
secret commissions in and also required him to bring the other investments 
made into court.  
The court held that the injunction sought by the plaintiffs should be refused 
because the money in question did not belong to the plaintiffs so as to make the 
defendant a trustee. Rather, in the view of the court, this was money which the 
plaintiffs were entitled to claim as ‘a debt due from the defendant to the 
plaintiffs in consequence of the corrupt bargain which he entered into.’ The 
courts found that the money which he had received under the corrupt bargain 
could not be treated as belonging to plaintiffs ‘before any judgment or decree 
in the action [had] been made.’232 As such, in the view of Lindley L.J., the 
relation between the parties was that of debtor and creditor, and not that of 
trustee and cestui que trust.233   
The court was influenced by two considerations: (a) firstly, the fact that if the 
claimants were entitled to a proprietary remedy, the property acquired by the 
defendant with the bribe money would be withdrawn from the mass of the 
defendant’s creditors on the defendant’s bankruptcy; and (b) secondly, the fact 
that the claimants would be entitled not only to an account of the money plus 
interest, but also to all profits made by the defendant using the money, for 
example if he had set himself up in business.234 The effect of the Lister 
decision was that the principal’s relief was restricted to an account for the 
value of the bribe. Profits arising from the bribe remained the property of the 
agent. The principal had no priority status as a secured creditor in the event of 
the agent being declared bankrupt.   
A century after Lister, in the landmark case of AG for Hong Kong v. Reid235 the 
relationship between the principal and agent was viewed in a fundamentally 
                                                     
 
230  Lister v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D 1. 
231   The Plaintiffs, a manufacturing company, employed the Defendant, who was their foreman, to 
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different manner by the courts. In this case, Mr. Reid, a New Zealander who 
eventually rose to become the Attorney General Public Prosecutions for the 
Government of Hong Kong, had received bribes from certain criminals to 
obstruct justice in their favor. Mr. Reid was found guilty and eventually 
sentenced to eight years imprisonment and fined HK$12.4 million. It was 
established that property held by Mr. Reid in New Zealand was acquired by the 
proceeds of the bribe. These assets included three freehold properties − two in 
the name of Mr. and Mrs. Reid and the third in the name of Mr. Malloy, Mr. 
Reid’s solicitor. 
The question before the courts was whether the claimant had any right to these 
proceeds of the bribe. The Privy Council held that while under the law, such 
moneys or properties belonged to the agent under equity, which acts in 
personam, it was unconscionable for the agent to obtain or retain the benefit of 
the bribe. As such, in the view of the court, when Mr. Reid received the bribe, 
he was in breach of his duty to the Government of Hong Kong. Upon the 
breach of this duty, he became a debtor in equity for the amount of the bribe to 
the Hong Kong government. Equity requires as done that which ought to have 
been done. As such, the increased value of the property representing the bribe 
was also owed to the Hong Kong government by Mr. Reid, who stood as a 
constructive trustee in respect of such property. In the words of Lord 
Templeman:  
‘The decision in Lister & Co v Stubbs is not consistent with the principles that 
a fiduciary must not be allowed to benefit from his own breach of duty, that 
the fiduciary should account for the bribe as soon as he receives it and that 
equity regards as done that which ought to be done. From these principles it 
would appear to follow that the bribe and the property from time to time 
representing the bribe are held on a constructive trust for the person 
injured.’236 
This constructive trust or account of profits is now regarded as a conventional 
equitable remedy. In Murad v. Al-Saraj,237 the court remarked that:  
‘Equity recognises that there are legal wrongs for which damages are not the 
appropriate remedy. In some situations, as in this case, a court of equity 
instead awards an account of profits. As with an award of interest, the 
purpose of the account is to strip a defaulting fiduciary of his profit.’238   
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Lord Russel of Killowen in the early Regal case239 remarked about the 
constructive trust:   
‘The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of fiduciary position 
make a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on 
fraud, or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations as to 
whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or 
whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for 
the plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the 
plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his 
action. The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated 
circumstances, been made.’ 
The position of the law on constructive trusts with respect to illegal 
commissions has, however, been radically affected by the recent 2011 ruling in 
Sinclair Investments v. Versailles.240  This case involved the attempt to recover 
the proceeds of a fraudulent conspiracy. Sinclair Investments was induced to 
advance money to an offshore company controlled by a Mr. Cushnie called 
Trading Partners Limited (‘TPL’) by false representations that the money 
would be used by TPL for trading transactions of a particular type. Sinclair 
Investments advanced £2.35m to TPL. The moneys advanced were not used by 
TPL for the agreed purpose but instead used in a ‘cross-firing’ operation 
involving transfers between bank accounts and a series of fraudulent 
transactions which eventually led to a collapse of the conspiracy and the 
appointment of receivers with respect to the companies involved.  
Sinclair sought a declaration that the receivers had held a part of the proceeds 
upon a constructive trust for Sinclair. Sinclair claimed that a Kensington 
property was (or is to be regarded as having been) purchased with profits 
improperly made by Mr. Cushnie in breach of the fiduciary duty he personally 
owed to Sinclair Investments with regard to the advances that it had made to 
TPL. Sinclair also argued that in the alternative, the property was (or is to be 
regarded as having been) purchased with profits the making of which had been 
achieved by Mr. Cushnie’s unconscionable and dishonest conduct in inducing 
Sinclair to pay its advances to TPL and then dishonestly assisting in TPL’s 
breach of trust towards Sinclair by procuring the use of the money for an 
unauthorized purpose. Sinclair’s case was dismissed by the High Court.241 
The Court of Appeal noted that the arguments made by the claimants focused 
on cases where: 
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‘the courts have had to consider whether, where an agent or employee accepts 
a bribe or secret commission or the like, his principal or employer 
beneficially owns the bribe. As in the present case, the money in such cases 
was received by a fiduciary, and, although its receipt derived from his 
fiduciary position and was a plain breach of his fiduciary duties, it was not 
money which was part of the assets subject to his duties, or derived from such 
assets.’242  
After reviewing the cases on this point, the court referred to the decision in 
Lister & Co v. Stubbs,243 where the Court unanimously held that the bribe 
could not be considered to be the property of the employers. The court in 
Sinclair held that the ruling of Lindlay L.J. in Lister v. Stubbs indicated that the 
remedy of equitable compensation would not extend to enable a fiduciary to be 
held accountable for any profit he had made on an asset which he had acquired 
with a bribe.244 
The court noted that the Lister case was disapproved by the Privy Council in 
the AG v. Reid case, where Templeman J. held that the agent was accountable 
to the principal ‘not only for the original amount or value of the bribe but also 
for the increased value of the property representing the bribe.’245 The Court of 
Appeal in Sinclair Investments rejected this contention and stated that they 
would not follow the Privy Council decision in the Reid case in preference to 
its own decision unless there were domestic authorities that showed that its 
decision was per incuriam or of doubtful reliability.246 
The Court of Appeal held that the lower court was right in rejecting the 
claimant’s proprietary claim to the proceeds of sale of the shares in question. 
The court found that there was a consistent line of reasoned decisions which:  
‘appear to establish that a beneficiary of a fiduciary’s duties cannot claim a 
proprietary interest, but is entitled to an equitable account, in respect of any 
money or asset acquired by a fiduciary in breach of his duties to the 
beneficiary, unless the asset or money is or has been beneficially the property 
of the beneficiary or the trustee acquired the asset or money by taking 
advantage of an opportunity or right which was properly that of the 
beneficiary.’247 
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The Court of Appeal in the Sinclair Investments case concluded that the 
claimant had only a personal not proprietary claim in such cases.248 Thus the 
pendulum seems to have swung from the denial of a proprietary claim to the 
proceeds of a bribe in Lister v. Stubbs, to the ruling that favored such a 
proprietary right in AG v. Reid and back again to a position that denies such a 
proprietary right with respect to Sinclair Investment v. Versailles. 
5.5.1.2 Claim against the Bribe-Giver 
The principal can also bring claims against the bribe-giver. A claim can be 
made against the bribe-giver for the amount of the bribe as well as an account 
for profits.249 In the Petrotrade case, Steel J. remarks that as:  
‘… regards the claim for money had and received, the gist of the cause of 
action is the benefit which has accrued to the briber, again whether or not 
attributable to a contract between the briber and the claimant.’250  
The principal can claim against the bribe-giver for an account for profits that 
resulted from the bribery of a principal’s agent. In Consul Development Pty Ltd 
v. DPC Estates Pty Ltd,251 Gibbs J. points out that the strict rule of equity that 
forbids a person in a fiduciary position to profit from his position appears to be 
designed to deter persons holding such a position from being swayed by 
interest rather than by duty. This, in his opinion, lays the premise to extend 
such a no-profit rule to persons who assist in the violation of fiduciary duties. 
He states that: 
‘if the maintenance of a very high standard of conduct on the part of 
fiduciaries is the purpose of the rule it would seem equally necessary to deter 
other persons from knowingly assisting those in a fiduciary position to violate 
their duties.’252   
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The rationale of the account for profits is to strip the agent and briber of all 
they have gained. It is not compensatory or restitutionary. An account for 
profits is not calculated on the basis of what the principal has lost but rather on 
what the defaulting parties have gained. Even if there is no loss suffered by the 
plaintiff, the right to an account of the profits subsists.253   
Another rationale for such a no-profit rule is the equitable principle that a man 
should not be allowed to benefit from his own wrong. As Gibbs J. points out: 
 ‘the rule is to be explained simply because it would be contrary to equitable 
principles to allow a person to retain a benefit that he had gained from a 
breach of his fiduciary duty, it would appear equally inequitable that one who 
knowingly took part in the breach should retain a benefit that resulted 
therefrom. I therefore conclude, on principle that a person who knowingly 
participates in a breach of fiduciary duty is liable to account to the person to 
whom the duty was owed for any benefit he has received as a result of such 
participation.’254 
In Fyffes v. Templeman, Toulson J. cited with approval the reasoning in the 
Consul Development Property case and stated:  
‘although the dishonest intruder owes no personal obligation of loyalty to the 
injured party, it is unconscionable for him dishonestly to suborn the loyalty of 
the agent and equally unconscionable for him to keep benefits which he has 
obtained by dishonestly abusing to his own advantage the position of the 
agent whose duty was to his principal.’255  
Toulson J. further stated: 
‘I would conclude that there are cogent grounds, in principle and in practical 
justice, for following the approach of Gibbs J and holding that the briber of an 
agent may be required to account to the principal for benefits obtained from 
the corruption of the agent.’  
In Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid, Lord Templeman described 
bribery as ‘an evil practice which threatens the foundations of any civilised 
society’ and that the law should not assist a party to retain the profits of such a 
vice.256 
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These rulings must now be reconsidered in light of the Sinclair Investment v. 
Versailles case, which reverts to the position established by the Lister v. Stubbs 
position to the effect that there is no proprietary right to the proceeds of the 
bribe but only a personal right against the fiduciary.  
The principal can also make a claim against the bribe-giver for equitable 
compensation based on knowing assistance. The briber does not stand in a 
fiduciary relationship to the principal. The briber is a ‘stranger’ to the 
relationship of trust that exists between the principal and the agent. Yet the 
briber is an instrumental element in the breach of the fiduciary duty owed by 
the agent by assisting such an agent to fraudulently and dishonestly breach the 
fiduciary duty owed. Lord Selborne has stated that:  
‘… strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act 
as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, 
perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents 
receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless 
they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of 
the trustees.’257 
In the case of the bribe-giver there is a clear intention to assist in ‘a dishonest 
and fraudulent design.’ Dishonesty is ‘the touchstone’ of this equitable 
liability.258 The Court in the Royal Brunei case concluded that:  
‘liability in equity to make good resulting loss attaches to a person who 
dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation. It is 
not necessary that, in addition the trustee or fiduciary was acting dishonestly, 
although this will usually be so where the third party who is assisting him is 
acting dishonestly.’259 
Following on from this ruling, the court in Kuwait Oil Tanker Co v. Al Bader 
held that:  
‘If one who knowingly assists in a breach of trust may be held liable as a 
constructive trustee even though he does not receive the trust property … it 
must follow that one who dishonestly participates in a theft, albeit as an 
accessory rather than a principal, must be liable along with the actual thief as 
a constructive trustee.’260  
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On the nature of such accessory liability, Lord Millet in the Twinsectra case 
stated that the:  
‘accessory’s liability for having assisted in a breach of trust is quite different. 
It is fault-based, not receipt-based. The defendant is not charged with having 
received trust moneys for his own benefit, but with having acted as an 
accessory to a breach of trust. The action is not restitutionary; the claimant 
seeks compensation for wrongdoing.’261  
5.5.2 Claim in Tort for Damages 
The principal can sue the agent and bribe-giver for fraud. The courts in the 
Salford case stated that where bribery is concerned, the cause of action against 
the bribe-giver is for fraud. According to the judges, ‘since the agent is 
necessarily a party to the bribery, it follows that the tort is a joint tort of briber 
and agent.’262 The liability arising against the bribed agent and bribe-giver is 
reiterated in the Mahesan case. Here the courts described the right of the 
plaintiff to remedies against the briber in the alternative. Either from the bribe-
giver in the amount of the bribe as money had and received or to recover, as 
damages for tort, the actual loss which the principal sustained as a result of 
entering into the transaction in respect of which the bribe was given. 263  
This position is summarized in Bowstead and Reynolds Art. 49, which 
provides: 
‘When an agent receives or arranges to receive any money or property by way 
of bribe or secret commission in the course of his agency from a 
person who deals or seeks to deal with his principal, the agent is liable 
to his principal jointly and severally with that person –  
(1) in restitution for the amount of the bribe or secret commission; or 
(2) in tort or contract, for any loss suffered by the principal from entering 
into the transaction in respect of which the bribe or secret commission 
was given or promised; 
and the bribe, if it was paid, is held on trust for the principal.’264 
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A claim can be made against the disloyal agent in damages for fraud in respect 
of the actual loss which has been sustained by the claimant as a result of acts in 
connection with which the payments were made. The court will presume the 
amount of the bribe. If the purchaser alleges loss or damage beyond this, he 
must prove it.265 In Daraydan Holdings Ltd v. Solland International Ltd, Mr. 
Justice Lawrence Collins said that it would be assumed that the true price of 
any goods bought by the principal was increased by at least the amount of the 
bribe, but any loss beyond the amount of the bribe itself must be proven.266 
Bribery causes loss or damage as a result of the breach of the fiduciary duty. 
The courts have ruled on loss and damage even where there has been no 
representation made to the principal or any reliance placed on a non-existent 
representation as is typical of the classic tort. In Hovenden and Sons v. 
Millhoff, Romer L.J. laid down three rules that characterize bribery as a wrong 
which is ‘is sui generis.’ Firstly, the motive of the briber in giving the bribe is 
not relevant and evidence as to such motive will not be allowed; secondly, 
there is an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the principal that the agent was 
influenced by the bribe; and thirdly, there is an irrebuttable presumption in 
favor of the claimant that the true price of the goods as between him and the 
purchaser company must be taken to have been less than the price paid by at 
least the amount or value of the bribe. If the principal seeks to claim for any 
loss beyond this presumption it must be proven. 267  
There is some debate whether this opens up a gap in the remedial scheme and 
creates in the case of bribery a sui generis tort that has its own particular 
characteristics. In the Mahesan case, Diplock J. expresses the view that the 
rules in the Hovenden case open a new chapter in the law of civil remedies for 
bribery. He states:  
‘[T]hese rules refer to three of the elements in the tort of fraud, the motive, the 
inducement, and the loss occasioned to the plaintiff, but go on to say that the 
existence of the first two elements and of the third up to the amount of the 
bribe are to be irrebuttably presumed. This is merely another way of saying 
that they form no part of the definition of bribery as a legal wrong. To the 
extent that it is said that there is an irrebuttable presumption of loss or damage 
to the amount of the value of the bribe this is another way of saying that, 
unlike in the tort of fraud, actual loss or damage is not the gist of the action. 
But then to go on to say that actual loss in excess of the amount of the bribe 
can be recovered only if it is proved is to produce a hybrid form of legal 
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wrong of which actual damage is the gist of part only of a single cause of 
action.’268 
Mitchell suggests that a reading of the Mahesan,269 Petrotrade270 and Fyffes271 
cases leads to the proposition that bribery is a special sui generis tort of 
fraud.272 The Privy Council in the Mahesan case established that a principal 
whose agent has been bribed can recover the amount of the bribe from the 
briber in an action for money had and received, and alternatively, recover 
damages from the briber in an action for the tort of fraud. Steel J. in Petrotrade 
states that the bribery claim is ‘… not a species of deceit but a special form of 
fraud where there is no representation made to the principal of the agent let 
alone reliance.’273 In a similar vein, regarding loss resulting from the agent, the 
courts in Reading v. AG have held that the right of the principal to recover the 
amount of the bribe from the agent does not depend upon his having incurred 
any loss as a result of his agent’s conduct:274 Mitchell argues that these rulings 
point to bribery as a form of tort, but that the normal elements of the tort of 
fraud are inoperative. There is no need to prove motive, inducement and a 
proportion of the loss sustained. There is an irrebuttable presumption in favor 
of the claimant.275 
In line with the Hovenden position, Mr. Justice Slade in Industries & General 
Mortgage Co. Ltd v. Lewis has held that proof of corruptness or corrupt motive 
is unnecessary in a civil action founded on bribery.276 The plaintiff must, 
however, prove any loss beyond the amount of the bribe. For this aspect of the 
loss, actual damage must be established to sustain the claim. Nonetheless, to 
the extent that there is an irrebuttable presumption in respect of the bribe itself, 
it is unlike any tort. On the other hand, to the extent that proof is required of 
actual damage of loss beyond the amount of the bribe, the claim is like any 
tort. As such, it may be argued that the bribery claim in tort occupies a special 
sui generis position. This position is arguably traceable to the desire of the 
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courts to punish and deter acts of bribery. Here the scale of justice tilts towards 
deterrence rather than mere compensation. 
5.5.3 Claim for Breach of Employment Contract 
The principal can also sue for breach of the employment contract. Increasingly 
the breach of anti-bribery rule is considered a material breach of contracts 
involving agents such as consultancy, procurement and construction contracts. 
The common law right to terminate a contract of agency for disloyalty by the 
agent is maintained by the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulations 1993, which provides in Regulation 16 that:  
‘[T]hese Regulations shall not affect the application of any enactment or rule 
of law which provides for the immediate termination of the agency contract—
(a)because of the failure of one party to carry out all or part of his obligations 
under that contract; or (b)where exceptional circumstances arise.277 
5.5.4 Rule against Double Recovery 
The various claims highlighted above show that the aggrieved plaintiff may 
pursue claims for the recovery of the bribe or claims for losses resulting from 
the damages resulting from the corrupt exchange. This could imply that the 
claimant could make a double recovery in restitution and in fraud. Indeed, this 
was the finding in Salford Corporation v. Lever, where the court held that an 
aggrieved principal had two distinct and cumulative remedies: from the agent 
for the amount of the bribe, and from the agent and the briber, jointly or 
severally, damages for any loss which he has sustained by reason of his having 
entered into the contract.278   
This idea of double recovery was, however, put to rest in the Mahesan case.279 
The courts after examining the Salford and Hovenden cases found that the 
principles they laid down simply described the right of the plaintiff to 
alternative remedies against both the agent and the bribe-giver either to recover 
the amount of the bribe as money had and received (in restitution) or to 
recover, as damages for tort, the actual loss which the principal sustained as a 
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result of entering into the transaction in respect of which the bribe was 
given.280  
5.5.5 Misfeasance in Public Office 
The act of bribery by a public official is a deliberate act of abuse of office. It is 
an act which the public official knows is illegal, is committed by the public 
official by virtue of his position, and is for the personal gain of such a public 
official. As a basic principle, where an individual suffers loss or damage as a 
result of acts of corruption by a public official, a claim for redress can be made 
by such an individual. This principle is demonstrated and explained in the early 
civil case of Henley v. Mayor of Lyme Regis.281 This case involved the damage 
to property caused by a failure of the Mayor and Burgess of Lyme Regis, in 
breach of their public duty, to repair sea banks imposed by charter or letters 
patent of King Charles the first. 
Best J. held that ‘if a public officer abuses his office, either by an act of 
omission or commission, and the consequences of that, is an injury to an 
individual, an action may be maintained against such public officer.’282 He 
further added:  
‘If a man take a reward − whether it be in money from the Crown … for the 
discharge of a public duty from that moment he is quasi a public officer; and, 
if through any act of negligence or abuse in his office, an individual sustain 
an injury, he is entitled to remedies in a civil action.’283 
The House of Lords in the recent case of Three Rivers District Council v. 
Governor and Company of the Bank of England gave an up-to-date summary 
of the right of a member of the public to sue a public official whose abuse of 
office has resulted in injury to the claimant.284 Lord Hobhouse of 
Woodborough put the tort of misfeasance in public office in legal context and 
stated it has the following elements: 
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‘[F]irst, there must be an unlawful act or omission done or made in the 
exercise of power by the public officer. Second, as the essence of the tort is an 
abuse of power, the act or omission must have been done or made with the 
required mental element. Third, for the same reason, the act or omission must 
have been done or made in bad faith. Fourth, as to standing, the claimants 
must demonstrate that they have a sufficient interest to sue the defendant. 
Fifth, as causation is an essential element of the cause of action, the act or 
omission must have caused the claimants’ loss.’285 
These requirements place several obstacles in the path of a bribery claim 
against a public officer on the grounds of misfeasance in public officer. The 
claimant must be able to prove that the public officer knew that the he was 
acting unlawfully in taking a bribe. The plaintiff must also be able to establish 
a causal connection between the injury suffered and the actions of the public 
official. Furthermore, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the public official 
intentionally sought to cause a loss to the plaintiff by taking the bribe, (2) that 
he could have foreseen the loss to the plaintiff, and (3) that the public official 
willfully disregarded that risk. 
These are significant hurdles that make the path of a claim for bribery on the 
grounds of misfeasance in public office an unlikely one for victims of public 
bribery. 
5.5.6 Tortious Interference 
Where a party intentionally uses unlawful means to cause economic loss to 
another, such a party is liable for causing this loss.286 There must be an 
intention to cause harm as well as the use of an unlawful means. Where a 
party, using lawful or unlawful means, intentionally induces another person to 
breach a contract that he knew existed between such a person and another 
party, he is liable for the loss occasioned by such conduct. Such improper 
interference with another’s business or contracts is a tort whose precise scope 
is still in the process of being defined by the courts of law.287 
                                                     
 
285  Id., at Para. 42. 
286  Lord Bridge recognizes the tort of unlawful interference with business stating, ‘[T]here 
evolved from the 19th century cases the clear and salutary principle that a person who does an 
intentional unlawful act in the furtherance of his own business interest, or who aims to injure 
another and as a result causes damage to that other in the form of economic loss, or 
alternatively, economic loss relating to his business, has committed an actionable tort.’ See 
Lonrho Plc v. Fayed and Others [1992] 1 A.C. 448, at p. 455. 
287  J. Bentil, ‘Improper interference with another’s business or trade interest as a tort’, Journal of 
Business Law, November 1993, pp. 519-543, remarks ‘However, whilst essential aspects of the 
law relating to the tort of conspiracy to injure another’s business or commercial interest may 
now have come to be clarified and settled; those in respect of the law relating to the tort of 
 
CHAPTER 5 – PRIVATE REMEDIES IN ENGLAND 
268 
 
A bribe can be considered unlawful interference with a contract to the extent 
that the bribe-giver is committing a legal wrong, and knows that a legal wrong 
is being committed in the proffering of a bribe. The bribe-giver also knows that 
the giving of the bribe will cause the agent to stand in breach of the contract 
with the principal. Such an act of bribery can fall under the claim of wrongful 
interference with the trade of the principal to the extent that it may cause 
economic loss to the principal. As a result of the bribe given to the agent, the 
principal does not get the best possible conditions of trade. However, these are 
new and developing torts whose precise scope under English law is 
uncertain.288 Certainly as compared with the existing position of the law on 
bribery, there is not much merit in pursing this course of action. Bribery as a 
sui generis tort does not require proof of reliance or intention; these are 
irrebuttably presumed against the person offering the bribe. It does, however, 
require proof of loss (beyond the actual sum of the bribe), as do most torts. 
Therefore, taking the route of the bribery claim as a sui generis tort is a 
simpler, less burdensome route.  
5.5.7 The Public Interest Litigant 
In recent years a new class of claimant in bribery-related claims has come to 
the fore. The Corner House, a non-governmental organization that supports 
democratic and community movements for environmental and social justice, 
has brought several high-profile claims regarding the fight against corruption 
in England.  
In December 2004, The Corner House instituted legal proceedings against the 
UK’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ms. Patricia Hewitt, claiming 
that the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) had weakened its 
rules aimed at reducing corruption without consulting The Corner House or 
other interested NGOs. The Corner House claimed that the ECGD had, 
however, ‘carried out extensive and detailed consultation with its corporate 
customers and their representatives,’ who had lobbied the ECGD intensively 
on these rules. This, they argued, was ‘a serious breach of basic public law 
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standards of fairness and the ECGD’s own published consultation policy.’289 
The Corner House was awarded a full ‘protective costs order’ for a judicial 
review. This meant that it would not have to pay the government’s legal costs 
if it lost because it was bringing the case in the public interest. The government 
settled out of court and agreed to instigate a full public consultation on its 
changes to its anti-corruption rules, and to pay The Corner House’s legal 
costs.290 
In April 2007, The Corner House and the Campaign against Arms Trade 
(CAAT) instituted an action for the judicial review of the UK’s Serious Fraud 
Office’s decision in December 2006 to end its investigation into alleged 
corruption by BAE Systems in Saudi Arabia. The High Court found for Corner 
House stating that:  
‘the court has a responsibility to secure the rule of law. The Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was required to satisfy the court that all that 
could reasonably be done had been done to resist the threat. He has failed to 
do so. He submitted too readily because he, like the executive, concentrated 
on the effects which were feared should the threat be carried out and not on 
how the threat might be resisted. No-one, whether within this country or 
outside is entitled to interfere with the course of our justice. It is the failure of 
Government and the defendant to bear that essential principle in mind that 
justifies the intervention of this court.’291  
The High Court formally quashed the SFO’s decision to drop its corruption 
investigation into arms deals between BAE Systems and Saudi Arabia. It gave 
the SFO permission to appeal to the House of Lords against its ruling that the 
SFO’s termination of the investigation was unlawful. In July 2008 the House 
of Lords overturned the High Court’s ruling of April 2008. They held that the 
Director’s discretion to drop criminal proceedings legally extended to taking 
account of the threat uttered by Saudi Arabia that it would withdraw 
diplomatic and intelligence co-operation with the UK if the investigation 
continued, even though the threat was ‘ugly and obviously unwelcome.’292 
These cases show an increased willingness by private sector participants to 
intervene in cases involving international corruption. The response of the 
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courts in permitting the applications and providing an unprecedented full 
protective costs order to enable such public interest litigation, represents a 
broadening of the spectrum of the parties that can use the civil courts to 
challenge the occurrence of corruption and bribery under English law.  
5.5.8 Shareholder Litigation 
Shareholders of a company may bring an action against directors who pay 
bribes to secure a contract. However, as the City of Harper Woods Employees’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Oliver case shows, the application of English law may make this 
difficult.293 In this case a US federal appeals court affirmed the dismissal of a 
shareholder derivative suit against some current and former directors and 
executives of BAE Systems PLC. BAE is a publicly owned corporation 
incorporated in England and Wales. It operates in the United States through its 
subsidiary BAE Systems, Inc. The suit was filed in 2007 by the City of Harper 
Woods (Michigan) Employees’ Retirement System. The complaint alleged 
payment of more than $2 billion in bribes and kickbacks to Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan of Saudi Arabia. The alleged purpose was to secure for BAE the $80 
billion Al-Yamamah contract from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense for 
the sale of jet fighters and trainers. The suit claimed the defendants had 
breached their fiduciary duties and wasted corporate assets.  
Harper Woods alleged that the BAE defendants engaged in:  
‘intentional, reckless, and/or negligent breaches of their fiduciary duties of 
care, control and candour, involving illegal, improper, and/or ultra vires 
conduct, including causing BAE to violate the laws of the United States and 
international business codes and conventions ... by making, or permitting to 
be made, improper and/or illegal bribes, kickbacks and other payments.’ 
According to Harper Woods, the BAE defendants ‘caused BAE to engage in a 
pattern and practice of making illegal and improper payments to secure 
contracts and false and misleading statements to conceal and cover them up,’ 
in violation of U.S. and United Kingdom law. Specifically, Harper Woods 
alleged that the BAE defendants ‘undertook illegal and improper conduct ... in 
breach of their fiduciary duties to BAE,’ including paying more than $2 billion 
in bribes and kickbacks to Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia in order to 
obtain a large contract (known as the Al-Yamamah contract) from the Saudi 
Arabian Ministry of Defence. Harper Woods further alleged that the ‘illegal or 
improper payments were secretly bargained for at the outset of the Al-
Yamamah contract,’ and that Bandar received most of this money in 
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Washington, DC, via an account at Riggs Bank. Harper Woods sought 
damages (including punitive damages), an accounting by the defendants, and 
an order directing BAE to undertake certain corporate governance reforms. 
The trial court had applied English law to the case. It found that the Harper 
Woods pension fund had no standing to act as plaintiff. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed. It said that under the 
1843 English case of Foss v. Harbottle,294 ‘the company, not a shareholder, is 
the proper plaintiff in a suit seeking remedies for wrongs allegedly committed 
against the company.’ Furthermore, the court found that Harper Woods had 
failed to demonstrate that an exception to the rule of Foss v. Harbottle applies 
in this case. It also found that even if the defendants had paid bribes that broke 
the law, they had not acted beyond the scope of their legal authority. In English 
law, an ultra vires act is an act ‘beyond the corporate capacity of a company.’ 
The court pointed to the case of Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim295 as authority 
for the fact that the payment of a bribe does not constitute an act that is ultra 
vires the capacity of the company. 
5.6 Observations 
The English rules against corruption have moved from the public to the private 
sphere in a progression from judicial and ministerial corruption, to political 
corruption, to corruption in commercial relationships, to corruption occurring 
in foreign counties. The 2010 Bribery Act merges all these stages in a 
comprehensive instrument that covers public, private, national and 
international bribery. The Bribery Act replaces and repeals the English 
common law offenses of bribery as well as existing statutory laws. Nonetheless 
the common law and statutory instruments provide useful insight into the 
development, scope and nature of corruption as a legal wrong in the United 
Kingdom. As such, they remain important elements in an understanding of 
English anti-corruption law. 
Corruption is expressed in terms of bribery over criminal and civil law 
jurisprudence. The distinguishing feature of the commission that constitutes a 
bribe is that it is given in secret and its transfer involves a conflict of interest. 
English law clearly sees bribery as a grievous problem and this is reflected in 
successive acts of criminalization. From 1889 until the 2010 Bribery Bill there 
has been a concerted effort to address the damage that corruption causes within 
the society. The moral basis for the criminal law injunction is also evident in 
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the civil law regime. Here the focus is also on the perpetrators and how to 
remedy the breach of a duty that has occurred in order to act in the best 
interests of another person. In this sense, the bribery claim can be said to have 
a regulatory function 
The primary victim of corruption under English civil law is the principal in an 
agency relationship. There are indeed other opportunities to file private claims 
using rules developed relating to the abuse of public office, the economic torts 
of unlawful interference with contractual and trade relations, shareholder 
litigation, and public interest litigation. However, these present significant 
burdens of proof of causality or lack of standing for the potential claimant. 
An important question is the extent to which the historical principal/agency 
formulation can be stretched to accommodate a broader spectrum of victims of 
corruption. The challenge is how to accommodate within the principal/agent 
formulation parties who are not principals in a contractual sense without losing 
the certainty and clarity that enables persons to know what the precise scope of 
their obligations are under the law. At the same time, too narrow an 
interpretation may leave persons who have suffered loss as a result of 
corruption without redress.   
Cases like the Khalid case show that it is the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship that triggers private remedies for bribery. While there is clearly a 
fiduciary relationship in every principal-agent relationship, the fiduciary 
obligation may also arise in the absence of any contractual relationship. In 
determining the agency relationship in claims tainted by corruption, there is 
some element of judicial discretion with regard to the expression fiduciary. 
The courts have departed from traditional categorizations and imputed a 
fiduciary duty, where a position of authority is misused, even if there is no 
strict principal-agent relationship. Indeed the courts have stated that the 
expression fiduciary is used in a ‘wide and loose sense’ in settings such as the 
Reading case, which involved the receipt of bribes by virtue of position.  
The courts have imputed a fiduciary relationship where there was no 
contractual relationship between the party to whom a duty was owed and the 
party who took the bribe, but where the factual matrix pointed to a fiduciary 
relationship as in the Daraydan case. The breach of the duty to act in the best 
interest of another lies at the heart of the claim for bribery. Wherever this duty 
exists, it can be argued that there is a party whose right to a duty of loyalty has 
been breached. Simply put, the fiduciary nature of the duty is what identifies 
the parties rather than any formal classification.  
If this is the case, the concept of the principal-agent is very fluid and can 
arguably be stretched to cover cases that do not typically fall within the 
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commercial principal-agency relationship. It can give a right of suit to any 
party who holds a position in a ‘fiduciary’ relationship. Such a party would 
then have the right to proceed against the disloyal party (for example, public 
officials) as well as the bribe-giver (for example, the corporation that proffers 
the bribe to influence the acquisition of business). Adopting a loose definition 
of the concept of fiduciary may give persons to whom a duty of loyalty is owed 
by their elected representative the standing to proceed against bribe paying 
corporations as well as public officials, since damage or injury is not the basis 
for the claim but rather the breach of fiduciary duty.  
In the 2010 Bribery Act, the principal-agent terminology is done away with 
altogether. Rather, the Act speaks of persons who have a duty to perform a 
function in good faith or with impartially, or who are in a position of trust. It 
remains to be seen what effect this abandonment of the agent/principal 
terminology may have on the private claim for redress. Is the legal test of good 
faith or proper performance as espoused in the Act sufficient to justify 
intervention of the court into private transactions in a bid to deter bribery? Or 
is a fiduciary relationship necessary for the intervention of the court? Does 
removing the principal/agent formulation make it easier for parties that fall 
outside this formulation to bring a bribery claim or can the concept of agent 
and principal be stretched to include such indirect claimants? A related 
question is what triggers the intervention of the court in the bribery claim? Is 
the primary focus solely the rights of the parties before the court or are there 
larger purposes that can be deduced from the court’s jurisprudence regarding 
the private action for bribery? 
The replacement of the principal-agent relationship with the concepts of good 
faith, impartiality and the position of trust under the Bribery Act, arguably 
widens the doors of the court’s discretion to entertain claims from a broader 
spectrum of claimants. Such an approach could broaden the conceptual basis of 
the bribery claim. It moves beyond being an avenue for the enforcement of 
private rights in private transactions to a method of ensuring that transactions 
that militate against social, economic and cultural development are deterred. 
The payment of a secret commission that gives rise to a conflict of interest is 
the distinguishing feature of a bribe under English civil law. Secrecy is more 
than ‘bare knowledge’ but requires that the principal be fully informed of all 
circumstances relating to the payment of a commission to an agent and not 
have to make further inquiry. The element of secrecy helps to expose payments 
that are dressed up as legal commissions as bribes. Secrecy has been described 
as the line of demarcation that must be firmly drawn by the courts. Secrecy in 
the payment of the commission triggers the breach of the fiduciary duty that 
exists between the agent and principal. The principal has a right to the single-
minded loyalty of the agent, and where this is breached the law exerts an 
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extensive liability to account on the disloyal agent and the party causing the 
agent to breach the duty to act in the best interest of the principal.  
Defenses that can be made against the bribery claim are that there was no 
secret gift or inducement offered. This will be the case where the principal was 
aware of the transaction. Another possible line of defense is that such 
payments are acceptable in course of business or customary under an 
applicable law. A further line of defense is that there was no fiduciary 
relationship and therefore no duty of loyalty to breach. This list is not 
exhaustive but the response of the courts show that the essential nature of the 
transaction is the decisive factor. ‘Smokescreens’ and attempts to camouflage 
the nature of the transaction will usually not succeed.  
The Bribery Act does not expressly provide that the primary agreement to give 
a bribe is void. However, by using language prohibiting the ‘offer or promise’ 
or ‘agreement’ to receive a bribe, this will clearly cover a contract that 
evidences the agreement to give or receive a bribe. The primary contract to 
give a bribe is one that will not be enforced by the English courts and the 
plaintiff will be faced with the application of the ex turpi causa principle. The 
courts will leave the parties as they found them and not assist the plaintiff in 
benefiting from wrongdoing. This clearly benefits the defendant at the expense 
of the plaintiff, but as the courts have pointed out this is not a question of 
justice between the parties but rather an issue of public policy. 
The secondary contract between the bribe-giver and the party to whom a duty 
of loyalty is owed is a contract that results from unauthorized acts of an agent. 
Such an agreement is voidable unless the third party can rely on the doctrine of 
apparent authority. However, in the situations where the third party is actually 
involved in the agent’s breach of duty, as is typically the case in a bribery 
exchange, there can be no application of the doctrine of apparent authority. It 
would seem from the rulings in the Logicrose case and the World Duty Free 
case that the contract is not void ab initio. This would result in harm to the 
principal, who has already suffered the disloyalty of the agent. These rulings 
hold that the secondary contract is voidable at the instance of the principal. The 
secondary contract therefore remains valid at the prerogative of the principal. 
The principal offenders from the viewpoint of civil law are the disloyal agent 
and the bribe-giver. On the part of the disloyal agent, stripping the agent of any 
profit gives the principal the right to recover the bribe, to recover the profits 
resulting from the bribe, to recover any loss suffered as a result of the actions 
of the agent, and may also justify the termination of the contract. On the part of 
the bribe-giver, the principal is given the right to recover the bribe, to recover 
any loss suffered as a result of the actions of the principal’s agent, to rescind 
the contract resulting from the bribe, and to account to the principal for the 
benefits arising from the bribe paid to the principal’s agent. The well-accepted 
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proprietary right of the principal to any benefits arising from the bribe is now 
under question with the recent Sinclair Investment v. Versailles ruling. The 
Court of Appeal has now denied the principal a proprietary right to the 
proceeds of a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court expressly rejected the AG v. 
Reid ruling and upheld the Lister v. Stubbs position. This is clearly a setback 
for the line of reasoning that sees the complete disgorgement of any and all 
profits arising from a bribery transaction as an important public policy 
statement, and the manifestation of a deterrent function that is in keeping with 
the criminal prohibitions that underlie the civil law on bribery. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the pursuit of claims by persons who have suffered 
damage as a result of corruption has engendered the response of courts not just 
to undo the damage caused by the acts of bribery but also to serve a larger 
function of deterrence that echoes criminal law. The principle that persons 
should not profit from their wrongful actions has pushed the boundaries of 
civil law response beyond mere restitution and compensation. This is reflected 
in remedies that seek to strip away the profits obtained by virtue of the crime 
and denying the underlying primary and secondary contracts of validity. 
The bribery claim in English civil law can be described as a quasi-public 
claim. The cases and approach of the courts show that the effect of bribery on 
the social, economic and cultural development of English society plays a 
prominent role in their decision making. Even though the parties are asserting 
private rights, the public law implications of their actions override the 
traditional viewpoint of the function of private law as serving an essentially 
compensatory function. The intrusion of public policy is reflected in the 
tendency of the courts to adopt rulings that seek to deter and punish in a 
manner that reflects classical criminal law theory. 
Beyond the traditional principal-agent claims, where the private claimant 
enjoys the benefit of the court’s strict approach to the breach of the fiduciary 
duties, the path for the private claimant is not so clear. Nonetheless elements 
such as: (1) the broadening of the base of plaintiffs who can institute a bribery 
claim by imputing the fiduciary relationship where the facts indicate such as a 
relationship; (2) the emphasis on deterring the practice of bribery; (3) the 
unenforceability of the primary agreement to give a bribe by the plaintiff; (4) 
the unenforceability of the secondary agreement at the prerogative of the 
aggrieved principal of contracts resulting from bribery; (5) the development of 
public interest litigation; (6) nascent shareholder litigation; as well as (7) the 
possibility of claims for tortious interference, provide a framework by which 
civil law can augment the foundations laid by the criminalization of bribery 
and corruption in the bid to rid society of what the English judges has 
described as the ‘evil’ that is bribery. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 PRIVATE REMEDIES IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The Netherlands is one of the ten least corrupt countries in the world. 
However, along with the rest of Europe it is caught up in an intense effort to 
review and strengthen its anti-corruption strategies.1 The Dutch authorities 
have been evaluated as being aware of the ‘potential dangers of corruption’ 
and are occupied with ‘continuous pro-active actions’ with regard to integrity. 
This active anti-corruption strategy, even in a country where corruption is 
arguably not the most pressing of problems, can be viewed as a testament to 
the interconnectedness of a globalized world. The negative effects and impact 
of corruption call for a coordinated response by all players in the world market, 
regardless of their position on the Transparency International Index.2  
                                                     
 
1  See Evaluation Report on the Netherlands, Reporting in the Second Evaluation Round, Greco 
Evaluation II Rep (2205) 2E, Council of Europe, GRECO-Group of States against Corruption, 
p. 14,  Para. 46, and at p. 21 Para. 73. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoEval2(2005)2_Netherlan
ds_EN.pdf. In a recent study for the Ministry of Justice Research and Documentation on Public 
Corruption in the Netherlands, the authors concluded that ‘research on criminal cases and 
convictions based on the corruption articles in the Penal Code support the image that the 
corruption problem in the Netherlands is rather limited’. See L. Huberts, J. Nelen, Corruption 
in Dutch Public Administration, Scope, Character and Findings (Corruptie in het Nederlandse 
openbaar bestuur omvang, aard en afdoening) , Boom Lemma, Utrecht, 2005, at p. 153. 
http://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/aard-en-omvang-corruptie-in-nederland.aspx#project-
informatie. However, this may be a question of perception and what is actually being 
evaluated. In the introductory chapter of his book, van Hulten makes a strong argument that 
corruption is as much a problem in the Netherlands as it is elsewhere. See M. van Hulten, 
Corruption, Unknown, Not Reduced and Present Everywhere (Corruptie onbekend, onbemind, 
alomtegenwoordig), Boom, Amsterdam, 2002.  The persistent allehation of fraud in the 
building sector may be an indication of this. See the Parliamentary Inquiry in Fraud in the 
Building Sector (Eindrapport Parlementaire Enquetecommissie Bouwnijverheid, Vergaderjaar 
2002-2003, Kamerstuk 28244 nr. 6)  which confirmed the problem of large scale fraud in this 
sector. 
2  On 1 December 2011, the Netherlands, with a score of 8.9, was listed as No. 7 (and No. 5 in 
the EU and Western Europe) after New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway in 
the Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 published by Transparency International. 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/  
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There has been considerable development in anti-corruption initiatives in 
Europe. As Corstens points out, the issue of corruption has been a topical issue 
in Europe for a significant time.3 In the Netherlands, significant changes have 
been made to Dutch law as a result of the ratification of several international 
anti-corruption instruments.4 It is safe to say that effective implementation of 
anti-corruption rules have entered the mainstream of policy concerning Dutch 
business transactions. However, most studies and research done on the reform 
of corruption law have focused mainly on criminal aspects as well as the 
resulting criminal consequences of breaches of the criminal law.5   
The prosecution of cases involving foreign bribery in the Netherlands is quite 
limited. In the Netherlands Phase 2 Follow up Report on the Implementation of 
the OECD Convention, for example, the Netherlands admitted that as of 
‘October 2008, no foreign bribery cases had been brought before the Dutch 
                                                     
 
3  G. Corstens, ‘European Initiatives against Corruption’ (Europese initiatieven tegen corruptie), 
in A. Hartmann, E. Pols, (Eds.), Corruption from Taboo to Social Change, (Corruptie: van 
taboe naar sociale verandering), Vol. 27 SI-EUR, Gouda Quint, Deventer, 2001, pp. 21-30. 
4  See ‘The Law on the Reform of Certain Public Servant Offenses’ in the Dutch Penal Code to 
adjust certain provisions in the Penal Code, Art. 51 Extradition Law, and Art. 67-67(a) 
Criminal Procedure Rules, in view of the ratification of certain Treaties relating to the fight 
against Fraud and Corruption (Corruption Law Reform), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden, Vol. 2000, 616 (Official Gazette, 28 December 2002, No. 616), which entered 
into effect 1 February 2001 (Wet van 13 december 2000 tot herziening van een aantal 
strafbepalingen betreffende ambtsmisdrijven in het Wetboek van Strafrecht alsmede 
aanpassing van enkele bepalingen van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, van artikel 51a van de 
Uitleveringswet en van de artikelen 67 en 67a van het Wetboek van Strafvordering in verband 
met de goedkeuring en uitvoering van enkele verdragen inzake de bestrijding van fraude en 
corruptie (herziening corruptie-wetgeving)). This effected changes in the Dutch criminal laws 
as a result of the ratification of the international anti-corruption instruments such as the 
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities financial Interests, 26 July 1995, 
and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, 1997. 
5  Examples of recent research include H. Addink, J. ten Berge, ‘The study on innovation of legal 
means for eliminating corruption in the public service’, Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 11.1, May 2007, http://www.ejcl.org; L. Huberts, (Ed.) Public Corruption and 
Fraud in the Netherlands (Bestuurlijke corruptie en fraude in Nederland), Gouda Quint, 
Arnhem, 1992; L. Huberts, H. Hulsebosch, K. Lasthuizen, C. Peeters, The Netherlands a Fraud 
and Corruption Country? The Scope, Background Findings of research on corruption and fraud 
in Dutch City Councils in 1992 and 2003 (Nederland fraude en corruptie land? De omvang, 
achtergronden en afwikkeling van corruptie- en fraude onderzoeken in Nederlandse gemeenten 
in 1991 en 2003), Working paper, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2004; H. Nelen, A. 
Nieuwendijk, Not ABC: An Analysis of National Police Internal Investigations Department 
Research into Public Servant and Government Corruption (Geen ABC: Analyse van 
rijksrechercheonderzoeken naar ambtelijke en bestuurlijke corruptie), Boom Juridische 
Uitgevers, The Hague, 2003; H. de Doelder, G. Smid, ‘The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption: Useful for the Netherlands?’, (‘Het Verdrag van de Verenigde Naties tegen 
corruptie: waardevol voor Nederland?’), Delikt en Delinkwent Vol. 36, No. 8, 2006, pp. 833-
854; L. Hubert, J. Nelen, Corruption in Dutch Public Administration, Scope, Character and 
Findings (Corruptie in het Nederlandse openbaar bestuur omvang, aard en afdoening) Boom 
Lemma, Utrecht, 2005.  
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courts.’6 However, out-of-court settlements with respect to seven companies 
accused of paying kickbacks in the context of the Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq 
were achieved (although the offense charged was the violation of legislation 
relating sanctions on Iraq and not the foreign bribery offense).7 More recently, 
in October 2010 Royal Dutch Shell is reported to have paid out $10m (£6.3m) 
in fines to the Nigerian government, following allegations of bribes paid on its 
behalf by freight forwarding company Panalpina to Nigerian government 
officials. The fines were part of the settlement of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) charges following an investigation launched in early 2007 that 
involved up to a dozen energy companies that were customers of Panalpina.8 
Apart from these developments in criminal processes the ambit of anti-
corruption strategy has been further broadened by the entry into force, in the 
Netherlands, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)9 
                                                     
 
6  The Netherlands. Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, p. 
1, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/43/2020264.pdf; see also The Netherlands: 
Follow-up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations, p. 3 Para. 2. 
http://www.oecd.org/topicdocumentlist/0,3448,en_33873108_33873626_1_1_1_1_37447,00.h
tml 
7  The Dutch Prosecution Department reports ‘that it has concluded financial transactions (out of 
court settlements) with 7 companies for violating sanction legislation by paying kickbacks 
when implementing the Oil for Food Programme.’ Criminal gains have also been confiscated. 
In July 2008 a press release was issued about these settlements. Together with names of the 
companies (Alfasan International B.V., N.V. Organon, Flowserve B.V., OPW Fluid Transfer 
Group Europe B.V., Prodetra B.V., Solvochem Holland B.V., Stet Holland B.V.), the 
settlements have been made public. For the following Oil-for-Food transactions out-of-court 
settlements have been reached: 1. Alfasan International B.V., Woerden, fine: € 31,800 and 
confiscation: € 10,183.55; 2. N.V. Organon, Oss, fine: € 381,602; 3. Flowerserve B.V.,  Etten-
Leur, fine: € 76,274 and confiscation: €180,260; 4. OPW Fluid Transfer Group Europe B.V., 
Nieuw Vennep, fine: € 57,204 and confiscation: € 24,600; 5. Prodetra B.V., Wadinxveen, fine: 
64,751 and confiscation: € 34,485.95; 6. Solvochem Holland B.V., Rotterdam, fine: € 136,000 
and confiscation: € 144,592; 7. Stet Holland B.V., Emmeloord, fine: € 119,712 and 
confiscation: € 54,458. See The Netherlands Follow-up Report, id., Note 6 above, at p. 14. 
8   The Securities and Exchange Commission reported that from September 2002 through 
November 2005, Shell International Exploration and Production Inc., on behalf of Shell, 
authorized the reimbursement or continued use of services provided by a company acting as a 
customs broker that involved suspicious payments of approximately $3.5 million to officials of 
the Nigerian Customs Service in order to obtain preferential treatment during the customs 
process for the purpose of assisting Shell in obtaining or retaining business in Nigeria on 
Shell’s Bonga Project. As a result of these payments, Shell profited in the amount of 
approximately $14 million. None of the improper payments were accurately reflected in 
Shell’s books and records, nor was Shell’s system of internal accounting controls adequate at 
the time to detect and prevent these suspicious payments. See 4 November 2010 Royal Dutch 
Shell Plc. and Shell International Exploration and Production Inc. Other Release Number(s): 
AAER-3204  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-63243.pdf. 
9  United Nations Convention against Corruption (Verdrag van de Verenigde Naties tegen 
Corruptie) 31 October 2003, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Vol. 44, 
2003, No. 3, Vol. 2006, No. 266, entered into force 30 November 2006. See for general 
overview H. de Doelder, G. Smid, ‘The United Nations Convention against Corruption: Useful 
for the Netherlands?’ (‘Het Verdrag van de Verenigde Naties tegen corruptie: waardevol voor 
Nederland?’), id., at Note 5 above. 
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and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (CLC).10 These conventions, 
which call for effective remedies for persons who have suffered damage as a 
consequence of corruption, motivate the development of strategies centered on 
private remedies in the implementation of Dutch anti-corruption laws. In this 
respect, Tak points out that there has not been much published about the 
private law effects of bribery in Dutch literature.11 He identifies the 
dissertation on Steekpenningen (Bribery) written in 1925 by Salomonson;12 the 
article on Enige civielrechtelijke gevolgen van omkoping (Certain Civil Law 
Consequences of Corruption)13 written in 1982 by de Savornin Lohman; as 
well as the 1994 publication by Dorresteijn, Corruptie en Privaatrecht 
(Corruption and Private Law)14 as the primary academic literature in this 
regard. More recently, Eltjo Schrage made private remedies for corruption the 
subject of his valedictory lecture at the University of Amsterdam.15 These 
writings lay the foundation for a central question that is now made more urgent 
by the obligations of the Netherlands under its domestication of the UNCAC 
and CLC, i.e.: what potential exists under Dutch private law for private 
remedies for persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption?    
The notion of non-criminal redress for corruption is one that is receiving 
increased interest. In 2001 Hartmann identified three primary avenues for non-
criminal law redress under the Dutch system.16 The first involves using 
administrative penalties such as fines or the withdrawal of permits and 
subsidies where acts of corruption have been committed by persons. A second 
aspect is the rules relating to the laws relating to professional misconduct. A 
                                                     
 
10  Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Burgerrechtelijk verdrag inzake Corruptie), 
Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Vol. 2008, No. 27, entered into force 1 
April 2008. 
11  See P. Tak, Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of National and Supranational Legal 
Structures, in G. Heine, B. Huber, T. Rose (Eds.), Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison 
of National and Supranational Legal Structures, Paris, ICC, 2003, pp. 275-317, p. 303. 
12  L. Salomonson, Bribery (Steekpenningen), Dissertation, Vilders, Leiden 1925, p. 24. 
13  O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Enige 
civielrechtelijke gevolgen van omkoping), in Lugdunum Batavorum Juri Sacrum: 1882-30 
januari-1982: rechtsgeleerde opstellen vervaardigd door leden van het Leids Juridisch 
Dispuut ‘Juri Sacrum’ ter gelegenheid van het honderdjarig bestaan van het Dispuut, Kluwer, 
Deventer, 1982, pp. 127-158. 
14  A. Dorresteijn, Corruption and Private Law (Corruptie en privaatrecht), Gouda Quint, 
Arnhem, 1994. 
15  E. Schrage, Private Law Redress for Bribery (Privaatrechtelijke aanpak steekpenningen) (, 
Valedictory Lecture, University of Amsterdam, 21 October 2010. 
16  A. Hartmann, The New Anti-Corruption Rules in the Dutch Penal Code (De nieuwe anti-
corruptiebepalingen in het Nederlandse wetboek van strafrecht), in A. Hartmann, E. Pols 
(Eds.), Corruption: from Taboo to Social Change (Corruptie: van taboe naar sociale 
verandering), Vol. 27, SI-EUR, Gouda Quint, Deventer, 2001, pp. 31-49. 
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third avenue is the private civil actions17 resulting from a breach of the 
obligations between persons as a result of an act of corruption.  
On the issue of administrative recourse, Hartmann points out that although 
corruption is generally not considered suitable for administrative sanctions 
(because it falls into a category of actions that are normally punished by the 
criminal process and therefore excluded from administrative sanctions). 
Administrative sanction is nonetheless possible, in his opinion, where 
conditions and requirements are clearly set out. He points, for example, to the 
Wet bevordering integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur (Wet 
Bibob) (Promotion of Integrity Reviews by the Public Administration Act). 
This law enables administrative bodies such as city councils and ministries to 
check the integrity of corporations or applicants for permits or subsidies. Such 
a permit or subsidy can be denied where an applicant fails to meet the 
necessary conditions.18 Involvement in acts of corruption would clearly fall 
within such a lack of integrity. He also points to the possibility of suspending 
permits or subsidies as activities within the powers of administrative bodies 
that can be used in the fight against corruption by making such permits or 
subsidies subject to the fulfillment of required conditions.19   
Hartmann, however, raises an important question that relates closely to the 
question of private remedies by victims of corruption. He notes that while the 
unlawful nature of corrupt transactions can lead to private legal consequences 
in the form of damages or the payment of fines, the question remains whether 
such administrative procedures and civil sanctions are a suitable approach to 
adopt in the fight against corruption. The ultimate result of a private action, 
similar to an administrative action, is monetary compensation. Hartmann 
points out that the symbolic value of punishment via the criminal process 
brings with it a certain moral weight that is appropriate in the punishment of 
corruption, and that the criminal process helps to underscore the societal 
rejection of corruption. This, in his opinion, is an important function of using 
the criminal process to fight corruption.20  
Hartmann’s comments about the various non-criminal modes of redress present 
a broader picture of the possibilities of non-criminal redress for corruption that 
exist under Dutch law. However, this chapter is concerned primarily with 
private remedies for corruption that center upon the private obligations and 
agreements that are affected by corrupt exchange as well as the right to 
                                                     
 
17  Id., at pp. 45-47. 
18  Id., at p. 46.  
19  Id., at p. 47. 
20  Id., at pp. 47-48. 
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institute legal proceedings by persons who have suffered injury as a result of 
corruption. 
6.2 The Normative Framework 
The normative framework that governs private remedies for corruption from 
the perspective of Dutch Law is derived from three principal sources: firstly, 
international instruments that have been incorporated into Dutch Law; 
secondly, the Dutch Penal Code (DPC), which criminalizes public and private 
corruption thereby laying the foundations for private remedies for such 
‘wrongful’ acts; and thirdly, the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), whose rules 
determine the specific avenues of redress available where corruption occurs in 
private relationships.  
6.2.1 International Instruments 
The Netherlands is a party to major regional and international conventions 
regulating international corruption. These include the Convention on the 
Protection of the European Communities Financial Interests of 26 July 1995 
drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3 Treaty on European Union;21 the EU 
Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of the EU Member States;22 The OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions;23 the EU Council Framework Decision against Corruption in the 
Private Sector;24 the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of 
Europe;25 the Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe;26 
                                                     
 
21  Convention on the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communities, OJ C 
316, 27 November 1995.  
22  Council Act of 26 May 1997; drawing up the Convention made on the basis of Art. K.3(2)(c) 
Treaty on European Union, on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, OJ C 195, 25 June 1997, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33027_e
n.htm. 
23  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Paris, 27 November 1997, in force 15 February 1999, 1998, 37 ILM, p. 1. The 
Netherlands has ratified the Convention and enacted implementing legislation. For details of 
implementation status see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.htm. 
(Hereinafter referred to as the OECD Convention). 
24  Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33308_e
n.htm. 
25  Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Verdrag inzake de strafrechtelijke bestrijding van 
corruptie); Strasbourg, 27 January 1999, Trb. 78, 1999, No. 3, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm, entered into force in the 
Netherlands on 1 August 2002.  
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the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;27 and 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption.28 
Under the Dutch Constitution, international conventions have primacy over 
domestic law to the extent that they are obligatory, self-executing and duly 
published. Primacy implies that they prevail over any national law that 
contradicts the international rules.29 Of these aforementioned international 
instruments, two deserve further consideration because they have not only 
entered into force in the Netherlands but have specific provisions regarding the 
provision of private remedies for corruption. These are the Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption and the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption.  
6.2.1.1 Explanatory Reports on the CLC and UNCC   
The Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (CLC) entered 
into force in the Netherlands in April 2008. The United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCC) entered into force in the Netherlands in November 
2006. 
The implications of the CLC for Dutch law were commented upon by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in his Toelichtende Nota (Explanatory Report) to 
Parliament while the bill was being considered.30 The government noted that 
                                                                                                                            
 
26  Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Burgerrechtelijk verdrag inzake corruptie) 
Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Vol. 2008, No. 27, entered into force in the 
Netherlands on 1 April 2008. 
27  United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (Verdrag van de Verenigde Naties 
tegen grensoverschrijdende georganiseerde misdaad), New York, 15 November 2000, Trb. 46, 
2000, No. 4 entered into force 25 June 2004. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/PDF/Dutch/174-Dutch.pdf. 
28  United Nations Convention against Corruption (Verdrag van de Verenigde Naties tegen 
corruptie), Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Vol. 44, 2003, No. 3, Vol. 
2006, No. 266, entered into force 30 November 2006. 
29  See Art. 93 Dutch Constitution (Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Versie 2008), 
which provides that ‘provision of treaties and resolutions by international institutions, which 
may be binding on all persons by virtue of their content, shall become binding after they have 
been published.’ Art. 94 Dutch Constitution provides that ‘Statutory regulations in force within 
the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties 
that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.’   
30  Briefing of the Minister of Justice, J.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
M.J.M. Verhagen, on the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, to the Speakers of the Upper 
and Lower Chambers of the States-General Dutch Parliament (Brief van de Minister van 
Buitenlandse Zaken  aan de Voorzitters van de Eerste en van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal: Burgerrechtelijk Verdrag inzake Corruptie, Strasbourg, 4 November 1999, No. 1), 
The Hague, 21 September 2007, 31 230 (R 1833), 2007-2008 Session, Explanatory Report 
(Toelichtende Nota) (Hereinafter referred to as the Explanatory Report to the Dutch Parliament 
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the convention did not require that there have to be legal remedies within the 
domestic law that are specifically directed at corruption.31 Rather, the 
motivation of the Convention, in the understanding of the Dutch government, 
was to ensure that contracting parties implemented its principles and rules to 
make it possible for legal and natural persons who have suffered harm as a 
result of corruption to have access to effective remedies including damages.32 
In this view, the private claim for damages by the person who has suffered 
harm as a result of corruption was not to be viewed as a new right awarded to 
such victims but rather as a remedy that flows from the operation of the Dutch 
Civil Code.  
Requirements of the CLC that affect the private right to private remedies, such 
as the definition of corruption,33 the right to compensation for damage34 and 
conditions for liability,35 were in the opinion of the Dutch government fully 
satisfied by provisions of Dutch law. For example, the elements of the 
definition of corruption under Art. 2, the CLC comes within the definition 
under the Dutch Penal Code (DPC).36 The government noted that the 
requirement under Art. 3, of the CLC for material damage, loss of profits and 
non-pecuniary loss are also satisfied by provisions under Dutch law.37 
However, the requirement for ‘full compensation’ for damage was interpreted 
by the Minister as allowing the judge in each instance to determine in each 
individual case whether the criteria for damages have been fulfilled and the 
                                                                                                                            
 
on the Civil Law Convention), 
www.eerstekamer.nl/brief/20070921/burgerrechtelijk_verdrag_inzake.  
31  Explanatory Report to the Dutch Parliament on the Civil Law Convention, id., at p. 4. 
32  Id.  
33   Art. 2 Civil law Convention provides that:  
‘… corruption means requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, 
a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper 
performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue 
advantage or the prospect thereof.’ 
34  Art. 3 CLC provides that:  
‘1. Each Party shall provide in its internal law for persons who have suffered damage 
as a result of corruption to have the right to initiate an action in order to obtain full 
compensation for such damage. 2. Such compensation may cover material damage, 
loss of profits and non-pecuniary loss.’ 
35  Art. 4 of the CLC provides that  
‘1. Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the following conditions to be 
fulfilled in order for the damage to be compensated: (i) the defendant has committed 
or authorised the act of corruption, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the act 
of corruption; (ii) the plaintiff has suffered damage; and (iii) there is a causal link 
between the act of corruption and the damage. 2. Each Party shall provide in its 
internal law that, if several defendants are liable for damage for the same corrupt 
activity, they shall be jointly and severally liable.’ 
36   Explanatory Report CLC referring to Arts. 177-178a, 328ter, 362-364a Dutch Penal Code, id., 
Note 30 above.  
37  Id., referring to Art. 6:95-110 and Art. 6:162 DCC. 
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extent of the compensation that should be paid to the plaintiff.38 The 
requirement for a causal link between the act of corruption and the damage 
suffered by the plaintiff as well as joint and several liability under Art. 4 CLC 
was also considered to be satisfied by the provisions of Dutch law.39  
Similarly, in the Explanatory Report by the Minster of Foreign Affairs to 
parliament in respect of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
40the government noted, in a similar vein, that the ratification of the 
Convention would not require any amendments to Dutch law.41 The UNCAC 
requires that participant states establish the liability of legal persons for the 
offenses of corruption established under the Convention including civil 
liability.42 In the Explanatory Report on the UNCC, the Minister identified two 
categories of remedial actions that can be taken under Dutch law pursuant to 
Arts. 34 and 35 of the United Nations Convention. The first category goes to 
the validity of contracts. Parties whose free consent to a transaction is 
influenced by error or fraud attributable to an act of corruption and who would 
not have entered into the contract but for the act of corruption, are given the 
right to sue for remedies by seeking the nullity of the contract. The validity of 
such contracts could also be questioned for being contrary to good morals and 
public policy.  
The second category identified in the report concerns the actions to 
recompense the person who has suffered damage. The UNCAC requires that 
members of the convention must ensure that their domestic laws provide for 
the right to compensation for damages resulting from acts of corruption. The 
Explanatory Report points out that under Art 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code an 
action may lie in tort for the ‘violation of a right, an act or omission violating a 
statutory duty or a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct.’43 
Such a tortious act renders the perpetrator liable to a claim for damages for 
pecuniary loss and loss of profit,44 or disgorgement of profits (winstafdracht)45 
in favor of the person who has suffered damage. Furthermore, damages can be 
claimed where the agreement is rescinded (ongedaanmaking). Where the 
bribery occurs through an employee of the briber, the behavior of the employee 
                                                     
 
38  Id., referring to Art. 6:109 DCC. 
39  Id., referring to Arts. 6:98, 6:162 and 6:102 DCC. 
40  Briefing of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, B.R. Bot, and the Minister of Justice, J.P.H. 
Donner, to the Dutch Parliament (Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de 
Voorzitters van de Eerste en van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal), 2005-2006 Session, 
No. 30 808 (R1815), Explanatory Report (Toelichtende Nota), 30 808. (Hereinafter referred to 
as the Explanatory Report to the Dutch Parliament on the UN Convention). 
41  Id., at p. 3.  
42  See Art. 26 UNCC. 
43  Explanatory Report to Dutch Parliament on the UN Convention, id., Note 40 above, at p. 21.  
44  Id., referring to Art. 6:96 DCC. 
45  Id., referring to Art. 6:104 DCC. 
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may be attributed to the employer. This responsibility of the employer is based 
on the fact that an employer is vicariously responsible for the acts of his 
employees.46   
For these reasons, the Dutch government considers that Dutch law is fully 
compliant with the provisions of the CLC and the UNCAC. The following 
sections examine these provisions in more detail to determine the extent to 
which the right to private remedies is indeed met under Dutch law. 
6.2.2 National Law 
Dutch domestic law provides the legal foundation for claims by persons who 
have suffered damage as a result of corruption. Firstly, the Dutch Penal Code 
(DPC)47 criminalizes acts of corruption, and secondly, the Dutch Civil Code 
(DCC) sets the framework for the types of claims that can be brought by 
victims of corrupt acts. The following sections examine the provisions relating 
to corruption under the DPC and DCC respectively. 
6.2.2.1 The Dutch Penal Code 
Sikkema points out that the word ‘corruption’ does not have a legal meaning 
and is not found in the Dutch Penal Code (DPC). Rather the expression used in 
the Code is the ‘bribery’ of public officials.48 An important foundation for civil 
actions for bribery stems from the fact that bribery is considered an illegal act 
and is criminalized under the DPC. In his 1925 dissertation, Salomonson 
remarked that without the criminalization of bribery in all countries there can 
be no effective fight against the problem of corruption.49 There would be no 
basis for recourse by the victim. Provisions of the DPC that criminalize bribery 
are found in: Book 2 Title 8, Misdrijven tegen het openbaar gezag (Offenses 
against Public Order), Arts. 177, 177(a), 178 and 178(a) dealing with the active 
bribery of public servants and judges; Book 2 Title 28 Ambtsmisdrijven 
(Offenses of Public Servants), Arts. 362-364 dealing with passive bribery; and 
in Book 2 Title 25 Bedrog (Deceit), Arts. 328ter dealing with private bribery. 
                                                     
 
46  Id., at p. 22, referring to Art. 6:170 Para. 1 DCC as well as Art. 6:172 DCC for the liability of a 
party for the acts of a person acting as his representative (vertegenwoordiger). 
47   The Dutch Penal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), Adopted 3 March 1881, updated by 
amendments up to 1994 (Hereinafter referred to as the DPC). 
48  E. Sikkema, ‘Public corruption in the Criminal Law’ (Ambtelijke corruptie in de 
strafwetgeving), Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 31, No. 7, 2005, at p. 26. See also E. Sikkema 
Ambtelijke corruptie in het strafrecht: een studie over omkoping en andere ambtsdelichten, 
Boom, The Hague, 2005. 
49  L. Salomonson, Bribery (Steekpenningen), id., Note 12 above, at p. 14. 
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6.2.2.2 Active Bribery as an Offense by Public Officials 
The DPC categorizes the active bribery of public servants as an indictable 
serious offense in Arts. 177 to 178a of the DPC. It is placed in the second book 
of the Penal Code, which deals with serious offenses such as those against the 
safety of the state, offenses against the dignity of the Queen, offenses against 
heads of friendly states or other internationally protected persons, offenses 
against the carrying out of state duties and responsibilities, against public 
order, the general safety of goods and persons, offenses against the state and 
offenses against immorality. A cursory reading of these serious offenses shows 
that they all go to the foundation of the existence and well-being of the 
authority of the State and the rule of law.  
Giving a bribe to public servants is an offense that undermines the operation of 
public authorities and institutions. According to Art. 177(1) of the DPC, a 
public servant who does something contrary to his or her duty is guilty of 
performing an ‘unlawful act or omission.’50 It states that whoever:  
‘“gives”’ a gift, makes a promise or offers a service to a public official with 
the intention of influencing such a public official to do or omit from doing 
something contrary to his or her public duty will be liable to incur a prison 
sentence of no more than four years or a fine.’51  
This prohibition and sanction also applies to influencing former public 
officials52 or persons to be appointed as public officials.  
Art. 177(a) applies in situations where a civil servant is influenced in a way 
that is not contrary to his or her duty. This article was added as a result of the 
Corruption Law reform of 2001 to establish that the bribery of a public servant 
in order to obtain an act or omission of such a public servant which is not in 
breach of official duty is nonetheless an offense. For this offense the offeror of 
the gift or other inducement is subject to a lesser prison sentence of no more 
than two years or a fine in the fourth category.53 Special provision is made for 
judges in Art. 178(1). Where a person is guilty of active bribery to influence 
the judgment of a judge, such a person is subject to a higher prison sentence of 
six years or a fine in the fourth category.54 Where such a gift or promise is 
                                                     
 
50  See title Heading Art. 177 Dutch Penal Code. See generally C. Cleiren, J. Nijboer (Eds.) Text 
and Commentary on the Dutch Penal Code (Strafrecht Tekst & Commentaar: de tekst van het 
Wetboek van Strafrecht en enkele aanverwante wetten voorzien van commentaar) , 5th edn, 
Kluwer, Deventer, 2004.  
51  See Art. 177(1) Para. 1 DPC.  
52  See Art. 177(1) Para. 2 DPC.    
53  See Art. 177a DPC.    
54  See Art. 178(1) DPC.    
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made with the intention of obtaining a conviction in a criminal case, the offeror 
can be punished with a prison sentence of not more than nine years or a fine in 
the fifth category.55 
Any exchange that is of value to the recipient constitutes a gift within the 
meaning of Art. 177.56 The Dutch Supreme Court has held that this would 
include not just a promise of money,57 but also non-monetary promises such as 
a sexual favor.58 Where an act contrary to the public duty of an official 
coincides with a period of receipt of gifts, there does not have to be a one-on-
one link between a specific gift and a specific act contrary to the public duty of 
an official for Art. 177 to be applicable.59 
The scope of application of these provisions was extended after the Netherlands 
ratified the OECD Bribery Convention on 12 January 2001. Art. 178(a) extends 
the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts to corruption that has occurred in other 
countries. This allows the Dutch courts to have jurisdiction over (1) any Dutch 
public servant engaged in foreign bribery outside the Netherlands,60 (2) the 
employee of any Dutch domiciled international organization;61 (3) foreign 
bribery involving a Dutch public servant,62 as well as (4) any act of bribery of a 
Dutch or foreign public official committed by a Dutch national abroad.63 As a 
result of the OECD induced reforms, the DPC also applies to present, former, 
and ‘to be appointed’ public servants of foreign states or international 
institutions.64   
6.2.2.3 Passive Bribery as an Offense by Public Servants 
Arts. 362-363 of Book 2 Title XXV the DPC provides that prison sentences or 
fines will be imposed on an official who accepts65 or asks for66 gifts, promises 
or services, knowing or reasonably suspecting that it is given to influence his 
or her behavior. Where this is done in respect of acts done or omitted to be 
done that are not contrary to the duty of a present, future or ‘to be appointed’ 
public official, a prison sentence of not more than two years or a fine in the 
                                                     
 
55  See Art. 178(2) DPC.    
56  HR 25 April 1916, NJ 1916, p. 551. 
57   HR 29 November 1915, NJ 1916, p. 300. 
58   HR 31 May 1994, NJ 1994, p. 673. 
59  HR 20 June 2006, NJ 2006, p. 380. 
60  See Art. 6(1) DPC.  
61  See Art. 6(2) DPC.  
62  See Art. 4(10) DPC.  
63  See Art. 5(1) DPC. See generally The Netherlands: Follow-up Report on the Implementation 
of the Phase 2 Recommendations, at p. 26. 
64  See Art. 178a DPC.  
65  See Art. 362(1) Para. 1-2 DPC. 
66  See Art .362(1) Para. 3-4 DPC.  
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fifth degree will be imposed.67 A higher prison sentence or fine is imposed in 
instances where the acceptance or the asking for the gift, promise or service is 
with regard to an act that is contrary to the duty of the public official. This is 
punishable with a prison sentence of no more than four years or a fine in the 
fifth category.68 As Peçi and Sikkema point out in their comparative study on 
passive bribery under Dutch law, a ‘distinction is made between bribery 
inducing an unlawful act or an omission in return on the one hand, and bribery 
inducing a legitimate act or an omission in return on the other. This distinction 
is relevant for the severity of the maximum punishment that can be imposed.’69 
Again special provision is made in the case of the asking for, or acceptance of 
a gift, promise or service by a judge where the highest penalty of up to nine 
years or a fine of the fifth category may be imposed.70  
6.2.2.4 Private Bribery as an Offense 
From the outset, public bribery has been a criminal offense. However, private 
bribery only became a criminal offense in 1967 after the addition of Art. 328ter 
to the Penal Code.  
Art. 328ter (1) criminalizes the passive bribery of persons other than public 
officials (private sector agents or employees) as follows:  
‘A person who, in a capacity other than that of a public official, either in the 
service of his/her employer or acting as an agent, requests or accepts a gift or 
service, or promise thereof in relation to something s/he has done or has 
refrained from doing or will do or will refrain from doing in the service of 
his/her employer or in the exercise of his/her mandate, and who, in violation 
of the requirements of good faith, conceals the acceptance or request in 
question from his/her employer or principal, will be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not more than two years or a fine of the fifth category.’ 
                                                     
 
67  See Art. 362(1) and (2) DPC. 
68   Id., Art. 363. See also J. Roording, ‘Corruption in Dutch Criminal Law’ (‘Corruptie in het 
Nederlandse strafrecht’), Delikt en Delinkwent, 2002, p. 120. 
69  These authors, however, argue that the distinction between legitimate acts (Art. 362 DCC) and 
unlawful acts (Art. 363 DCC) should be abolished. They argue that:  
‘case law concerning the term “contrary to his duty” seems to be unclear. As a result 
of the very broad view that the courts take with respect to the scope of the provision 
of Art. 363 DCC, the provision of Art. 362 DCC seems to have become more or less 
superfluous. Finally, an important advantage of joining the two articles referred to is 
that the legislation concerning bribery could be greatly simplified.’  
See I. Peçi, E. Sikkema, ‘Corruption and legal certainty; the case of Albania and the 
Netherlands implementation of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in a transitional 
and consolidated democracy’, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1, January 2010, p. 101, at p. 
113, available at http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/.  
70  See Art. 364 DPC. 
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Art. 328ter (2) criminalizes the active bribery of persons other than public 
officials (private sector agents or employees) as follows: 
‘The same sentence will be imposed on a person who gives a gift, makes a 
promise thereof, or offers, or provides a service to another person who, in a 
capacity other than that of a public official, is employed or acts as an agent, in 
relation to something that person has done or has refrained from doing or will 
do or will refrain from doing in his/her employment or in the exercise of 
his/her mandate, the gift or promise being of such nature or made under such 
circumstances that s/he might reasonably assume that the latter, in violation of 
the requirements of good faith, will conceal the acceptance of the gift or 
promise from his/her employer or principal.’ 
The motivations for the introduction of this article can be deduced from the 
Report of the Committee on Private Bribery.71 Central to the Committee’s 
recommendations were its findings that:  
(a) public morals and public order were at stake; 
(b) that the increase in the number of positions of trust because of 
increased specialization and delegation in the business world brought 
with it an increase in the number of instances in which corruption can 
flourish; 
(c) as more private enterprises are occupied with matters of public interest 
private corruption can extend to these areas; and  
(d) that the existing rules in the opinion of the committee did not provide 
sufficient protection to maintain the integrity of the employment 
relationship.72  
 
The Committee was of the opinion that the criminalization of private 
corruption would clarify the legal position and provide an impulse for the 
improvement of business regulations against corruption. Furthermore, the 
Committee felt that in view of the ongoing integration of Europe, it would be 
good for the Netherlands not remain behind in this international movement 
toward the criminalization of private bribery.73 
There was resistance to the idea of criminalizing private bribery; some argue 
that Art. 328ter has remained a dead letter.74 Nonetheless, Art. 328ter performs 
                                                     
 
71  Report of the Committee on ‘Private Bribery’ (Rapport van de Commissie ‘Niet-Ambtelijk 
Corruptie), Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Papers, Session 1965-1966, No. 8473, 
pp. 5-16, also referred to as the Commissie-Mulder. Bijlage bij de Memoire van Toelichting, 
Zitting 1965-1966, No. 8437, Subnote. 4, pp. 5-16. (Hereinafter referred to as the Report of the 
Committee on Private Bribery). 
72  Report of the Committee on Private Bribery, id., at pp. 11-12. 
73  Id., at p. 12. 
74  See G. Corstens, ‘Why some categories of criminal laws remain a dead letter’ (‘Waarom 
blijven sommige categorieën van strafbepalingen een dode letter’), NJB, 24 October 1981, Vol. 
37, Kluwer, Deventer, pp. 973-978; H.G. Bunt, ‘Measures against corruption in the private 
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an important characterizing function by stilling the debate as to whether or not 
commercial bribery is a permissible act. Simply put, it establishes that bribery 
whether carried out by in public or in private is a criminal activity that is 
punishable by law. Furthermore, whether such activity is carried out 
domestically or abroad by Dutch nationals, it is a punishable criminal activity. 
There is no exemption made in the language of facilitating payments under 
these Dutch provisions.   
In summary, the DPC criminalizes the practices of active75 and passive 
bribery76 of public officials as well as judicial officers in the public sector.77 In 
the private sector, the DPC criminalizes active78 as well as passive79 bribery of 
non-public officials such as agents acting in violation of the duty of good faith 
owed to a principal. These provisions lay a foundation that stigmatizes bribery 
in public and private transactions making it an illegal act. This creates the 
platform upon which the notion that parties ought not to be allowed to profit 
from the illegal activity of bribery or rely on contracts resulting from such 
illegal acts, can be founded. In addition, it also creates the basis for private 
remedies for damage has been suffered by a victim as a result of an act of 
corruption. 
6.2.3 Dutch Civil Law 
Salomonson writing in 1925 concluded that Dutch civil law does not give 
enough redress in the fight against bribery.80 Dorresteijn, discussing the 
interaction between corruption and the private law, stated ‘that the picture has 
arisen that the bribe-giver always wins.’81 Has this state of affairs changed 
today? This question is all the more relevant in view of the provisions of the 
Civil Law Convention (CLC), which requires that Dutch law shall provide ‘for 
persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption to have the right to 
initiate an action in order to obtain full compensation for such damage.’82   
This right of compensation extends not just to actions against private parties83 
but also to actions against public officials.84 This compensation should ensure 
                                                                                                                            
 
sector’ (‘Maatregelen tegen Corruptie in het Bedrijfsleven’), Justitiële Verkenningen, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, 1993, pp. 35-50. 
75   Arts. 177 and 177a DPC. 
76  Arts. 362, 363, 364 DPC. 
77  Art. 178 DPC. 
78  Art. 328(2)ter DPC. 
79  Art. 328(1)ter DPC. 
80  L. Salomonson, Bribery,  id., Note 12 above at p. 65. 
81  A. Dorresteijn, Corruption and Private Law, id., Note 14 above, at p. 16. 
82   See Art. 3 CLC. 
83  Art. 3 CLC. 
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that any ‘material damage’85 suffered by the person who has been betrayed by 
an act of bribe-taking by a person in a position of trust, or who has suffered 
‘lost profits’ or other ‘non-pecuniary’86 loss, is compensated by the courts. The 
courts also have a duty to the larger society. The freedom of parties to conduct 
contracts and enter in to contracts is limited by any association to 
circumstances that pose a danger to society in most legal systems.87 
The preamble of the CLC emphasizes the ‘importance for civil law to 
contribute to the fight against corruption, in particular by enabling persons who 
have suffered damage to receive fair compensation.’88 With the coming into 
force of the CLC in the Netherlands, the rights of persons who have suffered as 
a result of corruption could receive a new impetus. These rights are established 
by the DCC.89  
6.2.3.1 Distinguishing Element of Bribery 
The criminalization of corruption by the DPC establishes a baseline of 
illegality from which not only criminal but also private law consequences flow. 
While the Committee on Private Bribery, which criminalized private bribery in 
the Netherlands, did not delve into the civil law consequences of bribery, it 
pointed out that the criminalization of private bribery labeled it as a tort and 
that this fact increases the possibilities and range of civil law responses and 
private actions by parties that have suffered damage.90 The focus of civil law is 
on defining the link between the illegal act of corruption and its consequences.  
                                                                                                                            
 
84   Art. 5 CLC states that:  
‘Each Party shall provide in its internal law for appropriate procedures for persons 
who have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption by its public officials in 
the exercise of their functions to claim for compensation from the State or, in the case 
of a non-state Party, from that Party’s appropriate authorities.’ 
85  See Art. 4 Civil Law Convention. 
86  Id. 
87  See generally on the issue of the validity of contracts, J. Hijma, Void and Voidable Legal 
Transactions (Nietigheid and vernietbaarheid van rechthandelingen),, Kluwer, Leiden, 1988. 
88  Preamble Civil Law Convention on Corruption.  
89  A completely reformed Civil Code entered into force in 1992 replacing the Civil Code dating 
from 1838. The former Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) became effective in the year 
1838. It was essentially a translation of the French Civil Code with some adaptations. The 
Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) comprises nine Books. Of these nine, Books 3, 6 and 7 
are of particular relevance to the issue of contracts tainted by bribery. Books 3 deals with the 
general principles and the law of patrimony, Book 6 deals with the law of obligations and 
general related principles, while Books 7 and 7A deal with special contracts that are subject to 
particular statutory rules, such as agency contracts. The English Translation used in this book 
is that by H. Warendorf, R. Thomas, I. Curry-Sumner, The Civil Code of the Netherlands, 
Kluwer, Deventer, 2009. 
90  See Report Committee on Private Bribery, id., Note 72 above, at p. 11, see Note 2. 
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The Explanatory Report to the Civil Law Convention explains that the 
definition of corruption contained in Art. 2 of the CLC is aimed at clarifying 
the meaning of corruption and to provide the legal framework within which the 
obligations, arising from the Convention, operate.91 The distinguishing element 
of bribery is found in the obligations between parties. The Dutch Minister in 
his Explanatory Report to the Convention points out that corruption can only 
be said to have occurred where the corrupt behavior has had an effect on the 
manner in which the transaction at hand has been carried out.92 Parties 
examining the private law consequences of corruption are essentially looking 
at the effect of bribery on obligations assumed between the parties to the legal 
transaction affected by corruption. 
Corruption is defined in Art. 2 of the CLC as the:  
‘requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any 
other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper 
performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of the bribe.’93  
Since not all gifts or other actions are automatically bribes, what factor 
distinguishes a bribe from innocuous activity? This is a difficult line to draw 
and may well depend on a particular society’s ‘norms and values.’94 
Nonetheless, as Salomonson points out, the giving of money − unless of a 
completely insignificant amount − is seen as associated so closely with the 
concept of buying that it assumes some counter-performance or 
consideration.95 The bribe may, of course, also consist of a gift other than 
money such as goods or services96 and this is reflected in the terms of undue 
advantage or influence in the above definition. However, the key point here is 
the fact that the giving and receiving occurs within a relationship. The manner 
in which this relationship is defined sets the scope of the application of the 
rules governing the civil law consequences of corruption. 
                                                     
 
91  Explanatory Report to the Dutch Parliament on the Civil Law Convention, id., Note 30 above, 
at p. 4. 
92  Id., at p. 4.   
93  Art. 2 CLC.  
94  O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 above, at 
p. 129. 
95  Salomonson remarks that a tip, for example, will always be such a small amount while with a 
bribe very high amounts are usually involved. See L. Salomonson, Bribery,  id., Note 12 
above, at p. 6. He refers to the work of R. von Jhering, Die Jurisprudenz des täglichen Lebens: 
eine Sammlung an Vorfälle des gewöhnlichen Lebens anknüpfender Rechtsfragen, 12th edn, 
Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1903, and more particularly to his work Das Trinkgeld. See also article 
by C. Kenny, ‘Jhering on Trinkgeld and Tips’, Law Quaterly Review, Vol. 32,1916, at pp.306-
321. 
96  O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 above, at 
p. 128. 
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There is a common element in the definitions under the Penal Code and under 
the CLC. This is the fact that bribery occurs in a triangular relationship and 
cannot arguably exist outside of these relationships. The Civil Law Convention 
speaks of corruption as an act that distorts proper performance.97 It is within 
these relationships that ‘distortion’98 or the ‘influencing’99 that affects the 
performance of a ‘duty’100 occurs. This duty is owed by the bribe-recipient to a 
party who stands outside the transaction between the bribe-giver and the 
person bribed. 
Dorresteijn sees corruption as an element in a relationship of trust and 
delegation of power within a triangular relationship of the offeror of a bribe, 
the bribe-recipient, and the principal of the bribe-recipient. Indeed, according 
to Dorresteijn, there can be no corruption without bribery. Someone who 
profits at the cost of an organization but without the involvement of a third 
party is not, in his view, corrupt. Such conduct can rather be described as 
fraudulent. From this perspective Dorresteijn argues that corruption is a form 
of white collar crime and can only occur in a relationship that provides the 
opportunity to misuse power. Where there can be no misuse of power, there 
can be no corruption.101 An abuse of power can occur in terms of the power of 
representation given by an employer to an employee or agent, or from a public 
authority to a public servant.102  
In a similar vein, de Savornin Lohman restricts his examination of civil law 
consequences of bribery to instances where a person in seeking a particular 
legal result with a third person, gives a gift to a another person with whom this 
third person stands in a contractual relationship that gives the recipient of the 
gift the power to influence the coming into effect of the desired legal result.103  
From this analysis, the essential distinguishing element of bribery from fraud, 
tips, gifts and other business practices is that the person bribed misuses his 
relationship with a third person, to whom he owes a contractual duty of loyalty.   
 
 
                                                     
 
97  Art. 2 CLC.  
98  Art. 2 CLC. 
99  Art. 177 DPC.   
100  Art. 2 CLC; Art. 177 DPC. 
101  A. Dorresteijn, Corruption and Private Law, id., Note 14 above, at p. 19. 
102  Id., p. 19 
103  O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 above, at 
p. 128. 
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6.3 Consequences of Bribery on Contracts 
Public and private bribery are criminalized under the Dutch Penal Code. This 
has implications both in contract and in tort. A contract tainted by bribery 
raises questions about the boundaries of contractual freedom. Since the law 
does not act in vain in cases where an action is characterized as criminal, this 
characterization sets a boundary to the extent that parties may freely contract. 
It also sets a framework for remedies where damage is suffered as a result of 
such illegal activity. The following sections examine, firstly, the remedies that 
arise from the breach of the contractual principal/agent relationship, and 
secondly, those remedies that accrue where the breach of obligations is non-
contractual.  
6.3.1 Contractual Validity of Primary and Secondary Contracts 
The rules prohibiting public and private bribery are silent as to the status of 
transactions entered into or resulting from a violation of the prohibition. Under 
Dutch law, this regulatory silence is filled by provisions that deal with the 
validity of transactions that fall outside the boundaries of contractual freedom. 
A contract that leads to socially unacceptable consequences may be declared a 
nullity ipso facto or a nullity at the instance of one of the parties to the 
contract. Such an annulment has retroactive effect to the time the contract 
came into existence.104 The principal provisions that have an impact on the 
effect of bribery on the validity of resulting contracts are found in the second 
title of Book 3,105 in Book 6106 and in Book 7107 of the Dutch Civil Code 
(DCC). There are three primary grounds for a contract to be declared a nullity. 
These are:  
 
(1) that the contract is contrary to good morals or public policy;108  
(2) that the contract has been entered into as a result of duress, fraud or undue 
influence,109 and  
(3) that the contract has been entered into under the influence of an error.110 
 
The question whether a contract affected by bribery can be declared a nullity 
rests in a distinction drawn under Dutch law between ‘unilateral’ and 
‘multilateral’ juristic acts. A unilateral act can be declared a nullity ipso facto 
whereas a multilateral act that involves more than two parties is open to the 
                                                     
 
104  See Art. 3:53(1) DCC. 
105  Book 3 deals with the Law of Property, Proprietary Rights and Interests. 
106   Book 6 deals with the General Part of the Law of Obligations. 
107  Book 7 deals with Specific Contract including Agency Contracts. 
108  Art. 3:40 DCC. 
109  Art. 3:44 DCC. 
110  Art. 6:228 DCC. 
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possibility of an annulment.111 The contract between the bribe-giver and the 
party receiving the bribe as well as the contract between the bribe-giver and the 
party to whom the receiver of the bribe owes a duty of trust, both constitute 
multilateral agreements that are subject to the penalty of being annulled as 
opposed to being nullity ipso jure. As such, the contract resulting from a 
transaction tainted by bribery is not automatically a nullity. These contracts 
are, however, subject to the threat of being annulled by parties who have 
suffered damage due to the corruption that led to the contract.  
 
A ground for annulment serves as a defense against a claim or other legal 
measure based upon the contract tainted by corruption.112 Such an annulment 
has retroactive effect to the time the performance of the contract.113 However, 
the court may refuse to give effect to an annulment in whole or in part, if the 
juridical act (contract tainted by corruption) has already produced 
consequences which can only be reversed with difficulty. It may order a party 
who is prejudiced by its decision to be compensated in money by a party who 
unjustly benefits from it.114 Therefore, where a contract tainted by a bribe has 
come into existence and there has been some element of performance, it may 
become difficult to declare that the contract ceases to exist and is annulled. In 
these circumstances, the issue will become one of monetary compensation for 
the damage caused as a result of the act of bribery. 
6.3.2 The Primary Contract  
The first agreement in a transaction affected by bribery is the agreement 
between the bribe-giver and the bribe-recipient. This is referred to in this book 
as the primary contract. Art. 328ter DPC criminalizes passive and active 
private bribery while Arts. 177, 178 and 362 DPC criminalize the active and 
passive bribery of public officials. The criminalization of bribery under the 
provisions of the DPC renders the primary contract subject to the challenge of 
invalidity. Furthermore, Art. 8 CLC provides that Dutch law should ensure that 
                                                     
 
111  Art. 6:213 DCC defines a contract as a multilateral juridical act whereby one or more parties 
assume an obligation towards one or more other parties. Hartkamp explains that a fundamental 
distinction is made between (ipso jure) nullity on the one hand and the possibility of 
annulment. Ipso jure nullity operates automatically and the function of the court in a dispute 
over the validity of such a contract is purely declaratory. A contract that is subject to 
annulment is valid until it is annulled by a subsequent act of a court or declaration by the 
interested party where there is no transfer of immoveable property. See generally A. Hartkamp, 
Chapter 8 Law of Obligations, in J. Chorus, P. Gerver, E. Hondius (Eds.), Introduction to 
Dutch Law, 4th edn, Kluwer, Deventer, 2006, at p. 152, at p. 154. 
112   Art. 3:51(2) DCC provides that ‘a ground for annulment may always be invoked at law as a 
defence against a claim or other legal measure based upon the juridical act.’  
113  Id., Art. 3:53(1). 
114   Id., Art. 3:53(2). 
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‘any contract or clause of a contract providing for corruption to be null and 
void.’  
Generally, under Dutch law, the grounds for a declaration that a primary 
contract is unenforceable are found in Art. 3:40 DCC, which provides that:  
 
1.  A juridical act which by its content or necessary implication is 
contrary to good morals or public policy is a nullity.  
2.  A juridical act that violates a mandatory statutory provision becomes a 
nullity; if however, the provision is intended solely for protection of 
one of the parties to a multilateral juridical act, the act may only be 
annulled; in both cases this applies to the extent that the provision 
(violated statutory provision) does not otherwise provide.   
3.  Statutory provisions which do not purport to invalidate juridical acts 
in conflict therewith are not affected by the preceding paragraph. 
 
The provisions of Art. 3:40 (1) and 3:40 (2) DCC establish two grounds on 
which a party’s freedom to enter into a contract is curtailed: (1) where the 
agreement will be in conflict with public morality and public order and (2) 
where it is in conflict with mandatory law. Art. 3:40(1) deals with the broader 
notion of illegality as contrary to public morality and good morals, while Art. 
3:40(2) is more specific to the illegality that results from the violation of a 
mandatory statutory provision. Art. 3:40(3) of the Code provides that Art. 
3:40(2) has no application to mandatory rules, which do not in their scope of 
application affect the validity of the juridical act in question. The laws 
criminalizing bribery and in particular Art. 328ter DPC are mandatory in 
character and clearly can affect the validity of the transaction in question. The 
exception to Art. 3:40(2) provided in Art. 3:40(3) therefore would not seem to 
apply with regard to the anti-bribery rules.  
6.3.2.1 Invalid as Contrary to Public Order and Public Morality   
Where an agreement is based on an alleged unlawful cause, such an agreement 
has to be evaluated according to the public order and morality grounds of Art. 
3:40(1) DCC.115 There is no definition of ‘good morals’ or ‘public policy’ in 
the DCC, and an evaluation of what satisfies either of these grounds depends 
on the public standards of morality as discerned by the courts of law.116 Private 
bribery has not always been regarded as contrary to public morality or order. 
Private bribery was once seen as a tax-deductible expense. Companies could, 
for tax purposes, declare bribes that had been given to close international deals. 
                                                     
 
115  HR 24 September 1999, NJ 1999, 737. 
116  See O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 
above.  
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Clearly in this scenario it was not contrary to public morality or public order to 
give a bribe.  
Thus, in 1925 when Salomonson wrote his dissertation on bribery, the question 
whether an agreement to give a bribe was contrary to good morals or public 
policy was still posed in a context where private bribery was not illegal in the 
Netherlands. There was no law forbidding private bribery and Salomonson 
could rightly conclude that ‘in our law, the giving of a bribe to persons other 
than public officials is not declared to be a crime or explicitly forbidden.’117 
This resulted in a dichotomy where the criminality of a transaction involving 
corruption depended on whom the parties to the transaction were. If the bribery 
transaction involved private parties it was not illegal; only where bribery 
transactions involved a public official did it become illegal under the Penal 
Code.  
Since at that time private bribery was not a crime, Art. 3:40(2) dealing with 
illegality that results from the violation of a mandatory statutory provision did 
not apply. Nonetheless even in the absence of a direct statutory prohibition of 
private bribery, Salomonson still made the argument that the primary contract 
to give a bribe was against public morality because the ‘logical and intended 
consequence of the bribe is immoral.’118 As Salomonson pointed out, the 
agreement to give a bribe put the receiver of the bribe in a position where an 
agreement could only be concluded by betraying the interest of the principal as 
‘niemand immers kan twee heren tegelijk dienen’ (nobody can simultaneously 
serve two masters).119 He further argued that where such behavior leads to 
direct and demonstrable injury to the principal, it can be concluded that the 
receiver of the bribes has not fulfilled his duty to the principal and, as such, the 
bribery agreement is contrary to public morality.120  However, public policy is 
an unruly horse.121 In the absence of a statutory provision stigmatizing bribery 
                                                     
 
117  L. Salomonson, Bribery, id., Note 12 above, at p. 70. 
118  He states that the ‘logische en bedoelde gevolg der steekpenningen immoreel is, d.w.z. 
wanneer de steekpenningen dengeen voor wie ze bestemd zijn, in de verleiding moeten 
brengen een met zijn plichten onverenigbare handeling te verrichtten.’ (The logical and 
intended result of a bribe is immoral, i.e. bribes influence the person for whom they are 
intended, to perform acts that are incompatible with his duty). See L. Salomonson, Bribery, id., 
Note 12 above. at  p. 71. 
119  Id., Salomonson at p. 72. 
120  Id., Salomonson at p. 72. 
121  The view that public perception shapes public morality seems to be the accepted standpoint 
Salomonson points out, citing a decision by the Hoge Raad H.R. 22 February 1924, NJ 192, 
where the Supreme Court decided that transportation insurance agreements on birth control 
products to prevent conception were not in conflict with public morals because in present day 
Holland it was not seen by the people in general as unacceptable. See Salomonson, Bribery, 
id., Note 12 above, at p. 68. 
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in private transactions, a finding that such bribery was contrary to good order 
and policy was not indicated by public perceptions of morality.  
With the enactment of Art. 328ter DPC any uncertainty about the status of 
private bribery and its legal consequences is removed. The public policy 
position today is clarified by the existence of national and international rules, 
to which the Netherlands is a party, that criminalize both private and public 
bribery. These establish bribery is an act that is contrary to public morality in 
the Netherlands.  
If there is a dispute about the validity of the primary contract, Art. 3:49 DCC 
provides that it can be annulled by judicial decision, which in this instance will 
be merely declaratory as the act was never valid and is therefore null, void and 
without legal consequence.122 By reason of bribery being contrary to public 
policy under Art. 3:40(1) the courts will annul any contract to give or receive a 
bribe.123 Furthermore, a party affected by the primary contract to give a bribe 
can invoke Art. 3:40(1) as a ground for annulment of the contract. Art. 3:51 
provides that ‘a ground for annulment may always be invoked at as a defense 
against a claim or legal measure based upon the juridical act.’ 
6.3.2.2 Invalid as Contrary to Mandatory Law 
Art. 3:40(2) DCC renders any act that violates a mandatory statutory provision 
a nullity. Since 1965 private bribery has been criminalized in the Netherlands. 
However, these provisions are directed at the conduct of the parties engaging 
in private bribery and do not expressly prohibit the primary contract to give or 
receive a bribe. Is the primary contract between the bribe-giver and the bribe-
recipient a nullity as a result of the operation of Art. 3:40(2) DCC? De 
Savornin Lohman, writing after the criminalization of private bribery, took the 
view that the primary agreement was a nullity but not on the basis of being in 
conflict with a mandatory law under Art. 3:40(2) DCC. Rather he was of the 
view that the primary contract was a nullity under the ‘more complicated’ 
route of being in conflict with good morals and public policy.124  
This is because, according to him, the legislative history points out that Art. 
3:40(2) DCC is only applicable where the juridical act − the agreement itself − 
                                                     
 
122  Art. 3:49 DCC provides that ‘Where a juridical act is subject to annulment, it can be annulled 
either by extra-judicial declaration or by a judicial decision.’ See also A. Hartkamp, Chapter 8 
Law of Obligations, in J. Chorus, P. Gerver, E. Hondius (Eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law, id., 
Note 111 above, at p. 154. 
123   Art. 3:51 DCC. 
124   O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 above, at 
p. 131-132. 
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is forbidden by the law.125 He righty points out that in the case of the 
agreement to give a bribe, this is not the case. The agreement itself is not 
forbidden but only the content or application of the agreement is in conflict 
with Art. 328ter DPC, which prohibits the active or passive bribery of non-
public officials. Art. 328ter DPC is silent on the validity or otherwise of the 
actual agreement between the bribe-giver and the bribe-recipient.   
This viewpoint is supported by authors such as Hijma, who in his commentary 
on Art. 3:40 points out that ‘even though this is not made clear in the article 
itself, the meaning to be drawn from the parliamentary records is that Art. 
3:40(2) is only applicable where the transaction or contract itself is in violation 
of the law.’ If the entry into the contract is not in itself per se forbidden but 
rather only the effect of such a contract is contrary to the mandatory rules, then 
the relevant applicable article is Art. 3:40(1) DCC.126 
The parliamentary records do seem to indicate that where the performance of 
an agreement according to its content or application obliges one of the parties 
to commit an act forbidden by law, then the agreement is a nullity on the basis 
of Art. 3:40(1).127 The rationale for this is that it is contrary to public policy to 
require persons to comply with performances that the law forbids. Where an 
agreement commits a party to performing an act forbidden by law, it is 
contrary to public policy under Art. 3:40(1) DCC and therefore a nullity.  
However, it is possible to make an argument for nullity of the primary contract 
as contrary to mandatory law under Art 3:40(2). While Art. 328ter DPC does 
not stipulate the sanction that awaits a primary contract to give a bribe, it does 
clearly indicate that such an act of giving or receiving a bribe, or other undue 
influence, is a criminal offense. Hartkamp has remarked that where the law 
provides that a particular type of conduct results in a criminal act, it is beyond 
doubt that an agreement that results in the act is forbidden by the law.128 With 
the passage of Art. 328ter of the DPC, private bribery is clearly prohibited by 
the law. An agreement between two private parties to give and receive a bribe 
is an act that is criminally punishable. This implies that in as far as the primary 
                                                     
 
125  He refers to the Report of the Committee on ‘Private Bribery’(Rapport van de Commissie 
‘Niet-Ambtelijk Corruptie’), id., Note 72 above, at p. 11, Note 2. 
126  J. Hijma, in J. Nieuwenhuis (Ed.), Law of Property, Proprietary rights and Interests, text and 
Commentary on Books 3, 5, 6 (Vermogensrecht: tekst & commentaar : de tekst van de Boeken 
3, 5, 6), Kluwer, Deventer, 2007, at p. 59; see also HR 11 May 1951 (Flora-Van der Kamp) 
(NJ 1952/127); HR 11 May 1951 (Burgman-Aviolanda) (NJ 1952/128); HR 16 November 
1984 (Maduro-Maduro) (NJ 1985/624); HR 11 May 2001 (OZF/AZL-AZL/Moerman) (NJ 
2002/364).  
127  Parl. Gesch. Boek 3, pp. 190-91.  
128  A. Hartkamp, C. Sieburgh, Verbintenissenrecht, : Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht (Contract 
Law: General Contracts), Asser Series, 13th edn, Kluwer, Deventer, 2010, at pp. 271-273. 
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contract to give a bribe is concerned, the statutory prohibition of Art. 328ter 
DCC renders it prohibited by mandatory law. The contract between the bribe-
giver and the bribe-recipient arguably falls within the scope of Art. 3:40(2) 
DCC.  
Bribery is seen as a threat to the integrity of public order, the employment 
relationship, and the integrity of business and fair competition.129 This 
condemnation of bribery has culminated in the criminalization of private 
bribery with the passage of Art. 328ter DPC. This changes the argument 
against the validity of the primary contract between the bribe-giver and the 
bribe-recipient. Instead of the primary contract being void on the more flexible 
ground of public policy, such an agreement can be considered a nullity on the 
unambiguous ground of being invalid as being contrary to mandatory law. 
In summary, the primary agreement between the bribe-giver and the bribe-
recipient is a nullity on the basis of being contrary to good order and public 
policy under Art 3:40(1) DCC and arguably also as being contrary to 
mandatory provisions of the law under Art 3:40(2) DCC.  However, as a 
multilateral act, it is only subject to annulment where a party to the transaction 
seeks such an annulment. As such, it may be declared a nullity at the instance 
of one of the parties to the transaction.130 
6.3.3 The Secondary Contract  
As noted above, Art. 328ter DPC criminalizes private bribery. It applies to the 
conduct of giving and receiving a bribe and does not address the secondary 
contract that comes into being between the bribe-giver and the party to whom 
the bribe-recipient owes a duty of loyalty. Since there is no statutory 
prohibition of this secondary agreement, the provisions of Art. 3:40(2) DCC 
dealing with agreements that are in violation of a statutory prohibition will not 
apply to the secondary contract.  Yet, this contract between the bribe-giver and 
the principal of the bribed agent is clearly tainted by bribery. The freedom of 
consent of the principal is compromised by the concerted acts of the agent and 
the bribe-giver. The question is whether the principal bound by a contract 
negotiated by an agent or employee who has been disloyal to the interests of 
the principal, or whether the principal claim that the contract is a nullity on the 
grounds of Art. 3:40(1) DCC?  
                                                     
 
129  Report of the Committee on Private Bribery, id., Note 72 above, at p. 6. 
130  See generally for a discussion on transactions in conflict with good morals V. van den Brink, 
Legal Transactions in conflict with Public Morality (De rechtshandeling in strijd met de goede 
zeden), Boom, Amsterdam, 2002. 
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Upholding a party to a contract that was not entered into with complete 
freedom of contract contradicts the notion of consent required for legal acts 
that produce juridical effects.131 Any agreement that suffers from a defect in 
consent may therefore be annulled.132 Has the consent of the principal to a 
secondary contract been compromised in such a way as to justify a claim that 
there is a defect in the consent?  
A principal is usually bound by any action of an agent where such acts are 
within the agent’s authority.133 Where a contract is tainted by allegations of 
bribery, this is arguably an action that has taken place outside the scope of the 
agent’s authority. Unless it can be shown that the principal has expressly 
directed that a bribe be solicited, or unless the principal ratifies the resulting 
contract, the principal may seek to avoid the contract by establishing grounds 
that show a defect of consent.  
Typical grounds would include the claim that he is not bound by the 
consequences of the agent’s acts because: 
(a) the contract was entered into as a result of duress, fraud or undue 
influence Art 3:44(1) DCC; 
(b) the fact that the principal has been ‘tricked’ into a contract under 
circumstances that compromise freedom of choice, may constitute a 
civil wrong, which opens the door to an action in damages if any 
losses have been incurred by the principal Art 3:44(3); 
(c) (b) the contract was entered into as a result of an error Art 6:228 DCC); 
(d) the principal may also seek to end the contract of employment with the agent 
based on the ‘loss of confidence’ resulting from the abuse of the trust 
relationship; 
 
These possible grounds are examined in the following sections. 
 
6.3.3.1 Invalidity for Duress, Fraud, Undue Influence 
The DCC does not refer specifically to bribery as a ground for a defect of 
consent. However, it does provide some general rules on circumstances that 
would constitute an impediment of freedom of choice. Art. 3:44(1) DCC 
provides for nullity of contract where the agreement is the result of duress, 
                                                     
 
131  See Art. 3:33 DCC. 
132   See generally A. Hartkamp, Chapter 8 Law of Obligations, in J. Chorus, P. Gerver, E. Hondius 
(Eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law, id., Note 111 above, at p. 155. 
133  See generally on the liability of the unauthorized agent from the perspective of Dutch law, D. 
Busch, Unauthorised Agency in Dutch law, in D. Busch, L. Macgregor (Eds.), The 
Unauthorised Agent, Perspectives from European and Comparative Law, CUP, Cambridge, 
2009, pp. 141-148. 
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fraud or undue influence.134 Does bribery fall into any of these categories? 
Duress is described under Art 3:44(2) DCC as occurring where a person 
induces another to perform a specific juridical act by unlawfully threatening 
him or a third party with harm to his person or property. The duress must be 
such that the person would be influenced by it. Furthermore the duress must be 
such that a reasonable person would be influenced by it.135 Bribery clearly does 
not fall within this category of duress. There is no threat that influences the 
principal to enter into the agreement.  
Another category which is not of immediate application is undue influence. It 
occurs where a person knows or ought to understand that another is being 
induced to perform a juridical act as a result of special circumstances – such as 
a state of necessity, dependency, wantonness, abnormal mental condition or 
experience – and promotes the realization of that juridical act, although what 
he knows or ought to understand should cause him to refrain from doing so.136 
There is no special relationship of dependency between the principal and the 
giver of the bribe that would found allegations of undue influence under Art. 
3:44(4) DCC. 
The category which has the closest connection to bribery is that of fraud under 
Art 3:44(3) DCC. Fraud is said to occur where a person induces another to 
perform a specific juridical act by intentionally providing him with inaccurate 
information, or by intentionally concealing any fact he was obliged to 
communicate, or by any other artifice.137 Art. 3:44(3) DCC makes it clear that 
where a person is deliberately misled into entering a legal transaction, this may 
constitute a fraud that can annul the validity of the ensuing transaction. 
However, the three circumstances under which this can occur are stated to be 
where:  
(a) inaccurate information has been provided; 
(b) a fact that a party was obliged to communicate was concealed; or 
(c)  a trick or artifice (kunstgreep) has occurred.  
 
This raises the question whether in the contractual negotiations between the 
bribe-giver and the principal of the bribe-recipient, the bribe-giver as a 
contracting party has a duty to communicate the fact of such bribery to the 
other contracting party (i.e. the principal) and whether a failure to do this 
constitutes a fraud or ‘trick’ that grounds the nullification of the secondary 
contract that results from their negotiations.  
                                                     
 
134  See Art. 3:44(1) DCC. 
135  See Art. 3:44(2) DCC. 
136  See Art. 3:44(4) DCC. 
137  Art. 3:44(3) DCC. 
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Asser’s Introduction states that not every ‘untruth’ should be regarded as 
fraud, but only those instances where the untruth is of such importance and 
was intended to be relied upon by another.138 Art. 3:44(3) stipulates that 
representations in general terms, even if they are untrue do not constitute fraud. 
As such, not every untrue representation by the bribe-giver to the principal can 
be regarded as fraud.  Only a representation that is made with intent to deceive 
is a fraud.  
The parties to the secondary contract are, on the one hand, the bribe-giver and, 
on the other, the principal of the bribe-recipient. This contract is entered into 
based upon the representations that the principal has agreed to. Unknown to the 
principal, these terms of the contract may have (but for the disloyalty) of the 
agent been more in his favor than they were under the current terms of the 
contract. However, the fact remains that the principal consented to the terms of 
the contract as signed. Similarly, the bribe-giver is well aware that the terms of 
the contract were influenced by his secret dealing with the agent of the 
principal. However, for this untruth to constitute a fraud it must have been the 
deliberate intention of the bribe-giver to deceive the principal with respect to 
the terms of the contract and, more importantly, this deliberate untrue 
representation must have caused the principal139 to enter into the contract.140 In 
other words, the false information must have influenced the principal to an 
extent that in this was the factor that caused the principal to enter into the 
contract. 
It can be argued that since the principal consented the terms of the contract 
there was no false information regarding the contract between the principal and 
the bribe-giver. This contract, tainted as it is by corruption, is nonetheless a 
validly concluded contract. However, as regards the question of untrue 
representation, it could be argued that the failure to disclose the act of bribery, 
constituted a false representation, which if the principal was fully informed 
about, would have caused him not to enter into the contract. De Savornin 
Lohman argues that between the principal and the bribe-giver there is little 
doubt the bribe can be described as a ‘trick’ (‘kunstgreep’), by which the 
employer of the bribe-recipient is moved to enter into the transaction in a 
fraudulent way within the meaning of Art. 3:44(3) DCC. De Savornin Lohman 
argues that the application of this as a ground to nullify the contract is in 
keeping with reality because it is precisely the discovery of this fraud that leads 
                                                     
 
138  C. Asser, Introduction to Dutch Civil Law: General Contract Law (Handleiding tot de 
beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht: algemeen overeenkomstenrecht), Asser Series 
6, Vol. 3, Kluwer, Deventer, 2005, p. 207. 
139   Emphasis added. 
140  See Art. 3:44(3), sentence 3. 
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to the breakdown of trust that in many instances will be the reason for the 
principal to want to withdraw from the contract.  
However, the standard to establish fraud is high. It must be shown that the 
false representation caused the principal to enter into the contract. If the 
principal would still have entered into the contract albeit on different terms, 
then this does not constitute fraud.141 Where the principal intended to enter into 
the contract, and the fact of bribery compromised his negotiating position as to 
the terms of the contract, the fact of bribery cannot be said to be a central 
element that induced the contract. For these reasons, bribery cannot be said to 
constitute fraud within the meaning of Art. 3:44(3) DCC that is sufficient to 
annul the contract entered into between the principal and the bribe-giver. 
6.3.3.2 Invalidity for Reasons of Error 
Art. 6:228 DCC deals with error as a vitiating factor and can apply to the 
secondary contract between the bribe-giver and the principal of the bribed 
agent. It provides: 
A contract which has been entered into under the influence of an error and 
which would not have been concluded had there been a correct assessment of 
the facts, may be nullified: 
(a)   if the error is due to information given to the other party, unless the 
other party could assume that the contract should have been entered 
into irrespective of such information;  
(b)  if the other party, in view of what he knew or ought to know regarding 
the error, should have informed the party in error;  
(c)  if the other party entering into the contract made the same incorrect 
assumption as the party in error, unless the other party, even if there 
had been a correct assessment of the facts, need not have understood 
that the party in error would therefore be prevented from entering into 
the contract. 
 
Art. 6:228 DCC is said to address ‘facts or circumstances that are essential to 
the mistaken party (in the sense that he would not have entered into the 
contract on the same terms at all had he known the truth) even if the facts and 
circumstances are extrinsic to the contract.’142 Art. 6:228(a) DCC emphasizes 
that where a misrepresentation has been made, this may lead to nullification of 
the contract. Art.6:228(b) DCC focuses on the failure to disclose information, 
while Art. 6:228(c) DCC deals with the consequences of a common mistake. 
                                                     
 
141  Parl. Gesch. Boek 3, p. 210; Asser p. 208. 
142  See H. Beale, A. Hartkamp, H. Kötz, D. Tallon, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law: 
Casebook on the Common Law of Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002, at p. 394. See also 
A. Hartkamp, M. Tillema, Contract Law in the Netherlands, Kluwer, The Hague/Boston, 1995, 
Para. 80, p. 78. 
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The contract that results from the successful bribery of an agent is not likely to 
fall under Art. 6:228(c) DCC because the terms and conditions of the contract 
are not the bone of contention. There is no error as to the contents of the 
contract. Rather, the primary focus of a claim for invalidity rests on whether 
the act of bribery of the agent and the failure of the bribe-giver to disclose this 
fact to the principal falls within the purview of Art. 6:228(a) and (b) DCC. 
The principal seeking to avoid a secondary contract that is tainted by 
allegations of bribery could argue that it was entered into without full 
information or wrong information about the state of affairs relating to the 
contract under Art. 6:228(a) DCC. If so, the principal is in effect claiming that 
the contract was entered into as a result of erroneous information about the 
manner into which the contract come into being. If a principal is the only party 
that is unaware of the fact of bribery, then the principal could claim that the 
contract was entered into under an error about the ‘attributes’ of the other 
party.143 This can be described as an error made as to the person with whom he 
was contracting. Rather than the contract being made with someone who is 
trustworthy, the contract was actually being made with someone who is 
undermining and sabotaging the interests of the mistaken party. This raises the 
question whether there was an intention to be legally bound in that particular 
instance. This failure could create a ground for declaring the contract invalid as 
not meeting the fundamental principle of consensus ad idem, which creates a 
binding contract,  
For a claim that a contract is defective for bribery under Art.6:228(b), there has 
to be proof of deliberate withholding of information by the bribe-giver. An 
objective test is provided in Art. 6:228(b) DCC, which offers relief on the 
ground of error where the party who paid the bribe knew or ought to have 
known that this constituted, for the principal, information that may lead to the 
contract not being concluded had there been a correct assessment of the facts. 
The second part of Art. 6:228(b) implies that such a withholding of 
information only constitutes an error where the party paying the bribe had a 
duty to inform the party in error of what he knew. This raises the question of 
when the duty to inform (mededelingsplicht) arises. Is the bribe-giver under a 
duty to inform the principal of the fact of bribery on the part of his agent? Does 
this failure to inform the principal come within the meaning of ‘error?’  
                                                     
 
143  H. Beale, A. Hartkamp, H. Kötz, D. Tallon, Cases Materials and Text on Contract Law: 
Casebook on the Common Law of Europe, id., pp. 365-366, where it is pointed out that Dutch 
law treats mistaken identity or attributes as a kind of error falling under Art. 6:228 DCC. 
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The Dutch Supreme Court has made it clear that under certain circumstances 
there is a duty of disclosure on the part of the other party to the transaction.144 
Hijma points out that it is generally agreed that there are three criteria that 
determine when such a duty to inform exists. These are:  
(a)  where a party is aware of the real state of affairs or can be assumed to 
be aware of the real state of affairs;  
(b)  where such a party knew or should have known that such information 
was important to the other party to the transaction; and 
(c)  where the party must have known that the other party was mistaken.145  
 
To these conditions Hijma adds that such a party is in such a position where 
the prevailing opinion (verkeersopvatting)146 affirms that there is a duty to tell 
the other party the true state of affairs.147 
Is there a prevailing opinion that a party who gives a bribe to an agent is under 
a duty to inform the principal of the agent of the fact of the bribery? De 
Savornin Lohman argues that the crux of the answer to this question depends 
on whether the principal of the bribe-recipient can be said not to have been 
aware of the bribery.148 Art. 6:228(b) DCC applies to a situation where one 
party knew of the lack of information of the party in error. As such, a lot will 
depend on whether the knowledge of the agent can be imputed to the principal. 
If it can, then the employer is deemed to have been aware of all the 
circumstances relating to how the transaction came into being. De Savornin 
Lohman points out that this will depend on the circumstances of the case.149 
Dutch law recognizes two classes of agent: the ‘direct’ agency, where a 
contract concluded by such an agent is imputed to the principal, and the 
‘indirect’ agency, where the agent acts in his own name but for the account and 
                                                     
 
144  HR 30 November, 1973, NJ 1974, 97 (Van der Beek-Van Dartel); HR, 21 December, 1990, NJ 
1991, 251 (Van Geest-Nederlof). 
145  J Hijma in his comments on Van Geest-Nederlof, HR, 21 December 1990, in S. Lindenbergh, 
A. Koburg (Eds.), Cases on Contract Law (Ars Aequi Jurisprudentie Verbintenissenrecht), 1st 
edn,  Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 18-19.  
146  There is no clear English translation for this Dutch judicial phrase. Pauline Memelink gives the 
closest approximation as ‘common opinion, public opinion, generally accepted principles, 
generally accepted views, views accepted in society, generally prevailing opinion, general 
business understanding, or general understanding of the business community.’ See P. 
Memelink, De Verkeersopvatting, Dissertation, Boom, Leiden, 2009, (English Summary). 
147  J. Hijma in S. Lindenbergh, A. Koburg (Eds.), Cases on Contract Law (Ars Aequi 
Jurisprudentie Verbintenissenrecht), id., Note 145 above, at p. 19. 
148   O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 above, at 
pp. 142-143. 
149   Id.  
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at the risk of the principal.150 Cases involving bribery usually involve the direct 
agent who is the intermediary between the principal and the bribe-giver. There 
would in general be no restriction to the power of representation granted. It is 
indeed that very power of representation, the direct nature of the agency, which 
gives the agent the necessary leverage to be considered as the party with whom 
the bribe-giver negotiates. The principal is bound by actions that are within the 
agent’s authority. The question arises whether the taking of a bribe to facilitate 
a contract renders the resulting contract outside the scope of the agent’s 
authority.  
De Savornin Lohman argues that the Supreme Court in 1979 held that where 
the person who represents a foundation enters into a transaction in the name of 
the foundation between the foundation and another party, this transaction is 
valid as a legal transaction of the foundation even where the statutory 
representatives have acted contrary to an internal rule of the foundation (that 
such a transaction could only come into place following a decision of the 
directors).151  
However, another viewpoint could be based on the notion of apparent authority 
or lack of it. In view of the fact that bribery is criminalized under the DPC, 
bribery by an agent may lead to criminal liability on the part of the company 
that knew of such activities, if the company can be deemed to have ‘implicitly 
authorized’ such conduct. To avoid such liability, the onus will be on the 
company to show that it had done everything possible to ensure that bribes 
were not accepted by its agents, via its due diligence, company policies, 
company codes, warnings to prospective clients, and so on. If this meets the 
standard set out in Art. 3:61(2) DCC, then there can be no claim that the 
principal was ‘informed’ within the meaning of Art. 6:228 DCC. Art. 3:61(2) 
sets the threshold for the apparent authority of an agent. It provides: 
‘Where a juridical act is performed in the name of one party and, on the basis 
of a declaration of conduct of that party, another party has assumed and, in 
the circumstances could reasonably assume that a sufficient procuration 
(authority) had been granted, the inaccuracy of this assumption may not be 
invoked (against the party making the assumption).’  
When the circumstances are such that a reasonable person can assume 
sufficient authorization given by the principal to the agent, the threshold for 
                                                     
 
150   D. Busch, Unauthorised Agency in Dutch Law, in D. Busch, L. Macgregor (Eds.), The 
Unauthorised Agent, Perspectives from European and Comparative Law, CUP, Cambridge, 
id., Note 133 above, pp. 139-140. 
151  O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id, Note 13 above, at 
pp. 146-47. 
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apparent authority is met and the principal cannot claim not to have knowledge 
of the acts of the agent, and there will be no basis for a claim of error on the 
grounds of a lack of awareness of the real state of affairs. In such an instance, 
there would be no basis from which to declare the contract annulled. On the 
other hand, where the threshold of apparent authority is not met, and the 
company can show that the actions of the agent or intermediary were expressly 
forbidden by the corporation and that this was done in such a way as to make it 
reasonable for parties contracting with the company to assume that the agent 
was acting contrary to the wishes of the principal, then there can be no 
apparent authority within the meaning of Art. 3:61(2) and a foundation is laid 
for nullification on the ground of error under Art. 3:228(b).  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that there is a duty within reasonable 
boundaries to investigate before entering into a transaction so as to ensure that 
consent is not given as a result of an error.152 In the anti-corruption climate of 
today’s business world, this implies that a principal cannot bury his head in the 
sand but must play an active role in ensuring that the contract entered into is 
the sort of contract that the principal indeed intended to enter into and not a 
contract procured as a result of a bribe. This duty to investigate can also help 
the principal to set the boundaries of what is and what is not the apparent 
authority of the agent. If a principal has taken reasonable steps to investigate 
the other party to the transaction and any possibilities of bribery by its agent, 
then the exercise of this duty to investigate makes clear the fact of a lack of 
consent to a corrupt exchange and may allow the principal to seek to nullify a 
contract that is tainted by corruption despite the principal’s best efforts to make 
sure that this did not occur. This line of reasoning could bring the lack of 
disclosure of the fact of bribery by the bribe-giver as a ground of error 
sufficient to vitiate the contract under Art 6:228 (a) and (b) DCC. 
In summary, the secondary contract resulting from the successful act of 
commission of bribery on the part of the agent of the principal is not within the 
contemplation of the prohibition under Art. 328ter DPC. The question whether 
it is a valid contract hinges whether the consent the principal was impaired. An 
argument for impairment can be made on the grounds of error. If the principal 
had been aware of all the circumstances surrounding the contract, would he 
have entered into the contract?  Since the party giving the bribe was aware that 
the consent of the principal was being undermined by the bribe transaction 
with the principal’s agent. Art. 6:288(b) could apply to the advantage of the 
principal by not allowing the bribe-giver who ‘purchased’ the contract, to 
exploit the lack of information to the principal and provide such a principal 
with the grounds to claim a lack of consent sufficient to annul the contract. 
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6.4 Right to Return of the Bribe or Other Performance 
6.4.1 Position of the Bribe-Giver 
The giving of a bribe in a private transaction is an illegal act and forbidden by 
Art. 328terDPC. As a result, the contract between the bribe-giver and the 
bribe-recipient is a nullity and any payments made in this respect are in respect 
of a null transaction. A payment made on the basis of a null transaction is an 
undue payment within the meaning of Art. 6:203 DCC because there is no 
valid contract that justifies the payment of the bribe-giver to the bribe-taker. 
Art. 6:203 DCC provides that:  
A person who has given an item of property to another without legal basis is 
entitled to reclaim it from the recipient as performance not due. (2) If the 
performance not due was the payment of a sum of money, the claim is for 
restitution for the same amount. (3) A person who without any legal 
obligation, has performed an act of a non pecuniary nature, may claim from 
the recipient that this performance be reversed.    
Art. 6:203 DCC anticipates three sorts of performances in the making of an 
undue payment, i.e., the giving of a ‘good,’153 the giving of money,154 and a 
performance of another kind.155 From the perspective of the money paid or 
other advantage given by the bribe-giver, Art. 6:203 DCC provides that such a 
payment must be restored to the bribe-giver because the payment was made 
without a legal ground or a legal fact to justify the making of the payment.156  
This is supported by the position of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Lotisico 
case, where parties entered into an agreement forbidden under the Lottery Law 
of 1905.157 The court ruled that where an agreement is entered into contrary to 
the law, it is clear that both parties in the transaction have acted contrary to the 
law and the return of what is unjustifiably given can be demanded. Following 
this reasoning, the person who has paid the bribe has the grounds upon which 
to ask for the return of the bribe.158 
                                                     
 
153   Art 6:203 Para. 1. 
154  Id. Para. 2. 
155  Id. Para. 3. 
156   See generally, H. van Kooten Restitutionary Consequences of Invalid Agreements 
(Restitutierechtelijke gevolgen van ongeoorloofde overeenkomsten), Kluwer, Deventer, 2002.  
157  HR 4 May 1923, NJ 1923, 920 (Lotisco). 
158     For example, in October 1884, the District court in Assen required that an employee who had 
received a bribe pay the bribe back to the person who had given the bribe so as to restore the 
parties to the transaction position that had existed before the wrongful act of bribery was 
performed. Rb Assen 23 October, 1984, NJ 1985, 829. See on this decision A. Dorresteijn, 
Corruption and Private Law, id., Note 14 above, at p. 10. 
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As more focus is being turned to corrupt practices, one can conceive of 
instances where the bribe-giver may seek the bribe back.159 Salomonson 
describes a situation where in a case of insolvency the trustees in bankruptcy 
may seek the return of bribe moneys given out by the insolvent party.160The 
right of the bribe-giver to the return of the bribe, on the ground of undue 
payment, however raises some problematic issues. De Savornin Lohman points 
out that in a case where the bribe-recipient has accepted the bribe but has taken 
no action to further the interests of the bribe-giver, it is clearly reasonable for 
the bribe to be returned. However, where the bribe-recipient has in fact 
achieved the purpose for which the bribe was given and a contract in favor of 
the bribe-giver has resulted, this raises questions about the reasonableness and 
fairness of the expectation under Art 6:203 DCC that the bribe be returned to 
the bribe giver. It is unfair to hold that the bribe-giver is, under these 
circumstances, entitled to the return of the bribe.161 
6.4.2 Position of the Bribe-Recipient  
De Savornin Lohman  raises the interesting question: if a bribe-giver is entitled 
to a return of the bribe as an undue payment, is the bribe-recipient also entitled 
to some form of return for his performance under the contract? In a reciprocal 
agreement, Art. 6:203 DCC applies to both parties. Each party to a contract 
that has no legal ground has the right to have the agreement ‘undone.’ From 
the point of view of the bribe-recipient, the performance carried out in respect 
of the primary contract to give and accept a bribe is not the giving of a ‘good’ 
or of ‘money.’ Nonetheless, there has been a performance of some ‘other kind’ 
in respect of the null contract. Can this performance be repaid to the bribe-
recipient?  
Clearly, the actual activity that the bribe-recipient has performed cannot be 
returned ‘in natura.’162 The question arises whether it can be quantified in 
terms of money. The two principal arguments against such a quantification 
center on the illegality of the activity of the briber taker and the difficulty in 
placing a value on the actions of the bribe-recipient. De Savornin Lohman 
disagrees with these arguments and states that the arguments that the actions of 
                                                     
 
159  Of interest is the attempt by the son of former President Suharto to sue two men he says he 
paid $2 million to in a failed bid to secure a pardon after his sentencing on corruption charges. 
See report in The New York Times, 4 January 2002, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E0DF1E30F937A35752C0A9649C8B63
&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print.  
160  See L. Salomonson, Bribery, id., Note 12 above, at pp. 74-75; See also O. de Savornin 
Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 above, at p. 134.  
161   See generally O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., 
Note 13 above, at pp. 134-136. 
162   Id. at p. 135. 
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the bribe-recipient are immoral and therefore are not quantifiable in money are 
met by the fact that the actions of the bribe-giver are equally morally 
irreprehensible, yet the bribe-recipient does have a right, under a strict reading 
of the law, to a return of his performance.163 Secondly, he argues that the 
argument that it is difficult to place a value on the actions of the bribe-recipient 
can be met with the fact that the value of the bribe itself is known or that the 
value of the performance of the bribe-recipient can be assessed in terms of the 
value that the transaction represented for the bribe-giver. 164 
Quantification of the value of the transaction may be easier where the actions 
of the bribe-recipient have been successful and a contract has come into place 
as a result of these activities. However, where the purpose of giving the bribe 
has not been realized, the quantification of the value of the performance of the 
bribe-taker is more difficult to assess. It is open to question how to quantify 
performance made without juridical foundation. However, in general the 
arguments made have focused on the fact that this must be made in according 
to the market value.165 Hamaker adopts a different point of view and states that 
an objective calculation can lead to unfair results and that the value should be 
taken from that price which the parties to the contract have placed on their null 
agreement.166 Hijma arrives at this same conclusion in his dissertation 
Nietigheid en vernietigbaarheid van rechtshandelingen.167 De Savornin 
Lohman, speaking specifically about bribes, states that the performance of the 
bribe-recipient should be viewed as ‘one that cannot be quantified in money.’ 
Art. 6:211 DCC provides that:  
‘Where a performance made on the basis of a contract which is null and 
cannot by its nature be reversed, and where this performance ought not to be 
valued in money, a claim to reverse a counter-performance or reimbursement 
of its value is also barred to the extent that such claim would, for that reason 
offend reasonableness and fairness.’ 
On these premises, de Savornin Lohman argues that where rescission is not 
possible because the bribe has achieved its desired purpose and the resulting 
agreement between the bribe-giver and the employer of the bribe-recipient was 
                                                     
 
163    Id. at p. 136. 
164    Id. (in natura can be translated as ‘in kind’). 
165  See M. Scheltema, Undue Payment (Onverschuldigde betaling), Kluwer, Deventer, 1997, pp. 
203-207; H. van Kooten, Restitutionary Consequences of Invalid Agreements 
(Restitutierechtelijke gevolgen van ongeoorloofde overeenkomsten), id., Note 156 above, at pp. 
107-112. 
166  G. Hamaker, The Claim of Undue Payment under Dutch Law (De Vordering uit 
Onverschuldigde Betaling naar Nederlands Recht), Kluwer, Deventer, 1970, at pp. 149-150. 
167  See J. Hijma, Void and Voidable Legal Transactions (Nietigheid en vernietbaarheid van 
rechthandelingen), id., Note 87 above, at p. 94. See also M. Scheltema, Undue Payment 
(Onverschuldigde betaling), id., Note 165 above, pp. 236-238. 
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not rescinded after the discovery of the bribe, it is in conflict with 
reasonableness and fairness for the bribe-giver to have a claim against the 
bribe-recipient and that the bribe-recipient will have no reciprocal claim 
against the bribe-giver. Following this reasoning, any performances made in 
respect of this void contract for reasons of reasonableness and fairness, should 
lie where they have fallen. The bribe-giver ought not to be entitled to the return 
of his bribe to the extent that the bribe-recipient cannot retrieve the actions he 
has taken in performance of the bribery contract.168  
In summary, therefore, in the interests of reasonableness and fairness, the 
argument that supports the return of the bribe to the giver of the bribe, must 
also support the quantification of the corresponding performance of the bribe-
recipient and the payment of such restitution. Reasonableness and fairness 
dictate that there should be no one-sided imposition of the right to the return of 
the bribe in favor of the bribe-giver. The agreement to give a bribe is a nullity 
and any payment made in respect of such an agreement has no legal basis. The 
performances of the bribe-giver and the bribe-recipient should be considered 
performances which under Art. 6:211 DCC by their nature cannot be reversed 
and ought not to be valued in money. To conclude otherwise, would benefit the 
bribe-giver to the detriment of the bribe-recipient where both parties have 
behaved in an equally morally reprehensible manner. 
6.4.3 Position of the Principal of the Disloyal Agent 
Can the amount of the bribe be claimed by the principal? An agency contract is 
defined as a contract for services under the DCC.169 The agent must exercise 
the care of a good provider of services.170 An important aspect of the duty of a 
good provider of services is the duty to account to the client for the manner in 
which the agent has executed the services.  
In the Goudse Bouwmeester case,171 the principal of an agent was allowed to 
keep the bribe money. The Chief Engineer of the City Council of Gouda 
received a bribe of 35,000 guilders from a contractor. The City Council 
discovered this and threatened him with summary dismissal stating that their 
final decision may be positively influenced if he returned the money. The chief 
engineer transferred the amount of the bribe into the Council’s account. 
Nonetheless the City Council went ahead and fired him. He then demanded the 
bribe to be paid back to him stating that the payment was unjustified and 
                                                     
 
168    See O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 
above, at p. 136. 
169  See Art. 7:425 DCC.  
170   See Art. 7:401 DCC. 
171  HR 12 March 1926, NJ 1926, 777, (Goudse Bouwmeester).  
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without legal basis. The Supreme Court held otherwise and stated that the City 
Council was entitled to keep the money.172 
Where the agent has received moneys for the principal, the agent must account 
for such moneys.173 In Salomonson’s opinion, the wording of Art. 7:403 DCC 
and the history under Roman and German law leads to the conclusion that the 
principal is in his rights to expect from his agent a declaration of all that he has 
received as a result of his authorization and that this would also include what 
he has received from third persons in relation to the power of authority that he 
has received.174 He is therefore responsible to declare the receipt of any bribe 
to his principal. Such a duty can only be given up by the express permission of 
the principal to the fact that his agent is receiving the bribe.175 
6.5 Tort Claims 
Dutch Tort law is codified in Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code. One of the most 
celebrated expansions of the old Art. 1401 DCC176 involved a bribery case − 
the Lindenbaum-Cohen case.177 The judgment in this case has been codified in 
Art. 6:162 DCC, which provides: 
(1)   A person who commits a tort against another which is attributable to 
him must repair the damage suffered by the other in consequence 
thereof.  
(2)   Except where there are grounds for justification, the following are 
deemed tortious: the violation of a right and an act or omission 
                                                     
 
172   The court reasoned that by paying back the money, motivated by feelings of proprietary, regret 
or other such feelings, the chief engineer had wanted to establish a ‘natural’ (moral) obligation. 
Art. 6:3 states that (1) a natural obligation is one which cannot be enforced at law.  (2) A 
natural obligation exists (a) where the law or a juridical act deprives an obligation of its 
enforceability; (b) where a person has, as regards another person, a compelling moral duty of 
such a nature that its performance, although unenforceable at law, must, in common opinion, 
be considered as the performance of an obligation owed to that other person. The court found 
that in this instance there was a natural contract. As such, in the opinion of the court, there was 
a basis upon which the chief engineer had paid the money into the city council’s account and 
as such a legal ground for the payment. The payment could therefore not be viewed as 
unjustified, but rather justified and as such could not be paid back. 
173  See Art. 7:403 DCC.  
174  See L. Salomonson, Bribery, id., Note 12 above, at pp. 76-81. 
175  Id. 
176  Art. 1401 Old DCC provided that ‘Every unlawful act which causes damage to another obliges 
him by whose fault the damage occurred to repair it.’ 
177   HR 31 January 1919, (Lindenbaum-Cohen); NJ 1919, p.161: W 10365(1919). J. van Dunne, 
Verbintenissenrecht: onrechtmatige daad en overige verbintenissen, 5th edn, Kluwer, 
Deventer, 2004, pp. 140-144. See also the discussion about development from Art. 1401 Old 
DCC to Art. 6:162 DCC in G. Betlem, Civil Liability for Transfrontier Pollution: Dutch 
Environmental Tort Law in International Cases in the Light of Community Law, Kluwer, 
London, 1993.  
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breaching a duty imposed by law or a rule of unwritten law pertaining 
to proper social conduct. 
(3)   An unlawful act can be imputed to its author if it results from his fault 
or from a cause for which he is answerable according to law or 
common opinion. 
 
The claims by a victim of corruption in tort under Dutch law are considered 
below in the light of the provisions of Art. 6:162 DCC. 
6.5.1 The Claim against the Agent  
Art. 3 of the Civil Law Convention that is in force in the Netherlands provides 
that parties to the Convention shall ensure that their national laws provide 
persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption to have the right to 
initiate an action in order to obtain full compensation for such damage. Such 
compensation may cover material damage, loss of profits and non-pecuniary 
loss. The persons who have suffered damage within the meaning of Art 3 CLC 
can be identified from provisions of Art. 2 CLC, which defines corruption as 
the giving or accepting of a bribe which distorts the proper performance of any 
duty or behavior required of the bribe-recipient.178 The victim of corruption is 
that party to whom such duty is owed. This right of performance will most 
usually arise as a result of a contractual undertaking of proper performance in 
an agency relationship. As far as bribery in commercial transactions is 
concerned an action could lie in tort for damages against the agent for breach 
of the duty of proper performance.  
The right of proper performance owed to the principal is also derived from the 
fact that the DCC describes the contract between the principal and his agent as 
a contract of mandate, by which one party the mandatee (lasthebber) assumes 
the obligation to perform juridical acts for the account of the other party, the 
mandatory (lastgever). The acts of the mandatee have legal effect for the 
mandatory as if they had been performed by the mandatory himself.179 The 
mandatee may only act within the limits of the powers vested in him by the 
mandatory and any act performed outside of these limits will have no binding 
effect.180 Where a mandatee acts outside of the authorization granted, the 
mandatory or other party to the juridical act may claim damages for any loss 
sustained as a result of the null act unless he knew or should have known that 
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the mandatee was acting outside the remit of his power or that the mandatee 
had given the third party full information about the extent of his powers.181 
6.5.2 The Claim against the Bribe-Giver 
An action in tort could also lie against the party with whom the principal of the 
bribe-recipient was negotiating i.e. the bribe-giver. There is a general 
obligation to negotiate in ‘good faith’ that is violated where one of the parties 
to the negotiation seeks to undermine the position of the other party, without 
his knowledge, by giving a bribe to his agent. The position of the principal is 
undermined as is the position of other persons competing for business with the 
principal. There is no direct provision in Dutch law for economic torts caused 
by the unlawful interference with another’s business. However, bribery can be 
said to cause injury to all those who have sought to compete freely and fairly 
for a contract. Art. 6:162 DCC provides that ‘… the following are deemed 
tortious: the violation of a right and an act or omission breaching a duty 
imposed by law or a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct.’  
Acting in breach of the legal prohibitions against bribery in commercial 
activity under Art. 328ter DPC is clearly an unlawful act. However, the 
question may be raised whether the prohibition in Art. 328ter DPC is intended 
to protect the principal or the losing competitor claiming to have suffered 
unjustly as a result of the act of bribery by the bribe-giver. Art. 6:163 DCC 
provides that there is no obligation to repair the damage if the standard 
breached does not serve to protect against damage such as that suffered by the 
person suffering the loss. The argument can be made that Art. 328terDPC does 
not contemplate the injury suffered by persons whose economic interests are 
injured by acts of bribery. However, the counter-argument can be made that in 
the case of bribery, the bribe-giver violates the standard set by the statutory 
prohibition against bribery as well as the general duty of good faith owed to 
the principal as the other party in a contract negotiation and as such is an act 
that can be deemed tortious within the meaning of Art. 6:162 DCC.  
Apart from this, there seems to be a strong case to suggest that the term 
‘unlawful’ in Art. 6:162 DCC will create liability on the part of the bribe-giver 
with regard to anyone who has suffered injury as a result of an act of bribery. 
The duty that is breached is against the duty of care which is due in society. 
The Dutch Supreme Court in the famous Lindenbaum-Cohen case ruled on the 
meaning of an unlawful act arising out of non-contractual liability. This case 
involved a printer who had given bribes to employees of his competitors to 
share information about their principals. The Supreme Court stated that an 
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action could lie against Cohen, the printer, even though there was no 
contractual undertaking between him and the employer of the persons bribed. 
The court held that under the term unlawful act is to be understood ‘an act of 
omission which violates another person’s right or conflicts with the 
defendant’s statutory duty, or is contrary either to good morals or to the care 
which is due in society with regard to another’s person or property.’182 The 
concept of tort according to this case is to be understood to apply to cases of 
performance or non-performance by a person that is against good morals or the 
duty to take care, which is owed in the eyes of society to another person or 
property and which results in an obligation to redress such damage as may be 
caused as a result of such action.183 
As such, the principal of the disloyal agent or any other party that has suffered 
injury as a result of the unlawful acts of the bribe-giver will have a right under 
Dutch law to sue for damages in tort for the breach of the statutory duty not to 
act in violation of mandatory law. 
6.6 Compensation for Damages 
The bribe-giver in making a payment to an agent seeks to distort the 
relationship between the agent and principal to his own advantage and to the 
disadvantage of the principal. This fact alone constitutes harm to the principal. 
Whether or not the actions of the agent taking the bribe result in a contract 
between the principal and the bribe-giver, there has been a failure of the duty 
of proper performance by the disloyal act of the agent. Where such a failure of 
performance results in any material damage, loss of profits or non-pecuniary 
loss to the person to whom the duty of proper performance is owed, there is a 
right to initiate an action in order to obtain full compensation for such 
damage.184  
                                                     
 
182  HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919 161 (Lindenbaum-Cohen). This ruling is codified in Art. 
6:162(2) DCC, which states that except where there is a ground for justification, the following 
acts are deemed tortious: the violation of a right, or act or omission violating a statutory duty 
or rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct. Art. 6:162(3) DCC states that a 
tortfeasor is responsible for the commission of a tort if it is due to his fault or to a cause for 
which he is accountable by law or pursuant to generally accepted principles.  
183  A. Hartkamp, Chapter 8 Law of Obligations, in J. Chorus, P. Gerver, E. Hondius (Eds.), 
Introduction to Dutch Law, Id., Note 111 above, at p. 146. See also J. van Dunne, 
Verbintenissenrecht: onrechtmatige daad en overige verbintenissen, id., Note 177 above, at pp. 
141-43. 
184   See Art. 3 CLC. In addition it is useful to refer to the provisions of the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference, Outline Edition, Sellier, 2009, on this point. It provides in Book 6 Art. 2:208 
that:  
‘Loss caused to a person as a result of an unlawful impairment of that person’s 
exercise of a profession or conduct of a trade is legally relevant damage. (2) Loss 
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6.6.1 Damages for Non-Performance of an Obligation 
The principal whose agent has taken a bribe may be entitled to damages under 
certain circumstances. Art. 6:74 DCC provides that ‘[e]very failure of an 
obligation shall require the obligor to repair the damage to which the obligee 
suffers therefrom, unless the failure is not attributable to the obligor.’ Where 
the non-performance is not attributable to the agent, there can be no claim in 
damages.185 The principal who can show that a loss has been suffered that was 
caused by the act of receipt of a bribe by an agent is entitled to damages. The 
plaintiff may claim damage for loss to property, rights and interests and any 
other prejudice suffered to the plaintiff’s property.186 The courts have some 
discretion in determining the extent of damage to be claimed. Art. 6:97 allows 
the court to assess the damage in a manner most appropriate to its nature. 
Where the extent of the damage cannot be determined precisely, it shall be 
estimated by the court.187 To establish a right to damages is, however, no easy 
task because of (1) the lack of information available to the principal; (2) the 
need to show that the principal has suffered quantifiable damage; and (3) the 
need to establish a causal link between the act of bribery and the damage 
suffered. There has to be a link between the non-performance and the damage 
caused. Art. 6:98 DCC provides that:  
 
‘reparation of damage can only be claimed for damage which is related to the 
event giving rise to the liability of obligor, which, also having regards to the 
nature of the liability and of the damage, can be attributed to him as a result of 
such event.’  
 
Art. 4 of the CLC elaborates further on this requirement for a causal link 
between the act of bribery and the damage caused. Art. 4(1) of the CLC 
provides that: 
  
Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the following conditions to be 
fulfilled in order for the damage to be compensated:  
(1) the defendant has committed or authorized the act of corruption, or 
failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the act of corruption; 
(2) the plaintiff has suffered damage; and 
(3) there is a causal link between the act of corruption and the damage; 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
caused to a consumer as a result of unfair competition is also legally relevant damage 
if Community or national law so provides.’ 
185   See Art. 6:75 DCC provides that ‘a failure in performance cannot be attributed to the obligor if 
it is neither due to his fault not his account pursuant to the law, a juridical act or generally 
accepted principles.’ 
186  See Art. 6:95 DCC. 
187  See Art. 6:97 DCC. 
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As regards damage caused by unlawful (tortious) acts, Art. 6:162 DCC states 
in broad terms that ‘a person who commits an unlawful (tortious) act towards 
another which can be imputed to him, must repair the damage which the other 
person suffers as a consequence thereof.’ The tortious act must be imputable to 
the party to be sued.  
In short, the following conditions must be met for an action with respect to 
compensation for damages resulting from corruption to lie. Firstly, it must be 
shown that the party to be sued committed or authorized the act of corruption, 
or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the act of corruption. Since bribery 
occurs in secrecy, this is a high threshold to meet unless there is evidence 
forthcoming from the parties to the bribery transaction. This could occur where 
there is an attempt from either of these parties to hold the other to the terms of 
the bribery agreement where there has been a falling out. However, in the 
absence of such a conflict, and in the majority of cases where the transaction 
proceeds smoothly, there will be little incentive from the parties to the 
transaction to provide the evidence needed to overcome this first hurdle. 
Independent evidence could be uncovered by forensic accounting and auditing. 
This is a difficult process as most bribery transactions will occur ‘off the 
books.’ 
In recognition of the difficulty this hurdle represents, Art. 10 CLC requires 
that:   
(1) Each Party shall, in its internal law, take any necessary measures for the 
annual accounts of companies to be drawn up clearly and give a true and 
fair view of the company’s financial position. 
(2) With a view to preventing acts of corruption, each Party shall provide in 
its internal law for auditors to confirm that the annual accounts present a 
true and fair view of the company’s financial position. 
 
Art. 11 CLC requires that ‘[e]ach party shall provide in its internal law for 
effective procedures for the acquisition of evidence in civil proceedings arising 
from an act of corruption.’ Effective internal control mechanisms may help 
detect that a bribe has been paid and help in the establishment of the fact that 
the bribe-giver indeed paid a bribe.188  
Secondly, the party bringing the tort claim must show that damage has been 
suffered. This is a difficult requirement to establish within the context of an 
                                                     
 
188  This will also help to provide a company with the information that a violation of the anti-
corruption rules may have occurred and indicate to such a company whether measures such as 
voluntary reporting should be undertaken, depending on the extent of exposure such a 
company has to legislative regimes such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or the UK 
Bribery Act of 2010. 
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agency relationship. Where the bribery transaction has been successful and the 
party offering the bribe has entered into a contract with the principal of the 
bribed agent, the contract itself can only represent damage to the principal 
where the terms were grossly unfair or misleading. As Salomonson points out, 
in most cases it will be difficult for the principal to establish (1) that he has 
suffered damage and (2) the quantum of such damage.189 In most cases proof 
of damage will only be possible where the agent has negotiated clearly 
unacceptable conditions, such as the purchase of products above the market 
price.190 In most instances, however, the act of bribery will lead to a contract 
that is beneficial to the principal, who has agreed to enter into the contract on 
the terms specified. This is a major difficulty in proving damage sufficient to 
found a claim in cases of bribery where a subsequent contract has been 
concluded between the principal and the bribe-giver.  
A third hurdle that must be passed is the requirement for a causal link between 
the act of corruption and the damage suffered. If it is in the first place difficult 
to establish that damage has occurred to the principal then the issue of 
causality becomes moot. Apart from this, the causal link limits the sphere of 
victims that can claim for compensation. The fact that a corporation gave a 
bribe to construct a bridge that consequently fell down and injured a person 
may give rise to a suit for negligence but it will be hard to establish a direct 
causal link between the bribe and the bridge collapsing. The direct cause would 
be the negligent construction rather than the remote possibility of the influence 
of a bribe in the negotiation of the contract. It is not sufficient that an act of 
bribery took place; it must also be demonstrable that the plaintiff has suffered 
damage that can be attributable to the act of bribery. This proof of damage will 
in the majority of cases be difficult to achieve.  
6.6.2 Joint and Several Liability 
Both the bribe-giver and the bribe-recipient are jointly and severally liable for 
damages to the principal. It is not clear whether the bribe-giver and the bribe-
recipient can have recourse to each other in dividing up the claim. Art. 4(2) 
CLC provides that ‘Each Party shall provide in its internal law that, if several 
defendants are liable for damage for the same corrupt activity, they shall be 
jointly and severally liable.’ Similarly, Art. 6:101 DCC provides that both 
parties are liable for the portion of the damage that each in their mutual 
relationship has occasioned and that they are obliged to come to an agreement 
regarding damages and costs. Art. 6:101 DCC further provides that damages 
will be in proportion with the extent to which the damage can be attributed to 
                                                     
 
189   See L. Salomonson, Bribery, id., Note 12 above, at pp. 74-75. 
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each party, which depends on the circumstances of the case. This gives the 
judge room to look at the circumstances in coming to a decision. De Savornin 
Lohman is of the opinion that this will in most instances lead to the greater 
portion of the damage being borne by the bribe-giver.191 This is also in keeping 
with Art. 6:2 DCC, which requires that obligations meet with the requirement 
of reasonableness and fairness. 
6.7 Dismissal of the Agent 
The agent of a principal who takes a bribe is usually a direct agent who has 
sufficient authority to bind the principal and who was acting in the name of the 
principal at the time that the contract is concluded.192 Such an agency contract 
is a general contract of employment where the agent undertakes to perform 
work in the service of the principal for remuneration for a given period.193 In 
this respect there is a duty to act bona fides. The principal and the agent are 
under an obligation to act as a good employer and a good employee.194 Where 
an agent has taken a bribe against the interests of the principal, this can lead to 
the summary dismissal of the agent for ‘urgent reason.’ Art. 7:677 DCC 
provides that each of the parties to a contract of employment may give notice 
of termination of employment for ‘an urgent reason.’ The principal may also 
apply to a court with a request that a contract of employment be set aside for 
‘serious reasons’ under Art. 7:685(1) DCC. Such a ‘serious reason’ will 
include those circumstances which would constitute an ‘urgent reason’ under 
Art. 7:677 DCC.195 
Examples of circumstances that will constitute an ‘urgent reason’ to end an 
employment include circumstances where the agent lacks to a ‘serious degree 
the competence or suitability to carry out the work he has contracted to 
perform,’196 the agent is guilty of theft, embezzlement, fraud or other offenses, 
and thereby ‘ceases to be worthy of the trust of the employer’197 where the 
agent ‘gravely neglects the work to which he is subject under the contract of 
employment,’198 or where the agent becomes or remains unable to perform the 
contracted work due to intent or recklessness.199 
                                                     
 
191   See O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, id., Note 13 
above, at pp. 156-157. 
192  See Art. 3:610(1) DCC. 
193   See Art. 7:610(1) DCC. 
194   See Art. 7:611 DCC. 
195   See Art. 7:685(2) DCC. 
196   See Art. 7:678(2)b DCC. 
197    See Art. 7:678(2)(c) DCC. 
198   See Art. 7:678(2)(k) DCC. 
199   See Art. 7:678(2)(l) DCC. 
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In any of these circumstances which may easily result where the agent has 
acted contrary to the interest of the principal by taking a bribe to influence a 
transaction in favor a third party, an aggrieved principal may not ‘reasonably 
be required to allow the contract of employment to continue by a court of 
law.’200 As such, the act of bribery may give the principal the right to terminate 
the contract of employment with the agent with immediate effect and such an 
agent will be liable to the principal in damages.201 
6.8 The Collective Claim 
With regard to empowering litigants to file private actions for corruption, there 
are mechanisms under Dutch law that encourage small claimants to pool their 
claims and resources together to bring a collective action. Art. 305a DCC 
allows for foundations of associations to bring a representative action on behalf 
of a group of persons with similar interests to the extent that the articles of the 
foundation promote this interest.202 This has led to the growth of specialized 
claim associations.203 The right to bring an action is subject to a major 
restriction. Such a foundation has no locus standi to bring the claim unless it 
can show that it has first made an attempt to consult with the defendant to 
resolve the issue.204  
Art. 305a DCC serves primarily to encourage the voluntary settlement of 
disputes regarding harm suffered. Only where there has been an attempt at 
voluntary settlement can an action be filed in court. Again, there is a restriction 
regarding the remedy. The foundation may seek a declaratory order from the 
court against the defendant; however, such an action will not be allowed for 
the purpose of seeking monetary compensation.205 As such, the Art. 305a DCC 
foundation has a rather restricted scope. As has been pointed out these 
restrictions have taken the ‘sting’ out of its provisions. ‘It can be used for 
eliciting declaratory judgments on wrongfulness and for obtaining injunctive 
                                                     
 
200    See Art. 7:678(1) DCC. 
201   See Art. 7:677(3) DCC. 
202    Art. 3:305a(1) DCC. 
203   Art. 3:305(a) DCC, group actions are by and large self-regulated. In recent times there has 
been an initiative led by the Dutch lawyer Jurjem Lemstra with other stakeholders to produce a 
on a claim code for ‘Article 3:305a DCC foundations’ (Claimstichtingen). The Claim code was 
entered into effect in July 2011. 
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relief, but strictly speaking it cannot be used to legally compel the tortfeasor to 
compensate.’206  
Apart from the assignment of individual claims to a foundation under Art. 305a 
since 2005 under the Wet Collectieve Afwikkelingen Massaschade WCAM 
(Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act) there is the possibility of a 
collective action for mass damage.207 The collective action under WCAM is a 
process of reaching a settlement between all parties that are affected by a 
damage208 causing event that is declared binding by a court of law.209 The 
Court has a supervisory jurisdiction over the agreement and may reject the 
agreement on several grounds.210 However, the main thrust of the WCAM is 
the voluntary and amicable settlement of disputes.211  
It must be pointed out that the Dutch collective action is sui generis and very 
distinguishable from the more commonly encountered class action that is 
typical of the US legal system.212 Indeed the collective action has different 
goals than the typical class action for damages. As such, despite the 
                                                     
 
206   T. Arons, W. van Boom, ‘Beyond tulips and cheese: exporting mass securities claim’, 
European Business Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 6, 2010, at pp. 862-864, for a short history of the 
case law that is codified in Art. 305(a) DCC.  
207  Wet Collectieve Afwikkelingen Massaschade WCAM 2005. 
208  Art. 907(2) DCC. 
209    Art. 7:907(1)  DCC provides that a collective agreement is ‘[a]n agreement concerning the 
payment of compensation for damage caused by an event or similar events concluded between 
a foundation or association with full legal competence and one or more other parties which 
have committed themselves by this agreement to pay compensation for this damage may, at the 
joint request of the parties that concluded the agreement, be declared binding by the court on 
persons to whom the damage was caused so long as the foundation or association represents 
the interests of these persons pursuant to its articles of association.’ 
210   Art. 907(3) DCC provides that ‘The court shall reject the request if: (a) the agreement does not 
comply with the provisions of paragraph 2; (b) the amount of the compensation awarded is not 
reasonable having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the damage, the ease and speed with which 
the compensation can be obtained and the possible causes of the damage; (c) insufficient 
security is provided for the payment of the claims of persons on whose behalf the agreement 
was concluded; (d) the agreement does not provide for the independent determination of the 
compensation to be paid pursuant to the agreement; (e) the interests of the persons on whose 
behalf the agreement was concluded are otherwise not adequately safeguarded; (f) the 
foundation or association referred to in paragraph l is not sufficiently representative of the 
interests of persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded; (g) the group of persons on 
whose behalf the agreement was concluded is not large enough to justify a declaration that the 
agreement is binding.’  
211   For procedure under the WCAM see T. Arons, W. van Boom, ‘Beyond tulips and cheese: 
exporting mass securities claim’, id., Note 206 above, at pp. 865-876. 
212  See generally, T. Arons, W. van Boom, id., at pp. 857-883. See also H. van Lith, The Dutch 
Collective Settlement Act and Private International Law, Maklu, Apeldoorn, 2011, at pp. 13-
18; Guidance on the Dutch Collective Settlement Act 2005 by the Ministry of Justice,  
available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/richtlijnen/2008/06/24/de-nederlandse-wet-collectieve-afwikkeling-
massaschade/litwcamfrenknl.pdf. 
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introduction of the WCAM in the Netherlands, it has been rightly remarked 
that the class action is not a feature of European litigation.213 For the small 
claimant seeking to file a private action for bribery, the focus of collective 
actions on voluntary settlements in the Netherlands offers a different approach 
to the developed class actions mechanism of a country like the US.  
6.9 Observations 
The normative framework for private remedies for corruption in the 
Netherlands is found in the provisions of the UNCC, the CLC and in the 
provisions of the DPC and DCC. The DPC underwent reform to reflect the 
changes that have taken place in the international framework regarding 
corruption, with the result that domestic and foreign acts of corruption are 
criminalized in the Netherlands. These instruments form the platform upon 
which the issue of private remedies for corruption takes shape. The definition 
of corruption under Dutch private law is restricted to bribery. Despite the lack 
of corruption cases prosecuted in the Netherlands, there has been significant 
legislative activity that has resulted in an anti-corruption strategy that 
condemns corruption and is, in principle, committed to providing not just state 
prosecutors but victims of corruption with a means of fighting the negative 
consequences of corruption.  
This broad policy position is, however, limited by the ambit of the rules in the 
civil code. In general terms, the position of the penal and private law is that 
bribery can only be said to occur in a relationship between the principal of an 
agent who has acted in breach of the duty of trust, the agent, and the bribe-
giver who engineers the breach of the duty. Two of these three parties are in a 
contractual relationship. It is the existence of the contractual relationship 
between the principal and the bribe-recipient that creates a situation where the 
bribe recipient has the power to influence the coming into existence of a 
contract between the principal and the bribe-giver. This grant of power in an 
agency relationship, such as that between the principal and the bribe-recipient, 
is subject to the limitation that it be exercised in the best interests of the 
principal. Where this power is exercised contrary to the interests of the 
principal and in favor of the bribe-giver, this results in a misuse of power and 
the commission of a legal wrong, and constitutes a breach of mandate with 
legal consequences. 
                                                     
 
213 W. van Boom, M. Loos, ‘Effective Enforcement of Consumer Law in Europe: Synchronizing 
Private, Public, and Collective Mechanisms’, January 2008, at p. 7, Electronic Copy available 
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The Dutch Civil Code lists four primary areas where a victim may claim rights 
with regard to a relationship tainted by corruption: firstly, with regard to the 
validity of the agreement; secondly, the right to the return of the bribe or other 
inducement; thirdly, in the right to bring an action for compensation for 
damages; and lastly, in the position of the employer affected by corruption on 
the part of his employee. All of these issues flow out of the relationship 
between the bribe-giver, the bribe-recipient and the principal of the bribe-
recipient. Beyond this narrow category of persons directly involved in the 
bribery transactions, there is little scope within Dutch law for actions by the 
indirect victims that may suffer the consequences of corrupt actions. For such 
indirect victims, their protection against corruption remains in public criminal 
law and administrative processes such as the BIBOB law. As far as Dutch 
private law is concerned, however, the primary victim of the act of corruption 
is the principal of the disloyal agent.  
The Primary Agreement: The Dutch rules prohibiting private bribery are silent 
as to the status of transactions entered into in violation of the prohibition. Yet, 
there is a minimum standard established by Art. 8 CLC Corruption, which 
stipulates for the invalidation of any contract or clause of a contract providing 
for corruption, as well as nullity where a party’s consent to a contract has been 
undermined by an act of corruption. These provisions provide a minimum 
content to the approach the courts must take.  
A primary ground for invalidity or nullity is found in the provisions of Art. 
3:44 DCC. The provisions of the Dutch Civil code and the jurisprudence on 
this matter support the conclusion that a primary contract providing for bribery 
would be a nullity for being contrary to good morals and public order as well 
as for being in violation of an imperative statutory provision. An agreement to 
pay a bribe is contrary to good and public order because it commits the actors 
to carrying out an action that violates an imperative statutory provision. 
The Secondary Agreement: The question of transaction validity also extends to 
the subsequent contract that comes into being between the person to whom the 
bribe-recipient owed a duty of proper performance and the bribe-giver. This 
contract is not in conflict with the imperative statutory conditions laid down by 
Art. 328ter DPC, which only applies to the contract that is entered into 
between the giver and the bribe-recipient. Here the issue of validity centers on 
the sufficiency of consent. Factors that may undermine the consent to a 
contract include the abuse of circumstances, error, fraud and improper 
performance of representational authority. Fraud is a possible ground on which 
the principal can seek the nullity of a contract. A bribe is certainly evidence of 
withholding information or inaccurate information to the principal within the 
meaning of the Art. 3:44(2) Civil Code. This provides the principal with the 
grounds to avoid the contract for which he claims that had he been fully 
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informed he would not have entered into the contract. However, proof of fraud 
is a very high threshold that is not likely to be met in the typical bribery case.  
Error is a promising ground for the application of nullity of the secondary 
contract. Art. 6:228 DCC provides that a contract can be annulled which has 
been entered into under the influence of error and which would not have been 
entered into had there been a correct assessment of the facts. Some writers 
argue that Art. 6:228 DCC is not written for circumstances such as bribery but 
rather situations where the party suffering under the error has entered into an 
agreement different from what he thought he was receiving. This is clearly not 
the case with the contract between the bribe-giver and the employee/principal 
where both parties are quite clear as to the subject matter of the contract in 
question. However, the crucial question remains whether the principal would 
have entered into the contract had he been aware of all the circumstances 
surrounding the contract.  
To the extent that the party giving the bribe was aware that the consent of the 
principal was being undermined by the bribery transaction with the principal’s 
agent, Art. 6:288(b) DCC could apply to the advantage of the principal where 
the principal can show that the actions of the agent or intermediary were 
expressly forbidden by the corporation and that this was done in such a way as 
to make it reasonable to assume that the agent was acting contrary to the 
wishes of the principal. Under such circumstances, there would be no 
imputation of the knowledge of the agent to the principal within the meaning 
of Art. 3:61(2) DCC. Furthermore, where it is reasonable from public facts to 
assume that the agent was acting without authority, the bribe-giver would 
arguably have a duty to inform the principal under Art. 6:288(b) DCC. This 
lays the foundation for nullification on the ground of error.  
With the increasing availability of codes of conduct and self-regulatory 
frameworks which expressly state that acts of bribery are a violation of 
company policies, it can be argued that this puts the potential bribe-giver on 
notice and provides sufficient notice for a reasonable assumption that an agent 
was acting outside the scope of authority. On such a basis, the act of bribery 
could fall into the category of information that should be disclosed by the 
bribe-giver to the principal of the bribe-recipient in order to enable the 
principal to make a correct assessment about whether or not to proceed with 
the contract. The non-disclosure by the bribe-giver is arguable ground to 
nullify the subsequent contract, should the principal desire to do so. 
Right of Return of the Bribe: If a contract is null in the eyes of the law, it is 
deemed never to have existed. What occurs then in respect of the performance 
that has already occurred under the null contract? Art. 7:403 DCC and the 
jurisprudence on this matter leads to the conclusion that the principal is in his 
rights to expect from his agent a declaration of all that he has received, 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
327 
 
including the bribe money. In the Goudse Bouwmeester case, for example, the 
principal of the agent was allowed to keep the bribe money. More controversial 
is the question whether the bribe-giver has a right to the return of the bribe 
money? The Dutch Supreme Court in Lotisico ruled that an agreement that is 
entered into contrary to the law is a nullity and as such has no legal 
consequences, and that the return of what is unjustifiably given can be 
demanded. However, if the bribe-giver is entitled to a return of the bribe as an 
undue payment, the bribe-recipient is also by the same logic entitled to some 
form of return for his performance under the contract. This is hardly possible, 
and Art. 6:211 DCC stipulates that where a performance in kind is made on the 
ground of a null agreement and does not deserve to be recompensed in money, 
then the rescission or ‘unmaking’ of the reciprocal action or the repayment of 
the value thereof is ruled out. Following this reasoning, the company that has 
given a bribe and the agent who receives a bribe are parties to a contract 
which, if it comes to light, is a nullity. Any performances made in respect of 
this null contract for reasons of reasonableness and fairness, will lie where they 
have fallen. 
Compensation: The second aspect of the question for civil remedies is the right 
to institute an action for compensation for damage suffered. The Dutch 
Supreme Court in the case of Lindenbaum-Cohen has given a broad 
interpretation to the notion of an ‘unlawful act.’ It applies to a performance or 
non-performance by a person that is against good morals or the duty to take 
care of that which in the eyes of society is owed to another person or property. 
A violation of this results in an obligation to redress such damage as may be 
caused by such an action. Clearly the act of bribery constitutes an unlawful act 
as a violation of the right of the principal to the proper performance of his 
agent. It is also a violation of an imperative statutory duty not to give a bribe or 
other inducement. However, in order for an action for compensation to take 
place there must be proof of damage. In bribery cases this is typically a very 
high burden to discharge. 
The right to sue is restricted by the conditions that need to be met by the 
person seeking to be compensated. These conditions circumscribe the scope of 
persons who can be considered ‘victims’ under the normative framework for 
private remedies under Dutch law. Art. 4 CLC makes it clear that it is not 
sufficient that an act of bribery took place; it must also be demonstrable that 
the plaintiff has suffered damage that can be attributable to the act of bribery. 
The major problem facing the potential plaintiff in actions for compensation is 
the proof of damage and the quantification of such damage. For this reason it is 
likely that the right to private remedies for damage arising from corruption 
may be manifested primarily in its use as a shield to avoid liability under a 
contract by seeking a declaration of nullity, rather than as a sword to claim 
compensation for damage under the existing provisions of Dutch law.   
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6.10 Conclusion 
The victim of corruption under Dutch law is restricted to the narrow category 
of the principal of the disloyal agent. This principal represents the direct victim 
that has suffered damages as a result of corrupt actions. It is the betrayal of the 
position of trust by the agent that founds the private claim. However, the CLC 
arguably moves beyond this narrow conceptual basis and speaks of ‘any 
person’ who has suffered damage. The challenge therefore remains to enable 
the indirect victim, who may not strictly fall within the principal/agent 
relationship, to bring claims for redress for breach of non-contractual 
obligations that occurred as a result of acts of corruption. Dutch law does not 
recognize a broader category of victims. The types of remedies and categories 
of persons that may bring an action are restricted by the fact that claims can 
only be brought by the party to whom the agent owed a duty of performance.  
The primary agreement to give a bribe is shrouded in secrecy and will only see 
the light of day where there is a falling out between the parties to the 
transactions. This means that rigorous mandatory forensic accounting, which 
exposes illegal transactions, will remain the primary method of fighting 
corruption related to the primary agreement. The secondary agreement 
between the offeror of the bribe and the principal of the disloyal agent may be 
declared invalid following an action by a dissatisfied principal who can show 
that consent was impaired. However, questions of compensation for damages 
are made almost unrealistic given the high hurdles of causality that must be 
scaled. 
Does this satisfy the call for private remedies for victims of corruption? The 
very narrow possibilities that exist for the victim under Dutch Law call for a 
critical look at how the civil law can be a more effective tool in the fight against 
corruption. Nothing significant has been added or changed in Dutch private law 
by the UNCC and CLC regarding redress for the person who has suffered harm 
as a result of corruption. The right to compensation for damage for the victim of 
corruption is certainly better acknowledged, but there has been no broadening of 
a private remedy beyond the scope that already existed under the DCC. 
.   
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CHAPTER 7  
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 4-6 have looked at models for private remedies for corruption in the 
United States, England and the Netherlands. This chapter focuses on 
international arbitration, a legal process that plays a key role in the regulatory 
environment of international business.1 For centuries transacting parties from 
different jurisdictions have resorted to arbitration as the method of choice to 
resolve disputes of an international commercial character.2 Arbitration is a 
process of dispute settlement that is set up and controlled by the parties to the 
dispute. It is founded on the principle of party autonomy and underscored by 
the principle of freedom of contract. This private system of commercial dispute 
settlement is ‘held in place by a complex system of national laws and 
international treaties.’3 Although set up by private persons, it has binding force 
because decisions of the arbitration panel are enforced by the state where 
parties do not voluntarily comply. International commercial arbitration is a 
                                                     
 
1   This chapter is based on a paper presented at a at the Conference on the Civil Law 
Consequences of Corruption ZERP, Center for European Law and Politics, Bremen, University 
of Bremen, Germany on 15 March 2008 and subsequently published as A. Makinwa, Civil 
Remedies for International Corruption: The Role of International Arbitration in the Fight 
against Corruption, in O. Meyer (Ed.), Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Schriftenreihe 
des Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik an der Universität Bremen), ZERP, Vol. 3, Nomos 
Verlag, Baden Baden, 2009, pp. 257-280.  
2   For a brief historical review of international arbitration see A. Redfern, M. Hunter, Law and 
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2004, pp. 2-5. 
They describe the transformation of arbitration from a primitive form of settling disputes to the 
preeminent form of settling international commercial disputes. They state, ‘… at its core, 
international commercial arbitration remains much as it always was. It is a private method of 
dispute resolution, chosen by parties themselves as an effective way of putting an end to 
disputes between them, without recourse to the courts of law. It is conducted in different 
countries and against different legal and cultural backgrounds with a striking lack of formality 
… it does not look like a legal proceeding at all.’ Id., at p. 1. 
3  Id.  
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process that is neither fully private not fully public. It is ‘a hybrid’ form of 
access to justice that straddles the junction between private and public law.4 
The issue of private remedies for victims of corruption has received special 
impetus by the provisions of Art 35 UNCC that requires States to provide 
persons that have suffered damage as the result of corrupt acts, the means to 
institute legal proceedings to claim compensation.5 A legal proceeding is 
generally defined as ‘the orderly sequence of events that constitutes the 
progression of a lawsuit or judicial procedure from the time of commencement, 
through all acts and occurrences, until and including the execution of the final 
judgment.’6 The legal proceeding characterizes a system of public justice 
where the state intervenes in disagreements to provide solutions in the interest 
of the disputing parties and ultimately to society.  While Art 35 UNCC refers 
to legal proceedings and not to international arbitration, its provisions do call 
on states to ensure redress for all victims. To the extent that international 
arbitration may influence this private right of redress, the role it plays in 
disputes involving contracts tainted by corruption, should be assessed. 
Furthermore, the presence of an arbitration clause in the international contracts 
that characterise grand corruption means that the primary forum for the 
settlement of disputes involving contracts tainted by international corruption 
would not be legal proceedings in a national court, but rather by international 
arbitration. It is therefore necessary to define and examine the role of the 
international arbitration in an examination of the rights of private individuals to 
seek remedies for harm suffered as a result of corruption.  
The chapter examines the response of the arbitrator to matters tainted by 
corruption.7 It looks at the effect of the world-wide convergence of mandatory 
                                                     
 
4   Redfern and Hunter describe international commercial arbitration as a hybrid. ‘It begins as a 
private agreement between the parties. It continues by way of private proceedings, in which the 
wishes of the parties are of great importance. Yet it ends with an award that has binding legal 
force and effect and which, on appropriate conditions, the courts of most countries in the world 
will recognise and enforce. The private process has a public effect….’ Id., at p. 11. 
5  Emphasis added. 
6   Webster’s Law Dictionary, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, 2006. 
7  This is a broader question than the technical issue of the arbitrability of a contract tainted by 
corruption. As the following sections show, there is broad agreement that a tribunal has the 
authority to entertain matters that are tainted by corruption. This chapter, however, looks 
beyond the basic jurisdictional issue of arbitrability to the compatibility of private arbitration 
or self-regulation with the resolution of disputes that have a public dimension. The case being 
made here is that the principles of arbitrability, separability of the arbitration clause and 
competence-competence, which preserve the right of the arbitration panel to entertain matters 
tainted by corruption, are premised on the foundation that the rights at issue are essentially 
private rights. The worldwide criminalization of corruption emphasizes the public dimension 
of matters involving contracts tainted by corruption. The extent to which a private right 
centered mechanism can legitimately resolve matters involving public rights raises questions 
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rules regarding international corruption as well as the emergence of 
international anti-corruption public policy on the function of the arbitrator. The 
two models of response identified in this chapter strengthen the position of 
victim of corruption by bringing an element of transparency into the arbitration 
process regarding contracts sanctioned by corruption. However, these 
responses to matters tainted by corruption also raise significant questions about 
the expanding scope of the arbitral panel into areas of public law and public 
rights and the legitimacy of the arbitration process when it takes on such a role. 
The appropriateness of international arbitration as a forum for settlement of 
disputes tainted by corruption which have a criminal public dimension is 
questioned to the extent that private arbitration may not adequately cater for 
the harm suffered by all parties who have suffered harm as a result of 
corruption or be capable as acting as a custodian for the public good. 
7.2 The Arbitration Panel and the Victim of Corruption 
Art 35 UNCC speaks in terms of victims of corruption. From the perspective 
of the arbitral panel, victims of corrupt actions fall into two groups: those 
directly involved in the transaction as a party to the contract in dispute and 
those indirect victims that are affected by the consequences of the contract.8  
Direct victims who are parties to the contract in question and have suffered 
damage as a result of corrupt acts may raise corruption as a defense to 
obligations arising under the contract in dispute. While arbitration typically 
affects the private rights of parties that agree to subject their private disputes to 
international arbitration, many contracts acquired via government procurement 
or bidding process have a public dimension. Where such contracts go to 
arbitration the question arises as to the proper role of the arbitration panel 
when faced by such quasi-public matters. The position of the indirect victims 
that lie beyond the commercial transaction tainted by corruption raises 
questions about the legitimacy of the international arbitration forum to resolve 
disputes where the public dimension impinges on these ‘ultimate’ victims.9 
                                                                                                                            
 
about the role of the arbitration panel in the fight against corruption. This chapter is centered 
on the fact that the contract tainted by corruption is a contract that is in violation of the law 
applicable to the contract in most major arbitration centers today. 
8  Art. 35 UNCC speaks of a victim as an ‘entity’ or ‘person’ who has ‘suffered damage’ as a 
result of an act of corruption. UN Convention against Corruption New York, 31 October 2003, 
in force 14 December 2005, 2349 UNTS, p. 41; (2004) 43 ILM 37 (hereinafter, the UNCC). 
9  The following quotation sums up the heart of the legitimacy question: ‘Their meetings are 
secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully 
disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes between 
investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems 
questioned and environmental regulations challenged. And it is all in the name of protecting 
the rights of foreign investors under the North American Free Trade Agreement.’ IISD 
Publications Centre, Private Rights Public Problems, A Guide to NAFTA’s Controversial 
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Some examples from investment arbitration highlight the plight of such 
indirect victims in transactions affected by allegations of corruption before a 
tribunal. Examples are damage suffered by persons living next to a toxic 
landfill,10  the drinkers of water contaminated by chemicals, and states trying 
to undo consequences of massive fraud in a procurement bidding process.11  In 
these cases the victims affected by the contract tainted by corruption are made 
visible. This underscores the fact that corruption is not a ‘victimless’ crime. 
The basic rights and security of citizens are often compromised by acts of 
international bribery that distort free market conditions, compromise the 
provision of goods and services, and deter social development.  
7.3 Implications of Criminalization  
International arbitration in cases involving commercial corruption now takes 
place within a new normative framework. The existence of this new normative 
order is demonstrated by the global reach of the recent UNCC signed by 140 
countries.12 The international repudiation of corruption and the criminalization 
of public and private bribery in international business transactions set contracts 
tainted by corruption apart as originating from the commission of a legal 
wrong.   This framework has an impact on the role and possible obligations of 
the arbitrator and also raises questions about the appropriateness of the private 
agreement to arbitrate disputes that have a public dimension. While the focus 
of the anti-corruption rules is on formal legal proceedings, it certainly does 
influence the normative framework within which the arbitration panel must act. 
The arbitration panel is an integral part of the justice system and its actions 
should be consistent with the international regulatory framework against 
corruption.  
With the wide reaching criminalization of international corruption, the relative, 
culture specific perspective regarding corruption has given way, in certain 
aspects and to a certain extent, to a common standard.13 For international 
arbitration, such a ‘universal’ state of affairs implies that the effect of anti-
corruption rules on arbitration would be relatively consistent regardless of the 
                                                                                                                            
 
Chapter on Investor Rights, New York Times, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development and the World Wildlife Fund, 11 March 2001 available at 
www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_citizensguide.pdf, accessed on 11 November 2011. 
10  See W. Dodge, ‘Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 ILM 36 
(2001), and Mexico v. Metalclad Corporation, 2001 B.C.S.C. 664, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 95, No. 4 (October 2001), pp. 910-919. 
11  Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26. 
12  For a normative analysis of anti-corruption regulations see M. Bukovansky, Corruption is Bad: 
Normative Dimensions of the Anti-Corruption Movement, Working Paper, No. 2002/5, 
Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1962. 
13  A. Makinwa, ‘The rules regulating transnational bribery: achieving a common standard?’, 
International Business Law Journal, Iss. 1, 2007, p. 17. 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
333 
 
law applicable to the contract. This situation lends itself to the notion of a 
consistent standard to be adopted by the arbitration panel when faced with 
matters tainted by international corruption.14 This is all the more so because of 
the influence of national law on the implementation of the arbitration process. 
The application of a consistent standard by the arbitration tribunal overcomes 
the problem of divergent national approaches. This is a very welcome 
development because it raises the possibility of treating the primary and 
secondary contract tainted by corruption in a similar fashion regardless of 
whether the contracting parties are from a civil or common law jurisdiction. 
The private sphere of arbitration must interact with the public sphere of 
government power when it comes to the recognition and enforcement of 
awards. In this sense, the fate of a private award ultimately rests with the 
public authorities.15 This is particularly true of international arbitration where 
an agreement reached by private agreement at the international level can only 
be enforced by a domestic national court in the absence of voluntary 
settlement. The generality of arbitration instruments make recognition and 
enforcement by the national courts subject to the compliance with the public 
policy of the country where the award is sought to be enforced. Making 
international arbitration awards subject to the public policy of a State preserves 
the norms of the society and the legitimate expectations of its citizens. 
Examples of this requirement for compliance with public policy are found in 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards16 and the UNCITRAL Model International Arbitration law.17 Both 
instruments stipulate that enforcement of awards will not be allowed where 
                                                     
 
14   In the absence of an international standard there is no moral basis binding the arbitrator. In this 
viewpoint it may be argued that:  
‘[a]rbitrators operate in a morally relative environment, in the sense that the moral 
basis in the evaluation of corruption is specific to each arbitral process. This suggests 
in turn that there could be as many moral systems as there are arbitral processes 
evaluating corruption.’  
See A. Sayed, Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration, 1st edn, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 2004, p. 23. 
15   Hunter and Redfern emphasize that ‘An understanding of the necessary interchange between 
the arbitral process and national systems of law is fundamental to a proper appreciation of 
international commercial arbitration.’ They point out that the interchange with local courts may 
occur at the beginning of the arbitration process with judicial enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement, to intervene in the process itself in the appointment of a tribunal (if this cannot be 
done under the arbitration agreement) and after an award is made to intervene to enforce the 
award. See A. Redfern, M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 
id., Note 2 above, at p. 65. 
16  United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
(the ‘New York’ Convention), New York, 10 June 1958, in force 7 June 1959, 1958, 330 
UNTS p. 3. See also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 
Art. 34 and Art. 36. 
17   UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 Art. 34 and Art. 36. 
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they infringe against the public policy of the state where the award is to be 
enforced.18 The New York Convention provides: 
‘recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may … be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition 
or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country.’19  
Also, awards may be reviewed at the place of the seat of arbitration on limited 
grounds including public policy.20 
The supervisory role of the courts of the seat of arbitration or the place of 
enforcement is crucial in a system of dispute resolution that operates parallel to 
the national courts system because not all matters are capable of settlement by 
arbitration.21  Redfern and Hunter note that: 
‘…it is precisely because arbitration is a private proceeding with public 
consequences that some types of dispute are reserved for national courts, 
whose proceedings are generally in the public domain. It is in this sense that 
they are not capable of settlement by arbitration.’22  
Matters tainted by corruption are matters that are impacted by mandatory rules. 
This raises the fundamental question whether matters of such public dimension 
can properly be the subject matter of private arbitration. This question has for 
the most part been affirmatively answered by most jurisdictions.23  This 
changes the focus of the inquiry in this chapter from whether a matter tainted 
                                                     
 
18  R. Cole, ‘The public policy exception to the New York Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards’, Journal on Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1, 1985-1986, p. 365, at 
p. 368.  
19   Art. 5(2) 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards. 
20   Art. 6 UNCITRAL Model Law. 
21   See 1958 ‘New York’ Convention, (1958), Art. II(1), Art. V(2); Model Law Art. 34(2)(b)(i), 
Art. 36(1)(b)(i).  
22   A. Redfern, M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, id., Note 2 
above, at p. 138. 
23  This question has been answered affirmatively by most western jurisdictions. As Redfern and 
Hunter point out,  
‘the modern approach … that has now received widespread acceptance both 
nationally and internationally, is that an allegation of illegality does not in itself 
deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction. On the contrary, it is generally held that 
the arbitral tribunal is entitled to hear the arguments and receive the evidence and to 
determine for itself the question of illegality.’  
See A. Redfern, M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, 2004, p. 143. 
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by arbitration is arbitrable to whether an arbitration tribunal can be the 
legitimate forum for the settlement of such public policy centered disputes. 
7.4 The Public/Private Divide 
The system of international commercial arbitration is premised on the fact that 
within the private sphere parties are given the freedom to regulate their private 
transactions.24 The state ensures that the legitimate expectations created by 
such private agreements are met by giving to properly constituted agreements 
the force of law. This places the principle of party autonomy at the center of a 
system that caters primarily to private rights. The scope of party autonomy is 
reflective of contract law where parties enter into private agreements that are 
enforced by the public legal process. However, this freedom of contract is 
limited by factors that impinge on the freedom of the parties to the contract or 
by issues that impinge upon the security of society.  The criminalization of 
corruption renders the contract tainted by corruption subject to limitations on 
party autonomy. A private agreement by parties cannot circumvent the rules 
instituted for the protection of the public. 
At the same time, international arbitration is a very necessary response to the 
need to have an effective method of resolving international business disputes in 
a manner that respects the different jurisdictions of participants, ensures a 
quick, efficient and capable resolution of the matters in dispute, is binding on 
the parties and most importantly constitutes a final determination.25 The 
tension between the need for finality and the method and transparency of the 
arbitration process is manageable where the rights involved are purely private 
rights. However, where the arbitration panel is charged with the resolution of 
disputes that have not just a private but also a public character, this tension is 
harder to resolve. 
                                                     
 
24   McConnaughay writes that few principles are as widely recognized as the autonomy of parties 
to international contracts to designate the law that will apply to their transactions and the forum 
in which they will reserve their disputes but that traditionally the scope of this autonomy is 
confined to matters that otherwise would be governed by private law. He states, ‘…Within this 
context, parties to international contracts are free to designate the law or principles that will 
govern their transaction to the exclusion of all otherwise applicable law. They also are free to 
privately arbitrate any disputes that might arise between them to the exclusion of otherwise 
compulsory public court litigation.’ P. McConnaughay, ‘The scope of autonomy in 
international contracts and its relation to economic regulation and development’, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 39, December 2000, pp. 595-656. 
25  Redfern and Hunter in answering the question ‘why arbitrate?’ point out the principal reasons 
why parties to international commercial contracts chose to submit a dispute to arbitration as (a) 
the choice of a ‘neutral’ forum and a ‘neutral’ tribunal; (b) the enforceability of the arbitration 
award; (c) the flexibility of arbitration awards and the confidentiality of the process. See A. 
Redfern, M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, id., Note 2 
above, at pp. 22-23. 
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The system of international arbitration floats upon an amorphous 
categorization of rights as public or private.  This categorization is becoming 
increasingly unclear as the boundary between the private and public spheres 
becomes less distinct. Privatization and government involvement in private 
contracting has blurred the lines between private and public entities in 
international business.   
Matters coming before an international arbitral tribunal may often not be 
strictly private in nature but of a quasi-public character. Not surprisingly, it has 
been argued that ‘to realize the efficiencies of this international system of 
private arbitration, it is necessary to cede to arbitrators the authority to reach 
binding determinations of claims that implicate public rights, and not merely 
private rights.’26 It would seem  that the idea of international arbitration as 
essentially a system based on private rights is giving way to a broader concept 
where it is simply regarded as a method of dispute settlement in international 
commercial transactions regardless of whether the disputed rights are public or 
private.27 
However, the intrusion of a system premised on party autonomy and private 
rights into the area of public rights raises a basic issue of legitimacy of the 
arbitration forum. To what extent can a system of private dispute resolution 
operate in the public sphere? More specifically, what is the implication of the 
criminalization of international corruption and the consequent mandatory 
nature of the substantive domestic rules criminalizing international and public 
bribery on the conduct of international arbitration? Furthermore, corruption in 
international business is concerned to a great extent with contracts where party 
autonomy is limited by public interest. Given the objective of public law to 
protect society from the harm occasioned by acts in breach of public norms, 
what is the responsibility of arbitration panels towards the victims that the 
public law seeks to protect? 
 
 
                                                     
 
26  D. Donovan, K. Greenawalt, Mitsubishi after Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules before Courts 
and International Arbitrators, in L. Mistelis, J. Lew (Eds.), Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2006, p. 10, at p. 13.  
27   See holding of US Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), 
which emphasizes a broad scope for the arbitration panel. The court found that:  
‘The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, 
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes 
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and 
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, 
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.’  
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7.5 Effect of Mandatory Nature of Anti-Corruption Rules 
The widespread adoption of the UNCC28 as well as international and regional 
instruments regulating bribery in international business means that 
international corruption is a crime in most countries. Anti-corruption rules are 
mandatory in nature and the condemnation of corruption is of almost global 
scope. This means that the arbitration panel, when faced with disputes 
involving such corruption is faced with a convergence of mandatory rules. This 
convergence places international commercial corruption in a situation where 
the ‘application of mandatory rules is (or should be) so well accepted that it 
can be categorized as uncontroversial’29 
A party to an arbitration agreement could simply insist that international 
arbitration is not the proper forum for disputes involving public mandatory 
anti-corruption rules in a bid to avoid the arbitration process. This is the 
conundrum that international arbitration is faced with. On the one hand, the 
policy underlying the arbitration process encourages finality and non-
interference by the courts in the arbitral process. On the other hand, the 
mandatory nature of anti-corruption rules implies that arbitrators must defer to 
these rules regardless of the agreement of the parties. 
The interplay between mandatory rules and the place of arbitration as well as 
the place of enforcement of awards is also important. In general terms, an 
award must not contravene anti-corruption rules and public policy to be 
enforceable.30 Furthermore, there is an obligation on the arbitrator to ensure 
that the parties do not arbitrate in vain.  Art. 35 ICC Rules, for example, 
stipulate that:  ‘In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the 
Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall 
make every effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law.’31 
This may lead to the arbitrator being caught in what Kreindler describes as 
‘between a rock and a hard place. He states:  
                                                     
 
28  The UN Convention has as of November 2011, 140 signatories and 154 State parties. See also 
Status of ratification available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session2/V0850398e.pdf, accessed 
on 13 November 2011.  
29  A. Barraclough, J. Waincymer, ‘Mandatory rules in international commercial arbitration’, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 2, 2005, p. 218. 
30  1958 ‘New York’ Convention, (1958), Art. II(1), Art. V(2); Model Law Art. 34(2)(b)(i), Art. 
36(1)(b)(i). 
31  See generally J. Horvarth, ‘The duty of the tribunal to render an enforceable award’, Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 18, 2001, pp. 135ff. 
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‘Failure to engage in such self-inquiry may cause the arbitrator to be an 
accomplice to a contract against public morals or issue an award which 
violates public policy. Initiating his own investigation on the other hand, and 
in particular drawing his own conclusions as to such illegality in its award 
might constitute an impermissible foray into a dispute.’32  
This conundrum is premised on the different roles and objectives of public and 
private rights. Courts in the US have shown an increasing willingness to move 
away from a strict private/public law demarcation by allowing the extension of 
private arbitration to matters that are of a public nature.33 The danger however 
of an extension of international arbitration to public law matters is that this 
expanding role may undermine the rules that protect against public harm and 
also simultaneously erode at the legitimacy of the arbitration process as a 
private method of settlement of commercial disputes.34 
The words of Justice Stevens in his dissenting judgment in the antitrust 
Mitsubishi case are of relevance here.35 When faced with the question about 
                                                     
 
32  R. Kreindler, ‘Aspects of illegality in the formation and performance of contracts’, 
International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 1, 2003, at p. 14. 
33  See for example in the US the case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 723 F.2d, at pp. 164-66. The question before the court was whether a federal antitrust 
claim arising from an international transaction was arbitrable. The Supreme Court held 
‘concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign tribunals, and sensitivity 
to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result 
would be forthcoming in a domestic context. Again, in respect to Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506 (1974), which dealt with an international securities transaction, the court upheld 
the arbitration clause providing for arbitration of an international securities claim. 
34   McConnaughay argues that the extension of autonomy in international contracts to public law 
is detrimental in cases involving developed countries because it:  
‘permits transnational commercial actors to opt out of protective regulatory law − 
thus increasing the risk of precisely the public harm the regulatory law intended to 
prevent. Further, the arbitrability of public law either reduces the probability of 
correct applications of public law and thereby contributes to under-regulation, or 
increases the risk of arbitral procedural reforms that threaten the continued utility of 
international arbitration.’  
He also argues that because the exercise of autonomy with respect to public law matters invites 
greater judicial supervision than exercises of autonomy with respect to matters governed by 
private law, the extension decreases rather than increases predictability in international 
commerce. See P. McConnaughay, ‘The scope of autonomy in international contracts and its 
relation to economic regulation and development’, id., Note 24 above, at pp. 49-50. 
35  In this case the issue involved a claim by an American car dealer in Plymouth that two major 
automobile companies were parties to an international cartel that had restrained competition in 
the American market in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 USC Sec. 1. The question before the 
court was whether the antitrust claim was arbitrable where a company had agreed to arbitration 
under an arbitration clause. The Court of Appeal, following the decision of the Second Circuit 
in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (1968), held that 
the claim was indeed non-arbitrable. On appeal the Supreme Court, affirming its ruling in 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506 (1974), concluded that ‘concerns of international 
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes 
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the arbitrability of a matter involving anti-competitive behavior, he quoted 
Justice Feinberg and stated:  
‘… A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. Antitrust 
violations can affect hundreds of thousands -- perhaps millions -- of people, 
and inflict staggering economic damage. . . . We do not believe that Congress 
intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere than in the courts.’36  
In his opinion an arbitration agreement to the effect that all claims ‘relating to’ 
a contract should be settled by arbitration could surely not be understood to 
mean encompass a claim that relies, not on a failure to perform the contract, 
but on an independent violation of antitrust federal law.37 Justice Steven’s 
words can be paraphrased with regards to the primary and secondary contracts 
resulting from corrupt activity. Contracts tainted by corruption are not ‘merely 
a private matter’ but can affect hundreds of thousands of people, and ‘inflict 
staggering economic damage.’ 
It has been said that ‘public rights belong not to the litigants, but to society at 
large.’38 The principles of freedom of contract and consent that underscore the 
arbitration process are based on ‘private rights’, and on the assumption that the 
arbitration of these rights are consented to by all parties. This assumption is 
stretched where the rights at play include not just private but public rights. 
Criminalization of corruption is a clear indication of the fact that the rights 
protected are not just private but public rights. Therefore criminalization places 
international corruption in the same class as mandatory rules prohibiting anti-
competitive practices, environment spoliation, money laundering and 
terrorism, i.e. laws which must be applied regardless of the agreement between 
the parties.39 Such laws curtail the freedom to contract at will.  
Examples of such restrictions are found in principles and restatements of 
contract law.  The EU Regulation on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations touches on the question of freedom of contract and mandatory rules 
when it stipulates that: 
                                                                                                                            
 
require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be 
forthcoming in a domestic context.’ Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614 
(1985), 473 US 629. 
36  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., id., at pp. 655-665. 
37  Id., at p. 645. 
38  W. Park, ‘Private adjudicators and the public interest: the expanding scope of international 
arbitration’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, 1986, p. 629, at p. 638. 
39  On categories of mandatory rules affecting arbitration see P. Mayer, ‘Mandatory rules of law 
in international arbitration’, Arbitration International, Vol. 2, 1986, at pp. 274-275. See also 
M. Blessing, ‘Mandatory rules of law versus party autonomy in international arbitration’, 
Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1997, p. 23ff. 
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‘[o]verriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is 
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as 
its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are 
applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.’40   
In a similar vein the Principles of European Contract Law stipulate that ‘[A] 
contract is of no effect to the extent that it is contrary to principles recognized 
as fundamental in the laws of the Member States of the European Union.41 It 
further provides:  
‘Effect should nevertheless be given to those mandatory rules of national, 
supranational and international law which, according to the relevant rules of 
private international law, are applicable irrespective of the law governing the 
contract.’42   
The US Restatement (2nd) Contracts on its part states that ‘[a] promise … is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is 
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the 
circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.’43 A 
public policy against the enforcement of promises or other terms may be 
derived by the court from (a) legislation relevant to such a policy, or (b) the 
need to protect some aspect of the public welfare.44 
A principal argument in this regard is that the role of a public judge or 
authority should not be thrust or ‘improperly delegated’ to private entities.  
Writers like Donovan and Greenawalt argue that matters of public dimension 
do fall properly fall within the scope of the arbitration panel.45 Referring to the 
Mitsubishi anti-trust case, they take issue with the ‘improper delegation’ 
argument as unfounded to the extent that it is premised on a delegation that 
‘has in large part already taken place.’ In their view, the  
                                                     
 
40  Art. 9 EC Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 No. 
593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177 
of 4 July 2008. 
41   Art. 15:101 Principles of European Contract Law, Prepared by the Commission on European 
Contract Law, 1999, available at 
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/pecl_full_text.htm#pecl1.  
42   Art. 1:103 Principles of European Contract Law.  
43   Sec. 178 Restatement (2nd) Contracts, American Law Institute, 1981. 
44  Id.  
45  D. Donovan, K. Greenawalt, Mitsubishi after Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules before Courts 
and International Arbitrators, in L. Mistelis, J. Lew (Eds.), Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration, id. Note 26 above, at p. 31. 
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‘entire debate on mandatory rules in arbitration deals with a set of public 
rights that, by definition, the state has already entrusted to private litigants by 
providing private rights of action.’46  
In this view, a delegation may indeed have taken place where criminal statutes 
expressly provide private litigants with the right to act as private prosecutors. 
In such instances, the public nature of the laws is not inconsistent with the 
private nature of the actors charged with prosecution. Examples of public 
criminal statutes from the United States where the private litigant is given a 
right of action include US Antitrust legislation such as the Sherman Act47 and 
statutes such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.48 
These expressly allow for private rights of suit along with the possibility of 
treble damages. Has a private right of action similarly been delegated in the 
case of international corruption? If yes, following the logic of Donovan and 
Greenawalt, one could argue that the international arbitration panel is indeed a 
proper forum for the consideration of such delegated rights. 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption introduces on the global 
stage the notion of private actions for damage caused by corruption. Art. 35 
UNCC provides that ‘each State Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary, in accordance with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that 
entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption 
have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for that 
damage in order to obtain compensation’. While a distinction must be drawn 
between the private enforcement of criminal laws and civil liability for 
damages suffered as a result of another’s act, it could be argued, that the 
UNCC can be seen as the basis of a delegation of a public right to private 
enforcement in matters relating to international corruption. 
However this argument does not survive a close examination. It is instructive 
to see that the United States has made a reservation in its ratification of the 
UNCC stating that the provisions of the Convention are non-self-executing and 
that none of the provisions of the Convention creates a private right of action.49  
From the perspective of the United States the United Nations does not create a 
private right of action with respect of international corruption that can form the 
                                                     
 
46  Id. 
47       Act of 2 July 1890 (Sherman Anti-Trust Act). 
48      The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. It is important to note that the 
exercise of the right as a private prosecutor is nonetheless exercised before a national court of 
law. So the analogy is not quite on all fours with the notion of a private litigant before an 
arbitration tribunal. 
49  The United States signed the Convention on 9 December 2003 and ratified it on 30 October 
2006. Available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html , accessed on 
15th May 2008. 
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basis of a delegation of rights proposition.50 Apart from this, the provisions of 
the UNCC are made subject to provisions of national law.51 A private right of 
action for the anti-corruption rules has not been granted in any of the 
jurisdictions studied in this book.  International corruption cannot be said to 
fall within the range of matters where a delegation of public criminal rights to 
private persons has taken place.  
As the role of the international arbitration expands the underlying premise of 
arbitrability of matters tainted by corruption is challenged by the fact that 
contracts tainted by corruption are evidence or the result of criminal activity. 
This public law dimension of international corruption may render the arbitrator 
dealing with the primary or secondary contract tainted by corruption not solely 
the servants of the parties to these contracts but also of the public at large. In 
this view, the answer to the question ‘is the arbitrator the servant of the parties 
or of the truth,’52 must in the instance of contracts tainted by corruption be 
answered in favor of ‘the truth’. 
7.6 Convergence of International Public Policy on Corruption 
The international repudiation of corruption and the success of the UNCC 
which has now been ratified by 140 countries means that apart from a 
convergence of mandatory laws regarding corruption in international business, 
there is also a convergence of public policy. Public policy is often looked upon 
as a ‘wild card’ in law. In legal systems that look to certainty and the rule of 
law as of highest value, public policy that grows and ebbs with the dynamics of 
changing societal values can indeed be viewed as ‘a very unruly horse’ which 
once mounted can lead to destinations unknown.53 This is particularly true in 
the context of international commercial disputes where the argument has been 
made that there may be a clash of public policies emanating from different 
jurisdictions.54  
                                                     
 
50  For reasons such as the subjection of Art. 35 to the principle of non-interference in Art. 4 
UNCC and to national law, it is clear that Art. 35 does not create a new private right of action 
in respect of the acts of corruption defined under the UN Convention except to the extent that 
such a right already exists under national law. See Chapter 9 for a full discussion of this point. 
51  See Chapter 9 for a full analysis of the Private Right of Action under Art. 35 UNCC. 
52  J. Rosell, H. Prager, ‘Illicit commissions and international arbitration: the question of proof’, 
Arbitration International, Vol. 15, 1999, pp. 329ff.  
53  Lord Denning M.R. in Richardson v. Melish (1824), Bing. 228; [1834] All ER 258. 
54  L. Mistelis, ‘Keeping the unruly horse in control or public policy as a bar to the enforcement of 
(foreign) arbitral awards’, International Law Forum du Droit International, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
2000, p. 248. 
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Three levels of public policy are generally distinguished.55 Transnational 
public policy is understood to comprise of ‘an international consensus as to 
international standards or accepted norms of conduct that must always apply 
and which provides limitations to public as well as private international 
relationships and transactions.’56 Transnational public policy has been 
described as policy a breach of which ‘concerns all or most states.’57 
Transnational public policy is a result of an international consensus that 
reflects the national laws and international response to corruption.58 Such 
transnational public policy arguably has a direct effect on the conduct of the 
arbitral tribunal and sidesteps the question of the varying standards that may 
occur in the applicable law or laws.  
Barraclough and Waincymer assert that ‘it is uniformly accepted that 
arbitrators must apply any mandatory rule that reflects transnational public 
policy in order to maintain a minimum standard of conduct and behavior in 
international commercial relations.’59 The combination of the domestic anti-
corruption laws of most states and their obligations under the international 
regulations in respect of international commercial corruption supports the view 
that international corruption is an act that goes against the norms, mandatory 
rules and international obligations of most societies.60 
                                                     
 
55  The ICSID Tribunal in the World Duty Free case refereeing to practices in national courts, 
international arbitration and international instruments, outlined three levels of public policy 
regarding corruption i.e. domestic public policy, international public policy, and transnational 
public policy. World Duty Free v. Kenya, 46 ILM 339, 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 
Award, 4 October 2006, at Paras. 138-157. See also P. Mayer, A. Sheppard, N. Nasser, Interim 
Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 
International Law Association, London Conference, 2000. 
56  M. Buchanan, ‘Public policy and international commercial arbitration’, 26 American Business 
Law Journal, 511, 513, 1988, pp. 514ff. 
57  The tribunal in the World Duty Free case remarked that in their opinion, bribery constituted a 
breach of international public policy, as well as of English and Kenyan public policy. The 
concept of ‘international’ public policy meant, effectively, that of transnational public policy, 
meaning a breach of the policy concerns of all or most states. World Duty Free v. Kenya, id., 
Note 55 above, at Paras. 141-142. 
58  Sayed points out that ‘in international arbitration the establishment/existence of such 
transnational public policy [is] facilitated by the fact that contracts of international trade and 
arbitration are not only nationally regulated but also internationally debated. Such debates 
frequently produce inter-national conventions, and often generate “transnational” instruments 
… Such practices are regarded as sufficiently established by repetition that they are able to 
surpass their initial contingent conditions to acquire normative relevance.’ A. Sayed, 
Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration, 1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2004, p. 4. 
59  A. Barraclough, J. Waincymer, ‘Mandatory rules in international commercial arbitration’, id., 
Note 29 above, at p. 218. 
60  The consensus of opinion is that corruption is not condoned in most systems and cultures. See 
P. Nichols, ‘Outlawing transnational bribery through the world trade organization’, Law and 
Policy in International Business, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1997, p. 305.  
CHAPTER 7 – THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
344 
 
This was clearly the view of the tribunal in the World Duty Free case. The 
tribunal noted that:  
‘In light of domestic laws and international conventions relating to corruption, 
and in light of the decisions taken in this matter by courts and arbitral 
tribunals, this Tribunal is  convinced that bribery is contrary to international 
public policy of most, if not all, States, or, to use another formula, to 
transnational public policy. Thus, claims based on contracts of corruption or 
on contracts obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral 
Tribunal.’61   
Transnational public policy against international commercial corruption sets up 
a limitation to the power of the arbitrator because this public policy transcends 
and is reflected in all applicable laws. Chukwumerijie in fact goes further to 
assert that in the unlikely event of a conflict between national law and such 
transnational policy, arbitrators must in fact refuse to apply such national 
law.62 
Due to the far reaching wave of criminalization and obligations entered into by 
countries under the anti-corruption instruments, the chances that the choice of 
applicable law by the parties will conflict with this global consensus is not very 
high. In the unlikely case of a conflict between the national law and this 
international consensus, the arbitration panel should in the interest of the 
integrity of the arbitration process, recognize the transnational public policy 
repudiating corruption. Furthermore, the criminalization of international 
corruption gives it ‘the force of law’ and raises it from the ranks of what some 
                                                     
 
61  World Duty Free v. Kenya 46 ILM 339 (2007), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 
2006, at Para. 157.  
62  O. Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, Quorum Books, 
Westport, CT, 1994, p. 193. The convergence of transnational public policy on corruption is 
probably best articulated by the provisions of the TransLex-Principles of transnational law. 
This is a digest of transnational law principles compiled by the Center for Transnational Law 
(CENTRAL) at the University of Cologne, Germany. The TransLex-Principles contain more 
than 120 principles and rules of transnational law, the New Lex Mercatoria. Available at 
http://www.trans-lex.org/principles accessed on 12 November 2011. Principle No. 4(7)(1) 
states that ‘A contract that violates bonos mores is void.’ Principle No. 4(7)(2)(a) stipulates 
that ‘Contracts based on or involving the payment or transfer of bribes (‘corruption money’, 
‘secret commissions’, ‘pots-de-vin’, ‘kickbacks’) are void.’ Bribery within the meaning of this 
article is: 
‘Any intentional offer, promise or transfer of any undue pecuniary or other advantage, 
whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official or private party, for 
the benefit of that official or private party or for a third party, in order that the official or 
private party acts or refrains from acting in relation to the performance of official or other 
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantages in the conduct of 
international business.’ 
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may refer to as ‘so-called’63  or ‘fleeting’64 public policy. In any event, the 
criminalization of international commercial corruption is a strong guideline to 
arbitrators to act consistently with the duty to render decisions that are capable 
of enforcement. 
7.7 A Medley of Roles 
As a private and confidential system of dispute resolution, much of what 
transpires between the parties and their chosen arbitrators never sees the light 
of day. Nonetheless, available cases show that the issue of corruption affecting 
contracts is one that international arbitration panels have wrestled with for a 
long time. The influence of international arbitration in the fight against 
international corruption will depend on the role played by the arbitration panel.  
The panel may, for example, decline to get involved in the detection and 
sanctioning of corruption by withdrawing from disputes where corruption is 
alleged. This can be described as a negative passive response. Negative 
because it denies the party who has suffered harm a forum for redress; passive, 
because the tribunal makes no determination on the effect of corruption. On the 
other hand, the tribunal may play a more active role and sanction the 
occurrence of corruption by making a ruling on the merits of the case. This can 
be described as a positive active response. Positive because the tribunal 
provides the party who has suffered harm a forum for redress for such harm 
and active because the tribunal makes a determination of the effect of 
corruption on the transaction in dispute. There is also of course the possible 
role where the arbitrator sees himself solely as a servant of the parties and 
ignores evidence of corruption or the implications of allegations of corrupt 
dealing if the parties so direct.  
Both the negative passive and positive active roles ultimately support the 
victim of corruption because the parties to the contract tainted by corruption 
are faced with the reality that the arbitral tribunal cannot be used as an avenue 
to sanction corrupt and illegal deals. A look at a few past awards is illustrative 
in showing how the positive and negative roles have come into play. It also 
shows that the arbitration panel reserves for itself the discretion to do what it 
deems best. This is indeed only to be expected in the absence of any system of 
hierarchy, or precedent as well as the absence of any overriding binding rule 
that removes the discretion of how to respond from the arbitrator. 
                                                     
 
63  W. Reisman, Law, International Public Policy (so-called) and Arbitral Choice in International 
Commercial Arbitration, in A. van den Berg (Ed.), International Arbitration 2006: Back to 
Basics?, Kluwer Publishing, 2008, pp. 849ff. 
64  Expression used by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Tensaccia S.P.A. v. Freyssinet Terra Armata 
R.L., 8 March 2006, referred to in Reisman, id., at p. 854. 
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7.7.1 The Negative Passive Role  
The negative passive role is exemplified by the ruling of Justice Lagergren the 
sole arbitrator in ICC Case No.1110 (1963).65 The claimant, an Argentine 
engineer, was a businessman in Buenos Aires while the respondent was a 
British company, trading in Argentina. In 1950 the parties entered into an 
agreement to supply electrical supplies to the Argentinean authorities. Officials 
from the respondent British company asked the claimant who had considerable 
influence with the Argentine government to promote the placing of an order 
for electrical equipment on the respondent’s behalf. The parties entered into an 
agreement under whose terms the respondent British Company was to pay the 
claimant a percentage of the price of the electrical equipment contract to be 
concluded between the respondent British company and the Argentine 
authorities. Only one contract out of three contracts awarded went to the 
respondent. The respondent subsequently refused to pay the agreed 
commission. The parties went to arbitration in Paris. The parties agreed that 
Argentine law was the proper law of the arbitration agreement.  
The arbitrator found that while the documents seemed on their face to be legal 
and looked like ordinary commercial documents, it was clear to him that ‘the 
agreement between the parties contemplated the bribing of Argentine officials 
for the purpose of obtaining the hoped-for business.’66 The arbitrator noted that 
Art. 768:5 Argentine Code of Civil Procedure stipulated that all questions 
which affect good morals are excluded from arbitration.67  Furthermore that 
Art. 502 Argentine Civil Code provided that an obligation contrary to law or 
public policy could have no effect. Art. 1891 of the same  Code provided that a 
mandate concerning an illegal, impossible or immoral act did not give the 
principal any cause of action against the mandatory nor the latter any cause of 
action against the principal.68 The arbitrator stated that:  
‘… it cannot be contested that there exists a general principle of law 
recognized by civilized nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos 
mores or international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and 
that they cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators.’69  
 
                                                     
 
65  G. Wetter, ‘Issues of corruption before international arbitral tribunals: the authentic text and 
true meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110’, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1994, p. 277, at p. 281.  
66    Case No. 1110. 1963 Yb. Comm Arb. XXI, 1996, 47 Para. 17 of award. 
67    Case No. 1110. Id., Para. 14 of award. 
68   Case No. 1110. Id., Para. 15 of award. 
69   Case No. 1110. Id.  
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The arbitrator declined jurisdiction holding:  
‘a case like this, involving such gross violations of good morals and 
international public policy, can have no countenance in any court either in the 
Argentine or in France or, for that matter, in any other civilized country, nor in 
any arbitral tribunal.’70  
The Lagergren case supports a negative passive role of the arbitrator by 
suggesting that disputes involving allegations of corruption do not fall within 
the ambit of matters properly to be considered as arbitrable. The role of the 
arbitrator in such instances is to withdraw and avoid giving a ruling. The 
limitation of this approach is that it does not prevent determined parties from 
simply moving on till they find a panel that is ready and willing to take on the 
dispute. From the perspective of the victim of corruption this role is of limited 
value because it does not effectively ‘sanction’ the act of corruption but rather 
avoids the issue by retreating. Furthermore, from the point of view of the 
arbitrator, in a system where the ‘judges’ are paid and selected by the 
disputants, the positive passive response may not translate to good business 
sense on the part of the arbitrator.  
7.7.2 The Positive Active Role 
A selection of cases shows many instances where the arbitration tribunal has 
played a positive active role by ruling on the merits in respect of matters 
tainted by corruption. In the ICC Iranian party v. Greek Party case71 the 
tribunal found that the commission at the heart of a consulting agreement was 
clearly ‘intended to remunerate the counterparties’ by way of ‘pots-de-vin’ or 
bribes. The Tribunal found that it was common knowledge that during the 
years in which the Greek company worked in Iran that corruption and the sale 
of influence was a constant practice.  It was extremely difficult, if not 
impossible to obtain contracts for public works without use of these methods. 
The tribunal noted that the Iranian Government had unsuccessfully, attempted 
to remedy this state of affairs by regulations including the 1936 law prohibiting 
the sale of influence and the 1958 Anti-Corruption Act, the law punishing 
conspiracies regarding the public transactions of 1959 as well as the 
amendment to Art. 139 Penal Code. The tribunal concluded that the parties had 
knowingly entered into an illicit contract. The consulting agreement was 
therefore in their view null and void and the parties could not require 
performance of the contract or seek restitution under it.72 
                                                     
 
70   Case No. 1110 Para. 16 of award. 
71  ICC Case No. 3916 of 1983. Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985, pp. 507ff. 
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In the Establishment of Middle East State v. South Asian Construction 
Company ICC case,73 the tribunal also played a positive active role. The 
respondent company after trying unsuccessfully to enter the construction 
market in country X employed the claimant as a consultant to act as its 
representative for the promotion and contracting of the Project. After 
negotiations lasting some eight months, the respondent was awarded the 
Project for approximately US$374 million. In a  letter from the respondent’s 
bank to the claimant’s bank in Geneva, the respondent undertook the 
irrevocable and unconditional commitment to pay immediately upon receipt of 
its down payment from the Ministry ‘for services which were received in full 
in connection with the above mentioned Agreement’ the sum of US$50 
million. That sum was subsequently remitted by respondent to the claimant’s 
bank.74 
The original project was subsequently extended by the Middle East State. 
When negotiating the extension the claimant and respondent signed an 
amendment to the Agreement relating to the extension. Having received the 
amount of US$50 million in 1979, the claimant claimed it was entitled to US$7 
million more. As the respondent refused to pay anything more, the claimant 
submitted the case to the ICC for arbitration.75 The defendant insisted that the 
Agreement was an agreement for bribery or was abused by the claimant for 
bribery. The claimant denied such allegation, stating that the Agreement was a 
consultancy agreement.76 The parties chose Swiss law as the law governing the 
agreement and the tribunal held that ‘ … It is obvious that if the said 
Agreement were an agreement for bribery, it would be null and void..,’ as 
bribery was is considered as immoral (contra bonos mores) in Swiss law. The 
tribunal found that the defendant’s accusation was not supported by direct 
evidence or even circumstantial evidence to be convincing.77 The tribunal 
determined that the US $50 million payment to the claimant was not a bribe.  
In the Westacre Investments case, the Beogradska Banka DD and the State-
Owned Company Yugoimport-SDPR (the appellants), the Federal Directorate 
of Supply and Procurement of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(the Directorate) and Westacre entered into a contract under whose terms the 
Directorate appointed Westacre its consultant with respect to the sale of 
                                                     
 
73  Establishment of Middle East Country X v. South Asian Construction Company Award in ICC 
Case No. 4145, 12 Yb. Comm. Arb., 1987, pp. 97ff. 
74   Id., at p. 98. 
75   Id. 
76   Id., at p. 101. 
77   Id., at p. 102. 
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military equipment in Kuwait.78  For these services Westacre was to receive a 
substantial percentage of the value of the contracts entered into by the 
Directorate with, principally, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense. The Bank 
guaranteed the payment of all fees due to Westacre under the Agreement under 
Clause 6 of the Agreement. The Agreement was governed by Swiss law and 
contained an arbitration agreement. In July 1989 the Directorate, secured a 
contract with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense for $500,546,000 and 
£11,440,329.29. The Directorate then repudiated the agreement with Westacre 
who then commenced arbitration. 
The Directorate and the Bank argued that the Agreement with Westacre was 
void on the grounds that it violated ‘ordre public international’ or ‘bonos 
mores.’  The arbitration panel found that while bribery renders an agreement 
invalid, in arbitration proceedings, bribery is a fact which has to be alleged and 
for which evidence has to be submitted, and at the same time constitutes a 
defense, nullifying the claims arising from a contract. The consequences of this 
are decisive. For this reason it is up to the defendant to present the fact of 
bribery and the pertaining evidence within the time limits allowed to him for 
presenting facts. The statement of facts and the burden of proof are therefore 
upon the defendant. The Tribunal found that the Directorate had not 
established that there was any bribery and had not established that the activities 
of Westacre were illicit or that there was anything which rendered the 
Agreement as unenforceable as violating ‘bonos mores.’  
The award was appealed by the Directorate to the Swiss Federal tribunal who 
upheld the award.79 On further appeal at the place of enforcement the question 
whether the allegations of bribery were sufficient for the facts of the case to be 
re-opened. The English court of appeal dismissed the appeal stating that ‘From 
the award itself it is clear that bribery was a central issue. The allegation was 
made, entertained and rejected. Had it not been rejected the claim would have 
                                                     
 
78  Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport-SDRP Holding Company Ltd & Ors [[2000] 1 QB 288 
affirming [1999] QB 740. 1999], EWCA Civ 1401 (12 May 1999). [1999] 3 All ER 864, 2008 
WL 1771450.  
79  This award was appealed by the Directorate to the Swiss Federal tribunal, who declined to 
nullify the award on the grounds that ‘the appellants claim that the agreement, owing to its 
illegal or immoral purpose, is void does not at all events accord with the factual finding made 
by the arbitral tribunal … the truth is that this argument consumes itself in a feckless criticism 
of the arbitral tribunal’s findings of fact and of the procedure applied, considering that no 
violation of mandatory rules of procedure occurred. In the last analysis, the arbitral tribunal did 
not at all contravene public policy in upholding the validity of the April 12, 1988, agreement, 
the substance of which was determined in the course of the proceedings. Thus the appeal is 
without grounds.’ Referred to in Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport-SDRP Holding 
Company Ltd & Ors id., [2000] QB 288, per Lord Waller.  
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failed, Swiss and English public policy being indistinguishable in this 
respect.’80 
A further example is the Hilmarton ICC case where the arbitrator found that 
Hilmarton Ltd. was engaged in the activity of influencing the Algerian 
government officials but concluded that bribery was not proven ‘beyond 
doubt.’81 The respondent concluded a protocol of agreement to give fiscal and 
legal advice to the claimant and obtain a contract with the Algerian authorities. 
The claimant was to be compensated with the payment of a percentage of the 
price of the construction contract. This respondent subsequently refused to pay 
in full. The complainant went to arbitration for compensation. The Panel noted 
that ‘it happens that nowadays, especially in certain fields (armaments, sale of 
know-how, aviation, etc.), the products or services offered do not differ 
significantly in quality, or are equivalent. Hence, the manager of an enterprise 
or the board of a company is tempted to use various means, and particularly 
bribes, that is, ‘any offer (or request) concerning the granting of a hidden and 
not-owed material advantage to the employee of a third party with the aim of 
influencing this third party in favour of the donor.’82 The Panel noted that 
‘[m]any enterprises, in fact, establish reserves for bribes, either by creating a 
‘bribery fund’ or by including this practice in the budget. For instance, bribes 
may be deducted from taxes in the Federal Republic of Germany.’83 The panel 
agreed that if the conclusion of the contract between defendant and the 
Algerian authorities depended on bribes paid by claimant, the contract would 
be null and void.84 However the panel found that bribery has not been proved 
beyond doubt.85   
                                                     
 
80   Emphasis added per Lord Mantell, Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport-SDRP Holding 
Company Ltd & Ors [2000] QB 288, at 316. S. Gee concludes that under English law, in 
proceedings to enforce a New York Convention award under Sec. 101(2) of the Arbitration Act 
1996:(a), where the award has itself addressed the fraud issue and rejected it, and has been 
confirmed by the court exercising supervisory jurisdiction; usually the English court would 
refuse to inquire further into the fraud issue at least unless there is fresh evidence making out a 
strong prima facie case of fraud, and which could not with reasonable diligence be obtained 
earlier. See S. Gee, ‘The autonomy of arbitrators, and fraud unravels all,’ Arbitration 
International, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2), 2006, p. 337, at p. 371. 
81  Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd, Award in ICC Case No. 5622, 
19 Yb. Comm. Arb 19, 1994, p. 105. 
82  Id., at p. 111. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85   Id., at p. 112. Similarly in the Westinghouse case, the tribunal ruled that allegations of bribes 
paid to the former President Marcos of the Philippines by Westinghouse Ltd were found not to 
have been proven. See Westinghouse v. The Republic of the Philippines, Award in ICC Case 
No. 6401, 7(1) Mealey’s International Arbitration Report, 1992. 
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A notable case where the arbitration tribunal has played a positive active role is 
the 2006 World Duty Free Company case,86 where the arbitral tribunal found 
that a contract procured by means of a bribe of $2 million to the former 
president of Kenya was in violation of international policy, Kenyan and 
English law and was therefore voidable. The claimant Mr. Nasir Ibrahim Ali 
owner of the World Duty Free Ltd had entered into an agreement for the 
construction, maintenance and operation of duty-free complexes at Nairobi and 
Mombasa International Airports.  A lease renewable after a period of 10 years 
was entered into for the sum of US$1,000,000 per annum.87 The claimant 
asserted in order to be able to get this contract and do business with the 
Kenyan government he was required to make a ‘personal donation’ of US$2 
million to Mr. Daniel Arap Moi who was then President of the Republic of 
Kenya.88   
The claimant alleged that  as a result of his lack of co-operation in a massive 
fraud scheme  set up to provide ‘illicit funds’ for President’s Moi’s re-election 
campaign and his co-operation with Interpol and the Kenyan Police when the 
scheme was uncovered, the  Government of Kenya took over the control, share 
and assets of the claimant’s company.89 World Duty Free was placed in 
receivership and according to the claimant was mismanaged and destroyed by 
the appointed receivers.90 The claimant alleges that he was threatened, 
unlawfully arrested and eventually deported to prevent him from challenging 
the take-over of World Duty Free and giving evidence in the Goldenberg fraud. 
The claimant further alleged that following an ex parte hearing by the Kenyan 
High court the illegal expropriation of World Duty Free was legitimized in 
favour of a Mr Pattni an agent of the Kenyan Government.91  
The claimant went to ICSID arbitration to seek full compensation and the 
return of the duty free complexes, lost profits, aggravated and exemplary 
damages, as well as legal costs. The Government of Kenya, among other 
actions, brought an application requesting the dismissal stating that the contract 
upon which the claimants action was based was procured by paying a bribe of 
US$2 million to the then President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi and as a 
violation of Kenyan, English and International ordre public, the resulting 
Contract did not have the force of law.92 The claimant sought to persuade the 
panel that a party should not be ‘enabled to reap the fruits of his own dishonest 
                                                     
 
86  World Duty Free v. Kenya, 46 ILM 339 (2007), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 
2006. 
87   Id., Paras. 64-65. 
88  Id., Para. 66.  
89   Id., p. 21, Paras. 68-71. 
90  Id., p. 22, Paras. 70-71. 
91   Id., pp. 22-23, Paras. 72-74. 
92   Id., p. 30, Para. 105. 
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conduct by enriching himself at the expense of the other’ and that the Tribunal 
‘must pay sufficient regard to the domestic public policy’ of Kenya under 
which the donation made was ‘not only acceptable, but fashionable.’93  
The tribunal found that the payments made by the claimant must be regarded 
as a bribe made in order to obtain the lease contract.94 The tribunal noted that 
bribery or influence peddling, as well as both active and passive corruption, are 
sanctioned by criminal law in most, if not all, countries. This was the case in 
Kenya under the Kenyan Prevention of Corruption Act of 1956, and under the 
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003.  As such, the tribunal held 
that:  
‘In light of domestic laws and international conventions relating to corruption, 
and in light of the decisions taken in this matter by courts and arbitral 
tribunals, this Tribunal is convinced that bribery is contrary to the 
international public policy of most, if not all, States or, to use another 
formula, to transnational public policy. Thus, claims based on contracts of 
corruption or on contracts obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this 
Arbitral Tribunal.’95 
The exercise of a positive active role by the arbitral tribunal involves a ruling 
on the merits in respect of the dispute affected by corruption. Thus is a 
laudable step as it ensures that the international arbitration panel plays an 
active role in the sanctioning of corrupt acts and provides the winning party 
with an award that can be enforced. From the point of view of the victim of 
corruption, it ensures that whether a matter tainted by corruption comes up 
before a national court or an international arbitration tribunal, the occurrence 
of international commercial corruption will be sanctioned. This positive active 
role therefore works in the interests of the direct and ultimately indirect victims 
of corruption because it prevents parties from using the arbitration process as a 
means of legitimizing and enforcing obligations resulting from corrupt activity. 
It is clear that the principle underlying the arbitration process is that a contract 
that is the result of bribery will be declared null and void. To this extent the 
arbitration process is synchronized with the normative framework that 
repudiates corruption and the framework of mandatory rules and public policy 
that support it. 
                                                     
 
93   Id., p. 34, Para. 121. In this regard the Tribunal remarked at Para. 133 that:  
‘Kenya considers that it is a bribe given in order to obtain the Agreement on 
which the claims are based. World Duty Free considers it a gift of protocol or a 
personal donation made to the President to be used for public purposes within the 
framework of the Kenyan system of Harambee; the Claimant recalls that this 
system is largely anchored in cultural practices when people are able to pull 
whatever resources they have, “in particular” to finance community projects.’ 
94   Id., p. 41, Para. 136. 
95  Id., p. 48, Para. 157. 
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However, as the several cases show, in many instances this central argument 
does not come into play for lack of proof.  Where the arbitral panel is faced 
with insufficient proof of bribery, the arbitral panel makes a ruling on this fact 
and proceeds to give an award. In this manner the arbitration panel acts and 
reaches a determination on a matter that falls within the scope of mandatory 
law and international public policy. This fact raises significant questions about 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process of arbitration as a forum for 
arriving at such determinations. The arbitrator, it may be argued, is a part of a 
(contractual) system of private settlement. As such, the arbitrator is an agent of 
the parties whose primary task is to enforce obligations entered into inter 
partes rather than an agent of an adjudication system that seeks to ensure that 
justice is upheld in the interests of the society as a whole.96 Mills identifies two 
aspects of this problem. The first is that the populace that is most affected by 
grand corruption, such as that found in international commercial corruption, 
has no advocate in the arbitral reference. Secondly, she states, ‘… one might 
even question whether public policy should not reserve to the courts of the land 
disputes affecting the livelihood of its populace, seeing that the populace never 
agreed to have foreign arbitrators determine their interests…’97  
From the point of view of private remedies, the indirect victim of corruption is 
stripped of the protections of mandatory law.  In addition, the direct victim to 
the contract tainted by corruption by agreeing to an arbitration agreement is 
faced with a burden of proof of corruption that even the state with its powers of 
investigation and inquiry may find daunting. Corruption occurs in the shadow 
and seldom leaves a calling card. For the indirect victim, there is a complete 
gap. By making determinations on matters of public law, the private arbitration 
panel does not take into consideration the individual rights that are protected 
by the state machinery. They have no voice; no representation and no input in 
an arbitration process which by its very definition was never intended to cater 
to them.  By ruling on the merits of disputes involving the primary or 
secondary contracts, the machinery of the state is bypassed by private 
agreement and the arbitration process closes the door to the full scope of 
recourse that would be available to both the direct and indirect victims of 
corruption. 
 In this view, it may be argued that international private arbitration cannot be 
the legitimate forum in respect of sanctioning matters that infringe on public 
                                                     
 
96  See generally A. Rau, ‘On integrity in private judging’, Arbitration International, Vol. 14, 
1998, p. 155.  
97  K. Mills, Corruption and Other Illegality in the Formation and Performance of Contracts and in 
the Conduct of Arbitration Relating Thereto, in ICCA Congress Series (No. 11), International 
Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions, Kluwer, The Hague, 2003, p. 
288, at p. 289. 
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rights. To be more specific, where a matter involves allegations of corruption, 
parties by agreement should not be able to exclude the rights of participation of 
other stakeholders, affected by the occurrence of corruption. Private parties 
should not be able to take the regulation and control of corruption out of the 
public sphere into a private and confidential dispute settlement process.  
Apart from questions about the legitimacy of international arbitration as the 
forum for the settlement of disputes tainted by international corruption, the 
efficacy of the international arbitration process in sanctioning international 
commercial corruption is also open to question. In international arbitration 
where the arbitrator is ‘hired’ by the very parties to the transaction in dispute, 
ensuring compliance with anti-corruption rules is arguably a dimension that is 
simply not within the contemplation of the framework of a submission to 
arbitration. Another problem is the cost of prosecution as well as the high 
criminal burden of proof. Added to this is the difficulty in investigating, 
gathering and compelling the production of evidence in complex international 
cases. Apart from these procedural difficulties, the stigmatization of the guilty 
criminal verdict and sanction as well as its possible deterrent effects is not 
easily replicated in a private confidential arbitration process. 
It is also important to note that arbitrators are ‘paid contractors’ who may have 
no specialized training, and who operate without the ‘stringent safeguards’ for 
human liberty that are built into criminal proceedings.98 They are only 
human.99 Furthermore, there is in general no appeal against the decision of the 
tribunal and there are limited chances of judicial review. These factors are 
arguably significant obstacles in the path of international arbitration as a 
legitimate and effective forum for the resolution of transactions involving 
international commercial corruption.  
7.8 Questioning the Role of the Arbitration Tribunal 
Since there is broad agreement that matters tainted by corruption are arbitrable 
and that the arbitration panel has jurisdiction in such cases, what is the nature 
and extent of the responsibility of an arbitration tribunal where a matter before 
it is tainted by corruption? This section takes a purpose-led approach in 
examining the role of international arbitration panel from the broader 
                                                     
 
98  G. Lynch, ‘The role of the criminal law in policing corporate misconduct’, Law & 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 60 , No. 3-2, Summer 1997, p. 23, at p. 27. 
99  B. Hanotiau, Misdeeds, Wrongful Conduct and Illegality in Arbitral Proceedings, in A. van 
den Berg (Ed.), New Horizons for International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, Kluwer, 
London, 2005, p. 261, at pp. 262-264. The author gives interesting examples of misconduct by 
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perspective of victims of international corruption. The question in this regard is 
whether it is the private sector (international arbitration), or the public sector 
that should ‘take the lead.’  
The role of the arbitration tribunal is also a matter of debate within arbitration 
circles. Calls have been made, for example, for the need to improve the 
transparency of the arbitration process;100 for an international regulatory body 
that compels and oversees the publication of awards;101 and for some sort of 
review in the form of ‘an UNCITRAL-based award review board to ensure that 
misconduct such as corruption, breach of natural justice and wilful disregard 
for governing law shall not pass unrectified.’102  Such proposals to improve the 
transparency of the arbitration process are certainly in the interest of the 
victims of corruption as they could serve as a ‘window’ into the type of matters 
that come up before arbitration panels. This would facilitate the detection of 
the occurrence of international corruption and at least open up the possibility 
of follow-on actions or responses from other stakeholders.  
Such an approach would however fundamentally change the very essence of 
the international arbitration process and undermine its characteristic features. 
Attempts to publicize the arbitration process in a manner similar to 
adjudication would destroy the important private and confidential nature of 
international arbitration.103 This may lead some ‘parties to turn away from 
arbitration completely.’104 A better approach may be one that preserves the 
important role international arbitration plays in the regulation of international 
trade but which prevents the process from being hijacked by the use of the very 
factors that characterize it for illegal ends.  
A victim-oriented purpose is best supported by a role that brings to the public 
arena the incidences of occurrences of international corruption that come 
                                                     
 
100  J. Lew, The Case for the Publication of Arbitration Awards, in J. Schultz, J. van den Berg 
(Eds.), The Art of Arbitration: Essays on International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum Pieter 
Sanders 12 September 1912-1982, Kluwer, The Hague, 1982, pp. 22ff. 
101  D. Gruner, ‘Accounting for the public interest in international arbitration: the need for 
procedural and structural reform’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 41, 2003, p. 
923 
102  K. Mills, Corruption and Other Illegality in the Formation and Performance of Contracts and in 
the Conduct of Arbitration Relating Thereto, id., Note 97 above, at p. 298. 
103  It is appropriate here to recall the ‘wise words’ of the President of India, Shri Fakhruddin Ali 
Ahmed quoted by Pieter Sanders in His Welcoming Address to the ICCA New Delhi 
Arbitration Conference 2000, at pp.5-6.  
 ‘Arbitration is different from court proceedings and has to be maintained so, if it is to 
continue as a successful instrument for resolving disputes. The more arbitration 
proceedings are aligned to court proceedings, the less it will progress.’  
104  V. Veeder, The Transparency of International Arbitration: Process and Substance, in L. 
Mistelis J. Lew (Eds.), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, id., Note 26 above, 
pp. 101ff. 
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before such international arbitration tribunals. Corruption in international 
business has a natural catchment area. International contracts will almost 
always channel disputes regarding such contracts to international arbitration. 
Social, political and economic considerations led to the first step of 
criminalization and stigmatization of international corruption. Where victim-
led claims are considered a desirable and logical step in the fight against 
corruption, strategies that enable the victim to have access, to initiate and to 
prosecute acts of corruption are crucial. Also required to empower the victim 
of corruption is access to information about the incidence and occurrence of 
corruption as well as strategies that limit the ability to conceal its occurrence.  
Another factor that can be considered in shaping out the desired role of the 
international arbitration tribunal is centered on the fact that in today’s 
globalized, integrated world traditional actors and roles are changing. This is 
particularly so in matters touching on global security and governance of which 
international corruption is a good example. There is increased participation of 
the private sector in the provision of security.105 The ‘blurring or collapse’ of 
the distinction between international policy and national domestic issues has 
been described as a ‘recurring motif in recent literature.’106  International 
arbitration already plays an important role in the regulation of disputes in 
transnational interaction. Given the trends towards privatization in the 
provision of international security, international arbitration stands at a vantage 
point. 
7.9 The Socially Responsible Arbitration Tribunal 
The idea of victim-led private remedies in the fight against corruption is a tacit 
acceptance of the positive influence that may be brought to bear when direct or 
indirect victims of the consequences of international corruption are given a 
more active voice in the sanctioning process.  The objective of increasing the 
effectiveness of the fight against corruption should be the determining factor in 
formulating a sanctioning process regardless of what side of the public/private 
fence it falls. Indeed rigid categorizations may be too great a simplification of 
the complex interactions that occur in corruption in international transactions.  
                                                     
 
105   S. Burris, P. Drahos, C. Shearing, ‘Nodal governance’, Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy, Vol. 30, 2005, p. 30. At pp. 46-47, the authors refer to the TRIPS (Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) as a spectacular example of nodal 
governance that blurs the line between the public and private spheres and which ultimately has 
global consequences. They state ‘far from remaining in the realm of contract, under state 
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and international trade law through nodal means. Here the private sector steers and the state 
rows.’  
106   N. Dorn, Conceptualising Security: Cosmopolitan, State, Multilateral and Market Dynamics, 
Boom, The Hague, 2008, p.1. 
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The structural weaknesses of the criminal law system in fighting international 
corruption, coupled with the limitations of the purely private system of 
international arbitration suggests the need to move beyond these traditional 
categorizations to an approach that capitalizes on the potential of both systems. 
This ‘third way’ may be possible in a move to what can be referred to as 
socially responsible international arbitration. 
From the viewpoint of the effectiveness of the processes needed to fight 
corruption and ultimately of the victim of corruption, what is needed is a 
process that ensures that international corruption is detected and sanctioned. A 
link between criminal systems that have inbuilt investigating and sanctioning 
capacity as well as procedural safeguards, with that of international arbitration 
which is the primary forum of international commercial disputes and where 
disputes tainted by international corruption are likely to be brought is, in this 
respect, of the essence.107 A link between the criminal process and 
international arbitration could open up a different role for the arbitrator. This 
role would be one that assists in the detection of corruption, but which, at the 
same time, avoids the questions of due process and legitimacy that arise where 
arbitrators take on a judge-like role in matters that have a public nature. In 
other words this role would seek to maintain the legitimacy of international 
arbitration involving international corruption that occurs at the junction of 
private and public law. 
This could be achieved by the development of a mechanism for the transfer of 
information and jurisdiction from the international arbitration process to a 
national court and or process108 in matters with a public dimension, such as 
international corruption. The trigger for such a transfer can be motivated by the 
                                                     
 
107   The idea for such linkage is implied by Justice Waller in Westacre Investments Inc. v. 
Jugoimport-SDRP Holding Company Ltd & Ors id., Note 79 above. He remarks:  
‘If the court were concerned with a domestic arbitration and citizens of this country, I 
would have thought that if a party were to come before the English court and seek to 
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available to them.’  
108  The motivation for arbitration should not be lost in this transfer. The transfer should be to a 
nationally supervised process of a confidential nature. This could take the form of a national 
panel or office that brings the opportunity for the parties to resolve the dispute and engage in a 
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FCPA and the UK Bribery Act and the catchment opportunity offered by international 
arbitration. This is one of the areas for further research suggested in the concluding chapter of 
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argument that the scope of the delegation by the State to the arbitration process 
is generally only to the extent that the matters it is concerned with are private 
rights. A matter of significant public dimension and public policy, such as 
international corruption, would arguably fall outside the scope of such 
delegated power in the absence of the grant of a private right of enforcement.  
In such instances, the discretion the arbitration panel enjoys in deciding how to 
proceed, should be exercised only to the point of determining that corruption 
has in fact taken place. At this point, beyond the threshold of a mere allegation, 
the link with the national court or process may be made. This could be 
achieved in the form of a duty imposed by the State on arbitrators to report 
incidences of international corruption.109 This duty to report, would serve to 
link the private system of international arbitration with that of the public 
authorities in a manner that preserves the integrity of the arbitration process 
while avoiding the dangers that its privacy and confidentiality may create. In 
the opinion of Catherine Rodgers, a disclosure obligation imposed by national 
regulation is a better target for reform efforts of the international arbitration 
system than system-wide transparency reforms. 110  
In this way, it may be argued, the arbitrator remains the agent of the parties 
insofar as the matter remains within the scope of the power delegated by the 
state. However, the panel would come under an obligation to the larger society 
where matters that affect interests beyond those of the contracting parties are at 
stake.  This socially responsible international arbitration panel would bridge 
the divide between private and public justice for the simple reason that justice 
in today’s world may often require elements of both. 
Furthermore, the creation of such a ‘walk-away’ would serve as a clear 
guideline for the arbitrator, where matters tainted by international corruption 
come up before a panel. It will remove the element of discretion and obligate 
the arbitrator to a particular course of action. This would not only serve as an 
advantageous  link between the public and private elements at play in the 
regulation of international corruption it would also prevent parties from simply 
shopping around for a more ‘amenable’ arbitrator. In such a system of socially 
responsible international arbitration, neither the private nor public sector takes 
the lead in the provision of security; rather they work side by side, accepting 
that traditional categorizations have weakened under new global and market 
configurations.  
                                                     
 
109  It is true that courts in civil cases do not have such a reporting responsibility; however, a 
crucial difference is the fact that the civil case in a national court is taking place within public 
open process whereas arbitration is by definition taking place within a private closed process.  
110  C. Rogers, ‘Transparency in international commercial arbitration’, Kansas Law Review, Vol. 
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7.10 Conclusion 
The wide reaching criminalization of international corruption has resulted in 
the emergence of a new normative framework in which the international 
arbitration of matters tainted by corruption takes place. In this normative 
framework there is a growing convergence of public policy and mandatory 
law, that lends weight to the assertion that there now exists a transnational 
public policy, condemning international corruption. This wide reaching 
condemnation has implications for the conduct of the international arbitration 
panel when faced with cases involving international corruption. 
The fact that most international contracts contain an arbitration agreement 
mean that the bulk of disputes that are tainted by international corruption are 
more likely to end up before an international arbitration tribunal rather than a 
court of law. This fact alone indicates that there is a role for international 
arbitration in the discussion about fighting international corruption. 
The limitations of the effectiveness of the criminal approach in the fight 
against international corruption as well as the coming into force of the UN 
Convention against Corruption which contains provisions that seek to 
empower the private litigant to seek remedies for harm caused by corruption 
motivates further inquiry as to how private remedies can augment and build 
upon the foundations already laid by criminalization. The objective of private 
remedies that compensate for damage suffered as a result of international 
corruption may be positively influenced by the role ascribed to international 
arbitration. Furthermore, from the perspective of the increasing privatization of 
global security and governance, international arbitration is at a vantage point to 
partner with the State in providing security to the victim of corruption. 
More specifically, the public policy implications of the new normative 
framework that has resulted from the criminalization of international 
corruption may impact on the discretion of the international arbitration panel. 
The opening up of the possibility of victim-led strategies, changes the 
dynamics of the fight against corruption. It is no longer simply a private 
economic affair involving governments and international businesses, but 
involves other stakeholders who are in the process of being given a voice.  
Circumscribing the discretion of the arbitration panel where boundaries 
between private and public matters are increasingly blurred may mean a re-
examination of the basic assumptions that underlie the private arbitration 
process. As the dynamics of international interactions change, the public sector 
intrudes more into the private sector and multinationals exert considerable 
influence on social and political development, international arbitration must 
respond and adapt to these changing currents in a manner that preserves the 
efficiency of the arbitration process while retaining its legitimacy. In this 
respect the role adopted by international arbitrators in the face of contracts 
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tainted by international corruption may assist or hinder the pursuit of private 
remedies by the direct and, ultimately, the indirect victims of international 
corruption. 
An examination of past awards shows that in matters tainted by international 
corruption, international arbitration tribunals have adopted a negative passive 
role where the tribunal withdraws from the matter as being contrary to public 
policy, or a positive active role where the tribunal rules on the merits of the 
dispute in which international corruption is alleged. The positive active role is 
consistent with the acceptance of the arbitrability of matters tainted by 
corruption and by the same token confirms the fact that the private 
international arbitration panel has an important role to play in the public fight 
against corruption. Both the negative passive and positive active roles 
strengthen the position of the victim of corruption to some degree but are 
subject to significant efficiency and legitimacy limitations.   
These factors lead to the suggestion for an approach that links the strengths of 
private international arbitration with those of public criminal law. This may be 
possible by developing a form of socially responsible international arbitration, 
where, beyond a certain threshold, the primary obligation of the international 
arbitrator, as agent to the parties, is replaced by an obligation to the larger 
society. Beyond this threshold, a duty to report the incidence and occurrence of 
international corruption is imposed on the arbitrator by the State. The rationale 
for this could center on the proposition that in the absence of the grant of a 
right of private enforcement, matters involving public rights are beyond the 
scope of the delegated power to settle private disputes granted by the State to 
international arbitrators.  A socially responsible arbitration tribunal can bridge 
the legitimacy divide by being mandated to act not solely as the servant of the 
parties to the arbitration agreement but also, in certain instances, as a servant of 
the general public. This may be a necessary step to help ensure that 
international arbitration continues to meet the needs of an integrated global 
market while at the same time catering to the provision of security for all 
victims of corruption and not only persons with access to the international 
arbitration process.  
A socially responsible international arbitration process could preserve the 
integrity of the international arbitration process and safeguard the vital role it 
plays in the regulation of international trade. At the same time it could assist in 
the detection and sanctioning of international corruption by acting as a window 
as to its incidence and occurrence in international trade disputes. Co-operation 
between public authorities and private arbitration could further the fight 
against international corruption and prevent international arbitration from 
being exploited as a tool to legitimize acts of international corruption to the 
detriment of its direct and ultimately indirect victims. In conclusion, socially 
responsible international arbitration could strengthen the ability of victims to 
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obtain remedies for damage caused by corruption as well as serve as a vehicle 
to secure the legitimacy and future of international commercial arbitration in 
world, increasingly concerned with global security and governance. 
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CHAPTER 8   
 TRANSACTION VALIDITY 
‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of 
causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 
all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to 
demonstrate and confirm it.’ 
 
Jeremy Bentham1 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The criminalization of supply-side corruption in international business seeks 
figuratively to dam the stream of corruption at its source through punishment 
and deterrence. This does not however address the downstream consequences 
that occur when the bribe achieves the purpose for which it was given. The 
contract resulting from corruption plays a pivotal role in the choices actors 
make in the corrupt exchange. This chapter charts the common ground 
regarding the private law response to the contracts tainted by corruption. 
Perspectives from the UNCC, the US, England and the Netherlands provide 
helping pointers as to the building blocks that may shape a common consensus 
regarding contracts tainted by corruption and underline the need to consider 
such contracts as a category of contracts that merits special consideration by 
the courts in view of their significant public dimension. 
Ultimately the corrupt exchange is an agreement between individuals; it also 
results in an agreement or contract between parties. The global consensus 
against corruption impacts upon these agreements. Art. 34 UNCC is the first 
global instrument to make the link between the fight against corruption and the 
contracts that result as consequence of the corrupt exchange.2 It raises the 
possibility of declaring such transactions invalid, rescinding contracts tainted 
                                                     
 
1   J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter 1, The Principle 
of Utility,1781. 
2  Emphasis added. The Civil Law Convention on Corruption predates the UN Convention but is 
an intergovernmental instrument of Council of Europe member states. See the Council of 
Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, April 1999, EUROP. T.S. 127 (entered into force 
November 2003). 
CHAPTER 8 – TRANSACTION VALIDITY 
366 
 
by corruption, and withdrawing contracts or other concession entered into by 
government authorities as important steps that can be taken to ensure that the 
consequences of corruption are treated in a manner that is in keeping with the 
original purpose of criminalization. This book argues that the regulation of 
contracts tainted by corruption can play a positive role in influencing the 
choices corporations make with respect to complying with anti-corruption 
rules.3  
In general terms, the choice to intervene in private contracts by the courts may 
occur where the substance of the contract is considered unfair or unreasonable, 
or is the result of an abuse of the bargaining process, or is simply 
unconscionable. Court intervention may also be the response to the impact of 
contracts on the general public.4 Art. 34 UNCC emphasizes the fact that the 
role of the courts with regard to contracts tainted by corruption is more than 
that of an impartial arbiter of a private agreement. 
Farnsworth speaks about the policing function of the courts, which places 
limits on the enforceability of contracts for policy reasons.5 The intervention 
by courts in contracts tainted by corruption provides a direct method of 
regulating corruption.6 This intervention displaces the freedom of the parties to 
contract with wider considerations of policy and public interest.7 Court 
intervention in the contract tainted by corruption challenges the principle of 
party autonomy and the stability of private agreements.  
The transaction tainted by corruption is best characterized as a sequence of 
illegal acts that are closely connected. In other words, rather than speaking of 
                                                     
 
3   Collins argues that ‘[P]rivate law certainly has similar effects in steering market behaviour to 
other types of social and economic regulation of business activity. Participants in markets may 
alter their behaviour in order to comply with private law rules.’ H. Collins, Regulating 
Contracts, OUP, Oxford, 1999, p. 56. 
4   Strong argues that ‘the effect to be given to an illegal element of a contract … should depend 
upon how the court can best serve the interest of the public and, when not inimical to the 
public interest, do justice to the parties.’ G. Strong, ‘The enforceability of illegal contracts’, 
Hastings Law Journal , Vol. 12, 1960-1961, p. 347, at p. 350. 
5   E. Farnsworth, Contracts, 4th edn, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2004, p. 217. 
6   Collins writes that ‘… we should not presuppose that specialised regulatory agencies and codes 
are the sole type of legal mechanism. The private law of contract enforced by the ordinary 
courts is equally a form of legal regulation.’ H. Collins, Regulating Contracts, id., Note 3 
above, at p. 7. 
7  Collins speaks of justice as a key consideration in the formulation of legal doctrine regarding 
obligations created by contracts, he states:  
‘[t]he state seeks to refrain from promoting injustice, and in legal doctrine this 
objective becomes interpreted as justification for restraints upon freedom of contract. 
Private law places limits on the enforceability of agreements, in order to constrain 
power relations created by contracts and to upset exploitative bargains.’ 
H. Collins, Regulating Contracts, id., Note 3 above, at p. 34. 
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an illegal contract, the corrupt exchange is a series of illegal contracts tainted 
by corruption in varying ways. While criminalization tends to break up the 
process of corruption into isolated events, corruption is more systemic.8 The 
process of corruption is characterized by a sequence of agreements that are 
closely connected in arriving at the final negative consequences of corruption. 
This process has been described as an infestation that progresses until 
corruption ‘become[s] the normal condition of the body politic.’9 
The first section of this chapter examines the framework provided for the 
consequences of corruption under the UNCC. The obligations imposed by Art. 
34 on states raises the question whether the UNCC heralds the beginning of a 
legal regime concerning transactions tainted by corruption. The second and 
third sections examine the response to primary and secondary contracts as 
elaborated in the US, England, the Netherlands and by international arbitration. 
The fundamental question is whether or not an enforceable contract can be said 
to come into existence and, if a contract does come into existence, how this 
affects the position of the party treated ‘unfairly’ or whose ‘consent has been 
undermined in the process of reaching the agreement.’  
This chapter ends with a brief look at the notion of the contract tainted by 
corruption as a regulatory tool and whether articulating a common position on 
the policing role of the courts with regard to such contracts may be a necessary 
step to bring coherency between the international repudiation of corruption and 
the contracts that result from violations of anti-corruption laws. 
8.2 Consequences of Corruption under the UN Convention    
The tangible consequences of the corrupt exchange are the primary and 
secondary contracts.  Does Art. 34 UNCC introduce a new legal regime 
regarding the consequences of corruption? Are there new arguments to be 
made regarding the validity of contracts tainted by corruption as a result of Art. 
34 UNCC?  By bringing the consequences of corruption into the scope of anti-
corruption sanctioning processes, Art. 34  attempts to address the contradiction 
that may occur where parties who have committed acts of corruption may be 
prosecuted, fined and imprisoned, while persons who personally benefit from 
the acts of corruption and the transactions are not treated similarly.  
                                                     
 
8   Emphasis added. 
9   Per Justice Grier in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 
at p. 335.  
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The members of the UNCC recognize the need to ‘foster a culture of rejection 
of corruption.’10 Requiring that member states shall take measures to deal with 
the consequences of corruption is necessary to ensure that a culture of 
corruption does not become the prevailing culture. Art. 34 UNCC provides:  
‘[W]ith due regard to the rights of third parties acquired in good faith, each 
State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of its domestic law, to address consequences of corruption. In this 
context, States Parties may consider corruption a relevant factor in legal 
proceedings to annul or rescind a contract, withdraw a concession or other 
similar instrument or take any other remedial action.’  
Art. 34 UNCC speaks of the consequences of corruption. The specific 
corruption to which Art. 34 refers is outlined in Arts. 15-25 UNCC.11 Of 
particular note are Arts. 15 and 16 UNCC, which respectively criminalize 
national and international corruption, as well as Art. 21, which criminalizes 
private corruption. The parties to contracts tainted by corruption can vary from 
a public/private configuration with the state on the one hand and the 
commercial entity on the other, to a private/private configuration between two 
commercial entities. These transactions embody the relationships between the 
person giving the bribe, the person accepting the bribe and the person from 
whom the bribe was kept secret. These are all relationships that flow out of or 
are tainted by the original act of bribery. This raises questions about the status 
of such transactions. 
Art. 34 recognizes the need to embrace the direct link between the act of 
corruption and its consequences. Art. 34 refers to contracts, concessions or 
similar instruments as consequences of corruption.12 By so doing, Art. 34 
reaches across the public/private divide to bring private agreements into the 
sphere of consequences of corruption, which states should seek to address. In 
this sense the purpose of Art. 34 is more than merely the provision of 
compensation to a wronged party but also, to some extent, to deter the 
commission of the corrupt exchanges that result in such contracts.  
 
                                                     
 
10    Preamble, Para. 5 UNCC.  
11   Arts. 15-25 of the UN Convention provide a taxonomy of acts of corruption as follows: the 
bribery of national public officials (Art. 15), the bribery of foreign public officials and officials 
of public international organizations (Art. 16), embezzlement (Art. 17), influence (Art. 18), 
abuse of function (Art. 19), illicit enrichment (Art. 20), embezzlement of property in the 
private sector (Art. 22), laundering of proceeds of crime (Art. 23), concealment (Art. 24), and 
the obstruction of justice (Art. 25). 
12    Art. 34 UNCC.  
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8.2.1 No New Legal Regime      
Art. 34 stipulates that states shall take measure to address the consequences of 
corruption. This is to encourage states to integrate the consequences of 
corruption into their anti-corruption strategy and planning. The first part of Art. 
34 is couched in mandatory terms:   
‘[W]ith due regard to the rights of third parties acquired in good faith, each 
State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles 
of its domestic law, to address consequences of corruption.’ 
However, the second part of Art. 34 modifies the first part by making it clear 
that the extent to which states are required to do this will depend on the 
fundamental laws and principles of the state in question. The fact that such 
measures are to be taken in accordance with the fundamental principles of its 
domestic law means that there is no new international standard regarding 
measures to be taken regarding the consequences of corruption established by 
Art. 34 except to the extent of concurrence with national principles. This is the 
light in which the last section of Art. 34 must be viewed. It provides that:  
‘In this context, States Parties may consider corruption a relevant factor in 
legal proceedings to annul or rescind a contract, withdraw a concession or 
other similar instrument or take any other remedial action.’ 
The ‘context’ that is referred to is the fact that Art. 34 is subject to the 
fundamental laws and principles of participating states. Thus, when Art. 34 
stipulates that states may consider the fact of corruption as a relevant factor 
with regard to the enforceability or either status of contracts, concessions or 
other instruments that result from corruption, the linking of corruption to the 
issue of transaction validity is left to the discretion of the state. 
As such, as far as the consequences of corruption are concerned, Art. 34 can 
hardly be said to be promoting any new measures. At best it can be seen as 
aiming to strengthen existing positions under domestic law with regard to the 
consequences of corruption to the extent that these promote the objectives of 
the UNCC.13 Despite the novelty of Art. 34, the UNCC does not introduce a 
new legal regime with regard to the validity of contracts tainted by corruption.   
In this sense, the UNCC does not add to existing provisions of the national law 
regarding the enforceability or validity of contracts, concessions or similar 
                                                     
 
13   Art. 1 UNCC states that one of the purposes of the UN Convention is to ‘promote and 
strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption.’ Emphasis added. 
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instruments tainted by corruption. However, Art. 34 UNCC does articulate on 
the global stage the important nexus between the public wrong of corruption 
and the rights and obligations of parties that result from the commission of this 
wrong. This is an important acknowledgment of the need to remove the 
artificial boundary that exists between the public and private approaches to the 
fight against corruption. The UNCC encourages a consistency of approaching 
by calling for a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach.14 
8.2.2 Measures under Art. 34 UNCC 
Art. 34 UNCC also calls on states to ‘take measures’ with regard to the 
contracts, concessions or other instruments that result from the corrupt 
exchange. This is an open-ended call. Transaction validity is just one suggested 
measure. The purpose of such measures is to ensure that the purpose of 
criminalizing bribery also extends to the consequences that it produces. As 
such, the measures to be taken in this regard are measures that delegitimize, 
invalidate or otherwise punish the occurrence of these consequences. 
Addressing the consequences of corruption clarifies the cost of non-
compliance with anti-corruption rules. The instability of the resulting contract, 
for example, or the exclusion from the contracting process can encourage the 
choice for compliance.15 
This is supported by the recent self-assessment report with respect to Art. 34 
filed by the US and the UK.16 These show that measures taken with regard to 
Art. 34 are primarily to exclude parties who have engaged in corrupt activity 
from the public procurement process. The UK in its Self-Assessment for the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption – Chapters III and IV17 − states 
that it has adopted and implemented the measures described in Art. 34 by 
providing processes for mandatory exclusions from public contract 
                                                     
 
14   See Preamble, Para. 4 UNCC. 
15   See EU Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC, Art. 45(1), which requires that an entity 
which has been convicted of corruption shall not be permitted to participate in public contracts. 
Council Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004, on the Coordination of Procedures for the 
Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts. 
16  The Netherlands is not due for reviewing until the third year of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption Review Mechanism and has yet to submit a Self-Assessment report. As 
such no details are yet available as to its implementation of Art. 34. See United Nations 
Convention against Corruption: Review Mechanism, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-pairings-year-1-of-the-review-
cycle.html, accessed on 27 November 2011. However, Art. 45(1) EU Public Sector 
Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC, which requires that an entity which has been convicted of 
corruption shall not be permitted to participate in public contracts, will clearly apply as a 
measure in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
17   UK Self-Assessment for United Nations Convention against Corruption - Chapters III and IV, 
www.dfid.gov.uk/.../draft-UK-self-assess-un-convention-corr.pdf, accessed on 27 November 
2011.  
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procurements where an economic operator has been convicted of corruption or 
bribery offenses.18 Even where there has been no conviction but mere 
allegations of bribery, contracting authorities have the discretion to exclude an 
economic operator from public bidding processes.19 The Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 allows for the confiscation of the benefit that a convicted defendant 
has obtained as a result of its criminal conduct.20 The Act also empowers the 
enforcement authorities (the Serious Fraud Office) to apply to the High Court 
for a civil recovery order to recover property which is, or represents, property 
obtained through unlawful conduct.21 
The US in its Self-Assessment for United Nations Convention22 refers to the 
fact that the adoption of measures with respect to Art. 34 includes 
administrative, civil and criminal sanctions. According to the report the 
‘visibility of punishment plays a significant role in prevention because of its 
deterrent effect’.23 It lists the measures that the US has taken with respect to 
Art. 34 as falling into the following categories: various degrees of criminal 
sentences for officials convicted for bribery; rescission and annulment of 
contracts procured by bribery; damages and restitution of moneys paid by 
government with regard to contracts tainted by corruption; and private actions 
for damages by private individuals who are victims of corruption.24 Also 
included is the withdrawal of contracts where the contracting authorities 
determine that there has been corrupt activity.25 
                                                     
 
18   UK Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/5) Art. 23(1) provides that ‘a contracting 
authority shall treat as ineligible and shall not select an economic operator in accordance with 
these Regulations if the contracting authority has actual knowledge that the economic operator 
… has been convicted of any … (b) corruption within the meaning of Sec. 1 of the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889(3) or Sec. 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906(4); 
(c) the offence of bribery;….’ Similar provisions are contained in the Defence and Security 
Public Contracts Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1848).  
19   Art. 23(4)(e) UK Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/5) provides that: ‘A contracting 
authority may treat an economic operator as ineligible or decide not to select an economic 
operator in accordance with these Regulations on one or more of the following grounds, 
namely that the economic operator … has committed an act of grave misconduct in the course 
of his business or profession.’ 
20   See Part 2, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
21   Id., see Part 5.  
22  US Self-Assessment for United Nations Convention against Corruption - Chapters III and IV, 
14 January 2011, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-pairings-year-1-of-
the-review-cycle.html, accessed on 27 November 2011.  
23  Id., at p.169. 
24  Id. 
25   See for example the US Federal Acquisition Regulations, which provide in Subpart 3.703(b)(2) 
on Voiding and Rescinding Contracts that a Federal agency, upon receiving information that ‘a 
contractor or a person has engaged in conduct constituting a violation of subsection 27(a) or 
(b) of the OFPP Act, should consider the rescission of a contract with respect to which … (2) 
The head of the agency, or designee, has determined, based upon a preponderance of the 
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8.2.3 Corruption as a Vitiating Factor  
Art. 34 UNCC stipulates that corruption is to be considered a factor in 
annulling or rescinding a contract, concession or similar instrument. Art. 34 
presents corruption as an independent cause of defective consent. This means 
that Art. 34 emphasizes corruption as a vitiating factor of an otherwise 
enforceable contract. A parallel can be drawn to the express inclusion of 
corruption as a vitiating factor in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which provides for corruption as a separate vitiating factor 
distinguishable from error and fraud. It states that ‘[i]f the expression of a 
State’s consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured through the 
corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating 
State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be 
bound by the treaty.’26  
8.3 The Primary Contract 
The first contract in the corrupt exchange is the contract between the bribe-
giver and the recipient of the bribe. This contract is described as primary 
because it sets the stage for the secondary contract that results between the 
bribe-giver and the principal of the bribe-recipient. This section draws on 
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 to examine the extent to which corruption affects the 
validity of such a primary agreement under US, English, and Dutch law and 
International Arbitration. This gives a general picture of the status of the 
primary contract from an international perspective. 
8.3.1 US Law 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UNCC, the OECD Convention and the 
various state commercial bribery statutes in the US prohibit the offering or 
acceptance of a bribe or other inducement to acquire business.27 These laws are 
directed at the conduct of parties involved in the giving and receipt of a bribe. 
                                                                                                                            
 
evidence that the contractor or someone acting for the contractor has engaged in conduct 
constituting such an offense.’ 
26   See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 50. Elias noted the reluctance 
of some states to include corruption of a state’s representative as a ground for invalidating a 
treaty. However, he notes that the drafters of the treaty concluded that:  
‘the corruption of a representative by another negotiating state undermines the 
consent which the representative purports to express on behalf of his state in quite a 
special manner which differentiates the case from one of fraud.’  
See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, p. 74, Para. 2, cited in T. Elias, 
New Horizons in International Law, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, NY, , 1974, at p. 165. 
27  See Chapter 4 for a full description of the criminalization of international and domestic 
commercial bribery under US laws. 
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However, the rules do not specifically address the status of contracts that result 
from this conduct. This means that decisions about the status of such contracts 
are left to the determination of the courts. The courts have been consistent about 
applying the policy behind the criminalization of bribery to questions about the 
status of resulting contracts. In the Oscanyon case, where a kickback was to be 
paid to a diplomat who promised to influence the award of a contract for the sale 
of arms, the court stated that ‘[t]he question then arises is this contract one 
which the court will enforce?’28 This is a question that the court has answered in 
the negative on grounds of public policy and on grounds that it is inconsistent 
with the statutory prohibitions of bribery. 
The Courts will generally hold that where a statute has expressly prohibited a 
particular type of conduct, an agreement that embodies such conduct is 
unenforceable.29 Farnsworth notes that where the promise sought to be 
enforced is conditioned on the parties engaging in the commission of a tort, the 
tendency to induce misconduct is what makes the promise unenforceable 
whether or not the conduct takes place.30 The courts will not entertain claims 
that are ‘founded upon services rendered in violation of common decency, 
public morality, or the law.’31 Similarly, the Court in Coppell v. Hall explained 
that the law will not ‘lend its support to a claim founded upon its violation.’32  
From the public policy perspective, the US courts look at the effect of 
contracts to give a bribe on the larger society and do not restrict themselves to 
a consideration of the rights of the parties to the contract. The contract to give 
a bribe is held to be unenforceable because it undermines the integrity of social 
and political institutions. In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 
compensation was claimed for services rendered in procuring the passage of a 
law. Justice Grier in rejecting the claim stated that the consequences of bribery 
are draconian, as such acts of purchasing influence can ‘infest the capital of the 
Union and of every state, till corruption shall become the normal condition of 
the body politic, and it will be said of us as of Rome – omne Romae venale.’33 
In similar dramatic terms, the court in Coppell v. Hall describes bribery as ‘a 
contamination that destroys wherever it reaches.’34 In the afore-mentioned 
Oscanyon case, the courts referred to the far-reaching moral implications of 
bribery that arise because of the ‘inherent viciousness of the transaction, its 
repugnance to our morality, and the pernicious effect which its enforcement by 
                                                     
 
28   Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880), at pp. 271-272. 
29  E. Farnsworth, Contracts, 4th edn, Aspen Publications, New York, 2004, p. 335.  
30  Id., at p. 316. 
31   Oscanyon v. Arms Co., id., Note 28 above, at p. 267. 
32   Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 542, 558-59, 19 L.Ed. 244 (1868), cited in Oscanyon v. 
Arms Co, id., at Note 28 above, at p. 268. 
33   Per Lord Grier in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U. S. 314 (1853), at p. 335. 
34   Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.), p. 542, at pp. 558-59. 
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our courts would have upon our people.’35 For this reason the US courts hold it 
as a principle that the primary contract to give a bribe is unenforceable.36  
When a court in the US is faced with a contract to give and/or receive a bribe, 
it is faced with a contract that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy, 
because the anti-corruption rules regarding private and public bribery clearly 
prohibit such agreements.37 By engaging in a contract to give or receive a 
bribe, the parties are committing the very conduct prohibited by the law. It is 
also in violation of public policy as a contract to commit a tort or to induce the 
commitment of a tort.38  
A fundamental question with respect to the primary contract is what the role of 
the court should be as regards the position of the plaintiff and the defendant. If 
the primary contract is held to be unenforceable this allows the defendant, who 
may be the party at fault, to walk away from the transaction without paying 
any penalty. Indeed it may leave the defendant enriched at the cost of the 
plaintiff.39 The general rule is that the US courts will not allow a claim on a 
promise that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. The court will 
simply leave the parties as it finds them regardless of the fact that this may lead 
to one party being unjustly enriched at the cost of the other.   
In Nathan v. Tenna Corporation, where the defendant sough to recover 
commissions on what was essentially a bribery kick-back scheme, the court 
held that public policy dictated that the plaintiff’s suit be dismissed.40 In 
McMullen v. Hoffman, where the defendants sought a claim based on a 
fraudulent exchange, the court held that the maxim ‘Potior est conditio 
defendentis’ would apply to render the contract unenforceable.41 In Coppell v. 
Hall, the court emphasized that a contract in violation of a statutory prohibition 
was unenforceable not on account of the defendant, but on account ‘of the law 
itself’ and the ‘purity of its administration.’42 The objective of the court with 
                                                     
 
35   Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103 U.S. 261, at p. 277. 
36   Per Lord Grier in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., id., Note 33 above, at p. 334. 
37   Sec. 192 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
38   Sec. 193 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
39  The Court of Appeals in McMullen v. Hoffman 174 U.S. 639 (1899), at p. 669, has stated that: 
‘the court refuses to enforce such a contract, and it permits defendant to set up its 
illegality not out of any regard for the defendant who sets it up, but only on account 
of the public interest. It has been often stated in similar cases that the defense is a 
very dishonest one, and it lies ill in the mouth of the defendant to allege it, and it is 
only allowed for public considerations, and in order the better to secure the public 
against dishonest transactions. To refuse to grant either party to an illegal.’  
40   Marvin B. Nathan and Natalie J. Nathan v. Tenna Corporation, United States Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 560 F.2d 761 (1977). 
41  174 U.S. 639 (1899), at p. 654 
42   Id., at pp. 558-559.  
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regard to its refusal to assist the plaintiff is also to encourage deterrence. The 
‘rigid adherence’ to the rule of non-enforceability helps to ensure that the 
public understands that such contracts will not be protected by the law.43 The 
exceptions to the strict rule against enforceability or recovery that applies to 
persons who were excusably ignorant of the wrongful aspects of the 
transaction44 would not apply to the contract to give a bribe where the actions 
of both parties were intentional with the purpose of acting against the 
knowledge of the person to whom the bribe-recipient owed a duty of trust.  
Wade, in his examination of US law on the subject of restitution for benefits 
obtained by illegal transactions, gives the reasons why courts may refuse to 
grant restitution as follows: (1) to grant restitution will aid in enforcing the 
illegal contract;45 (2) on the basis of the principle of volenti non fit injuria, a 
party engaged in an illegal contract must be taken to have known that the law 
will not enforce it or allow him restitution in connection with it. He must 
therefore have assumed any risk of loss;46 (3) the plaintiff should be punished 
by a denial of relief;47 (4) the plaintiff as a participant in an illegal contract is 
disqualified from seeking the court’s aid;48 (5) the nature of the suit offends the 
dignity of the court, as the suit is founded on an unlawful grounds that the 
courts cannot afford the time and expense for such suits founded in illegality;49 
and (6) to refuse relief will discourage illegal transactions.50 Wade also 
summarizes the primary reasons why a court may want to grant recovery.51 
However, with regard to the primary contract to give a bribe, the case law 
shows that the courts will lean toward the refusal of a right of recovery. The 
courts will leave the parties as they find them.  
In conclusion, the US Courts will not enforce an agreement to give a bribe on 
grounds of public policy and because it is prohibited by legislation. Sec. 178 of 
the Restatement provides that:  
                                                     
 
43   Id., at p. 670. 
44   Sec. 198 Restatement (2nd) Contracts.  
45   J. Wade, ‘Benefits obtained under illegal transactions − reasons for and against allowing 
restitution’, 25 Texas Law Review 31, 1946-1947, at p. 32. 
46   Id., at p. 35. 
47  Id. 
48   Id., at p. 37. 
49  Id., at pp. 42-48. 
50  Id., at p. 48. 
51  Wade also suggests reasons why the courts may decide to grant recovery as follows: (1) the 
fact that such recovery will prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant; (2) to encourage 
the plaintiff to disaffirm the illegal contract; (3) allowing recovery will discourage illegal 
transactions; and (4) refusing recovery will encourage fraud. See J. Wade, ‘Benefits obtained 
under illegal transactions − reasons for and against allowing restitution’, id., at pp. 52-57.   
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‘A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in 
its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.’52   
In addition, a promise to commit an act of bribery or to induce such an act 
amounts to a promise to commit a tort and is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy.53 Furthermore, an agreement to give a bribe or other inducement 
encourages an agent to act in breach of the fiduciary duty owed to a principal 
or will tend to induce such a violation of duty and is also unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy.54 For the above reasons it can be concluded that the 
primary contract is a contract that the courts will not enforce under US Law. 
8.3.2 English Law  
It is a well-established principle that the English court will not enforce a 
contract that is illegal.55 Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson stated that ‘No 
court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
immoral or illegal act.’56 This is a principle that is grounded in general 
principles of public policy rather than in the interest of the parties. Even where 
a defendant is seeking to avoid responsibility under a contract by alleging the 
contract is illegal, public policy allows this by requiring that the contract in 
contravention of statute is unenforceable.57 This principle allows no room for 
the exercise of any discretion by the court in favor of one party or the other.58 
The UK Bribery Act makes it a criminal offense to (1) offer a bribe intending 
that the bribe will induce the person to perform a relevant function or activity 
improperly;59 (2) reward the person for such an improper performance; or (3) 
know that the acceptance of the bribe will in itself constitute the improper 
                                                     
 
52   Sec. 178 Restatement (2nd) Contracts. 
53  See Sec. 192 Restatement (2nd) Contracts, which provides that ‘A promise to commit a tort or 
to induce the commission of a tort is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.’ 
54  See Sec. 193 Restatement (2nd) Contracts, which provides that ‘A promise by a fiduciary to 
violate his fiduciary duty or promise that tends to induce such a violation is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy.’ 
55  Justice Gibson, after reviewing in extenso the English principles on illegality stated ‘[t]here 
can be no doubt but that under English law a claim, whether in contract or in tort, may be 
defeated on the ground of illegality or, in the Latin phrase, ex turpi causa non oritur actio.’ 
Hall v. Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd 4 All ER 787.  
56   Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, at p. 343. 
57   Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson stated ‘It is not for his sake, however, that the objection 
is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the 
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff …,’ id.   
58   Tinsley v. Milligan [1993] 3 All ER 65. 
59   Sec. 1(2) UK Bribery Act 2010. 
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performance of a relevant function or activity.60 There is an express prohibition 
on the offering of a bribe and an agreement that evidences the offer of a bribe 
would clearly contravene the statute. Similarly, the UK Bribery Act 
criminalizes the request, agreement to receive, or the acceptance or 
anticipation of61 a financial or other advantage with the intention that, in 
consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly.62 
Also criminalized is the request, agreement or acceptance of a financial or 
other advantage of a bribe that in itself constitutes the improper performance63 
or constitutes a reward64 for improper performance. All functions of a public 
nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of a person’s 
employment or performed by or on behalf of a body of persons, whether 
corporate or incorporate, fall within the scope of activities in respect of which 
giving or receiving a bribe are criminalized.65 These provisions clearly prohibit 
the receipt of a bribe, and an agreement that evidences the receipt of a bribe 
would clearly fall within conduct that is expressly prohibited by statute and 
would be void following the rules on illegality. 66 
The criminalization of public and private bribery renders the agreement to give 
or receive a bribe illegal.67 The defense of illegality will therefore prevent the 
court from acting inconsistently with the criminal prohibition of bribery. The 
effect of upholding a contract to give a bribe would be to sanction the 
commission of the criminal conduct. The rules criminalize both active and 
passive bribery and as such apply to all the parties to the primary agreement 
i.e. to the party paying the bribe as well as to the party receiving it. The effect 
of this is to render the primary contract illegal and void.68 
Where a contract is made to deliberately commit a prohibited act, the contract 
is unenforceable under English law.69 In the words of Lord Holt, ‘Every 
contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made 
unlawful by any statute is a void contract, tho’ the statute itself doth not 
                                                     
 
60  Id., Sec. 1(3).  
61   Id., Sec. 2(6). 
62   Id., Sec. 2(2).  
63   Id., Sec. 2(3).  
64  Id., Sec. 2(5). 
65   Id., Sec. 3-4. 
66  See Chapter 5 above for a full description of the criminalization of international and national 
commercial bribery under UK law. 
67   St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 267, at p. 283, per Devlin J. 
68  In Phoenix Insurance v. Halvanon Insurance [1988] QB 216, the provisions of the Insurance 
Companies Act 1974 rendered it illegal, without the authority of the Secretary of State to carry 
on the business of effecting and carrying out contracts of insurance. A contract of insurance 
entered into by an unauthorized insurance company was held to be void. 
69   St. John Shipping Corporation v. Joseph Rank Ltd [1957] 1 QB 267, 283; Ali Mohammed v. 
Alaga & Co [2000] 1 WLR 1815. 
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mention that it be so ….’70 The effect of the prohibitions against the bribery of 
public officers, agents and foreign officials is to render any transaction that 
breaches this prohibition illegal. As such a contract to give a bribe would 
involve the commission of a statutory criminal offense and would be 
unenforceable by a court of law.71  
The courts in Re Mahmoud & Ispahani emphasized that statute may provide an 
express prohibition or that this may have to be inferred by the court from the 
fact that the statute imposes a penalty on the person entering into that class of 
contract.72 However, in St. John Shipping Corporation v. Joseph Rank Ltd the 
court noted that the distinction between contracts expressly and impliedly 
prohibited by statute, is not as to enforceability because in both cases the 
courts will not enforce such a contract.73 Any attempt by parties to make a 
claim on the primary contract will not be upheld by the courts.74 In Ali 
Mohammed v. Alaga & Co., the court referred to the unenforceability of a 
contract where the relevant legislation prohibits the actions embodied in the 
contract stating that ‘there are substantial reasons why, in the public interest, 
such agreements should be outlawed’ and that ‘if the court were to allow its 
process to be used to enforce agreements of this kind, the risk would inevitably 
arise that such agreements would abound … to the detriment of the public.’75 
The court will not entertain an action based on an illegality and deny the 
parties to such a contract the dignity of the law by way of remedies that may 
inadvertently affirm the illegality. This means that the claim of illegality plays 
into the hands of the defendant who is opposing the plaintiff’s claim.76 The 
consequence of a finding that the contract in question is an agreement to pay or 
receive a bribe is the application of the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur.77   
This means that with regard to claims by parties concerning the primary 
contract it is a defense to a claim by the plaintiff that the contract is illegal. 
This defense is not to achieve justice between the parties but rather to protect 
                                                     
 
70   Per Holt C.J. in Bartlett v. Vinor, 90 Eng Rep. 750. 
71   Re Mahmoud v. Ispahani [1921] 2 KB 716.  
72   [1921] 2 KB 716.  
73  [1957] 1 QB 267, 283. 
74  Parkinson v. College of Ambulance Ltd (1925) [1925] 2 KB 1. 
75   Ali Mohammed v. Alaga & Co [2000] 1 WLR 1815. 
76   ‘No Court ought to enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of 
enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract or transaction which is illegal, if the 
illegality is duly brought to the notice of the Court, and if the person invoking the aid of the 
Court is himself implicated in the illegality.’ See Scott v. Brown Doering McNab [1892] 2 QB 
724 per Lindley L.J., at p. 728. 
77  In Holman v. Johnson, Lord Mansfield remarked that ‘no court will lend its aid to a man who 
founds his cause of action on an immoral or illegal act.’ See Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 
Cowp. 341, 98 ER 1120 (1775) 1 Cowp 341, at p. 343. 
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the interest of the society.78 In Nayyar & Ors. v. Sapte & Anor., an attempt by 
the plaintiff to sue to recover the bribe paid was defeated by the application of 
the ex turpi causa principle. The court stated that ‘the principle of ex turpi 
causa can extend to immoral as well as illegal acts and may apply to improper 
conduct evincing serious moral turpitude. Bribery involves serious moral 
turpitude.’79 Under English law the primary agreement is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy as well as statutory illegality. 
If a service can be separated from the illegal contract, then a claim can be 
allowed. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Tinsley v. Milligan held that ‘A party to 
an illegality can recover by virtue of a legal or equitable property interest if, 
but only if, he can establish his title without relying on his own illegality.’80 In 
the Ali Mohammed v. Alaga case the plaintiff was allowed to a claim for 
quantum meruit for translation service that could be considered separate from 
the contract to receive a commission for the solicitation of clients contrary to 
the rules governing solicitors.81 The court found it relevant that ‘the parties are 
not in a situation in which their blameworthiness is equal, and that the plaintiff 
was ignorant that there was any reason why the defendant should not make the 
agreement which he says was made.’82 
The Law Commission in its Consultative Report emphasized the public interest 
sought to be protected by the illegality defense and states that  
‘the illegality defence should be allowed where its application can 
be firmly justified by the policies that underlie its existence. These 
include: (a) furthering the purpose of the rule which the illegal 
conduct has infringed; (b) that the claimant should not profit from 
                                                     
 
78  Per Lord Mansfield Holman v. Johnson, id.  
79  Nayyar & Ors v. Sapte & Anor [2009] EWHC 3218 (QB) (16 December 2009), where an 
attempt had been made to win a Global Sales Agent Contract in respect of Air India by paying 
a bribe to a person with connections in the Indian aviation industry. The court held that proof 
of a payment which is intended to be a civil law bribe is sufficient to engage the ex turpi causa 
principle. It is not necessary to establish that the intended illegal purpose has been effectively 
carried out. See Para. 118. 
80   [1994] 1 A.C. 340, at p. 385. 
81  The court accepted the argument by the plaintiff’s lawyers that ‘even if the alleged agreement 
is discarded as illegal and unenforceable, and without making any reference to that agreement 
at all, the plaintiff is entitled to be paid a reasonable sum for professional services rendered by 
him to the defendant on behalf of the defendant’s clients, the surrounding circumstances being 
such as to show that such services were not rendered gratuitously.’ 
82  Id. 
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his or her wrongdoing; (c) deterrence and (d) maintaining the 
integrity of the legal system.’83  
For the above reasons it can be concluded that the primary contract is a 
contract that the courts will not enforce under UK Law. 
8.3.3 Dutch Law  
Public and private bribery are criminalized under the Dutch Penal Code 
(DPC).84 The primary contract is evidence of an act that is forbidden under Art. 
328ter DPC. The Dutch Civil Code (DCC) limits the freedom of parties to 
contract where there is inconsistency with public law.85 By virtue of Art.3:40 
DCC, the primary contract would be a nullity on the grounds that it is contrary 
to public order and public policy under Art.3:40(1) DCC  or contrary to 
mandatory law under Art. 3:40(2) DCC.  
The validity of an agreement to give a bribe can also be questioned on the 
grounds that it is in conflict with public policy. A contract to give a bribe in 
terms of its content and its objective is in conflict with the good morals and 
public order (openbare orde)86 and it is therefore on the grounds of Art. 
3:40(1) DCC a nullity. Art. 3:40(1) DCC states that a juridical act which by its 
content or necessary implication is contrary to good morals or public policy is 
a nullity. Criminalization of public and private bribery under Dutch law is a 
                                                     
 
83   See Consultative Report, The Illegality Defence, LCCP No. 189, January 2009, Part 2, Para. 2. 
Leading up to this Report, in 1999 the Law Commission published a Consultation Paper 
(Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts, Consultation Paper No. 
154, 21 January 1999) to consider the introduction of a structured discretion for the court as 
regards the enforcement of an illegal contract (except for cases where the contract is illegal as 
being contrary to public policy) and the extent to which involvement of one or both of the 
parties to a contract in illegal activities should have an impact on their usual rights and 
remedies. The Commission finally decided that any improvement of the law could best be 
achieved through case law.  
84  See Chapter 6 for full details of criminalization of international and national commercial 
bribery under Dutch law. 
85   Some writers describe normative texts as absolutely mandatory ‘when such laws appear in 
legislation which also prohibits agreement which infringe morals or public policy.’ See 
Association Henri Capitant & Société de Législation Comparée (Ed.), European Contract Law 
Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules, 
2008, Sellier, Munich, at p. 142. 
86  The European Court of Justice has defined a public order law as follows: ‘concerning the 
classification of the provisions at issue as public-order legislation … law, that term must be 
understood as applying to national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be 
so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member State 
concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of 
that Member State and all legal relationships within that State.’ See Judgment of 23 November 
1999 in Case 376/ 96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils 
SARL (C-369/96), at Para. 30. 
PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 
381 
 
good indicator that it constitutes conduct that is contrary to Dutch public 
morals and policy. A contract to give a bribe would therefore arguably be a 
nullity under Art. 3:40(1) DCC. The participation of the Netherlands in 
international instruments prohibiting corruption in international and national 
business is further evidence of the fact that a contract to give a bribe is against 
the public order or public policy in the Netherlands.  
Apart from nullity on grounds of being in violation of public policy, Art. 3:40 
(2) DCC states that a juridical act that is in conflict with a mandatory statutory 
provision (dwingende wetsbepaling) is a nullity.  While the provisions of the 
Dutch Penal Code do not specifically refer to the status of the contract to give a 
bribe, Hartkamp has remarked that where a law provides that a particular type 
of agreement results in a criminal act, such an agreement that results in the act 
is forbidden by the law. 87  
The provisions of the DPC with regard to the prohibition of bribery apply to all 
parties engaging in the agreement to give a bribe and are not intended for the 
protection of one particular party. As such, the caveat to Art. 3:40 DCC to the 
effect that where a provision is intended solely for the protection of one of the 
parties to a multilateral juridical act, the act may only be annulled would not 
apply. An agreement to give a bribe would therefore fall within the four 
corners of Art. 3:40(2) DCC as a contract in conflict with the mandatory 
prohibitions against public or private bribery and constitute a nullity.  
Furthermore, the status of the contract to give a bribe is further clarified by the 
provisions of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (CLC), which is in 
force in the Netherlands. Art. 8 CLC provides ‘any contract or clause of a 
contract providing for corruption to be null and void’. This applies to the 
primary agreement between the bribe-giver and the bribe-recipient. This 
agreement is a nullity in the eyes of the law and therefore cannot found an 
action to enforce any rights before a court.  
The effect of such a nullity has consequences where there has been a transfer 
of property, of money or some other performance. Art.6:203 DCC mandates 
that any such transfer must be reversed as there is no legal basis to support the 
change in the position of the parties. Art. 6:203 DCC provides that ‘Any 
transfer of property must be undone, if for a sum of money, the money must be 
repaid and if a performance, the performance must be reversed.’   
                                                     
 
87  A. Hartkamp, C. Sieburgh, Verbintenissenrecht, Deel III, Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht, 
Asser Series, 13th edn, Kluwer, Deventer, 2010, at pp. 271-273. 
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The primary contract to give a bribe will usually involve the exchange of a 
monetary bribe or other inducement in exchange for the performance of an act 
by the recipient of the bribe. While it is easy to conceive of the return of the 
bribe or other inducement to the bribe-giver, it is not easy to envisage 
simultaneously the undoing or return of the performance of the recipient of the 
bribe. In a corrupt exchange not all the transfers of property or performances 
can be undone. Where the bribe-recipient has fulfilled his part of the bribery 
agreement, and a contract has resulted in favor of the offeror of the bribe, this 
performance may not be reversible or easily quantifiable. This results in an 
unfair situation where the recipient of the bribe is required to return the bribe 
or other inducement while the equally blameworthy bribe-giver is in a position 
to undo or ‘return’ the performance of the bribe-recipient. In this circumstance, 
the bribe-giver would be unfairly enriched by the operation of the rule in Art. 
6:201 DCC. 
To attain a fair result in instances such as these, Art. 6:211 DCC provides that 
where a performance made on the basis of a contract which is a nullity and 
which by its nature cannot be reversed; this performance ought not to be 
valued in money. Furthermore, that a claim to reverse a counter-performance or 
reimbursement of its value is also barred to the extent that such a claim would, 
for that reason, offend reasonableness and fairness.88 Thus where a party 
colludes in a bribery transaction and engages in conduct prohibited by law, the 
immorality of the transaction denies the right to restitution to all concerned.89 
For the above reasons it can be concluded that the primary contract is a 
contract that the courts will not enforce under Dutch Law and the courts will 
leave the parties as they find them. 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
88  Art. 6:210(2) provides that, ‘if the performance by its nature precludes a reversal then, so far as 
is reasonable, restitution shall be by reimbursement of the value of the performance at the time 
of its receipt, provided that the recipient has been enriched by the performance or was 
responsible for the performance being effected or had agreed to make some performance in 
exchange.’ 
89   Kooten remarks that ‘Dutch law recognises a category of cases in which restitution is denied. 
… This category is made up of cases in which a party has rendered a performance which 
“ought not to be valued in money” by a court … such as a murder. It would be shocking if a 
court would estimate the value of the murder in monetary terms. The justification for this 
denial of restitution is a general policy of upholding morality …. It is morally unacceptable for 
contracting parties to value a murder and this is all the more true for a court.’ H. van Kooten, 
Restitutierechtelijke gevolgen van ongeoorloofde overeenkomsten, Kluwer, Deventer, 2002, at 
p. 331. 
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8.3.4 International Arbitration 
The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement Convention of 
Arbitral Awards90 and the UNCITRAL Model International Arbitration law91 
emphasize the link between the public policy against corruption that is 
evidenced by the world-wide criminalization of bribery and international 
arbitration. This is because the enforcement of arbitral awards is subject to the 
laws or public policy of the state where the award is to be enforced.92 The New 
York Convention for example states that recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award may be refused by the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought if the subject matter of the dispute is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country or where 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of that country.93  
In general terms, an award must not contravene anti-corruption rules and 
public policy to be enforceable.94 Parties cannot contract out of mandatory 
provisions of the law in place such as the anti-corruption rules with respect to 
international and domestic commercial corruption. In the words of Justice 
Waller, in a case reviewing an arbitration award, the courts are ‘concerned to 
preserve the integrity of its process, and to see that it is not abused. The parties 
cannot override that concern by private agreement … [p]ublic policy will not 
allow it.’95   
                                                     
 
90  United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
the ‘New York’ Convention, (1958), Art. V(2). See also UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration 1985, Art. 34 and Art. 36. 
91   UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 Art. 34 and Art. 36. 
92  A. Cole, ‘The public policy exception to the New York Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards’, Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol., Vol. 1, 1985-1986, p. 365, at p. 
368.  
93   United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
the ‘New York’ Convention, 1958, Art. 5(2). 
94  The ‘New York’ Convention, 1958, Art. II(1), Art. V(2).; Model Law Art. 34(2)(b)(i), Art. 
36(1)(b)(i). 
95   Soleimany v. Soleimany [1998] EWCA Civ 285 (19 February 1998) [1998] 3 WLR 811, [1999] 
QB 785, [1999] 3 All ER 847. Pronouncements of international arbitration tribunals and the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes show that the transnational 
public policy on corruption as articulated by the provisions of the TransLex-Principles of 
transnational law is reflected in the Tribunals holdings. Principle No. 4(7)(2)(a) provides that 
contracts based on or involving the payment or transfer of bribes (‘corruption money’, ‘secret 
commissions’, ‘pots-de-vin’, ‘kickbacks’) are void. The TransLex-Principles of the Center for 
Transnational Law (CENTRAL) at the University of Cologne, Germany available at 
http://www.trans-lex.org/principles. 
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In Case No. 1110 (1963),96 where parties entered into an agreement to pay the 
claimant a percentage of the price of the electrical equipment contract he 
obtained for the defendant using his influence, Justice Lagergren, the sole 
arbitrator, found the claim to be untenable as based on the acceptance of a 
bribe and emphasized that contracts based on such an agreement to give a bribe 
and that ‘seriously violate bonos mores or international public policy are 
invalid or at least unenforceable and that they cannot be sanctioned by courts 
or arbitrators.’97 
In the ICC Iranian Party v. Greek Party case,98 the commission at the heart of 
a consulting agreement in dispute before the tribunal was in the opinion of the 
arbitral tribunal clearly ‘intended to remunerate the counterparties’ by way of 
‘pots-de-vin’ or ‘bribes.’99 As a result the tribunal held that the consulting 
agreement was null and void and the parties could not require performance of 
the contract or seek restitution under it.100 The characterization of an 
agreement to give a bribe as null and void is found in the case of the 
Establishment of the Middle East State v. South Asian Construction Company 
ICC case, where the tribunal held that ‘… It is obvious that if the said 
Agreement were an agreement for bribery, it would be null and void ….’101 For 
the above reasons it can be concluded that the primary contract is a contract 
that the international arbitration tribunal will not enforce. 
8.4 The Secondary Contract 
The secondary contract results from the successful bribery exchange. The 
principal of the bribe-recipient enters into a contract with the bribe-giver. This 
agreement is referred to as secondary because it would not have come into 
existence without the conclusion of the primary contract. However, the 
secondary agreement is not an illegal contract. It is a valid contract between 
the principal and the bribe-giver. The question is whether such a contract may 
be declared unenforceable because of the direct link between the secondary 
and primary contract. Extending the invalidity of the primary contract to the 
secondary contract would be a logical extension of the public policy that 
underlies the criminalization of corruption and the refusal to help or assist 
                                                     
 
96  G. Wetter, ‘Issues of corruption before international arbitral tribunals: the authentic text and 
true meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110’, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1994, pp. 277-281; Case No. 1110 1963, Yearbook Comm 
Arbitration XXI, 1996, pp. 47ff.  
97   Case No. 1110 1963 Yb. Comm Arb. XXI, 1996, 47 Para. 115 of award. 
98  ICC Case No. 3916 of 1983. Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-85, pp. 507ff. 
99   ICC Case No. 3916 of 1983. Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-85, p. 510. 
100   Id. 
101  Establishment of Middle East Country X v. South Asian Construction Company, Award in ICC 
Case No. 4145, 12 Yb. Comm. Arb., 1987, 97ff. 
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parties who engage in the corrupt exchange. This section draws on Chapters 4, 
5, 6, and 7 to examine the extent to which corruption affects the validity of the 
secondary contract under US, English, and Dutch law and International 
Arbitration. 
8.4.1 US Law 
The rules criminalizing bribery are silent about the status of the secondary 
contract between the bribe-giver and the principal of the bribe-recipient. The 
secondary agreement, although valid on its face, may nonetheless be declared 
unenforceable for considerations of public interest. The courts have developed 
policies on which they deny the enforcement of secondary agreements.102 One 
of these is the policy against the commission of inducement a tort or breach of 
fiduciary duty.103 The secondary agreement is evidence of the successful 
commission of the wrongful act of bribery and the breach of the duty of loyalty 
that the agent owes to a principal. Thus, although the secondary contract is not 
direct evidence of the commission of a legal wrong or tort, as is the case with 
the primary contract, it is the direct result of the commission of a legal wrong 
or tort. 
The secondary contract may be declared unenforceable where the court decides 
that public policy against its enforcement outweighs the interest of the court in 
upholding the freedom of contract of the parties to the transaction.104 In this 
weighing process, the courts will look to the ‘general tendency’ of such 
agreements.105 In Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store,106 the court found that the 
secondary contract resulting from a bribery transaction was unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy. The courts refused to assist the plaintiff in recovering 
either the price or the goods sold. Essentially the court left the parties as they 
found them extending the principle of non turpi causa to the secondary 
contract. In the opinion of the court, the seller could not recover because it was 
the result of a bribe paid to the agent of the principal. The Sirkin case shows 
that even though the commercial bribery statute in question107 did not 
expressly declare that the contract was unenforceable, the courts found that it 
                                                     
 
102  E. Farnsworth, Contracts, 4th edn, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2004, at p. 318. 
103   Id., at p. 338. 
104   Sec. 178(1) Restatement (2nd) Contracts provides that ‘A promise or other term is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if … the interest in its enforcement is clearly 
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.’ 
105   Justice Field in Tool Company v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45 at 53 noted that ‘… in the decisions have 
not turned upon the question whether improper influences were contemplated or used, but 
upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements.’ 
106   Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 A.D. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830, at pp. 833-834. 
107   New York Penal Law Sec. 439 makes it a misdemeanor to give, offer, or promise to an agent 
of another any gift or gratuity whatever without the knowledge and consent of the principal, 
with intent to influence such agent’s action in relation to his principal’s business. 
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was their duty to be guided by the public policy evidenced by the criminal law 
in administering the law.108 
Similarly, in McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp,109 the court 
dismissed the arguments that the secondary contract was not in itself illegal, 
and that the bribe payer had the right to be paid for his performance of his 
obligations under the contract. The court stated that public policy ‘fail[s] of its 
purpose’ unless it also covered the secondary agreement between the briber 
payer and the principal of the bribed agent, as the money being sued for was 
‘the fruit of a crime.’110 The court held that it would ‘deny awards for the 
corrupt performance of contracts even though in essence the contracts are not 
illegal.’111 In Colywas v. Red Hand Compositions Co.,112 a secondary contract 
acknowledged by the court to be valid on its face was held to be wholly 
unenforceable because of the admitted acts of bribery that preceded its coming 
into existence. The position is the same with public contracts. In United States 
v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,113 with respect to a consultant who took 
a secret commission in violation of the Federal Law against Bribery, Graft and 
Conflict of Interest 18 U.S.C. Sec. 434,114 public policy forbade the 
enforcement of the contract. Even though the statute did not specifically 
provide that the contract would be invalid, the court was of the opinion that the 
protection under the statute could only be ‘fully accorded if contracts which 
are tainted by a conflict of interest on the part of a government agent’ could be 
disaffirmed by the Government. For these reasons it can be concluded that the 
US courts will generally extend the public policy underlying the prohibition of 
the primary contract to the secondary contract as a contract that the courts will 
not enforce. 
8.4.2 English Law  
The agency relationship between the recipient of the bribe and the principal is 
the foundation for the act of bribery and the vehicle for the secondary contract 
that results between the bribe-giver and the principal.115 The authority to 
                                                     
 
108   Although this case was founded on the secondary contract i.e. the agreement resulting from the 
party who paid the bribe and the principal of the agent who received the bribe, the courts 
comments about the basis for judicial policy are relevant in respect of the primary agreement. 
See Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 A.D. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830, at pp.833-834. 
109   McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 468. 
110   Id., at p. 470. 
111   Id.  
112   Colywas v. Red Hand Compositions Co. 318 F.Supp. 1376 (1970). 
113   United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520. 
114  USC Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Chapter 11 – Bribery Graft and Other Conflicts 
of Interest. Sec. 208. Acts affecting a personal financial interest (formerly Sec. 434).  
115    The English Agency laws are found in principles of common law, and statutory instruments 
such as the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, and Statutory 
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negotiate and to conclude the secondary contract on behalf of a principal is 
what makes the act of private or public bribery possible.116 In the absence of 
such an agency relationship there is no avenue for bribery. Simply put, the 
agency relationship is an essential ingredient of public or private bribery. The 
duties of the agent in the agency relationship play a key role in determining the 
validity of the secondary contract entered into between the bribe-giver and the 
principal of the agent. An agent owes the duty to the principal to make proper 
efforts to negotiate and conclude transactions, communicate to the principal all 
the necessary information available to him and to comply with the principal’s 
reasonable instructions.117 The position of the agent is that of a fiduciary who 
has undertaken to act in the best interest of the principal.118  
The act of accepting a bribe by an agent negates all of these duties. The duty to 
make ‘proper efforts’ is breached where the agent requests, agrees to receive or 
accepts a financial or other advantage intending that, as a consequence, a 
function of a public nature or one connected with a business or performed in 
the course of a person’s employment, or performed by or on behalf of a body 
of persons (whether corporate or unincorporated),119 should be performed 
improperly120 in breach of the expectation by the principal that contracts 
entered into by such an agent on the principal’s behalf are negotiated in the 
best interest of the principal.121 Instead, bribery is ‘conduct designed to create a 
conflict between an agent’s duty and his own private interest.’122 And the agent 
is in breach of his fiduciary duty when he places himself in a position where 
his duty and interest conflict.123  
For these reasons, the secondary contract is also considered to be 
unenforceable by the English courts but at the prerogative of the betrayed 
principal to avoid the unfairness that will result where the principal who has 
already suffered the betrayal of an agent is also faced with a contract that is 
void ab initio. The court in Logicrose v. Southend United Football makes it 
clear that the secondary contract is not void ab initio.124 The choice is left to 
                                                                                                                            
 
Instrument No 1993/3053 as amended by the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1993, Statutory Instrument 1993/3173.  
116   Sec. 2 Agency Directive.  
117   Sec. 3 Agency Directive. 
118   Millet L.J. has stated that ‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of 
loyalty.’ In Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew (1998) 75 P. & C.R., p. 241, at p. 254.   
119   Sec. 3 UK Bribery Act 2010. 
120   Sec. 2 UK Bribery Act 2010. 
121   Sec. 4 UK Bribery Act 2010. 
122  Donegal International Ltd v. Zambia & Anor [2007] EWHC 197 (Comm.) 2007 WL 504688 
Para. 275.  
123   Daraydan Holdings Ltd v. Solland International Ltd, [2004] EWHC 622 (Ch), [2005] Ch 119. 
124   Logicrose v. Southend United Football Club [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1256, per Millet J. at pp. 1263-
1264. The ruling in Logicrose was cited with approval in World Duty Free Company Limited 
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the principal whom the courts state should have the prerogative after being 
deprived of the disinterested advice of the agent to determine whether or not it 
is in his interest to affirm the contract.125 
8.4.3 Dutch Law  
The rules criminalizing bribery in the Netherlands do not apply to the 
secondary agreement that comes into being between the principal of the 
disloyal agent and the bribe-giver. The question from the point of view of the 
DCC is whether such a contract is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 
The secondary agreement may be a nullity where it contravenes the notion of 
freedom of contract and results in one of the parties lacking the intention that is 
necessary to produce juridical effects.126 If the secondary agreement suffers 
from a defect of consent, this will render the agreement a nullity. Such defects 
of consent include duress, fraud and undue influence,127 as well as error.128 
The defects of duress and undue influence can be ruled out with respect to the 
secondary contract. Bribery does not constitute duress as there is no threat that 
induces the principal to enter into the contract,129 nor does it constitute undue 
influence130 as there is no special relationship of dependency between the 
bribe-giver and the principal of the disloyal agent. The defect occasioned by 
fraud deserves further mention. 
A possible argument of defect of consent may be made on the grounds of 
fraud. The circumstances of the bribery exchange leave the principal in the 
dark. Information about the contract he eventually signed is known by the 
agent and by the bribe payer. This information can be likened to an inaccurate 
misrepresentation. However, this is not sufficient to move it into the category 
of a fraud. Under Art. 3:44(3) DCC, only where there has been inaccurate 
information that has been deliberately withheld despite an obligation to 
communicate it, is there grounds for fraud. The actions of the bribe payer could 
also be described an artifice or ‘trick’ (‘kunstgreep’) by which the principal of 
                                                                                                                            
 
v. The Republic of Kenya stating, ‘There is nothing wrong with it as a contract, the position 
being simply that the circumstances in which it was made require that the injured party should 
be given the opportunity to relieve himself from its burdens.’ See World Duty Free Company 
Ltd v. Kenya, 46 ILM 339 (2007), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, at Para. 
164. 
125    Logicrose v. Southend United Football Club [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1256, at p. 1261. 
126   Art. 3:33 DCC. 
127   Art. 3:44 DCC. 
128   Art. 6:228 DCC. 
129   Art. 3:44(1) DCC. 
130   Art. 3:44(1) DCC. 
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the agent is moved to enter into the transaction, within the meaning of Art. 
3:44(3) DCC.   
The argument for fraud fails in that the terms of the contract between the bribe 
payer and the principal are known to the principal and accepted by him. For 
there to be fraud within the meaning of Art. 3:44(3) DCC the inaccurate 
information must have induced the secondary contract. If the principal would 
still have entered into the contract but on different terms, then the secondary 
contract cannot be said to have been induced by the fact of bribery. The 
threshold of causality in the case of fraud is very high and it may be difficult 
for the principal to seek to avoid the secondary contract where it can be 
established that terms of the contract were negotiated and agreed to by the 
principal. If the principal would still have entered into the contract albeit on 
different terms, then this does not constitute fraud.131   
A more likely ground for defect of consent is the ground of error. Art. 6:228 
DCC allows for the defect of error where the secondary agreement would not 
have been concluded if the principal had been fully aware of all the facts 
relating to the negotiation of the contract. Art. 6:228(b) DCC focuses on a 
failure to disclose information as a ground of error that may invalidate a 
contract. The principal seeking to avoid the secondary contract may argue that 
it was entered into without full information or wrong information, about the 
state of affairs relating to the contract. The principal can claim that the contract 
was entered into on the basis of an error as to the person he was dealing with. 
Rather than the contract being entered into with someone the principal 
considered to be trustworthy, the other party to the contract is a payer of bribes 
calculated to undermine the interests of the principal. The principal can claim 
that the contract was entered into based on an error about the ‘attributes’ of the 
other party.132 Such an error compromises the freedom of choice and may 
constitute a ground for invalidity due to a defect of consent where the other 
requirements of Art. 6:228 DCC are met.  
Art. 6:228(b) DCC states that a contract may be nullified where the other party 
(i.e. the bribe-giver), in view of what he knew or ought to have known 
regarding the error, should have informed the party in error (i.e. the principal 
of the disloyal agent.) Art. 6:228(b) DCC can only apply where the principal 
can indeed not be considered to have been informed about the fact of bribery. 
This will depend on whether the knowledge of the agent can be imputed to the 
principal. Where it can, there is no basis for invalidity due to the defect of 
                                                     
 
131  Parl. Gesch. Boek 3, p. 210. 
132  H. Beale, A. Hartkamp, H. Kötz, D. Tallon, Cases Materials and Text on Contract Law: 
Casebook on the Common Law of Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002, at pp. 365-366.  
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mistake. As a direct agent, the acts of the agent will ordinarily be imputed to 
the principal unless it can be shown that the actions of the agent or 
intermediary were expressly forbidden by the corporation and that this was 
done in such a way as to make it reasonable to assume that the agent was 
acting contrary to the wishes of the principal.133 
It is noteworthy that the onus is placed on the principal to establish that there 
has been a defect of consent. In comparison with the position in the US and in 
England, the plaintiff seeking to avoid the secondary contract has a much 
steeper task. 
8.4.4 International Arbitration 
In the Westacre Investments case, where the Westacre Company was to receive 
a substantial percentage of the value of the contracts entered into by the 
Directorate with, principally, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence, the tribunal 
reiterated that bribery renders an agreement invalid.134 Bribery is a matter of 
proof, and in the Hilmarton case the arbitrator found that Hilmarton Ltd was 
engaged in the activity of influencing Algerian government officials but 
concluded that bribery was not proven ‘beyond doubt.’135 The panel, however, 
stated that if the conclusion of the contract between the defendant and the 
Algerian authorities had depended on bribes paid by the claimant, the contract 
would be null and void.136 In a more recent case, the arbitral tribunal found that 
a contract procured by means of a bribe of $2 million to the former president of 
Kenya was in violation of international policy, Kenyan and English law, and 
therefore did ‘not have the force of law.’137   
 
                                                     
 
133   Art. 3:61(2) DCC provides that if ‘a juridical act is performed in the name of one party and, on 
the basis of a declaration of conduct of that party, another party has assumed and, in the 
circumstances could reasonably assume that a sufficient procuration (authority) had been 
granted, the inaccuracy of this assumption may not be invoked (against the party making the 
assumption).’ This places the onus on the principal to show that the acts of the agent are 
outside the apparent authority of the agent.  
134  The arbitration panel found that while bribery renders an agreement invalid, in arbitration 
proceedings, bribery is a fact which has to be alleged and for which evidence has to be 
submitted, and at the same time constitutes a defense, nullifying the claims arising from a 
contract. In this instance the tribunal held that the bribery alleged had not been established in 
proof. Westacre Investments Inc. v. Jugoimport-SDRP Holding Company Ltd & Ors [[2000] 1 
QB 288 affirming [1999] QB 740. [1999] EWCA Civ. 1401 (12 May 1999). 
135  Omnium deTraitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd., Award in ICC Case No. 5622, 
19 Yb. Comm. Arb. 19, 1994, p. 105. 
136  Id. 
137  World Duty Free v. Kenya, 46 ILM 339 (2007), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 
2006, at Para. 105.  
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8.5 The Contract as an International Regulatory Tool  
Criminalization provides a necessary starting point in the fight against 
corruption because in the absence of a normative framework there cannot be 
common objectives, methods or solutions. However, the factual reality of 
international society, its actors and its transactions center on promises and 
obligations entered into by artificial persons that direct and control economic 
activity. By focusing on the consequences of corruption and the status of 
transactions tainted by corruption the UNCC presents the contract tainted by 
corruption as a regulatory tool in the fight against corruption. Contracts that are 
tainted by international corruption constitute a category of contracts whose 
regulation should be consistent with the overall objectives of the mandatory 
system criminalizing international corruption.  
In this view, the contact tainted by corruption should be seen not only as a 
private act between parties but also as a potential instrument of social control. 
In the environment where corruption in international business takes place, a 
more logical basis for punishment and regulation may be one that is based on 
obligations inter-partes. This may occur by policing contracts to ensure that 
public policy protecting the public interest is enforced by the courts. It may 
also occur by interventions between the contracting parties themselves using 
the defense of illegality as a method of sanctioning bribery.  
This moves the debate away from a classical non-interventionist, closed-
system approach to contractual obligations, to an approach that accommodates 
the relational aspects of the parties and other stakeholders to the contract.138 
The international system may require that principles of freedom of contract be 
subsumed to the economic and social imperatives needed to ensure the stability 
of the international market. The vested self-interest of participants in the 
system justifies this interference with classical freedom of contract and party 
autonomy. 
To paraphrase Strong,139 the contract tainted by corruption may be illegal 
because the object or purpose of the contract is illegal. This is the case with the 
                                                     
 
138  This is in line with the relational theories of contract. Contracts cannot be divorced from the 
complex, interconnected relationships they evidence. There is no ‘universal’ law of contract. 
See I.R. Macneil, ‘Whither contracts?’, Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 21, 1969, p. 403; I.R. 
Macneil, ‘Contracting worlds and essential contract theory’, 9 Social & Legal Studies, 2000, p. 
431. See also R.W. Gordon, ‘Macaulay, Macneil, and the discovery of solidarity and power in 
contract law’, Wisconsin Law Review, 1985, p. 565; P. Zumbansen, ‘The law of society: 
governance through contract’, 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2007, p. 191.  
139   Strong states that ‘A contract may be illegal because the object or purpose of the contract is 
illegal. It may be illegal because it contains an illegal promise, although the performance of the 
promise is not itself illegal. Or it may be illegal because a lawful promise has been or will be 
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primary agreement that sets off the corrupt exchange: the agreement to give a 
bribe. A contract tainted by corruption may also be illegal because it results 
from the commission of a legal wrong, although the performance of the 
promise is itself not illegal. This would typically be the case for the secondary 
contract that results from the act of bribery by a disloyal agent between the 
principal and party that offered the bribe. Thirdly, it may be illegal because a 
lawful promise has been or will be performed in an illegal manner. This would 
be the case where, for example, an ostensibly legal contract, such as a 
consultancy or agency services, are used as a vehicle for the commission of 
illegal acts of bribery. These intertwined contracts tainted by corruption are 
different expressions of a common originating factor, i.e. bribery. Questioning 
the enforceability of such contracts tainted by bribery presents the court ‘with a 
double problem – the protection of the public welfare and, if consistent with 
public policy, granting relief to the parties.’140  
Existing principles of private law on contracts are generalized to preserve 
certainty, order and stability. However, such a generalization tends to view all 
contracts alike and does not address the particularities of special cases, for 
example, the contract that emerges as a result of the violation of anti-
corruption rules. As Collins points out, the abstraction and generality of the 
private law system means that ‘it lacks the mechanisms for differentiating in its 
regulation between different kinds of contracts.’141 He remarks that ‘the lesson 
to be learned from this story is that the price of the advantages obtained from 
the generality of private law systems is the incapacity to develop an adequately 
differentiated system of regulation of contracts.’142  
Contracts that result from the process of international corruption are by 
definition contracts that have a public element because of the twin facts of the 
involvement of the state and consequences that have an impact on the public at 
large. They are clearly in a different category from contracts between private 
parties whose consequences are primarily restricted to the parties themselves. 
A distinction between public and private contracts is one that is found in some 
civil law systems. Friedman explains that in French and German law, a 
distinction is made between contracts involving the state that are primarily of a 
financial or commercial character, which are categorized as private ordinary 
contracts, and those of a more public character, which arise in connection with 
defense, the police or public service as administrative contracts. The main 
distinction he points out is ‘the element of discretion in public policy, 
                                                                                                                            
 
performed in an illegal manner.’ G. Strong, ‘The enforceability of illegal contracts’, 12 
Hastings Law Journal, 1960-1961, p. 347. 
140   G. Strong, ‘The enforceability of illegal contracts’, id., at p. 348. 
141  H. Collins, Regulating Contracts, OUP, id., Note 3 above at  p. 47. 
142   H. Collins, id., at p. 48. 
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including, for example, the right to terminate a contract in certain 
circumstances, gives to the public authority greater latitude than in a private 
law transaction.’143 The question in contracts tainted by corruption is the role 
this type of public policy-based latitude should play regarding such contracts. 
Viewing these contracts in the context of the corrupt interaction brings the 
public interest that is sought to be protected to the fore. This places the primary 
and secondary contracts resulting from acts of bribery in a category where 
public interest should be the overriding consideration, regarding the 
enforceability of these contracts. 
This implies a different view of contracts of this nature. Friedman once pointed 
out that, ‘from being the instrument by which millions of individual parties 
bargain with each other, it has to a large extent become the way by which 
social and economic policies are expressed in legal form. This is another way 
of saying that public law vitally affects and modifies the law of contract.’144 
This is particularly true of contracts resulting from or tainted by international 
corruption. Such a distinction and viewpoint helps to provide the foundation 
for a treatment of such contracts in a manner that recognizes the social 
underpinnings and public character of the consequences of such transactions. 
The traditional idea of individuals negotiating on a level playing field, in 
classical contract theory is contradicted by the reality of mega-artificial 
persons with great bargaining power. The classical view of a contract in an age 
of big corporations with substantial bargaining power can no longer be said to 
represent the reality of contracting in today’s market place. The freedom to 
contract has, in certain instances, been recognized as illusory as evidenced by 
government and court intervention.145 Here, the rigidity of the private law 
system of contracts has been mitigated by legislative intervention in the 
particular case.146 The public interest that is at the center of the anti-corruption 
discourse also emphasizes and justifies the right of the state to intervene in the 
terms contracts tainted by international corruption. 
 
                                                     
 
143  W. Friedmann ‘Changing functions of contract in common law,’ University of Toronto Law 
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 15, 1951-1952, at p. 40. 
144  W. Friedman id.  
145  For example, in special conditions for consumer contracts that underscore the social welfare 
responsibilities of the modern states and the increasing power of group organization, collective 
bargaining. 
146   Collins concludes that ‘the search for reintegration of welfare regulation within private law 
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events which permit an assessment of whether the effects of private law regulation achieve 
harmony with the objectives of social and economic regulation. See Collins, id., Note 3 above, 
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8.6 Observations 
This chapter has focused on the consequences of corruption in the form of the 
primary and secondary contract. Contracts tainted by corruption are the center 
of the corruption exchange. In seeking to treat the disease and not just the 
symptoms, the cause and effect between the originating corruption and ensuing 
transactions must be addressed. Not only must international corruption be 
criminalized, but transactions resulting from the successful execution of 
bribery should also be held to the same logic so as to ensure that parties do not 
benefit from their crimes. It may be argued that the most important deterrent to 
corruption is the stability of the consequence. The more unstable the 
consequential contract is, the less the incentive there is to engage in the acts of 
corruption that create it. The more stable the contract, the more the incentive 
there is to engage in acts of corruption to acquire it. Real deterrence will 
therefore be found in a framework that tackles the contract that results from the 
violation of anti-corruption rules. This requires an approach to tackling 
corruption that combines the criminal and civil processes of sanctioning 
corruption into a single narrative.147 Examining the provisions of Art. 34 
UNCC alongside the position on transaction validity in the US, England, the 
Netherlands and under international arbitration, leads to the following findings. 
8.6.1 Effect of the UNCC 
8.6.1.1 Art. 34 Reaches across the Public/Private Divide 
For the first time as a worldwide instrument directed at fighting corruption, 
Art. 34 UNCC brings together public law provisions criminalizing corruption 
as well as the private law consequences in the form of contracts that result 
from acts of corruption. In so doing, it brings these activities within the same 
normative framework and encourages consistency in approach and treatment of 
originating acts of bribery and its consequences. In all of the three jurisdictions 
studied, the public/private divide characterizes the treatment of bribery 
transactions. Art. 34 UNCC enables public and private government authorities, 
courts and arbitration tribunals handling disputes tainted by corruption to be 
more closely aligned in terms of seeking deterrence. The objective in the 
consideration of such contracts is not simply to achieve justice between the 
parties to the contract, but also, in view of the UNCC, to protect the interest of 
the general public. 
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8.6.1.2 No New Legal Regime  
Art. 34 is drafted in non-mandatory terms and subjects the call on states to act 
on the consequences of corruption to the discretion of the state. It also subjects 
the measures to be taken regarding transaction validity to the fundamental 
principles of national law. As such, Art. 34 does not introduce a new legal 
regime regarding contract validity. While the UNCC does not introduce a new 
regime, it is a powerful endorsement of the need to ensure that there is a real 
nexus between the public wrong of corruption, and the status of the contracts 
and concessions that result from it. This can raise global awareness of the need 
to take measures against such consequences and possibly the commitment of 
states to taking such measures. However, as Art. 34 UNCC is currently drafted, 
recourse must still be made to national laws to assess the position regarding the 
validity of contracts tainted by corruption and the rights of the parties.  
8.6.1.3 Reporting on Measures under Art. 34 UNCC 
While there is no new legal regime regarding transaction validity under Art. 
34, it acts as a focal point for the reporting of measures that have been taken to 
implement it. This brings to the forefront measures that go after the 
consequences of corruption. The US and UK reports on the implementation of 
Art. 34 show that measures to strip away the benefits acquired by bribery using 
civil, criminal and administrative process are operational.148 These include 
mandatory exclusion from public contract procurement, confiscation of 
benefits resulting from criminal conduct, annulment of contracts, and 
restitution of moneys paid by the government. An important measure listed in 
the US Report is private actions by individuals who are victims of corruption. 
Reporting on measures undertaken under Art. 34 is an important method of 
keeping the focus on the whole spectrum of transactions that are tainted by 
corruption and not only on the offender who commits the act of corruption.  
8.6.1.4 Corruption as an Independent Vitiating Factor   
Art. 34 UNCC introduces corruption as an independent vitiating element in a 
similar manner to the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties. 
This is an important step that may help to encourage the development of 
corruption-specific principles and interpretation across jurisdictions. Art. 34 
sets the stage for differentiating contracts tainted by corruption from the 
general notion of contracts and corruption in stipulating corruption an 
independent vitiating factor. This is of particular importance for civil law 
                                                     
 
148   The Netherlands has yet to submit a report on its implementation of Art. 34. 
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jurisdictions such as the Netherlands where the plaintiff principal has the 
hurdle of establishing a defect of consent for the secondary contract to be 
considered a nullity. In England and the US, there is already very strong 
judicial policy against bribery in commercial transactions that applies to both 
the primary and secondary contract. This is only further strengthened by the 
provisions of Art. 34. 
8.6.2 The Primary Contract  
The primary agreement is the starting point of the corrupt exchange. The abuse 
of the position of trust that is central to the character of bribery is evidenced by 
an agreement that takes place between the party offering the bribe and the 
party receiving it. The status of the primary contract is not the direct object of 
the rules criminalizing bribery, but this contract is the very shadow of the 
prohibited conduct. An examination of the position in the three jurisdictions 
studied in this book as well as international arbitration shows that the primary 
contract to give and receive a bribe is a promise that the law will not enforce. 
The primary agreement to give a bribe is one that is characterized by the courts 
in all three jurisdictions studied in this book as unenforceable for public policy 
reasons. The approach of the courts primarily centers on the question of 
whether or not the court should intervene to provide recourse for the plaintiff 
seeking performance on a contract to give a bribe. The courts in the US and 
England apply principles of statutory illegality and public policy founded in ex 
turpi causa to deny restitution and to leave the parties as they found them even 
if this leads to the defendant being unfairly enriched at the cost of the plaintiff. 
There is no recourse under US or English law for the parties to the primary 
agreement. There is no claim in restitution, specific performance or other 
remedy. The unenforceability of the primary agreement and the availability of 
the illegality defense by the defendant create an environment where the 
contract to give a bribe becomes unstable.  
Considerations of public policy underscore the legal position that renders the 
primary contract unenforceable. In the US and England the courts have 
emphasized the fact that the ‘corrupting tendencies’ of bribery undermine the 
integrity of social and political institutions and this founds the principle that 
the court will not enforce a contract to give a bribe. The act of bribery is seen 
as a corruption of the law itself, and it is not for the courts to ‘lend support’ to 
an action to enforce what is in essence a violation of the law. An agreement to 
give a bribe that deliberately seeks to put in place what the law has prohibited 
is illegal. The principle of public policy applied by the courts is that no court 
will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or 
an illegal act, ex dolo malo non oritur actio.  
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This provides incentive for a defendant to renege on the bribery promise at no 
cost. The unjust enrichment of the defendant that may result would be, in the 
scheme of a policy to discourage the occurrence of corruption, a desired 
outcome. Corruption occurs in the shadows and it is the participants in the 
corrupt exchange that have access to these hidden processes. If a party may 
repudiate obligations under a contract to give a bribe at no risk and such 
repudiation is protected by the refusal of the courts to grant justice to the 
plaintiff for public policy and statutory illegality reasons, this may influence 
the contracting environment positively toward compliance with anti-corruption 
rules. The walk-away offered to the party in breach of the primary agreement 
may be an important incentive and form of reward that encourages the 
reporting of corruption. This would in turn encourage compliance with anti-
corruption rules, as the incentive to give a bribe is reduced such repudiation of 
the contract is consistently supported by the courts. 
In the Netherlands, the provisions of the Dutch Civil Code make it clear that a 
contract that is in conflict with mandatory rules prohibiting corruption is a 
nullity. Such a contract is also in conflict with good morals and public policy. 
Furthermore, the Civil Law Convention that is in force in the Netherlands 
requires the Dutch courts to deem any contract providing for corruption as null 
and void. Art. 34 UNCC, which is in force in the Netherlands, as well as the 
provisions of the Dutch Penal Code, particularly Art. 328ter DPC, support the 
viewpoint that the primary contract falls squarely within Art. 3:40(1) DCC and 
3:40(2) DCC and is a nullity.   
The transnational policy that is evident from a series of international arbitration 
and international investment awards is that parties to arbitration may not 
contract out of mandatory rules prohibiting bribery and that the enforcement of 
an award may be refused where such enforcement would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country. Given the world-wide criminalization of bribery 
and the transnational principles that contracts providing for bribery are null and 
void, it is not surprising that arbitration panels have consistently held that the 
primary agreement that evidences the payment of a bribe is invalid, null and 
void and cannot be sanctioned by arbitrators. 
As far as the primary agreement is concerned, the provisions of Art. 34 UNCC, 
the positions in the US, England, the Netherlands and under International 
Arbitration show that there is common ground. The fundamental principles of 
law in this regard coincide. 
8.6.3 The Secondary Contract  
The criminal prohibitions against bribery do not apply to the secondary 
contract that results between the bribe-giver and the principal of the disloyal 
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agent. This contract is accepted in the all jurisdictions studied to be a valid 
contract. The courts in the US and England have had no problem extending the 
logic of the judicial policy against enforcement of the primary contract to the 
secondary contract. The secondary contract that results from the successful 
bribery exchange will not be enforced in the US and England at the instance of 
the betrayed principal. A distinction is made between the conduct of acts of 
bribery evidenced in the primary contract and the result of acts of bribery, 
such as the secondary contract. However, in both instances the courts regard 
the behavior underlying these contracts from the perspective of the criminal 
act of bribery and the inducement to commit a tort that it represents. The 
motivation of the courts to deter such conduct weighs more than the desire to 
achieve justice between the parties. As such, the courts have refused to come 
to the assistance of the bribe payer who seeks to enforce the secondary 
contract that comes into existence with the principal. 
The US and English courts do not consider the secondary contract as void ab 
initio as this could put the principal in a position of double injury: first by the 
disloyal agent and secondly by the consequences of complete nullity. As such, 
the prerogative of unenforceability rests with the principal. If the principal 
decides to affirm the contract, there is judicial precedent that indicates that this 
is possible. Where the principal refuses to be bound by the obligations under 
the secondary contract the courts will also support this position.  
The position in the Netherlands is more complicated. The secondary contract 
is a valid contract unless it can be shown to be against public policy as 
resulting from a defect in consent. A tentative argument can be made on 
grounds of fraud. However, the threshold for fraud is significantly high. It is 
not likely that the principal will be able to show that a secondary contract to 
whose terms he agreed is fraudulent. A more convincing argument can be 
made on the ground of error. The principal can claim a defect in consent based 
on an error as to the person with whom the contract was being entered into. 
Because of the direct nature of the agency contract between the principal and 
the bribe-recipient to be able to rely on error, the principal will have to show 
that the knowledge of the agent could not reasonably be imputed to him. To 
the extent that the claim for nullity in the Netherlands with regards to the 
secondary contract is dependent on the principal being able to establish a 
defect of consent this is a more challenging proposition for the principal 
plaintiff.  As such, the principal in the US and in England has an easier path to 
avoiding the secondary contract.  
8.7 Conclusion  
An increasing level of transacting occurs outside national borders in private 
arrangements of international dimension. However, as the regulations 
regarding international corruption show, there are limits to contractual freedom 
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and party autonomy. The link between the contract that results from a corrupt 
exchange and the corrupt exchange itself is a factor that places the courts and 
international tribunals in a position where the worldwide repudiation of the 
corruption must necessarily influence their application of private law principles 
regarding the validity and enforceability of such contracts.149 This implies that 
dispute settlement mechanisms need to address the private law consequences 
of criminal acts of corruption. It also implies that the government monopoly on 
initiating criminal sanction can be weakened by providing protection for the 
public interest through supporting private remedies.  
These findings show that while there is no new contractual private law regime 
introduced by Art. 34 UNCC, the primary contract to give a bribe is a nullity 
on the ground of public policy and statutory illegality in all three jurisdictions 
considered. This information can be used in an instrumental manner because it 
serves as a form of reward where a party to a bribery contract is motivated to 
walk away from the transaction without having to pay any restitution. This 
could make such contracts more risky and less attractive and could also serve 
as a method of getting information about the secret practices of bribery if an 
aggrieved party seeks to enforce the contract. The question is whether and how 
such a principle of nullity can be fully exploited in the fight against corruption 
by private parties, civil society and indeed governments.   
The secondary contract, though not illegal, will not be enforced by the courts 
in the US and in England at the instance of the plaintiff principal. This means 
that the principal can walk away from the secondary contract where it is tainted 
by bribery. In the Netherlands, the fact that the secondary contract is not illegal 
means that the principal has to show a defect of consent such as mistake or 
possible fraud to avoid the contract. This is a more difficult burden than under 
common law, where the public policy against bribery extends to making the 
secondary contract unenforceable. 
                                                     
 
149  The contract law regime applicable to international contracts, the UN Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods steers clear of questions of validity and illegality of 
international contracts. De Ly notes that the CISG is an intermediate model in the field of 
uniform law in which ‘a compromise solution was found stretching the uniform substantive 
model as far as possible while retaining a modest place for domestic law and conflict rules.’ 
This leaves national law as the primary avenue for the translation of the prohibitions of 
corruption in international transactions into domestic systems. However, such a translation is 
constrained by the international public policy and the framework of rules repudiating 
corruption. See F. de Ly, Sources Of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model, in 
Celebrating Success: 25 Years United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 2006, (Collation of Papers at UNCITRAL -- SIAC Conference 22-23 
September 2005, Singapore), Singapore International Arbitration Center, pp. 28-38, at p. 28. 
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It can be concluded that a contract tainted by international corruption raises 
questions about the role of contracts in the ordering of an international 
society that is defined not so much in terms of a sovereign with a monopoly 
on violence, but by agreements based on pragmatism and mutual interest. It 
can be argued that, from the perspective of the fight against international 
corruption, principles of contract law must be viewed in the particular 
context of the international commercial society in which they operate.150 In 
this society, the private rights embraced in the law of contract are 
challenged by a global framework of anti-corruption laws. The mandatory 
nature of these rules carried to their logical conclusions impact the 
operation and validity of private agreements. Regulating these agreements 
could result in more uniformity in the judicial response to primary and 
secondary contracts tainted by corruption in both common and civil law 
jurisdictions. This is an essential pre-requisite for an international 
framework of rules for parties seeking remedies for contractual obligations 
affected by corruption. 
 
                                                     
 
150  Jan Smits speaks of soft methods of convergence where unification is not left to the State or 
European institutions but to the actors that are directly touched by legal unification. He states 
‘…they will decide to what extent they are in need of uniform law. Bottom-up methods of 
unification make this possible.’ See J. Smits, ‘Law Making in the European Union: On 
Globalization and Contract law in Divergent Legal Cultures’, Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 67, 
2007, p. 1181, at p. 1196. 
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CHAPTER 9 
INSTITUTING PRIVATE LEGAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The right of individuals to institute private actions for damage suffered as a 
result of corruption is a critical element in translating the gains of global 
criminalization of corruption into reality. It does this by changing the dynamics 
of the environment in which corruption occurs. The open-ended nature of 
private claims introduces an element of uncertainty by exposing the 
corporation to a riskier environment in the shape of variables in terms of 
number, duration and cost of potential private suits that may be filed by a 
variety of claimants. The criminal process, on the other hand, is much more 
predictable, as fines and punishment are pre-determined and can be more 
easily factored into the decision whether or not to give a bribe.  
The state as a principal actor and enforcer in grand scale corruption faces a 
fundamental conflict of interest that can impede the effectiveness of the fight 
against corruption.1 The artificial corporation is the other important actor. 
Traditional notions of criminal liability are uneasily juxtaposed on such 
artificial persons especially in an international environment without a clearly 
defined nexus of governance.2 
Private actors who institute claims independently of the state provide a 
potential manner of by-passing a compromised state in confronting the conflict 
of interest problem. With private legal proceedings, a walk around the state 
monopoly on initiating the sanctioning process for corruption becomes 
possible. Again, private claims with respect to private rights are probably more 
representative of an international trading environment that is based more on the 
power of agreement than a state’s monopoly on violence. Allowing private 
                                                     
 
1  See Chapter 2 above. 
2   A quotation attributed to a Lord Chancellor of Great Britain in the 18th century very aptly 
sums up the problem of criminal punishment as a method of encouraging norm-compliant 
behavior by corporations. Edward Thurlow remarked that ‘Corporations have neither bodies to 
be punished, nor souls to be condemned, they therefore do as they like.’ Edward Thurlow, 1st 
Baron Thurlow PC, KC (9 December 1731 – 12 September 1806). 
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persons a larger role in the fight against corruption recognizes that rigid 
dichotomies along the public/private divide may not adequately provide for 
social and economic security in an integrated international market.  
This chapter examines the international framework for private legal actions for 
damage suffered as a result of corruption. It draws on the overview undertaken 
in Part 2 of this book on the positions in the US, England and the Netherlands 
alongside the UNCC framework for civil liability for corruption.3 To this end, 
it examines the framework for civil liability for corruption under the UNCC, 
and the extent to which it provides or augments the private right of action to 
institute claims for corruption. In addition, important initiatives from other 
jurisdictions involving the institution of private legal proceedings for 
corruption are included so as to present a broad composite of the emerging 
scope of remedies for corruption using the private law. 
This chapter also examines the notion of corruption as a legal wrong as well as 
the various interests protected from the occurrence of this wrong. These 
interests are categorized into two broad groups. One the one hand are claims 
for damage that affect primarily private interests, such as, for example, the 
principal of a disloyal agent, shareholders affected by the corrupt actions of 
their company executives, or losing competitors alleging claims of unfair 
competition. On the other hand are claims that affect primarily the public 
interest exemplified by the indirect victims of corruption. This categorization 
helps to clarify the position of the law regarding these two categories of 
claimants. Since all claimants seek redress for damage suffered, understanding 
the foundation of differences in the legal response to these two categories helps 
to clarify analysis and proposals for reform.  
Two main challenges face the potential private litigant and in particular with 
respect to claims to the public interest. The first is the legal standing to bring 
the claim, and the second is the financial cost of instituting a private claim or 
reporting corruption. Encouraging the private litigant to commence actions for 
corrupt acts by providing mechanisms to resolve these challenges is an 
important step to exploiting the potential of the private actor in the fight 
against corruption. To this end, this chapter examines strategies that encourage 
the private litigant from the practices in the US, England and the Netherlands. 
The chapter concludes with an assessment of the position of the private litigant 
and whether or not there is a basis to conclude that the right of the citizen to 
institute legal proceedings for corrupt acts has been strengthened in the last 
                                                     
 
3  An obligation is a legally enforceable right. Civil liability relates to private rights and duties 
rather than those rights and duties that arise under criminal, administrative or military law. 
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two decades of intensive growth of anti-corruption rules and in particular under 
the provisions of the UNCC. 
9.2 Civil Liability as Enforcement Mechanism  
There are three primary provisions dealing with civil liability in the UNCC. 
The first is found in Art. 26 UNCC dealing with the civil liability of legal 
persons. The second is found in Art. 34 UNCC dealing with the consequences 
of acts of corruption.4 The third provision is found in Art. 35UNCC dealing 
with compensation for damage suffered as a result of corruption. These 
sections set the broad framework for the UNCC civil liability regime for 
corruption. Art. 26 UNCC frames civil liability in the context of the 
enforcement of anti-corruption rules by the state while Art. 35UNCC  frames 
civil liability as a private right of redress for the victim who has suffered 
damage.  
Civil liability can be used as a tool of enforcement in the absence of corporate 
criminal liability to avoid a sanctioning vacuum.5 It can also be used to address 
the conflict of interest that arises where the ability of the state to 
singlehandedly carry out enforcement is compromised for a variety of reasons 
ranging from a lack of capacity, to a lack of information, to a lack of political 
will. Here, civil liability fills a governance void by ensuring that the negative 
consequences of corruption do not go unchallenged. Civil liability constitutes 
an important method to harness the strengths of both public and private law 
processes in the fight against corruption. 
A distinction should be drawn between civil liability as sanction under Art 26 
UNCC and civil liability as a form of private remedies under Art 35 UNCC. 
Civil liability as sanction is an extension of the criminal law process and  
serves as one more method of punishing an offender. Civil liability as a right of 
redress for the individual operates on completely different principles and is 
centered upon the harm done to the individual as a platform for initiating a 
restitutionary process. The UNCC demonstrates these distinctions in its 
provisions on civil liability for corruption. 
The notion of civil liability under Art. 26 UNCC is focused on the relationship 
between the state and legal persons for whom criminal responsibility does not 
exist under national laws and in respect of whom civil liability may be the only 
                                                     
 
4  For a full description of the civil liability regime under Art. 34 UNCC, see Chapter 8. 
5   In Germany, for example, the criminal liability of corporations is described as ‘non-existent.’ 
See H. Hirsch, La Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif-Allemagne in H. De Doelder, K. 
Tiedemann (Eds), Criminal Liability of Corporations: La Criminalisation Du Comportement 
Collectif, Kluwer, 1996, pp. 31 – 69. 
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channel of governmental action. Art. 26 UNCC provides that states shall adopt 
such measures as may be necessary, consistent with their legal principles, to 
establish the liability of legal persons for participation in the offenses 
established in accordance with this Convention. This liability, subject to the 
legal principles of the concerned states, may be ‘criminal, civil or 
administrative.’6 Art. 26(4) UNCC calls on states to utilize ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions,7 including 
monetary sanction.’ This emphasizes the punitive function of the civil liability 
anticipated under Art. 26 as well as the fact that the execution of this punitive 
function lies with the state.8 
Art. 26 UNCC is situated in Chapter 3 of the UNCC, which deals with the 
criminalization, enforcement and prosecution of acts of corruption. The 
preceding Arts. 15-25 UNCC provide a taxonomy of acts of corruption as 
follows: the bribery of national public officials,9 the bribery of foreign public 
officials and officials of public international organizations,10 embezzlement,11 
in influence,12 abuse of function,13 illicit enrichment,14 embezzlement of 
property in the private sector,15 laundering of proceeds of crime,16 
concealment,17 and obstruction of justice.18 The language of the chapter makes 
it clear that these offenses are to be investigated and prosecuted by states using 
the criminal process. Indeed, Art. 30 dealing with enforcement speaks solely in 
terms of deterrence,19 criminal proceedings,20 conviction and parole.21 
A look at the Legislative Guide to the UN Convention shows that the reference 
to criminal, civil or administrative liability in Art. 26(4) is an 
acknowledgement of the differences in approaches regarding the criminal 
liability of corporations worldwide rather than recourse to the notion of civil 
liability as redress for damage suffered by an individual for acts of corruption. 
The Legislative Guide notes that:  
                                                     
 
6  Emphasis added. 
7  Emphasis added. 
8 Art. 26 UNCC. 
9 Art. 15 UNCC. 
10 Art. 16 UNCC. 
11 Art. 17 UNCC. 
12 Art. 18 UNCC. 
13 Art. 19 UNCC. 
14 Art. 20 UNCC. 
15 Art. 22 UNCC. 
16 Art. 23 UNCC. 
17 Art. 24 UNCC. 
18 Art. 25 UNCC. 
19 Art. 30(3) UNCC. 
20 Art. 30(4) UNCC. 
21 Art. 30(5) UNCC. 
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‘[N]ational legal regimes remain quite diverse with respect to liability of legal 
persons, with some States resorting to criminal penalties against the 
organization itself, such as fines, forfeiture of property or deprivation of legal 
rights, whereas others employ non-criminal or quasi-criminal measures.’22   
The Legislative Guide, points out that the language of Art. 26 UNCC reflects 
similar language in other international instruments, such as the Convention on 
the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law 1988,23 the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FAFTF) Forty Recommendations,24 
and the OECD Bribery Convention, to give a few examples.25 
The motivation of Art. 26 is to ensure that liability for the offenses that are 
created under the UNCC is achieved by whatever means and even in 
jurisdictions where there is traditionally no notion of corporate criminal 
liability. Regardless of the fundamental legal principles of the particular 
system, liability for the offenses under the convention can be established. 
While this opens the door to the possibility of civil liability for the criminal 
offenses of corruption created by the convention, this provision cannot be 
regarded as providing the foundation for the notion of private remedies. Civil 
liability under Art. 26 presents civil liability as a sanctioning tool to be used by 
the State. This shifts the focus of the rest of this chapter to Art. 35 UNCC 
which is entitled ‘compensation for damage.’ 
 
 
                                                     
 
22 Para. 321 of the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, ISBN-10: 92-1-133755-0, ISBN-13: 978-92-1-133755-6. UN Publication, 
Vienna, 2006, www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf (hereinafter 
Legislative Guide). 
23 Art. 9 Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal Law CETS No: 172 
stipulates that Parties shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be necessary to enable 
them to impose criminal or administrative sanctions or measures on legal persons.  
24 Recommendation 2, Subpara. (b) of the FATF Forty Recommendations, as revised in 2003, 
states that:  
‘Criminal liability, and, where that is not possible, civil or administrative liability, 
should apply to legal persons. This should not preclude parallel criminal, civil or 
administrative proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in which such 
forms of liability are available. Legal persons should be subject to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. Such measures should be without prejudice to 
the criminal liability of citizens.’ 
25 Art. 2 OECD Convention obliges parties to ‘take such measures as may be necessary, in 
accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of 
a foreign public official’. Even if a State parties legal system does not apply criminal sanctions 
to legal persons, Art. 3 (2) requires that states ensure that they are ‘subject to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for bribery 
of foreign public officials.’  
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9.3 Art. 35: The Cornerstone of a Victim-Centered Approach?  
The foundation for a private right of action is found in Art. 35 UNCC. The 
drafters of the Convention readily acknowledge in the Preamble, that while the 
prevention and eradication of corruption is a responsibility of all States, if their 
efforts are to be effective they must cooperate not just with other states but 
also with the support and involvement of citizens and groups outside the public 
sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-
based organizations.26 This paragraph is striking in advocating co-operation 
between the public and private actors as essential ‘if the fight against 
corruption is to be effective.’ This is a tacit recognition that the conflict of 
interest at the core of grand corruption limits the effectiveness of a public-
centered anticorruption enforcement framework as a single strategy. As the 
preamble states, the fight against corruption requires the co-operation of a 
plurality of actors and in particular of groups outside the public sector.  
Art. 35 focuses on one such private actor − the private litigant − and opens the 
door to a victim-centered strategy in the fight against corruption. Given the 
international scope of the UNCC, Art. 35 is an important index of the nature, 
scope and pre-conditions of the minimum content of a private right of action 
for corruption on a global scale.  
Art. 35 UNCC provides that:  
 
‘Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance 
with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate 
legal proceedings against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain 
compensation.’ 
 
Art. 35 demarcates corrupt acts established under the convention as wrongs for 
which there is a concurrent private right of redress. The UNCC effectively 
establishes the legal wrong of corruption and creates the framework within 
which private remedies for occurrences of this legal wrong can occur.  
 
The importance of Art. 35 in the development of anticorruption strategy is 
worth emphasis. Art. 35 represents the first instance in any international 
instrument where citizens are expressly empowered to initiate legal 
                                                     
 
26 Preamble, UNCC. See also Art. 13, which expatiates more fully on the participation of civil 
society calling on states to take measures ‘to promote the active participation of citizens and 
groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and 
community-based organizations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to 
raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by 
corruption.’ 
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proceedings under anti-corruption laws. In addition, the preamble to the UNCC 
suggests that the purpose for which the private right of redress is provided 
under the UNCC has a larger public function.27 In other words the private 
action of redress has not only the private function of rectifying the harm done 
to a particular plaintiff but also the public function of deterring persons from 
engaging in acts of corruption against the public interest.28 
Art. 35 UNCC can be described as the cornerstone upon which the right of the 
citizen to seek private remedies for corruption is founded. It reflects the well-
held principle that a person who suffers damage from a legal wrong has a right 
to reparations from the person responsible. It also establishes on a global scale 
the notion of private remedies for corruption. Art. 35 introduces the party left 
out of criminal law-based descriptions of sanctioning corruption and sees the 
restoration of the rights that are violated during a corrupt exchange as an 
intrinsic part of the process of repairing the social and economic hardship 
caused by corruption. The inclusion of a right to initiate legal proceedings by 
the private actor in the UNCC creates an international obligation for states. If 
anti-corruption rules are silent on the question of whether or not there is a 
private remedy for the breach of the rules, the UNCC would have an 
overreaching character in filling the regulatory gap. The express provision of a 
right to initiate legal proceedings by the party who has suffered damage could 
open a new chapter in the fight against corruption depending on how ‘real’ the 
scope of this right is. 
9.4 Private Right of Action under Art. 35 UNCC 
Given the almost-global reach of the UN Convention with 140 parties, the 
implications of a right of action granted to private parties to institute civil 
actions for corruption has profound implications. What is the precise scope of 
the private right of action under Art. 35 UNCC? 
                                                     
 
27 Common law jurisdictions have long held the principle of damages that are given to show an 
example. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763), Lord Chief Justice Charles Pratt 
upheld the award in full the basis that the case involved not simply ‘the mere personal injury’ 
of the plaintiff, but also the liberty of ‘all the King’s subjects’ against the exercise of ‘arbitrary 
power,’ 95 Eng. Rep. at pp. 768-69. In 1836, in the [1836] case of McBride v. McLaughlin, 15 
4 Watts p. 375, pp. 376-77 (Pa. 1836), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: ‘Whatever be 
the speculative notions of fanciful writers, the authorities teach that damages may be given, in 
peculiar cases, not only to compensate, but to punish …. That corrective damages may be 
given for the sake of example, is as old as the law itself.’  
28 This is more in line with theorists who see the law of torts or non-contractual obligations in 
terms of a wrong that should be redressed as opposed to theories that see this branch of the law 
as dealing primarily with the allocation of costs and adjustment of losses. For an overview of 
these two positions see J. Goldberg, B. Zipursky, ‘Torts as wrongs’, Texas Law Review, Vol. 
88, 2010. Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1576644. Electronic copy available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576644.  
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9.4.1 Narrow Scope of Art. 35 UNCC 
The victim of corruption is typically either a direct party to the primary or 
secondary contracts that are tainted by corruption or an indirect victim who is 
not a party to the contracts that underlie the corrupt exchange. A significant 
challenge especially for the indirect victim of corruption is how to found an 
action to claim a remedy for harm suffered as a result of corruption. The 
indirect victim unlike the direct parties to the primary and secondary contracts 
requires standing to sue on these underlying contracts. In addition, both direct 
and indirect victims of corruption are directly affected by the effects of the 
violation of the anti-corruption rules or to enforce the anti-corruption rules in 
general. This raises the question whether (a) Art. 35 UNCC provides a special 
right of action for victims of corruption to enforce anti-corruption rules and (b) 
whether Art 35 UNCC makes it easier for the indirect victim to  establish local 
standi to sue of damage suffered as a result of the primary and secondary 
contracts resulting from corrupt exchanges.  
For three reasons, the answer is negative. The UNCC does not appear to give a 
special private right of action to enforce the anti-corruption laws or special 
standing to claim damages for injury suffered as a result of corruption to all 
victims of corruption. This is firstly because of its adherence to the principle of 
sovereignty of states, secondly because it makes Art. 35 subject to the 
principles of national law, and thirdly because of the pre-conditions that it 
imposes for the potential litigant. In addition, an examination of Art. 35 as well 
as the position in the US, England and the Netherlands shows that access to a 
private right of action for corruption is constrained either by expressly 
disallowing such a right (as the US has done) and/or by the pre-conditions to 
the applicability of Art. 35 which raises the bar to the right to initiate legal 
action to a level at which only a very limited and narrowly defined group of 
direct victims can qualify. 
9.4.1.1 Subjection to Principle of Sovereignty 
The right to institute legal proceedings for corruption under Art. 35 UNCC is 
subject to the principle in Art. 4 UNCC of sovereignty and non-interference 
with domestic affairs of member states. Art. 4 UNCC provides that:  
‘States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a 
manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 
States.’  
Art. 4 points to a balance sought to be achieved within the UNCC. On the one 
hand, to provide an effective strategy against corruption there has to be a 
binding supranational rule that mandates states to adopt a common frame of 
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reference and minimum standards. At the same time the principle of comity 
that underlines the interaction of states relies on mutual respect and observance 
of each country’s sovereign position. The effect of the principle of sovereignty 
means that provisions regarding civil liability or a private right of action for 
acts of corruption under the UNCC must be in conformity with the 
fundamental legal principles of the member state in question.29 
9.4.1.2 Subjection to National Law and Principles 
The UNCC, in seeking to realize a common response to the problem of 
corruption, requires that each state shall implement the provisions of the 
Convention. Art. 65(1) provides that: 
‘[E]ach State Party shall take the necessary measures, including legislative 
and administrative measures, in accordance with fundamental principles of its 
domestic law, to ensure the implementation of its obligations under this 
Convention.’  
However, the Legislative Guide to the UNCC points out that there are three 
categories of provisions in the UNCC, which are ranked as (1) mandatory, (2) 
to be strongly considered and (3) optional.30 The Legislative Guide explains 
the significance of this ranking and provides that:  
‘[W]henever the phrase “each State Party shall adopt” is used, the reference is 
to a mandatory provision. Otherwise, the language used in the guide is “shall 
consider adopting” or “shall endeavor to”, which means that States are urged 
to consider adopting a certain measure and to make a genuine effort to see 
whether it would be compatible with their legal system. For entirely optional 
provisions, the guide employs the term “may adopt.”’31  
The Guide goes on to point out that there are safeguard clauses that operate as 
a filter regarding the obligations of states in cases of conflicting constitutional 
                                                     
 
29 The Legislative Guide points out the purpose of Art. 65, Para. 1, is to ensure that national 
legislators act to implement the provisions of the Convention in conformity with the 
fundamental principles of their legal system. See Para. 18 Legislative Guide UNCC. 
30 In establishing their priorities, national legislative drafters and other policymakers should bear 
in mind that the provisions of the Convention do not all have the same level of obligation. In 
general, provisions can be grouped into the following three categories: (a) Mandatory 
provisions which consist of obligations to legislate (either absolutely or where specified 
conditions have been met); (b) Measures that State parties must consider applying or endeavor 
to adopt; (c) Measures that are optional. See Para. 11 Legislative Guide UNCC. 
31 Para. 12 Legislative Guide UNCC. 
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or fundamental rules and that allow states to adopt certain measures ‘subject to 
[their] constitution and the fundamental principles of [their] legal system.’32 
Turning to the wording of Art. 35, the pre-eminence of national law becomes 
very clear. Art. 35 provides that states shall take measures to grant entities or 
persons the right to initiate legal proceedings for damage suffered as a result of 
corrupt acts in accordance with principles of its domestic law. The use of this 
safeguard measure subjects the measures that states are required to take to 
national law. This makes it clear that there is no new basis of liability or right 
of action created by the UNCC. A private right of action for the victim of 
corruption under the UNCC exists only to the extent that it is provided within 
the principles of national law. 
Furthermore, according to the UNCC, national law determines the sanctioning 
processes for corruption. Art. 30(9) UNCC provides that: 
‘Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the 
description of the offenses established in accordance with this Convention and 
of the applicable legal defenses or other legal principles controlling the 
lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that 
such offenses shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that 
law.’33 
The Legislative Guide to the UNCC explains that Art. 30(9) means that the 
domestic law of a State party governs: (a) the description of offenses 
established in accordance with the Convention; (b) applicable defenses; (c) 
legal principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct; and (d) prosecution and 
punishment.34 
Subjecting the private right of action under Art. 35 UNCC to the principles of 
domestic law shows that national law plays the determining role in (a) what 
measures for private remedies for corruption are possible and (b) what 
provision for compensation for damage is available for persons who have 
suffered damage. National rules remain the defining point for the right to 
private remedies for corruption as well as the focal point of questions such as 
the meaning of ‘measure,’ ‘entities or persons,’ ‘damage,’ ‘legal proceeding,’ 
and ‘responsibility for damage’ as stipulated under Art. 35. This means that 
Art. 35 UNCC cannot stand alone without supporting national law as the 
source of a private right of action for persons who have suffered damage as a 
result of corruption. 
                                                     
 
32 Para. 13 Legislative Guide UNCC. 
33   Emphasis added. 
34 Para. 33 Legislative Guide. 
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9.4.1.3 Art 35: Pre-Conditions for Private Right of Action 
Art. 35 requires that states should ensure that entities or persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption ‘have the right to initiate 
legal proceedings against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain 
compensation.’ The term ‘suffered damage’ can be considered in a general or 
technical sense. The word ‘damage’ can be used to mean loss in a general 
sense suffered by a victim of corruption for which a right of redress ought to be 
given. Damage can also be used in a technical sense where it refers to a 
specific and quantifiable loss suffered by a plaintiff for which specific loss the 
plaintiff should be indemnified.  
Goldberg emphasizes the effect of the difference in these two formulations. 
One approach looks beyond the wrong suffered by the plaintiff to the entire 
transacting environment. In this approach, the:  
‘character of the defendants conduct, mitigating circumstances that do not rise 
to the level of recognized defences, and the power and dynamic between the 
two parties are surmised in the notion of damage.’35  
The other approach depicts damages as a loss or setback which is restricted to 
compensation as indemnification and ‘requires the fact finder to set damages at 
an amount equal to the losses suffered by the tort victim as a result of the 
tort.’36 From the perspective of a private right of action for corruption, a logical 
objective within the context of the UNCC would be a notion of damages that 
looks beyond the specific damage to a particular plaintiff to a view that serves 
a broader purpose of deterring the conduct of the defendant. In other words, 
this point of view embraces the entire transaction and sees the purpose of 
damages not just as compensatory but also with the objective of deterring the 
defendant’s conduct. 
This is particularly important because formulating a right of action for 
corruption in strict compensatory terms restricts the category of persons that 
can initiate legal proceedings. Art. 35 speaks of an action ‘to obtain 
compensation.’ A broad reading of the term ‘compensation’ would include all 
types of damages awarded to a person injured by the wrongful act of another 
and would encompass all the purposes for which such damages are given 
including compensation, the determination of rights, punishment and 
                                                     
 
35 J. Goldberg, ‘Two conceptions of tort damages: fair v. full compensation’, DePaul Law 
Review, Vol. 55, 2006; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 06-11. Electronic copy 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=903813, at p. 437. 
36 Id., at p. 438. 
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deterrence, and the vindication of the injured party.37 A narrower reading 
would see ‘compensation’ as referring solely to damages provided as 
compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by a party and 
exclude broader purposes such as deterrence and vindication.38 
An examination of the formulation of Art. 35 supports a narrow reading of the 
term compensation. Art. 35 links the right to initiate legal proceedings solely to 
actions for compensatory damages. It speaks of the ‘right to initiate legal 
proceedings … in order to obtain compensation’ for the injury suffered by the 
party initiating the claim. The damage claimed by the plaintiff must be the 
consequence of the wrongdoer’s conduct. This is the manner in which Art. 35 
UNCC identifies the victims of acts of corruption that have been violated by 
the commission of a wrong. The direct link of relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant plays a central role.  
As such, Art. 35 grants a right to initiate legal proceedings that is clearly linked 
to the injury caused by the defendant to a particular plaintiff. In this sense, the 
formulation of Art. 35 is quite specific and provides a private right of action 
only in instances where there is a direct causal link between the injury and the 
party bringing the action. This condition is not stated expressly in Art. 35 but 
can be implied from its clear wording. Art. 35 speaks of the right to initiate 
legal proceedings ‘against those responsible for that damage.’ The damage 
caused is not damage to the whole world, but damage to the plaintiff. The 
measure of redress is compensation to repair the injury caused. There is no 
definition of the term responsible in the UNCC, but Art. 35 indicates that the 
person must have been involved in the act of corruption, that there must have 
been damage caused by the act of corruption and that damage must have 
caused injury to the party seeking to initiate the legal proceedings. When and 
how these conditions will be met, is not defined by the UNCC but is rather left 
to the principles of domestic law of states. 
Only where there is a direct causal link does a right to initiate legal 
proceedings arise. This is the classic traditional basis for actions based on non-
                                                     
 
37 See for example Sec. 901 of the Restatement (2nd) Torts, American Law Institute, St. Paul 
MN, 1965, (hereinafter Restatement (2nd) Torts), which explains that the purpose for which a 
provision is made for a right of redress for non-contractual claims (torts) is linked to the types 
of damages that are awarded by the court. These purposes are: (a) to give compensation, 
indemnity or restitution for harms; (b) to determine rights; (c) to punish wrongdoers and deter 
wrongful conduct; and (d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful 
self-help. Winfield v. Jolowicz points to contemptuous, nominal, punitive damages as serving 
different purposes in relation to the right of redress of a party who has suffered injury by the 
wrongful act of another. W. Rogers (Ed.), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 18th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2010, pp. 552-559.  
38 Sec. 903 Restatement (2nd) Torts.  
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contractual obligations in tort, namely to compensate the plaintiff for injury 
caused by another party. As such, Art. 35 is directed at specific instances 
where there is (a) damage to the claimant and (b) that is caused by an act of 
corruption as defined under the convention. The normative basis of 
compensation is to correct the loss suffered by the plaintiff by making the 
defaulting party responsible for that specific loss. This suggests that there is no 
special private right of action that is created under Art. 35 for all victims of 
corruption. Rather, Art. 35 is inward-looking, directed at the particular plaintiff 
and seeks merely to compensate that particular plaintiff for that particular loss.  
9.4.2 Art. 35 UNCC: Effect of Pre-Conditions  
The UNCC ostensibly seeks the support and involvement of citizens and 
groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental 
organizations and community-based organizations in the fight against 
corruption. However, the methodology for the private right of redress adopted 
under the UNCC falls short of any such objective. The combination of the 
principle of sovereignty, the subjection of Art. 35 to national law as well as the 
pre-conditions in Art. 35 leaves the right to redress at the discretion of the state 
and limits in any event the category of persons that have the right to initiate 
legal proceedings under the Convention.  
One may argue that given the variety of civil processes for redress available in 
different legal systems it is perhaps understandable that the language the 
UNCC adopts is a narrow formulation as a minimum standard, leaving states 
free to broaden its remit to the extent their particular laws and public policy 
permit. Indeed, states are encouraged to ‘adopt more strict or severe measures 
than those provided for’ in the Convention to prevent and combat corruption.39 
However, there does seem to be a lack of symmetry between the desire stated 
in the preamble of the UNCC for a broader participation by citizens and civil 
society in the enforcement of the anti-corruption rules and the provisions of 
Art. 35 UNCC.  
The effect of Art. 35 is that the UNCC falls short in harnessing civil society as 
a partner in enforcement with the public sector. It also does not address the 
rights of all ‘persons who have suffered damage’ as a result of corruption but 
rather only those persons that are relationally so placed as to enable a direct 
link to be made to the party responsible for the acts of corruption and where 
such a loss is quantifiable. This significantly limits the scope of redress only to 
actions for compensatory damage where there is a very specific link between 
the party responsible for the damage and the person bringing the claim. This 
                                                     
 
39 Art. 65 UNCC. 
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poses a formidable challenge to the ultimate, indirect victims of corruption 
who also suffer the effects but are not relationally directly connected to the 
party responsible for the damage. This leaves a large group − the indirect 
victims of the corruption − outside the ambit of the UN framework of a private 
right of redress for corruption. Even for the direct victim of corruption, the 
burden of establishing loss is not likely to encourage potential litigants. The 
absence of any motivation beyond compensatory damages coupled with the 
evidential burden may present too meager a payoff for the direct victim who 
may consider the risk of instituting an action as simply throwing good money 
after bad. This does not encourage an environment where private persons can 
partner with states in the fight against corruption.  
Apart from this hurdle of causality, subjecting the private right to institute legal 
proceedings to ‘the principles of domestic laws’ of member states implies that 
the scope of the right of redress will be determined by already existing 
provisions of domestic laws. The argument can be made that the mandatory 
nature of Art. 35, which states that members ‘shall’ provide a right to initiate 
legal proceedings, is not met where the member refuses to grant a right of 
action in its entirety and that the subjection to national law must accommodate 
this minimum commitment by states. The Legislative Guide, however, 
suggests that the effect of the subjection to principles of domestic laws is a 
safeguard designed to do precisely that. This empties Art. 35 of any effect on 
national law except to the degree granted by the State. Indeed, the fact of the 
matter is that the narrow formulation of Art. 35 does not in fact add to the right 
of actions under existing theories for redress under domestic laws. 
To achieve symmetry with the goals of the UNCC a broad reading of the 
convention may be necessary to bring the letter of the UNCC in line with its 
spirit. Since the Convention lays down a minimum standard, states are 
provided a platform that can be expanded in ways that encourage the private 
litigant. If compensation for harm suffered can be interpreted in a general 
sense where compensation may be interpreted to mean any form of redress for 
the plaintiff, this would include punitive and non-restitutionary forms of 
compensation. Broadening the right of action to include purposes such as 
punishment and deterrence is more in keeping with the spirit of the UNCC.  
Is such a broad reading possible, with the current formulation of Art. 35? It 
would require stretching the meaning of ‘damage’ to include not only direct 
damage but also consequential damage. It may also require stretching the term 
‘compensation’ to include not just specific loss to the plaintiff but also to 
instances where it is difficult to quantify loss but corruption is proven. This 
would shift the focus from proof of loss, to proof of the commission of a legal 
wrong, and would result in a strict liability framework for wrongs attributable 
to corruption. Finally it may require an interpretation of damages that allows it 
to serve purposes beyond compensation to allow for the punishment of the 
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offender and a reward for the plaintiff, who in undertaking the action against 
the commission of the legal wrong of corruption acts not only in his own 
interest but ultimately in the interest of the general public. If taken a step 
further by adopting schemes that reward or reduce the costs, the private litigant 
would also encourage the objective of a ‘multidisciplinary approach’ and the 
involvement of non-public actors in the fight against corruption. 
9.4.3 Art. 35 UNCC: Effect in US, England and the Netherlands 
None of the three jurisdictions studied in this book have interpreted Art. 35 as 
creating a private right of action or as requiring any change in their domestic 
private laws regarding a private right of action for acts of corruption. Indeed 
the response has been that national laws already make adequate provision for 
the citizen who seeks redress for damage suffered as a result of corruption. The 
overview of rules regulating corruption in these countries shows that while 
they have criminalized commercial and international corruption, there is no 
new express private right of action that is granted to the private citizen to 
enforce any of the anti-corruption laws. The private rights of action exist only 
to the extent provided under domestic laws and processes. 
9.4.3.1 Position in the US 
The US has taken the most formal position with respect to Art. 35. The US 
Congress, for example, has asserted that US law sufficiently meets the 
objectives of Art. 35 and that there is no need to broaden or enhance current 
US law ‘in any way’ because under US law, parties who have suffered from 
criminal acts are afforded the right to remedies under various legal principles.40 
Under US tort law, for example, where there is no express provision for a 
remedy in a legislative provision that protects a certain class of persons or 
requiring certain conduct, the court may impose a remedy.41 The US was 
concerned that Art. 35 would impose an obligation on the courts to open the 
door to ‘any’ person who had suffered damage as a result of corruption that 
went beyond the parties directly involved in the acts of corruption.42 As a 
                                                     
 
40 Senate Treaty Documents Nos. 1-8, 109th Congress-1st Session 4 January-22 December  2005, 
US Congressional Serial Set Serial Number 14941, US Government Printing Office 
Washington, 2006, at p. 10. 
41 Sec. 874(A) Restatement (2nd) Torts, provides that ‘When a legislative provision protects a 
class of persons or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the 
violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the 
purpose of the legislation and need to ensure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an 
injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new 
cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.’ 
42 Senate Treaty Documents Nos. 1-8, 109th Congress-1st Session 4 January-22 December  2005, 
id., Note 40 above. 
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result, the US resorted to a complete rejection of Art. 35 by making a 
reservation to the effect that ‘[N]one of the provisions of the Convention 
creates a private right of action.’43 The US Senate pushed against the notion 
that a victim of corruption could via the application of Art. 35 have a private 
right of redress that was not already provided under domestic law. The Senate 
felt that a reservation was important to avoid any possibility that Art. 35 would 
be construed as granting any requirement to ‘broaden or enhance current US 
law or practice.’44 The Senate also rejected the possibility of Art. 35 founding 
the basis of a private claim under the Alien Tort Statute.45 
By making this reservation to Art. 35, the US is not under the obligation 
imposed by the UNCC to take ‘measures as may be necessary’ to provide 
entities or persons who have suffered damages as a result of corruption with a 
right of action. This could leave the US at odds with the spirit of the UNCC, 
which arguably seeks to broaden the scope of measures available to victims of 
corrupt acts as a category of plaintiffs.46 However, analysis suggests even in 
the absence of an express reservation by the US, the formulation of Art. 35 
does not in any event create an express right of action beyond what is available 
or adopted under domestic law.  
The reservation made by the United States out of the fear that Art. 35 may 
extend a private right of action beyond the direct parties to the corrupt 
exchange helps to bring into focus the schism between direct and indirect 
victims of corruption. The UNCC and indeed domestic rules in most cases do 
not recognize the rights of all victims of corruption but rather only the rights 
that accrue to a particular class of victim.  
9.4.3.2 Position in England/the Netherlands 
Neither the UK nor the Netherlands have entered reservations in respect of Art. 
35. This means that in both these countries there have to be ‘measures’ that 
meet the requirements of Art. 35 and provide the victim of corruption with the 
‘right to initiate legal proceedings.’ Art. 35 gives a platform to victims of 
corruption in the UK and the Netherlands upon which to seek private redress 
                                                     
 
43 United Nations Convention against Corruption Declaration and Reservations, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories-declarations-reservations.html. 
44 Senate Treaty Documents Nos. 1-8, 109th Congress-1st Session 4 January-22 December  2005, 
id., Note 40 above. 
45 Id.; the US Senate also referred to the ruling in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 
655 (1992). Furthermore, with regard to a private right of action arising under the domestic 
laws regarding foreign corruption, as for example the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the 
US Courts have also declared that there is no private right of action created by the FCPA. See 
Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 718 N.Y.S. 2d.  
46 If indeed the formulation of civil liability under Art. 35 achieves this purpose. 
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from the courts of law. However, as the above analysis shows, this right is 
restricted to what is permitted under domestic law. Art. 35 does not add any 
new content to domestic provisions regarding private remedies for corruption.  
In the Netherlands, the Commission on Private Bribery pointed out that the 
criminalization of private bribery labels it as a tort and that this increases the 
possibilities and range of civil law responses and private actions by parties that 
have suffered damage.47 The Dutch Minister of Justice commented that the 
ratification of the UNCC did not require any amendment to Dutch law.48 
However, the position in the Netherlands is affected by the coming into effect 
of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (CLC), which deserves special 
mention.49 
On 6 November 1997, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
adopted 20 Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption in Resolution 
(97) 24. The Resolution calls for a multi-disciplinary approach to the fight 
against corruption, and the purpose of Principle 17 is to encourage states to 
‘ensure that civil law takes into account the need to fight corruption and in 
particular provides for effective remedies for those whose rights and interests 
are affected by corruption.’50  
The Civil Law Convention, which is in force in the Netherlands, has provisions 
for private remedies for corrupt acts. Art. 1 CLC provides that each Party shall 
provide in its internal law for effective remedies for persons who have suffered 
damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights 
and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage. 
Similar to Art. 35 UNCC, the CLC is not substantive law in itself but merely 
requires that states ‘shall provide effective remedies.’51 This introduces a 
                                                     
 
47 See Report of the Committee on Private Bribery, Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary 
Papers, Session 1965-1966, No. 8473, p. 11, at Note 2. (Rapport van de Commissie ‘Niet 
Ambtelijk Corruptie’ also referred to as the Commissie-Mulder) Bijlage bij de Memoire van 
Toelichting, Zitting 1965-1966, No. 8437, Subnote 4, pp. 5-16 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Report of the Committee on Private Bribery). 
48 Burgerrechtelijk Verdrag inzake Corruptie, Strasbourg, 4 November 1999, No. 1, Brief van de 
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de Voorzitters van de Eerste en van de Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal), The Hague, 21 September 2007, 31 230 (R 1833), Session 2007-2008, 
Toelichtende Nota (hereinafter referred to as the Explanatory Report to the Dutch Parliament 
on the Civil Law Convention), 
www.eerstekamer.nl/brief/20070921/burgerrechtelijk_verdrag_inzake. 
49  The Civil Law Convention has not been signed by the US. It has been signed but not ratified 
by the UK. See Chapter 3. 
50  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution 97(24) on The Twenty Guiding 
Principles for the Fight Against Corruption, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 
November 1997 at the 101st session of the Committee of Ministers. 
51 Art. 1 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Strasbourg, 4 November 1999, in force 1 
November 2003, 174 CETS (hereinafter the CLC).  
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requirement of ‘effectiveness.’ Unlike the UNCC, which leaves the question of 
efficacy open by subjecting the private right of action to the extent of redress 
provided under national laws, the CLC provides a minimum level of 
compliance. Not only does it provide for private redress, a victim is entitled to 
remedies that are ‘effective’ in providing redress for the rights and interests 
that are negatively affected by acts of corruption.   
The CLC is also more expansive in scope than Art. 35. Art. 1 CLC provides a 
broader framework and requires member states to ensure that parties who have 
suffered damage as a result of corruption have the remedies necessary to ‘… 
defend their rights and interests including the possibility of obtaining 
compensation for damage.’ It is clear that these rights and interests include but 
are not limited to the right to initiate an action for compensation by the use of 
the word ‘including’ in reference to the remedy of seeking compensation. This 
opens the doors to remedies beyond mere compensation. Redress could include 
other measures such a punitive or exemplary damages or restitution. This is in 
contrast to the UNCC where the right to initiate legal proceedings for corrupt 
acts is restricted to actions instituted ‘in order to obtain compensation.’  
The CLC also focuses on the issue of compensation for damage suffered by 
victims of corruption. In this regard there is also a requirement for a strict 
causal link. While the conditions for causality are implied in the formulation of 
Art. 35 UNCC, they are set out quite clearly in the CLC as follows:  
‘Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the following conditions to be 
fulfilled in order for the damage to be compensated: (1) the defendant has 
committed or authorised the act of corruption, or failed to take reasonable 
steps to prevent the act of corruption; (2) the plaintiff has suffered damage; 
and (3) there is a causal link between the act of corruption and the damage.’ 
The CLC provides that compensation for damage suffered as a result of 
corruption is dependent on the plaintiff showing that ‘there is a causal link 
between the act of corruption and the damage.’52 In the explanatory notes to 
this article, this is referred to as damage that is the ‘ordinary’ consequence 
corruption.53 
                                                     
 
52       Art. 4 Para. 1(iii) CLC. 
53 An adequate causal link must exist between the act and the damage, in order for the latter to be 
compensated. The damage should be an ordinary and not an extraordinary consequence of 
corruption. Thus, for instance, ‘loss of profits’ by an unsuccessful competitor who would have 
obtained the contract if an act of corruption had not been committed, is an ordinary 
consequence of corruption and should normally be compensated. On the other hand, there 
would be no adequate connection if, for example, an unsuccessful competitor, in his or her 
anger and disappointment over the loss of business, fell down the stairs resulting in a broken 
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9.4.4 No Change in Existing Civil Liability Regimes 
The platform created by Art. 35 is a very limited one. The subjection of the 
provisions of Art. 35 to the national law means that to the extent that no 
express private right of action is provided under national rules, there is no new 
private right of action for corrupt acts provided as a result of the ratification of 
the UNCC. It is to domestic practice, therefore, that one must look rather than 
any overarching legal instrument for guidance regarding the right to initiate 
legal actions, the types of claims that may be brought, and the precise nature of 
the interests protected and compensated. This is clearly the case in the US, 
where there is in any event an express rejection of Art. 35 UNCC. It is, 
however, not the case with the UK or the Netherlands, who have not made any 
reservation in respect of Art 35. Nonetheless, in these three countries the 
position of the private litigant in the absence of other provisions is not 
significantly altered by the provisions of Art. 35.  
Furthermore, Art. 35 refers only to a private civil action for compensation. The 
formulation under Art. 35 is a narrow one that focuses on compensatory 
damages that are owed to direct victims of corruption. This is the traditional 
response to damage suffered as a result of legal wrong in all three jurisdictions 
considered. Art. 35 does not add anything new to these existing positions. 
National laws do provide indeed provide redress, but only for a very narrowly 
defined group of potential plaintiffs where this narrow group can overcome the 
burden of quite stiff pre-conditions to the right to bring a claim. However, the 
question is whether the existing rules determining the category of persons who 
have the standing to bring a private action for corruption is sufficiently flexible 
to allow for the realization of justice for all victims, both direct and indirect, of 
corruption. It is also open to question whether the framework of the existing 
principles allows for the active participation of non-public actors and civil 
society in the enforcement of anti-corruption rules as desired under the UNCC. 
If national laws already adequately provided for private remedies for 
corruption, the introduction of Art. 35 would be superfluous. 
Art. 35 focuses on compensatory damages and would seem to exclude other 
purposes such as disgorgement of profits, constructive trusts, or punitive 
damages.54 The requirements of causality under Art. 35 and the restriction of 
                                                                                                                            
 
leg. See Art. 4 Explanatory report on the Civil Law Convention, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/174.htm. 
54 In 1843, the circuit court in Bishop v. Stockton offered the following instruction to a jury faced 
with a suit by a passenger against a common carrier: ‘If the defendants [are found liable], then 
the enquiry will be what amount of damages shall be given? Shall they be compensatory or 
exemplary? Compensatory damages are given to restore or make whole again, or make 
reparation for loss, injury, or suffering, past and future .... But further vindictive or exemplary 
damages may be given to indemnify the public for past injuries and damages, and to protect the 
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the amount of compensation to amounts that can be proven as direct damage 
suffered, place a burden on the plaintiff that is in no way offset by other 
incentives for the plaintiff in the form of exemplary punitive damages or other 
methods of reward that may encourage such a party to undertake the 
challenges of a civil action.  
In recent times there has certainly been an increase in the prosecution of 
international corruption and a great increase in the fines paid for the violation 
of anti-corruption rules. However, there is a gap, or what has been referred to 
as a ‘disparity in payment of damages,’ which is considered ‘unfair.’55 
Unfortunately Art. 35 simply cements this narrative at the international level 
by adopting a narrow compensatory damages formula. Art. 35 does not address 
the damages gap between direct and indirect victims of corruption but caters 
strictly to the group of persons who are arguably most able to bear the damage 
resulting from a corrupt act. 
Looking into the future, in the UK and the Netherlands, where Art. 35 is 
applicable without reservation, it has the potential to serve as additional 
support for an expanding role of the private actor. This will lie in the hands of 
courts, which may be called upon to determine its scope in the particular case 
through processes of statutory interpretation. At the very least, Art. 35 raises 
the bar for countries that have ratified it without reservation to ensure (1) that 
civil processes are available to victims of corruption to initiate legal 
proceedings and (2) this is a right that accrues to every party that has suffered 
damage that can be linked to the corrupt transaction. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
community from future risks and wrongs.’ Bishop v. Stockton, 84 3 F. Cas. 453, 454-55 (Pa. 
Cir. Ct. [1843]). 
55 In a petition dated Tuesday 2 August 2011, for example, the Nigerian Socio-Economic Rights 
and Accountability Project (SERAP) petitioned the Chairman of the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), Mrs. Farida Waziri, requesting her to take steps in ensuring that 
multinational corporations which were found guilty in the United States of committing foreign 
bribery in Nigeria pay adequate compensation for their actions. SERAP Executive Director 
Adetokunbo Mumuni has argued that many multinational corporations operating in the country 
have paid several millions of dollars in bribes to government officials and to some political 
parties, adding that while huge payments have been made in settlements in the US, Germany 
and the UK, only a paltry amounts have been paid in Nigeria. The group added that in spite of 
this, the Nigerian people have suffered more from the effects of foreign bribery, arguing that 
foreign bribery has caused immense damage and devastation to the economy and the 
institutions of governance, and directly undermined the full and effective enjoyment of 
internationally recognized human rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights by the 
citizens. ‘The disparity in payment of damages is unfair and violates the fundamental 
provisions of the UN Convention against Corruption, which Nigeria has ratified.’ See report by 
Davidson Iriekpen in This Day Newspaper, 3 August 2011, available at 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/. Emphasis added. 
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9.5 Scope of Private Remedies  
9.5.1 Corruption as an International Legal Wrong 
A legal wrong that has caused injury is recognized as founding a right of civil 
action.56 Wrongs may be criminal or civil, or both.57 A right to bring an action 
arises where an interest recognized and protected by the law is infringed. 
Where a party acts contrary to obligations imposed by the anti-corruption 
instruments, the breach of this obligation creates corresponding infringements 
of rights that can be enforced by the party whose rights have been interfered 
with.58 Under the common law systems, this category of actions fall under the 
law of torts, while in civil law countries this is generally referred to as the law 
of non-contractual obligations. The civil action for the legal wrong of 
corruption has the purpose of addressing the harm to the victim while at the 
same time seeking to deter conduct that is injurious to the public.59 
The UNCC grants a private right of redress action to ‘persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption.’ The UNCC does not 
provide a definition of the legal wrong of corruption but rather provides a 
taxonomy of acts that constitute corruption. States are expected to have laws 
                                                     
 
56 Sec. 7 Restatement (2nd) Torts explains that injury is the violation of some legally protected 
interest while harm is the infliction of any loss or detriment on the person of the plaintiff. 
Recognized heads of legal injury, which are of relevance to the issue of corrupt acts is the 
damage suffered, are the common law causes of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud; damages 
that result from misrepresentation (Chapter 22 Restatement (2nd) Torts), interference with 
contractual relations, (Chapter 37 Restatement (2nd) Torts) as well as interference with 
economic relations (Chapter 37A Restatement (2nd) Torts). The European Principles of Private 
law speak in terms of legally relevant damage as a loss or injury which results from a right 
conferred by law or worthy of protection by law. Book 6 Sec. 2:101 C. von Bar, E. Clive, H. 
Schulte-Nölke (Eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Outline Edition, Sellier, Munich, 2009 (hereinafter 
DCFR). Particular instances of legally relevant damage that have a bearing on the act of 
corruption are losses that result from the reliance on incorrect advice or information, Book 6, 
Sec. 2:207 DCFR; losses incurred upon unlawful impairment of business Book 6, Sec. 2:208 
DCFR; and losses resulting from the inducement of non-performance of an obligation. Book 6 
Sec. 2:210 DCFR. 
57 B. Zipursky, ‘Rights, wrongs, and recourse in the law of torts’, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review, 
Vol. 85, No. 1, 1998.  
58 J. Goldberg, B. Zipursky, ‘Torts as wrongs’, Texas Law Review, Vol. 88, 2010; Fordham Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1576644.  
59 This is referred to as the compensation-deterrence theory of torts. Goldberg writes that 
‘[H]istorically, it advances the notion that tort law has moved from being an institution for the 
adjudication of private wrongs to an institution that empowers judges and juries to legislate for 
the public good. Functionally, it suggests that the regulatory aim of such adjudicative 
‘legislation’ is to deter anti-social conduct and compensate those injured by such conduct.’ J. 
Goldberg, B. Zipursky, ‘Torts as wrongs’, id., at p. 16. He further states that ‘tort ha[s] 
transformed itself from private to “public” law, whereby it functioned to achieve “collective, ” 
not “corrective, ” justice.’ J. Goldberg, B. Zipursky, ‘Torts as wrongs,’ id., at p. 35. 
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criminalizing these corrupt acts in their domestic laws. The implementation of 
the UNCC by member states creates a uniform set of legal wrongs regarding 
corrupt actions. In other words, the UNCC can be said to create a global 
standard for acts of corruption that provides a common language of interaction 
and a ‘framework for stronger co-operation’ between states.60  
The acts of corruption that are recognized by the UNCC are very broad and all-
encompassing going well beyond the core corrupt act of bribery. By grouping 
them all together as ‘acts of corruption’ the UNCC creates a common 
normative thread between these various acts. This implies that all the acts of 
corruption characterized by the UNCC are legal wrongs that have criminal and 
private law consequences on a global scale. The establishment of UNCC-
defined ‘acts of corruption,’ which are accepted by over 140 countries, 
establishes a common normative framework that creates a significant platform 
for the shaping of international public policy as well as a basis for an 
international tort law regime regarding corruption. However, in the absence of 
a private right of action under the UNCC, the recourse the citizen has for injury 
suffered as a result of corruption is in a traditional private law claim. The 
growth of an international framework is therefore very much limited by 
national principles. 
9.5.2 Acts of Corruption 
Art. 35 UNCC speaks of ‘entities or persons who have suffered damage as 
a result of an act of corruption.’ There are 11 categories of ‘acts of 
corruption’ under the UNCC.61 Art. 35 is a part of Chapter 3 of the UNCC, 
which deals with criminalization and law enforcement. The activities that 
are criminalized in Chapter 3 are legal wrongs for which the law will 
provide redress. These acts of corruption described in the UNCC are 
typically crimes under most legal systems. By classing all these activities 
under the common umbrella of corruption, the UNCC emphasizes the link 
between these activities and their collective negative effect on governance, 
economic and political stability. The acts of corruption are not restricted to 
bribery but cover the entirety of actions that undermine the relationships of 
trust that are central to effective business and effective governance. This is 
a more accurate reflection of the international transacting environment 
                                                     
 
60 Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the UN, emphasizes that the ‘Convention 
introduces a comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules that all countries can apply in 
order to strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption.’ See Foreword to the 
UNCC. 
61 See p. 292 above. Art. 15-26 UNCC. 
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where corruption manifests in more facets than solely the giving and 
receiving of bribes.  
 
In the jurisdictions studied in this book, the private claim for corruption is 
centered in the core act of bribery. US Federal law refers in Title 18 Chapter 
11 to the crime of bribery, graft and conflicts of interests, which it describes in 
terms of the bribery of public officials.62 Similarly the commercial statutes 
under US state laws are framed in terms of bribery.63 In the UK, the new 
Bribery Act speaks strictly in term of ‘offences relating to bribery’;64 English 
common law refers to corruption in terms of bribery which is defined as the 
payment of a secret commission;65 in the Netherlands, corruption is described 
in terms of unlawful acts or omission by public offers that consist of the active 
giving or receipt of a gift or promise.66 The CLC, which is in force in the 
Netherlands, also takes a narrow construction of a corrupt act and restricts it to 
the ‘requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or 
any other undue advantage or prospect thereof.’67 
9.6 Interests Protected against Acts of Corruption 
Damage is generally considered as accruing for the violation of a legally 
protected interest.68 A private law claim for corruption results from damage to 
the person or property of the party seeking redress. Legally protected interests 
are defined by rules of law. In the case of corruption, the criminalization of a 
certain act as corrupt acts stigmatizes it as illegal and a violation of a legally 
defined interest. Interests protected under the UNCC can be distinguished as  
acts of corruption that primarily affect private interests such as the principal of 
                                                     
 
62 See 18 USC Sec. 201- 227. 
63   See Chapter 4 above, at p. 112. The judgment in Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 44 nn. 9 
& 10 [1979], provides a listing of state laws that outlaw commercial bribery. 
‘[T]here are seventeen states which have statutes making it a crime to bribe a particular type of 
employee, notably agents or employees in charge of purchasing or hiring: Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.’ The Judge referred to the article 
‘Control of nongovernmental corruption by criminal legislation’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 108, 1960, p. 848, at pp. 864 and 866. 
64 See Bribery Act 1020 C. 23, the title of which is amended with the description ‘An Act to 
make provision about offences relating to bribery; and for connected purposes.’ 
65 Justice Slade in Industries & General Mortgage Co. Ltd v. Lewis [1949] 2 All ER 573, stated 
that for the purposes of the civil law a bribe means the payment of a secret commission. 
66 Arts. 177, 177(a), 178, 178(a) 362- 364 and 328 Dutch Penal Code.  
67 See Art. 2 CLC. 
68 In the US Restatement of its common law rules, this is referred to in terms of injury and harm. 
Injury is the violation of some legally protected interest while harm is the infliction of any loss 
or detriment on the person of the plaintiff. Sec. 7 Restatement (2nd) Torts. The European 
Principles of Private Law speak in terms of legally relevant damage as a loss or injury which 
results from a right conferred by law or worthy of protection by law. See Book 6 Sec. 2:101 
DCFR.  
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a disloyal agent, shareholder, and third-party competitors facing uncompetitive 
behavior on the one hand and those that primarily affect the public interest on 
the other. The public interest is a euphemism for the indirect victims of 
corruption. Where there is damage to the public interest, this damage is 
suffered by the indirect victims of corruption who stand outside the contractual 
relationships that characterize the bribery exchange but yet are the true victims 
of its consequences.   
Claims relating to damage to the private interest broadly fall within the 
traditional core areas of corruption i.e. bribery centered on abuse of the agency 
relationship; while claims for damage suffered primarily by the public interest 
relate to bribery but also include activities that generally fall outside the 
traditional legal definitions of bribery and are included in the taxonomy of 
legal wrongs of corruption under the UNCC. This categorization into private or 
public interests notwithstanding, it must be emphasized that corruption 
undermines the governance, economic and political process of a society 
regardless of whether it primarily affects the public or private interest.  
The definitions of the various acts of corruption under the UNCC reflect the 
type of interest that a violation will primarily affect. Thus the bribery of 
national public officials69 will result in harm to the national government or 
citizens to whom the public official owes a duty of loyalty. Similarly the 
bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international 
organizations70 results in damage to the foreign government and foreign 
nationals as well as international organizations to which the foreign public 
official owes a duty of loyalty. Embezzlement by a public official results in 
damage to the owner of the property, funds or securities, which will usually in 
be a public entity.71 Trading in influence,72 as well as the abuse of function by 
a public official,73 result in harm to the public institution or authority whose 
trust has been abused. Illicit enrichment74 by a public official results in harm to 
the owner of the property or assets that have been illicitly acquired. Bribery75 
and embezzlement76 by citizens in the private sector results in harm to the 
private sector entity. Finally, laundering the proceeds of crime,77 
                                                     
 
69 Art. 15 UNCC. 
70 Art. 16 UNCC. 
71 Art. 17 UNCC. 
72 Art. 18 UNCC. 
73 Art. 19 UNCC. 
74 Art. 20 UNCC. 
75 Art. 21 UNCC. 
76 Art. 22 UNCC. 
77 Art. 23 UNCC. 
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concealment78 and obstruction of justice79 will result in harm to the state 
attempting to enforce and prosecute these crimes.  
Claims for damage primarily to private actors are well-represented in the three 
jurisdictions studied in this book. These are founded mainly on the breach of 
the fiduciary duty in the agency relationship as well as tortious interference. 
However, there are also claims that center on securities litigation, racketeering 
and antitrust rules that are at this moment only characteristic of the US system. 
Private claims for damage to the public interest, on the other hand, are more 
difficult to articulate because there is no clear cause of action within the three 
jurisdictions considered. However, several examples are given in this chapter 
of actions by private actors for redress for damage caused primarily to the 
public interest drawn from a variety of jurisdictions to show the type of 
initiatives that are emerging in this regard. 
Bribery occurs where a public or private official or agent uses this position to 
personal advantage by to the detriment of the party to whom such a party owes 
a duty of loyalty. The UNCC in Arts. 15, 16 and 21 criminalizes the bribery of 
national public officials, foreign public officials, public officials of public 
international organizations as well as private bribery. These provisions 
reference the triangular relationship that characterizes bribery. This triangle of 
persons is fundamental to the act of bribery, which results from the abuse of 
the representational relationship between the bribe taking party and the state or 
private person. This breach of a duty causes an injury that the private law 
seeks to repair. 
Art. 15 UNCC deals with the domestic bribery of national public officials and 
provides that: 
‘Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offenses, when committed intentionally: (a) 
The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of 
an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his 
or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself 
or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting 
in the exercise of his or her official duties.’ 
Art. 15 UNCC references a breach of duty that occurs on the part of a public 
official who is an employee of the State.80 A person qualifies as a public 
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official whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, 
whether paid or unpaid and irrespective of that person’s seniority.81 Any 
person who performs a public function for a public agency or public enterprise, 
or provides a public service also falls within the definition of a public 
official.82 In addition any other person defined as a public official, under the 
domestic law of a state, falls within the definition of a public official.83 
The act of corruption under Art. 15 UNCC occurs where a bribe is paid ‘in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties’ is made intentionally.84 The act of solicitation or acceptance by 
a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, also constitutes 
an act of corruption under this heading.85 The duty that founds a civil claim is 
owed primarily to the state or public agency that employs the public servant. 
This party is the direct recipient of any damage that results from the violation 
of the duty and has a right to institute legal proceedings under Art. 35 UNCC. 
Art. 15 UNCC collapses the artificial division between domestic and foreign 
by including acts of national bribery within the international framework of 
rules prohibiting corruption. This is an important link between the principles 
that underlie the prohibition of private commercial bribery and the bribery of 
public officials in the acquisition of business. The commercial agents and 
public officials that are instrumental in the acquisition of international 
contracts are closely related in an integrated market.  
The UNCC  also requires that states criminalize foreign bribery of foreign 
officials, public officials and private workers. Art. 16 UNCC provides that:  
‘1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, 
the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a 
public international organisation, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage 
in relation to the conduct of international business.86 
                                                                                                                            
 
80 A public official is any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office 
of a state in any capacity, Art. 2(a)(i) UNCC. 
81 Id. 
82 Art. 2(a)(ii) UNCC. 
83 Art. 2(a)(iii) UNCC. 
84 Art. 15(a) UNCC. 
85 Art. 15(b) UNCC. 
86  Emphasis added. 
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2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when 
committed intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public 
official or an official of a public international organisation, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another 
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the 
exercise of his or her official duties.’87 
Art. 16 UNCC prohibits the active or passive bribery of foreign public officials 
and officials of public international organizations. A foreign public official is 
any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of 
a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising a 
public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public 
enterprise.88 An official of a public international organization is an 
international civil servant or any person who is authorized by such an 
organization to act on behalf of that organization.89 Here the party to whom a 
duty of proper representation is owed is a foreign government who is the direct 
recipient of the duty and the primary holder of the right to receive proper 
representation from the public official. 
Art. 21 UNCC tackles bribery in the private sector. It provides:   
‘Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities: (a) 
The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage 
to any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector 
entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he 
or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting; (b) The 
solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by 
any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, 
for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, 
in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting.’ 
Here the party to whom a duty of proper representation is owed is a private 
person who is the direct recipient of the duty and the primary holder of the 
right to proper representation by an employee or commercial agent. 
An additional element of damage to the private interests is the inclusion of Art. 
22, which prohibits the embezzlement of property in the private sector as an 
act of corruption. This occurs where a person who directs or works, in any 
capacity, in a private sector entity embezzles any property, private funds or 
                                                     
 
87  Emphasis added. 
88 Art. 2(b) UNCC. 
89 Art. 2(c) UNCC. 
CHAPTER 9 – INSTITUTING PRIVATE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
428 
 
securities or any other thing of value entrusted to him or her by virtue of his or 
her position intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial 
activities.90 The party who suffers damage is the owner of the private property 
that is embezzled. 
The following sections examine the nature of the legal wrongs affecting private 
and public interests as well as the types of claims filed pursuant to damage 
caused by the infliction of these wrongs. 
9.7 Damage Primarily to Private Interests 
It should be noted that the claims for damage primarily to the private interest 
do not coincide with the government on the one side and the private citizen on 
the other. In some instances the government may take the role of a contractor 
in the market and in some instances a private entity may take on public 
functions. The overview of national law and the UNCC shows that claims for 
damage primarily to a private interest arise mostly in the following instances: 
(1) claims by the principal of the disloyal agent, (2) claims for intentional 
interference in business and contracts by a third party suffering from 
uncompetitive behavior caused by corrupt actions, (3) claims by shareholders 
on their own behalf (class actions) and on behalf of their corporations 
(derivative suits), and (4) FCPA based antitrust claims. 
9.7.1 Private Redress by Principal of Disloyal Agent 
The claim by the principal of the disloyal agent is the foundational claim for 
all the claims relating to damage to the private interest. This is because it is the 
agency relationship that defines the act of bribery. In the US, England and the 
Netherlands as well as under the UNCC there is an interplay between a public 
official or private person who has a duty not to take a bribe on the one hand 
and the party to whom this duty is owed on the other. The party to whom the 
duty is owed can be described as the principal and the party who owes the 
duty is an agent. Under US law, an agency relationship occurs where ‘one 
person (a principal) manifests assent to another person (an agent) that the 
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control.’91 This relationship is regarded as a fiduciary relationship, which 
means that an agent must act loyally in the principal’s interest as well as on the 
principal’s behalf.92 
                                                     
 
90 Art. 22 UNCC. 
91 Sec. 1.01, Restatement of the Law (3rd) Agency.  
92 Id., see also Comment (e) on S.1.01 at p. 23 Restatement of the Law (3rd) Agency.  
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The key feature of bribery is that it puts the agent in a position of conflict 
between a personal interest and the duty of loyalty to the principal.93 
Bowstead, a leading writer on the English Law of Agency, remarks that:  
‘[A]gency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one 
of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on his 
behalf so as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom 
similarly consents so to act or so acts. The one on whose behalf the act or acts 
are to be done is called the principal. The one who is to act is called the agent. 
Any person other than the principal and the agent may be referred to as the 
third party.’94  
In a similar fashion, the duty of proper representation under Dutch law 
requires that a party representing another should only act within the scope of 
the mandate to represent.95 Commercial representatives and agents are a 
special class of representative (mandatory) who is owed a right of proper 
representation because the acts of the mandatee bind the party granting the 
mandate.96 
This frames the act of national and international private bribery described in 
Arts. 15, 16 and 21 of the UNCC in the context of agency. A cause of action 
arises in favor of the principal where the duty of proper representation from an 
agent is violated in favor of a third party. The key aspect of the relationship 
between these three parties is the fact that the bribe-giver interacts with the 
agent on the basis of the fact that the agent is in a position to influence the 
acquisition of an advantage or other favor for the bribe-giver. The agent to the 
principal, national or state government of a private person is in a position to 
create a contractual relationship between the principal and a bribe-giving third 
party.   
The overview of the position of the principal in Chapters 4-6 of this book 
shows that the breach of the duty of loyalty is an injury that the courts will 
repair. There is, however, a discernible difference in the purpose of the 
                                                     
 
93 It has been noted that the ‘key to the determination of … whether or not a payment or other 
inducement made to an agent constitutes a bribe is whether or not the making of it gives rise to 
a conflict of interest, that is to say, puts the agent into a position where his duty and his interest 
conflict.’ Per Leggatt J. in Anangel v. IHI [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports, p. 526. See also Ross 
River Ltd v. Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2007] EWHC 2115 (Ch), (per Briggs J., 
taking a bribe puts the agent into the ‘moral debt of the third party against the interest of the 
principal’). 
94 F.M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2010, [1-001].   
95 Art. 66 Para.1 Book 3. 
96 Art. 7:414 Dutch Civil Code. See also J. Chorus , P. Gerver, E. Hondius (Eds.), Introduction to 
Dutch Law, 4th edn, Kluwer, The Hague, 2006, at p. 163. 
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intervention by the courts. In the US and England the focus is as much on the 
act of bribery itself as it is on compensating the principal. In seeking to deter 
the occurrence of the ‘evil act’ of bribery, the courts vigorously attempt to 
deprive the agent and the party giving the bribe of any profit from their actions. 
This has meant that the courts allow the principal to proceed against the agent 
for the moneys, profits and other benefits resulting from the bribe transaction. 
The courts will also allow the principal to avoid the contract resulting from the 
bribe transaction entered into with the party giving the bribe as well as an 
account for any benefits resulting from the transaction. There is a clearly stated 
punitive and deterrent purpose to court intervention. In contrast, the focus of 
court intervention in the Netherlands is to compensate the wronged principal 
and to put such a principal back in the position he would have been in but for 
the act of bribery. A principal may seek compensatory damages if the principal 
can establish a causal link between the act of bribery and the damage suffered. 
The principal under Dutch law may also seek to vitiate a contract but must be 
able to establish a defect of consent in seeking to avoid the contract that has 
resulted from the commission of a legal wrong. 
In the US, the acceptance of a bribe by an agent is regarded as a breach of the 
fiduciary relationship between the principal and the agent because it causes the 
agent to act disloyally.97 This duty of loyalty has several facets; of particular 
relevance to the issue of corruption is that the agent has a duty ‘not to acquire a 
material benefit from a third party in connection with transactions conducted or 
taken on behalf of the principal.’98 The agent must account to the principal for 
all transactions taken on the principal’s behalf.99 Where an agent takes a bribe 
in breach of this duty, the principal may:100  
1. Recover monetary relief from the agent, and in appropriate circumstance the 
third party who participated in the agent’s breach.101 
2. Seek contractual damages for the breach of the express or implied terms or the 
duty of good faith and loyalty of the employment or agency contract. 
3. Avoid the contract entered into by the agent with a third party who participated 
in the agent’s breach of duty.102 
                                                     
 
97 Sec. 8.01 Restatement of the Law (3rd) Agency.  
98 Id., Sec. 8.02. 
99 Sec. 8.01 Restatement (2nd) Torts, Comment (c). See also in re Niles, 106 F.3d 1456, 1461- 
1462 (9th cir. 1997). 
100   See generally discussion in Chapter 5 above, at pp.126-137. 
101 Comment (e), Sec. 8.02 Restatement (2nd) Torts. The bribe-payor and bribe-recipient may 
both be liable for repayment of the amount of the bribe. Continental Management, Inc. v. 
United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 501, 527 F.2d 613, 620 [1975] (common law right of government to 
sue bribers for the amount of bribes paid to government employees; ‘the amount of the bribe 
provides a reasonable measure of damage, in the absence of a more precise yardstick.’). 
102 U.S. v. ACME Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 87 S. Ct. 350 [1966] (a government may, as a 
matter of public policy, avoid a contract that is tainted by fraud, kickbacks, conflicts of 
interest, or bribery.) 
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4. Recover any material benefit, the value of the benefit or proceeds of the benefit 
retained by the agent, received by the agent through the agent’s breach.103 
5. Seek damages for any harm caused by the agent’s breach.104 
6. Seek damages from the offeror of the bribe for intentionally causing an agent to 
breach a fiduciary duty.105 
7. Seek damages from the offeror of the bribe for intentionally interfering with the 
performance of the agency contract or causing the agents performance to be 
more expensive or burdensome.106 
8. Seek an account for profits from the bribe-giver. 
 
The act of bribery taints the resulting transaction that is binding on the 
principal. The fact that the principal may be bound by transactions that are the 
result of the pursuit of the agent’s self-interest may result in a contract that is 
not to the advantage of the principal. The ‘vulnerability’ of the principal that 
results from the relationship of places a duty of loyalty on the agent the breach 
of which is an injury for which the US law provides a remedy.107  
The actions of the bribe-giver result in the agent being placed in a position of 
conflict of interest, where the agent’s interest in receiving a secret payment 
may take precedence over the agent’s duty to obtain the best terms for his 
principal in the process of negotiating the contract with the third party. Under 
US law the bribe-giver is also liable for damages to the principal, on the basis 
that the bribe-giver is liable for harm resulting to the principal if the bribe-
giver knew that the conduct of the agent constituted a breach of the duty of the 
agent and gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the agent to 
undertake such actions.108  
There are some presumptions that work in the principal’s favor. The principal 
does not need to establish the actual harm caused by the agent’s actions and 
has a right to receive from the offeror of the bribe the amount of the bribe paid 
                                                     
 
103 Where an agent profits as a result of the breach of a fiduciary duty, the courts may impose a 
constructive trust on the agent’s profits. Ellison v. Alley, 852 S.W.2d 605, 608; Mischke v. 
Mischke 530 N.W.2d 235,241 (Neb. 1995); Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d 
555, 402 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1980); see Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586 [1921] (the party who 
participates in a breach of fiduciary duty must disgorge all profits made as a result of wrongful 
conduct, without regard to whether the plaintiff suffered a corresponding loss). The party could 
then trace the proceeds of the bribe. 
104 Sec. 874 Restatement (2nd) Torts provides that ‘[O]ne standing in a fiduciary duty with 
another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by 
the relation.’   
105 Sec. 876(b) and (c) Restatement (2nd) Torts.  
106 Sec. 766A Restatement (2nd) Torts. 
107 See Matthew Conaglen, ‘The nature and function of fiduciary loyalty’, Law Quarterly Review, 
Vol. 121, 2005, p. 452.  
108 Sec. 876(b) Restatement (2nd) Torts.  
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to the agent.109 The principal also does not have to establish that the agent 
profited from the breach of the fiduciary duty to recover damages.110 The 
measure of damages that a principal is entitled to is more than just the amount 
of the bribe. The principal is entitled to ‘the amount of loss sustained, 
including the lost opportunities for profit.’ 
In England, the agent as a fiduciary is defined as ‘… someone who has 
undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in 
circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The 
distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The 
principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary.’111 The agent 
has a (1) duty to act in good faith; (2) duty not to make a profit; (3) duty not to 
assume a position where the duty and personal interest of the agent conflict 
and, (4) a duty not to act for personal benefit or the benefit of a third person 
without the informed consent of the principal.112 
The principal can make the following claims against the disloyal agent and the 
party that offered the bribe or other inducement:  
1. At common law claim in personam for money had and received.113 
2. In equity a proprietary claim for the recovery of the bribe itself.114 
3. Recovery of any benefits resulting from the bribery transaction.115 This remedy 
is now open to question in view of a recent 2011 ruling by the English Court of 
Appeal.116 
4. Contractual damages for the breach of the express or implied terms or the duty 
of good faith and loyalty of the employment or agency contract. 
                                                     
 
109 Sec. 8.01 Restatement (2nd) Torts, Comment (c). Franklin Med. Associates v. Newark Pub. 
Sch., 828 A.2d 966, 975 (N.J. Super. App.) [2003]. 
110 Sec. 8.01 Restatement (2nd) Torts, Comment (c).  
111 Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew, per Millett L.J. [1998] 75 P. & C.R. 241, at p. 
254.   
112 Id.  
113 The Privy Council in Mahesan v. Malaysia Government Officers, [1978] 2 W.L.R 444, at p. 
448, established that a principal whose agent has been bribed can recover the amount of the 
bribe from the briber in an action for money had and received, and alternatively, recover 
damages from the briber in an action for the tort of fraud. 
114 The Courts in Hovenden and Sons v. Milhoff, [1900] 83 L.T. 41, established that there is an 
irrebuttable presumption that the true price of the goods as between the principal of a disloyal 
agent and a purchaser company must be taken to have been less than the price paid by at least 
the amount or value of the bribe.  
115 Where a fiduciary accepted a bribe as an inducement to betray the duty of loyalty the bribe and 
any benefits resulting from the bribe are considered as were held in trust for the person to 
whom the duty of loyalty was owed. Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1993] 3 
W.L.R. 1143. 
116 The recent case of Sinclair Investments v. Versailles, [2011] EWCA Civ. 327, handed down on 
29 March 2011, has changed this position holding that the gain made on secret or unauthorized 
profits is not held on trust by the agent for the benefit of his principal.. 
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5. The agent can also sue for damages actually suffered as a consequence of the 
bribe.117 
6. Avoid the contract entered into by the agent with a third party who participated 
in the agent’s breach of duty.118 
7. A claim in equity for knowingly assisting the agent to breach a fiduciary duty to 
the principal.  
8. An account for profits. 
9. A claim for improper interference with another’s contracts.119 
 
It is interesting to note that the English courts have discountenanced the need 
for the plaintiff to show intention on the part of the bribe-giver. An irrebuttable 
presumption in favor of the plaintiff means that such a plaintiff does not have 
to prove fraud, motive,120 inducement121 or loss up to the amount of the bribe 
(amounts in excess of the bribe have to be proven). Even where the bribery 
does not result in a contract, the harm done by the action of giving and taking a 
bribe will be addressed by the court. In other words, the wrong is complete 
with the act of bribery regardless of whether or not any consequential damage 
results from it.122 
                                                     
 
117 The agent and the third party are jointly and severally liable to account for the bribe, and each 
may also be liable in damages to the principal for fraud or deceit or conspiracy to injure by 
unlawful means. Daraydan Holdings Ltd v. Solland International Ltd, [2005] Ch. 119.  
118 In Logicrose Ltd v. Southend United Football Club, [1988] 1 WLR 1256, Justice Millett said 
that the principal, having been deprived by the other party to the transaction of the 
disinterested advice of his agent, is entitled to a further opportunity to consider whether it is in 
his interests to affirm it. In Ross River Ltd v. Cambridge City Football Club Ltd, Justice Briggs 
stated that where a contract ensues following a secret payment received by a party’s agent, the 
principal is entitled to rescission if he neither knew nor consented to the payment. If he knew 
of it but did not give his informed consent, the court may award rescission as a discretionary 
remedy, if it is just and proportionate to do so. 
119 The giver of the bribe knows that the giving of the bribe will cause the agent to stand in breach 
of the contract with the principal. For discussion on the tort of interference with contractual 
relations see Lumley v. G, [1853] 2 E & B 216, OBG v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21. 
120 Hovenden and Sons v. Millhoff, [1900] (83 LT 43) (If a bribe is established the court will not 
inquire into motive of the bribe giver or allow evidence to be introduced to establish it); 
Daraydan Holdings Ltd v. Solland International Ltd, [2004] EWHC 622 (Ch) (there is no need 
to prove that the payer of a bribe acted with a corrupt motive; Industries & General Mortgage 
Co Ltd v. Lewis, [1949] 2 All E.R 573 (proof of corruptness or corrupt motive is unnecessary 
in a civil action); see also C. Mitchell, ‘Civil liability for bribery’, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 
117, April 2001, p. 207, who argues that bribery is a sui generis tort of fraud. 
121 Hovenden and Sons v. Millhoff, id. The court held that there is an irrebuttable presumption in 
favor of the principal, namely that the agent was influenced by the bribe. See also Industries & 
General Mortgage Co Ltd v. Lewis, [1949] 2 All ER 573 (strong presumption that payment by 
principal is increased by at least the amount of the bribe). Fyffes Group Limited v. Templeman 
et al., [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep., Vol. 643, at p. 660, (per Toulson, J.), at p. 577. However, if 
the principal can show that agreement negotiated by the bribed agent is less advantageous to 
him than an agreement negotiated at arm’s length by an honest and prudent agent, the principal 
can claim damages to the extent he has been disadvantaged. 
122 Petrotrade v. Smith, [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 486 at Para. 18; Daraydan Holdings Ltd v. Solland 
International Ltd, [2005] Ch. 119. 
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In the Netherlands, the principal of a disloyal agent may seek the return of the 
bribe or other performance, seek compensation for damages suffered or seek 
the dismissal of the agent.  An agreement to give a bribe is forbidden under the 
Penal Code and is a nullity.123 A payment made in respect of null transaction 
will constitute an undue payment as there is no legal basis for the payment of 
the bribe.124 Art 6:203 of the Dutch Civil Code requires that the sum of the 
bribe or other advantage that is made to the agent must be restored to the giver 
of the bribe because such a payment is made without a legal ground or legal 
fact that justifies the making of the payment.125 The position of the principal is, 
however, not so clear. What position is the principal to be restored to? De 
Savornin argues that the performance of the bribe-recipient should be viewed 
as one that cannot be quantified in money where the purpose of giving the 
bribe has not been reached and where it has been reached, to be as quantified 
in terms of the amount of the bribe.126 This position is supported by Art 6:211 
DCC, which bars a counter-performance in the case of a contract that is null 
and by nature cannot be reversed and is a performance that ought not to be 
valued in money. 
The agent is a mandatee under the Dutch Civil Code.127 Where such a 
mandatee acts outside of the authorization granted by the principal or 
mandator, the principal may claim damages for any loss sustained as a result of 
the null act unless he knew or should have known that the mandatee was acting 
outside the remit of his power or that the mandatee had given the third party 
full information about the extent of his powers.128 As the Goudse Bouwmeester 
case shows, where the agent has received moneys for the principal, the agent 
must account for such moneys.129 
The principal in the Netherlands is entitled to damages for any injury that is 
attributable to the agent.130 However, there has to be a loss incurred to 
property, right or other interest, and secondly there has to be a link between the 
                                                     
 
123 Art. 328ter DPC, which criminalizes private bribery. 
124 Art. 6:203 DCC. 
125 Lotisico case H.R. May 1923 W.11113, Rb Assen, 23 October 1984, NJ, 1985, p. 829. See 
generally, H. van Kooten, Restitutionary Consequences of Invalid Agreements 
(Restitutierechtelijke gevolgen van ongeoorloofde overeenkomsten), Kluwer, Deventer, 2002. 
126   O. de Savornin Lohman, Certain Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Enige 
civielrechtelijke gevolgen van omkoping), in Lugdunum Batavorum Juri Sacrum: 1882-30 
januari-1982: rechtsgeleerde opstellen vervaardigd door leden van het Leids Juridisch Dispuut 
‘Juri Sacrum’ ter gelegenheid van het honderdjarig bestaan van het Dispuut, Kluwer, Deventer, 
1982, p.127 at p.136.  
127 See Art. 3:66(1) DCC. 
128  Art.3:70 DCC. 
129 See Art. 7:403 DCC; HR 12 March 1926, NJ 1926, 777 (Goudse Bouwmeester). 
130 Art. 6:74 DCC provides that every failure of an obligation shall require the obligor to repair the 
damage to which the obligee suffers there from, unless the failure is not attributable to the 
obligor. 
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act of the agent and the injury claimed by the principal.131 Only where the 
damage suffered by the principal can be imputed to the agent is there an 
obligation on the agent to repair such damage.132 This is a significant obstacle 
to recovery by the principal who has entered into a contract as a result of the 
alleged bribery transaction between an agent and a third party. Only where the 
principal can show that the terms of the contract were grossly unfair or 
misleading can such a claim be made. Furthermore, not only must the principal 
show that he has suffered damage as a result of the contract resulting from the 
bribery transaction, he must also show that it was the actions of the agent that 
led to the damage incurred from an onerous contract.  
Dutch law provides that the principal can also have a claim against the offeror 
of the bribe for the commission of an unlawful act.133 The term unlawful act 
can be understood as ‘an act of omission which violates another person’s right 
or conflicts with the defendant’s statutory duty, or is contrary either to good 
morals or to the care which is due in society with regard to another’s person or 
property.134 Furthermore, the principal may summarily dismiss the agent for an 
urgent reason.135 Bribery falls under the circumstances described in under the 
Dutch Civil Code as constituting an urgent reason on the basis of which the 
principal’s contract with the agent can be terminated.136 
9.7.2 Remedies for Tortious Interference 
Bribery to attain business not only has a negative effect on the principal whose 
agent is bribed, it also affects third parties who are competing for the same 
contracts. Attaining or attempting to influence the granting of a contract by 
bribery causes damage to the third party who is faced with unfair competition. 
For this reason, bribery falls into the group of actions referred to as economic 
torts. The intentional interference with the prospect of a contractual 
                                                     
 
131 Art. 6:98 DCC provides that ‘reparation of damage can only be claimed for damage which is 
related to the event giving rise to the liability of the obligor, which, also having regards to the 
nature of the liability and of the damage, can be attributed to him as a result of such event.’  
132 Art. 6:162 DCC states that ‘a person who commits an unlawful (tortious) act towards another 
which can be imputed to him, must repair the damage which the other person suffers as a 
consequence thereof.’ The tortious act must be imputable to the party to be sued. 
133 Art. 6:162 (2) DCC. 
134 HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919, 161 (Lindenbaum-Cohen). This ruling is codified in Art. 6:162 
(2) DCC which states that except where there is a ground for justification, the following acts 
are deemed tortious: the violation of a right, or act or omission violating a statutory duty or 
rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct. Art. 6:162(3) states that a tortfeasor 
is responsible for the commission of a tort if it is due to his fault or to a cause for which he is 
accountable by law or pursuant to generally accepted principles.  
135 Art. 7:677 DCC provides that each of the parties to a contract of employment may give notice 
of termination of employment for ‘an urgent reason.’  
136 Art. 7:678 DCC.  
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relationship by an act of bribery can found a claim by a competitor who loses a 
bid for a contract.137 The US, England and the Netherlands have provisions in 
respect of this kind of loss. In the US and England this is a distinct cause of 
action while in the Netherlands it falls under the general principle of 
compensation for unlawful acts. 
In the US interference with economic relations is regarded as an intentional 
tort and is referred to as the intentional interference with prospective 
contractual relations.138 The two elements of intention and impropriety of the 
interference are essential conditions for the occurrence of this tort. The party 
giving a bribe is liable for unlawful interference only where the damage caused 
to the party bringing the claim was the intended consequence or was certain to 
occur as a result of the corrupt exchange.139 Thus only where a party giving a 
bribe intended the specific negative consequence of for example the loss of the 
contract being competed for by that third party, does a right to bring a claim by 
the wronged third party arise. This is a significant hurdle as in most 
competitive bids there may be no knowledge of the other parties that are 
competing for the bid. Yet to found an interference claim it must be shown that 
the bribe-giver acted with the specific intention or with the substantially certain 
result that the bribery of the agent would cause the particular complaining 
company not to get the contract. Even if there are only two companies 
competing for the contract, it would usually be difficult to prove that but for 
the bribe, the losing company would have won the contract as such a party may 
not have been awarded the contract in any event.  
The second requirement is that interference must be improper. In determining 
whether or not the actions of the bribe-giver are improper several factors are 
taken into consideration.140 The commentary on Sec. 767 of the Restatement 
                                                     
 
137 Per Bowen L.J. in Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1889] 23 QBD 598, p. 
614: 
‘What, then, are the limitations which the law imposes on a trader in the conduct of 
his business as between himself and other traders? … No man, whether trader or not, 
can, however, justify damaging another in his commercial business by fraud or 
misrepresentation. Intimidation, obstruction, and molestation are forbidden; so is the 
intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, 
assuming always that there is no just cause for it.’ 
138 See Sec. 766B Restatement (2nd) Torts: ‘One who intentionally and improperly interferes with 
another’s prospective contractual relation is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary 
harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation ….’   
139 See Sec. 8A Restatement (2nd) Torts. 
140 See Sec. 767 Restatement (2nd) Torts, where these include: (a) the nature of the actor’s 
conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct 
interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interest in 
protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the 
proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations 
between the parties. 
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(2nd) Torts indicates that a conduct that is in violation of a statutory provision 
or contrary to established public policy may render interference improper. 
Examples of such conduct would include conduct that is in violation of 
antitrust provisions or in restraint of trade, or conduct that is in violation of 
statutes and regulations.141 Clearly bribery is a conduct that is in violation of 
the FCPA, several State commercial bribery laws, the UNCC and OECD 
Conventions, which the US is party to as well as other federal laws for which 
bribery is a predicate offense.142 As such the giving of a bribe would constitute 
an improper interference within the meaning of the tort. 
The economic injury to a business that may result from an act of bribery places 
this tort within the scope of unfair competition laws in the US. A party will be 
subject to liability where harm is caused to the commercial relations of another 
by acts or practices determined to be actionable as an unfair method of 
competition taking into account (a) the nature of the conduct and its likely 
effect on both the person seeking relief and the public, and (b) where the acts 
or practices are actionable under federal or state statues, international 
agreement or general principles of common law.143 
An example of such a claim for the intentional tort of bribery based on unfair 
competition laws is the case of Korea Supply Company v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp.144 Korea Supply sued Lockheed Martin under the California’s Unfair 
Competition Law145 UCL, alleging that Lockheed Martin was awarded the 
contract by unlawfully bribing South Korean officials, in violation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and also in tort for unlawful interference with 
prospective economic advantage. The Californian Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiff had a right to damages in tort particularly in view of the fact that the 
alleged bribery was an FCPA violation.146 
In England the interference with a trade or business by unlawful means is also 
an intentional tort and occurs where a party uses intentionally unlawful means 
to cause economic loss to another. A party is liable for causing such economic 
loss where the giver of a bribe induces a third party not to enter into or 
continue a business transaction with another or prevents a competitor from 
                                                     
 
141 Comment on Sec. 767(a) Restatement (2nd) Torts, at p. 31; Sec. 766B (a) and (b) of the 
Restatement (2nd) Torts detail interference as consisting of inducing or otherwise causing a 
third person not to enter into or continue a contract as well as preventing the acquisition or 
continuation of a prospective contract. 
142 See discussion in Chapter 5. 
143 See Sec. 1 Restatement Unfair Competition, (3rd) American Law Institute St. Paul MN, 1995. 
144 See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 94142 (Cal. 2003). Korea 
Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., et al., 29 Cal. 4th 1134 [2003]. 
145 The Californian Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code) Sec. 17200.  
146 For full details of this case see discussion in Chapter 5. 
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acquiring or continuing with a business relationship because the agent of the 
owner of the prospective contract has been bribed, thus the offeror of the bribe 
may be liable for harm resulting from the loss of the benefits of the relation.147 
The unlawful interference must be intentional.148 That is, the party offering the 
bribe must have desired to cause the consequences of this act, or believe that 
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.149 In other words, 
‘[T]he defendant must intend to injure the claimant. This intent must be a 
cause of the defendant’s conduct.’150A bribe can be considered unlawful 
interference with a contract to the extent that the giver of the bribe is 
committing a legal wrong, and knows that a legal wrong is being committed in 
the proffering of a bribe.151 As compared with the existing position of the law 
on bribery, there is not much merit in pursuing this course of action. Bribery as 
a sui generis tort does not require proof of reliance or intention. These are 
irrebuttably presumed against the person offering the bribe. It does, however, 
require proof of loss (beyond the actual sum of the bribe) as do most torts. 
Therefore, taking the route of the bribery claim as a sui generis tort is a simpler 
route than economic torts of unlawful interference with business affairs. 
In the Netherlands, Art. 6:162(2) DCC allows for liability where damage is 
caused to another as a result of a legal wrong referred to as an unlawful act. 
Art. 6:163 DCC restricts the scope of the obligation to repair damage only in 
                                                     
 
147 Lonrho Plc v. Fayed et al., [1992] 1 A.C. 448 Para. 455 (a person who does an intentional 
unlawful act in the furtherance of his own business interest, or who aims to injure another and 
as a result causes damage to that other in the form of economic loss, or alternatively, economic 
loss relating to his business, has committed an actionable tort). See also Lord Reid, ‘[T]he 
respondent’s action [in calling a strike] made it practically impossible for the appellants to do 
any new business with the barge hirers. It was not disputed that such interference with business 
is tortious if any unlawful means are employed,’ per Lord Reid in J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd v. 
Lindley, [1965] AC 269, 324. See also Allen v. Flood, [1989] AC 1; OBG v. Allan, [2007] 
UKHL 21. 
148 ‘[T]he gist of this tort is intentionally damaging another’s business by unlawful 
means. Intention is an essential ingredient. The tort is not one of strict liability for 
harm inflicted on another’s business, nor is it a tort based on negligence. The 
defendant must have intended to inflict the harm of which complaint is made. That is 
the starting point. I shall have to return to this point later.’  
Per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in OBG v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, at Para. 141. 
149 Lonrho plc. v. Fayed et al., [1992] 1 A.C. 448, at Para. 455; OBG v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21 
at, Para. 47. The essence of the tort therefore appears to be (a) a wrongful interference with the 
actions of a third party in which the claimant has an economic interest and (b) an intention 
thereby to cause loss to the claimant. 
150 OBG v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, at Para. 166. 
151    ‘Unlawful means therefore consists of acts intended to cause loss to the claimant by interfering 
with the freedom of a third party in a way which is unlawful as against that third party and 
which is intended to cause loss to the claimant. It does not in my opinion include acts which 
may be unlawful against a third party but which do not affect his freedom to deal with the 
claimant.’ Per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord in OBG v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, at Para. 
51. 
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instances where the statutory provisions were aimed at protecting the persons 
claiming a remedy. The act of bribery is criminalized under the Dutch Penal 
Code and the various international instruments that the Netherlands is a party 
to. This clearly makes the act of bribery an unlawful act for which an action for 
damage may lie under Dutch law. It is also a breach of the statutory duty of 
loyalty owed by the agent to a principal.  
However, it is open to question whether the laws prohibiting bribery are 
specifically intended for the protection of the losing competitor. The action of 
bribery can still be viewed within the context of Art. 3:40 as an act that is 
contrary to public policy and the duty of care owed to society for which 
liability in damages can occur. In the Lindenbaum-Cohen case, which was 
decided when there was no provision prohibiting private bribery and therefore 
no direct statutory prohibition involved the bribery or another employee, the 
Dutch Supreme Court held that even where there was no contractual 
undertaking an action could lie against the offeror of the inducement and that 
the term unlawful act was to be understood ‘an act of omission which violates 
another person’s right or conflicts with the defendant’s statutory duty, or is 
contrary either to good morals or to the care which is due in society with 
regard to another’s person or property.’152 
A European case that illustrates a claim based on the notion of interference is 
ADT Projekt Gesellschaft der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Tierzüchter 
mbH v. Commission of the European Communities.153 In this case, an 
unsuccessful bidder alleged improper conduct against the Commission and 
claimed that it had carried out the tendering procedure relating to Project FD 
RUS 9603 in an unlawful manner. ADT sought the annulment of the decision 
by the Commission not to award the applicant the contract relating to Project 
FD RUS 9603 (‘The Russian Federation: Adapting Russian Beef and Dairy 
Farming to Restructuring’) and, secondly compensation for the harm, 
allegedly suffered by the applicant, as a result of the Commission’s conduct. 
ADT alleged infringement of the rules governing tendering procedures and of 
the principle of ‘fair competition’, against AGRER, Mr. Van de Walle (the 
expert entrusted by the Commission with drawing up the specifications for 
                                                     
 
152 HR 31 Jan. 1919, NJ 1919 161 (Lindenbaum-Cohen). This ruling is codified in Art. 6:162(2) 
DCC, which states that except where there is a ground for justification, the following acts are 
deemed tortious: the violation of a right, or act or omission violating a statutory duty or rule of 
unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct. Art. 6:162(3) states that a tortfeasor is 
responsible for the commission of a tort if it is due to his fault or to a cause for which he is 
accountable by law or pursuant to generally accepted principles. See also provisions of Book 6 
Art. 2:208 DCFR, which identifies loss upon the unlawful impairment of business as legally 
relevant loss. 
153 Case T-145/98 European Court Reports Page II-00387. 
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Project), SATEC (one of the applicant’s competitors in the contested tendering 
procedure), as well as against the Commission. The applicant claimed that Mr. 
Van de Walle had been involved in an attempt to bribe a Mr. Cherokee, the 
representative of the Project, to award the project to the successful bidder 
company, AGRER. They also referred to an attempt to bribe a member of the 
Russian administrative authorities by the company SATEC.154 
ADT argued that ‘such acts constitute serious infringements of the principle of 
fair competition which underlies any tendering procedure and should have led 
the Commission to annul the procedure at issue, in accordance with Art. 24(2) 
(f) of the General Regulations.’155 The unsuccessful bidder claimed that it had 
accordingly suffered injury equivalent to the loss of profit estimated at DEM 
550,000, consequent upon the award of the project to another tenderer or, at 
the very least, to the cost of drawing up its tender, assessed at DEM 225,250.  
The application was not successful for lack of evidence. The court held that an 
application seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by a 
Community institution must state the evidence from which the conduct alleged 
by the applicant against the institution may be identified as well as the reasons 
for which the applicant considers there to be a causal link between the conduct 
in question and the damage which he claims to have suffered, and the nature 
and extent of that damage. The court further held that ‘in order for an 
allegation of attempted bribery in the course of a tendering procedure for a 
contract to be regarded as proven, it must be founded on irrefutable evidence 
or, at the very least, on a body of objective, relevant and consistent 
evidence.’156 This burden was not discharged by ADT and the plea for 
annulment and compensation was rejected. 
9.7.3 Securities Litigation 
Where a company engages in acts of corruption, the shareholders are in a 
similar same position as a principal who is betrayed by a disloyal agent. A key 
difference is, of course, that the officials of the company are not acting in the 
interests of a third party in engaging in the corrupt action, but rather in the 
interests of the company itself in trying, by whatever means, to increase the 
margins of profit. Shareholders in the United States have demonstrated a 
willingness to challenge corrupt acts by officers of  corporations in direct,  
class  and derivative  lawsuits. Even though there is no private right of action 
under the FCPA, shareholders have used other US rules to bring these actions. 
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Shareholders have for example filed actions relating to bribery charges under 
the Securities Exchange Act.157 These shareholders claims center upon damage 
suffered as a result of misleading financial statements. Such misleading 
statements can lead to inflated share prices which lead to losses for the 
shareholder when the inflated stock subsequently drops in value.  
In re Immucor,158 shareholders filed a complaint under sections 10-b and 20(a) 
of the Exchange Act claiming that Immucor had mislead the shareholders by 
understating exposure to FCPA liability. The court allowed the shareholders’ 
action, stating the extent of Immucor’s FCPA violations was a significant piece 
of information that would have affected a reasonable investor’s decision. 
Similarly a securities class action filed by Legion Partners, LLP,159 on behalf 
of itself and all persons who bought the publicly traded shares of the Willbros 
Group Inc., was brought against the company and its officials as a result of a 
‘campaign of illegal and illicit bribery of foreign government officials’ in 
Bolivia, Nigeria and Ecuador to successfully obtain construction projects. As a 
result of government investigations into Willbros’ conduct, the company 
estimated that there would be 35% to 44% reductions in its previously reported 
income for the 2002-2003, which meant that the company had overstated its 
net income for this period. The shareholders claimed that the defendants’ 
public misrepresentations or omissions were material and would tend to induce 
a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of a company’s securities.160 In 
addition, because of the FCPA violation, the company could be prohibited 
from bidding for US contracts. This information led to a shock on the market 
which resulted in an immediate loss of 31% on Willbros shares.   
The logic behind a class action for damage caused by corruption was aptly 
stated in the Willbros’ petition. The plaintiffs argued that a class action was 
‘superior to all other available methods for two reasons: firstly, because a 
joinder of persons who had suffered similar damage would be impracticable, 
and secondly, because damages suffered by individual members of the Class 
may be relatively small and the expense of individual litigation would make it 
impossible for such persons to individually redress the wrongs suffered.161 The 
shareholders sought damages, attorney fees, and an order for an accounting of 
the defendant’s insider trading proceeds, and an accounting and imposition of a 
                                                     
 
157 15 USC Sec. 78a. 
158 In re Immucor Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2276-WSD, 2006 WL 3000133 (N.D. Ga. 4 October 2006). 
159 Legion Partners, (LLP, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated) v. Willbros Group 
Inc., Mincheal F. et al., 4:05-cv-01778 S.D. Tex. 
160 Id., at Para. 37. 
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constructive trust of asset freeze on the defendant’s insider trading proceeds.162 
Willbros settled the shareholder class action for $10.5 million.163 
Apart from claims based on allegations of misleading financial information, 
shareholders have also brought actions on behalf of their companies against 
company officials who have caused harm to the company by engaging in acts 
of corruption. While the damages awarded go to the corporation itself and not 
to the shareholders who file the actions, the derivative suit ensures that 
shareowners, who are the owners of the company, have a means of protecting 
the reputation and well-being of a company from corrupt activity by appointed 
officials. The derivative action by the shareholder can help to preserve the 
integrity of the corporation especially in the eye of the public by drawing a line 
between activities that shareholders will permit and condone and activities that 
are in breach of public laws for which the shareholders will demand the 
personal accountability of the officials involved. This could help to rehabilitate 
the image of a company as well as act as a corporation-led sanctioning process 
for corporate corruption. Furthermore, the derivative action allows the 
shareholders to hold these officials responsible and to associate the damage 
caused by such disloyal officials with the officials themselves rather than the 
company.  
A good example of such rejection of wrong doing by company officials by 
means of a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation is the case brought by 
an institutional shareholder, the Detroit Police and Fire Fighters Pension Fund, 
brought on behalf of Halliburton and its former subsidiary Kellogg Brown and 
Root (KBR) against the officials of the corporation.164 These officials were 
accused of improperly bribing Nigerian officials, overcharging the government 
contracts, accepting illegal kickbacks, human trafficking and conspiring to 
defraud the US government among other things. This culture of ‘complete 
lawlessness’ had caused the company ‘to suffer hundreds of millions in 
damages and to be exposed to substantial additional judgments in the 
future.’165 
                                                     
 
162 Id., at Para. 54ff.  
163     S. Huggard, J. Gardner, ‘Another reason to fear the Foreign Corruption Practices Act: the 
private tag-along suit’, Bloomberg Law Reports, Vol. 2, No. 10, 2009, p. 3. 
164 See Petition of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit, 
Derivatively on behalf of Halliburton Company and KBR, Inc., v. Albert O. Cornelius, Jr., et 
al., in the District Court of Harris County Texas, Cause No. 2009 – 29987 filed 14 May 2009. 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/149/cases/1140/1585/halliburton-and-
kbr-pfrs-of-detroit_complaint_abr.pdf. 
165 The Company had to pay to fines the SEC and Department of Justice including a $402 million 
fine for the Nigerian bribery scheme; ($177 million in disgorgement to the SEC for the 
Nigerian bribery scheme; $54 million for dumping hazardous waste; $8 million to settle 
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The shareholders claimed that the officials had failed to exercise the loyalty, 
good faith, due care and diligence it owed to Halliburton as well as to its 
shareholders. The company and shareholder had as a result been substantially 
injured for which injury the shareholders sought compensation on behalf of the 
corporation. In their petition the shareholders emphasized the reputational 
damage to the company that had resulted from this breach of fiduciary duty in 
stating that ‘[u]nder the defendants’ watch and supposedly under their control 
and supervision, the companies were permitted to engage in conduct so 
notorious that the name of “Halliburton” has become virtually synonymous 
with “corruption,” just as Enron became the poster-child for fraud.’166 The 
shareholders sought for indemnification by the company officials for the 
damages sustained by Halliburton as a result of their breaches of fiduciary 
duty. 
The overview of the US, England and the Netherlands shows that shareholder 
actions for corruption remain primarily a US affair.167 An attempt by 
shareholders to bring a class action against BAE systems, a UK company, was 
dismissed primarily based on the English rule in Foss v. Harbottle168 that 
disallows minority shareholder suits except in cases of ultra vires or ‘fraud on 
the minority.’ Such shareholder action may become more realizable under UK 
law with the passage of the Bribery Act, which creates the offense of 
negligently failing to prevent bribery169 coupled with the slightly more liberal 
conditions under the new UK Companies Act 2006 for derivative actions. Part 
11 of the Companies Act 2006 effectively widens the circumstances in which 
shareholders can bring derivative actions in the company’s name to protect 
their interests and obtain a remedy on the company’s behalf. Sections 261-3 of 
the Act give shareholders a statutory right to pursue claims against the 
company officials for misfeasance on behalf of a company. However, such 
shareholders must first obtain the consent of the court to proceed with such a 
claim and must have established a prima facie case against the company. 
                                                                                                                            
 
charges of overcharging and other procurement irregularities; $6.3 million to cover the 
‘estimated impact’ of a possible violation of the Anti-Kickback Act). Id., at Para. 149.  
166 Id., at Para. 1. 
167 A study on the private enforcement of corporate law in two common law jurisdictions with 
highly developed stock markets − the United Kingdom and the United States − that examined 
how often directors of publicly traded companies are sued, and the nature and outcomes of 
those suits, found that, based a comprehensive search for filings over 2004-2006, lawsuits 
against directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly nonexistent in the UK. 
The study also found that even in the US, based on a nationwide search of decisions between 
2000-2007, only a small percentage of public companies faced a lawsuit against directors 
alleging a breach of duty that is sufficiently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, 
and a substantial fraction of these cases are dismissed. See J. Armour, B. Black, B. Cheffins, 
R. Nolan, ‘Private enforcement of corporate law: an empirical comparison of the UK and US,’ 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 6, 2009, pp. 687-722.  
168 Foss v. Harbottle, [1843], 67 ER 189. 
169 See Chapter 5 above.  
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In the Netherlands, Van Boom et al. point out that the notion of the class action 
is not a feature of European litigation stating that ‘… there is neither a 
European class action nor a common group action for disgorgement or 
compensation. On the contrary, most member states are just beginning to 
discover the need for efficient and effective mass damage settlement.’170 An 
example of such a group action is found in Art. 305(a) DCC, which allows for 
foundations of associations to bring a representative action on behalf of a 
group of persons with similar interests to the extent that the articles of the 
foundation promote this interest.171 There is also the possibility of voluntary 
settlement under the Dutch Collective Settlement Act of 2005. In both these 
instances, the emphasis is on providing a medium for the parties to reach a 
voluntary agreement amongst themselves. The role of the court is essentially to 
supervise the agreement that has already been reached between the parties.  
9.7.4 FCPA Antitrust Cases 
The overview of the US position in Chapter 5 shows that apart from third-party 
claims based on tortious interference, parties have used the FCPA as a 
springboard to file actions for uncompetitive behavior by competitors who 
have engaged in corrupt activity even though there is no private right of action 
under the FCPA.172 Losing competitors have used the FCPA as a ‘trigger’ for 
private suits for corrupt transactions by using alternative criminal statutes such 
as the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act,173 the Clayton 
Antitrust174 and Robinson-Patman Acts.175 The foreign element of international 
                                                     
 
170 W. van Boom, M. Loos, ‘Effective Enforcement of Consumer Law in Europe: Synchronizing 
Private, Public, and Collective Mechanisms’, January 2008, at p. 7, electronic Copy available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913.  
171    Art. 3:305a(1) DCC. 
172 Lamb v. Philip Morris Inc., 498 US 1086; 111 S Ct 961; 112 L Ed 2d 1048 (19 February 1991) 
The court dismissed an attempt to use the FCPA as the basis for an action alleging the payment 
of unlawful inducements designed and intended to restrain trade in a foreign market stating 
that the FCPA did not apply to the plaintiffs but was primarily designed to protect the integrity 
of American foreign policy and domestic markets. The court concluded that in view of the 
general tenor of the FCPA, which requires the Attorney General to participate actively in 
encouraging and supervising compliance with the Act, the plaintiffs, as competitors of foreign 
tobacco growers and suppliers of the defendants, could not claim the status of intended 
beneficiaries of the FCPA. 
173 Codified at 18 USC Sec. 1961-1968. 
174 The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, enacted 15 October 1914, 
codified at 15 USC Sec. 12-27, 29 USC Sec. 52-53) follows the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(Sherman Act, [1] 2 July 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 USC Sec. 1-7) toprovide for a private 
right of action for persons who have suffered anti-trust injury in Sec. 15(a).   
175 The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (or Anti-Price Discrimination Act), (Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 
Stat. 1526, codified at 15 USC Sec. 13) prohibits the payment of a commission where there has 
been no service rendered in respect of a sale of goods where this distorts healthy competition. 
The courts have applied this act in cases of bribery. See for example Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling 
Nelson Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 936. 
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corruption cases involving the FCPA does not prevent US courts from 
entertaining such suits. The Act of State doctrine has been held not applicable 
to bar US courts from entertaining actions alleging foreign bribery. 176 
9.8 Damage Primarily to the Public Interest 
On the other end of the spectrum of claims for damage suffered by private 
interests such as principals, shareholders and losing competitors are claims for 
damage suffered primarily by public interests. The UNCC criminalizes acts of 
corruption where the party that suffers the damage is not an identified 
individual but rather the public at large. In these instances the state can be 
designated as the party against whom the legal wrong is directed. Art. 17 of the 
UNCC, for example, prohibits the embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion of property by a public official. Property is defined as ‘assets of 
every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible 
or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest 
in such assets.’177 The act of corruption occurs with the intentional 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his 
or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, 
public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the 
public official by virtue of his or her position.178 The party who suffers the 
damage caused by this act of corruption is the state that entrusted the property 
to the public official. 
Art. 18 UNCC prohibits the intentional trading influence as an act of 
corruption. Trading in influence occurs with the intentional promise, offering 
or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her 
real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or 
public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original 
instigator of the act or for any other person.179 It also occurs with the 
intentional passive solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other 
person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or 
for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or 
her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration 
or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage.180 The party who 
suffers damage resulting from such trading in influence is the state employing 
                                                     
 
176 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Intern. 493 U.S. 400, 110 S. 
Ct. 701 U.S.N.J., 1990. 17 January 1990. 
177 Art. 2(d) UNCC. 
178 Art. 17 UNCC. 
179 Art. 18(a) UNCC. 
180 Art. 18(b) UNCC. 
CHAPTER 9 – INSTITUTING PRIVATE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
446 
 
such a public official whose decision-making process has been unduly 
corrupted by the acts of the public official. 
Similarly, Arts. 19 and 20 prohibit, respectively, the abuse of function and 
illicit enrichment. These corrupt acts of abuse of function occurs with the 
intentional abuse of functions or position, i.e. the performance of or failure to 
perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his 
or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself 
or herself, or for another person or entity.181 Illicit enrichment occurs where 
there is a significant intentional increase in the assets of a public official that 
he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.182 
In both instances the state whose governing processes have been abused or 
whose official has been corrupted by unexplained fund is the party that suffers 
the damage of these corrupt acts. 
Included in the acts of corruption is the laundering of the proceeds of crime,183 
concealment or continued retention of property that result from any of the acts 
of corruption,184 and the obstruction of justice.185 Each of these acts results 
from criminal activity and hinders the prosecution or seeks to conceal the 
proceeds of crime. In each of these instances the primary party addressed by 
these acts of corruption is the state.  
                                                     
 
181 Art. 19 UNCC. 
182 Art. 20 UNCC. 
183 Art. 23 UNCC prohibits the following actions as acts of corruption when committed 
intentionally: (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the 
proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property 
or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade 
the legal consequences of his or her action; (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, 
source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, 
knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; (iii) Subject to the basic concepts of its 
legal system, the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, 
that such property is the proceeds of crime; (iv) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal 
system participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and 
aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of any of the above mentioned 
offenses.  
184 Art. 24 UNCC prohibits as an act of corruption the intentional concealment or the continued 
retention of property when the person involved knows that such property is the result of any of 
the corruption offenses established under the UNCC after the commission of any of the 
corruption offenses established under the UNCC and without having participated in such 
offenses. 
185 Art. 25(a) UNCC includes as an act of corruption when committed intentionally the use of 
physical force, threats or intimidation or the promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage 
to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of 
evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of the corruption offences established 
under the UNCC. Similarly, the intentional use of physical force, threats or intimidation to 
interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official in relation 
to the commission of the corruption offences is prohibited. 
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Unlike the claims for damage suffered by private interests, there is no clear 
provision for a private cause of action in such instances. This is understandable 
because the traditional defender of the public interest is the government. 
Indeed the examples cited below show examples of private remedies for 
corruption sought by variously by a state government using private law 
processes to protect the interest of the state and people; a state company 
seeking redress for international corrupt activity affecting its officials; and a 
succeeding government using the processes of private law to seek remedies for 
corrupt actions. Other examples show attempts by NGOs and private citizens 
to seek redress on the behalf of the general citizenry for damage caused by a 
corrupt activity. Several of these examples are taken from jurisdictions beyond 
the US, England and the Netherlands because they chart new territory and are a 
window into the variety of methods emerging to seek private remedies for 
corrupt activity.  
9.8.1 Claim for Social Damages  
A Costa Rican case involving international corruption by the multinational 
corporation Alcatel-Lucent provides a novel approach of suing for social 
damage for damage suffered as a result of corruption. Alcatel-Lucent, a 
provider of telecommunications equipment and services, reported in its SEC 
2009 Annual Report (Form 20) that in July 2007, the Costa Rican Prosecutor’s 
Office indicted eleven citizens, including the former president of Alcatel de 
Costa Rica, on charges of aggravated corruption, unlawful enrichment, 
simulation, and fraud.186 High-level government officials in Costa Rica were 
alleged to have received millions of dollars in bribes to ensure that Alcatel 
obtained or retained three contracts to provide telephone services in Costa 
Rica. These indictments by the Costa Rican prosecutor’s office resulted from 
information that came to light from an investigation into the activities of 
Alcatel by the US Authorities.187 
                                                     
 
186 The Attorney General’s claim superseded two prior claims, of 25 November 2004 and 31 
August 2006. On 25 November 2004, the Costa Rican Attorney General’s Office commenced a 
civil lawsuit against Alcatel-Lucent France (‘CIT’) to seek pecuniary compensation for the 
damage caused by the alleged payments described above to the people and the Treasury of 
Costa Rica, and for the loss of prestige suffered by the Nation of Costa Rica (social damages). 
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customers, for the harm to the reputation of ICE resulting from these events (moral damages), 
and for damages resulting from an alleged overpricing it was forced to pay under its contract 
with CIT. Reported in Alcatel-Lucent 2009 Annual Report on Form 20-F, p. 72, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886125/000130817910000036/alc200920f.htm#_Toc
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In December 2010 a settlement with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission was reached and Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay a total $45,372 
million in disgorgement to the SEC as well as a $92 million criminal fine to the 
US Department of Justice. At this point, the Costa Rican Attorney General’s 
Office and El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (‘ICE’), one of the Costa 
Rican state-owned entities whose officials’ were bribed by Alcatel Lucent 
consultants, filed amended civil claims against the eleven criminal defendants, 
as well as five additional civil defendants including, Alcatel-Lucent France 
(‘CIT’), seeking compensation for social damages in the amounts of US 
$52 million (in the case of the Attorney General’s Office) and US $20 million 
(in the case of ICE). On 20 January 2010 Alcatel-Lucent France entered into a 
settlement whereby the claim for social damages by the Attorney General 
would be dismissed in exchange for a payment of $10 million to compensate 
for the social damage brought about by the corrupt activity.188 
The action filed by the government of Costa Rica under the Criminal 
Procedural Rules in Costa Rica, to seek pecuniary compensation for damage 
suffered by the collective interests of the state and peoples of Costa Rica, 
illustrates a resort to private law notions of compensation for damage suffered 
as a result of corrupt activity.189 This provision for social damage has been 
described as a relatively new concept provided by Art. 50 Costa Rican 
Constitution and Art. 38 Criminal Procedure Code. Art. 38 of the Costa Rican 
Criminal Procedural Code provides that a ‘[C]ivil action for social harm civil 
action may be brought by the Attorney General’s Office, in the case of 
offenses involving collective or diffuse interests.’ This imposes a liability on 
persons who have caused damage to society by acts of corruption to claim civil 
compensation for such damage.190 
9.8.2 Claim for Mandatory Restitution by a State Company 
On 20 April 2010, El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (‘ICE’), one of 
the Costa Rican state-owned entities whose officials’ were bribed by 
consultants acting for Alcatel Lucent,191 filed a civil RICO action in a Florida 
state court seeking $73 million as damages for the bribery of its officials 
which resulted in the company overpaying for and receiving poor service in 
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189 See J. Olaya, K. Attisso, A. Roth, ‘Repairing Social Damage out of Corruption Cases: 
Opportunities and Challenges as Illustrated in the Alcatel Case in Costa Rica’, (6 December 
2010), (Unpublished), electronic copy available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1779834. 
190 Special Session– Finding the Real Cost of Corruption: How to Use the Concept of Social 
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respect of the contract that resulted from the bribery exchange.192 This claim 
was dismissed by the Florida court on the grounds of forum non conveniens in 
April 2011. An appeal is pending.193 
In a related petition for mandamus before the Florida Court of Appeals, ICE 
objected to the settlement and deferred prosecution agreements reached 
between the Department of Justice and Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., Alcatel-
Lucent Trade International, A.G., and Alcatel Centroamerica, S.A. to the tune 
of a payment of $92,000,000 in fines, as a result of a Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, and the payment of $45,372,000 in disgorgement in a related SEC 
civil enforcement proceeding.194 ICE sought to be regarded as a victim to 
benefit from the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (18 USC Sec. 3663A). As 
Alcatel was pleading guilty to conspiracy, a Title 18 crime, ICE argued that it 
was entitled to mandatory restitution. 
The SEC denied ICE’s request for a ‘Fair Fund’ and the government 
subsequently argued in its response to ICE’S Petition for Victim Status and 
Restitution that the state-owned entity at which corruption was so pervasive in 
the tender process should not be permitted status as a victim or awarded 
restitution.195 The SEC argued that it was not just the corrupt ICE officials 
who were to blame for the corruption that existed at ICE, but ICE itself as an 
organization, because it appeared from the facts to have had ‘a deeply 
ingrained culture of corruption’ and that this corrupt conduct did not just 
involve some low-level employees but rather that nearly half of the Board of 
Directors of ICE received bribes. Thus the component of the business 
                                                     
 
192 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., Complaint, Case No. 10-25859 
CA 13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 13 April 2010), at p. 1. ICE was a co-plaintiff in the case filed by the 
Costa Rican Attorney General’s Office against several defendants including Alcatel Lucent 
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Lucent’s ‘worldwide scheme of bribery and corruption.’ 
193 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad v. Alcatel-Lucent, Order, Case No. 10-25859 CA 13 
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194 United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, France, S.A. et al.. Petition for relief pursuant to 18 USC Sec. 
3771(d)(3) and objection to plea agreements and deferred prosecution agreement in Case No. 
10-20906-CRCOOKE (S.D. Fla.).  
195 See Government’s Response to ICE’S Petition for Victim Status and Restitution. United States 
v. Alcatel-Lucent, France, S.A. et al., Case No. 10-20906-CRCOOKE, Case No. 10-CR-
20907-COOKE (S.D. Fla.), p. 4.   
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corporation most ‘in control of and responsible’ for the actions of ICE was 
profoundly corrupt.196 
Furthermore the government argued that even if ICE could be regarded as a 
victim, restitution could not in this case be awarded for two reasons. Firstly, 
because of the compensatory nature of restitution, the government argued that 
restitutionary award would not be possible because any attempt to determine 
the amount of loss actually caused by the actions of the bribed officials would 
be speculation since restitution is limited to the ‘victim’s provable actual loss.’ 
In this case, the ‘conduct involved a corrupt tender process in which it is 
impossible to know which company would have won the bid and at what price, 
and thus, trying to unwind this process a decade later and determine the 
amount of loss, if any, would be sheer speculation.’ 
Secondly, the SEC argued that the complexity of the questions of fact 
concerning the quality of products and services provided by the subsidiaries of 
Alcatel Lucent et al. would complicate and prolong the sentencing process to 
such a degree that this burden on the sentencing process should far outweigh 
the need to provide restitution to ICE especially as reparations had already 
been paid to the Costa Rican Government and the various avenues of redress 
available to ICE in Costa Rica.197 
The District Court found that ICE was not a victim but actually a co-
conspirator and denied the petition. This ruling was affirmed on appeal.198 
Nonetheless this case opens the interesting possibility for corporations who are 
able to separate themselves from the act of their officers to seek mandatory 
restitution in respect of SEC settlements under US law. 
9.8.3 Private Citizens Challenging Acts of Corruption by State Officials 
Citizens and non-governmental organizations have teamed up to initiate 
actions against national leaders alleging corruption that has had negative 
consequences for the general populations of countries like the Congo 
Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Private citizens have sought to 
compel the authorities to commence investigations or make declarations and 
recommendations that will initiate prosecutions or impose accountability 
mechanisms on state leaders. 
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In March 2007, three French NGOs − Sherpa, Survie and the Fédération des 
Congolais de la Diaspora − filed a legal complaint before the French Public 
Prosecutor alleging the diversion of public funds by three African Presidents – 
Denis Sassou N’Guesso (of Congo-Brazzaville), the now deceased Omar 
Bongo-Ondimba (of Gabon) and Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo (of Equatorial 
Guinea) – as well as by their family members and close associates.199 In 
response to the complaint, a preliminary police investigation confirmed most 
of the allegations and further uncovered various additional assets, properties 
and goods (luxury cars, bank accounts). The investigation revealed: former 
President Bongo and his relatives owned 70 French bank accounts, nine cars, 
and 39 apartments – many located in the wealthiest district of Paris. The 
moneys at issue have also reportedly been traced to 24 apartments and 112 
bank accounts in France owned by President Sassou N’Guesso and his 
relatives, and to eight cars and an apartment in France owned by the Obiang 
family.  
The case was dismissed on 7 November 2007, as the prosecutor ruled the 
grounds on which it was brought were ‘insufficiently characterized.’ In July 
2008 TI France, together with Congolese and Gabonese citizens, lodged 
another complaint before the French Public Prosecutor. This complaint was 
strictly identical to the one filed by Sherpa sixteen months before and in a 
similar vein to the previous complaint, the Public Prosecutor decided on 3 
September 2008 not to pursue the case. Again on 2 December 2008, TI France 
and Gregory Ngbwa Mintsa, a Gabonese citizen, filed a complaint with a civil 
party petition in the hope of triggering a judiciary inquiry.  
The court admitted the claim of Transparency International but dismissed that 
of Gregory Ngbwa Mintsa on the grounds that he had no standing in this case. 
The Public Prosecution, however, appealed the decision. In October 2009 the 
Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the TI was admissible as a civil party. TI 
(France) appealed to the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation). The Supreme 
Court overruled the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal by ruling the 
complaint filed by TI France was admissible. This is viewed as ‘a considerable 
legal milestone,’ as ‘[F]or the first time in France, the collective action of an 
anti-corruption association is deemed admissible before a criminal court.’ 
                                                     
 
199 See Press release by Transparency International (France) 
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This, in the view of TI France, will help to ‘overcome the inertia of public 
prosecution in sensitive cases of political or financial nature in the future.’200 
9.8.4 The NGO Acting in the Public Interest 
In 2007, the Asociacion pro Derechos Humanos de Espafia (APDHE), a 
Spanish human rights organization, EG Justice, a US-based rights 
organization, and the Open Society Justice Initiative filed a complaint before 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, arguing that a 
systematic spoliation of the peoples’ wealth had been perpetrated over decades 
on Equatorial Guinea by the ruling elite. The complaint asserted that in spite of 
the fact that Equatorial Guinea had a small population of about 550,000, when 
compared with a vast wealth of natural resources, namely, abundant 
hydrocarbon deposits, forestry, fishing, titanium, iron ore, manganese, 
uranium, and alluvial gold, as well as the fact that Equatorial Guinea had never 
suffered the negative consequences of civil war and invasion − because of 
large-scale corruption, Equatorial Guinea was at or near the bottom for every 
major development and governance indicator, far below countries whose per 
capita wealth should make them peers.201 
The plaintiffs alleged that the diversion of the peoples’ wealth was 
accomplished through several means, including but not limited to 
expropriation of property from citizens, sham investments with foreign 
corporations, direct diversion of government revenue into private accounts, and 
of particular relevance to the issue of international corruption, the ‘… [R]igged 
Government procurement, construction, and licensing contracts  “negotiated” 
by officials irremediably tainted by conflicts of interest’ and ‘[S]ecret off-the-
books “contributions” by foreign companies of educational scholarships and 
other payments to or for the benefit of leading members of the Nguemo 
Mongomo group ….’202 
The APDHE requested that the Commission issue recommendations to the 
Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea that will oblige it to: (i) 
engage with representatives of all sectors of civil society to ensure genuine 
oversight by the people of revenues, investments, and expenditures comprising 
                                                     
 
200 For details of the complaint see: 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2008/2008_12_02_sto
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or deriving from the peoples’ resources, including rapid and full 
implementation of all steps necessary for compliance with its obligations under 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; (ii) establish and enforce a 
compulsory system of regular and meaningful financial disclosure under direct 
monitoring of the Commission applicable to all government departments 
without exception, in order to help ‘prevent potential conflicts of interest, help 
to detect illicit enrichment of public officials, and … help to deter corrupt 
practices’; (iii) ensure full and fair rights of appeal regarding land 
condemnation decisions, and prompt and adequate compensation, including 
provision for comparable alternative housing; (iv) ensure that the dire needs of 
Equatoguineans in the spheres of health, education, and housing are adequately 
addressed, including by provision of adequate resources for such needs in the 
Government’s budgets; and (v) take such other remedial measures as may 
come to appear appropriate during the course of the proceedings relating to this 
case.203 The case is pending. 
In a related development, in 2008 the APDHE filed a citizen’s complaint 
calling for an investigation into money laundering and corruption by the 
Obiang family. According to the complaint, in April 2004, the United States 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations submitted a report on 
money laundering and foreign corruption focusing on the activities of the US 
entity Riggs Bank.204 During the course of the investigations, a number of 
accounts held by the Government of Equatorial Guinea, by senior government 
officials and by some of their family members were found in this bank.205 The 
case is under investigation. 
A case that deals with a high level corruption and the right to private remedies, 
is the recent suit by the Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project SERAP v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 
Universal Basic Education Commission before the Community Court of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).206 This case was 
based on a report of investigations conducted into the activities of the 
Universal Basic Education Fund centered on the mismanagement of funds 
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204 The Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot 
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on investigations. Released in conjunction with the permanent subcommittee on investigations 
hearing on 15 July 2004. 
205 See criminal complaint APDHE v. Obiang Family, available at 
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allocated for basic education in ten states of the Federation of Nigeria 
submitted to the Nigerian Presidency on 13 April 2004.207 In October 2007 the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission set up by the FG to handle matters 
of corruption within government establishments (ICPC) reported having 
recovered 488 million naira of funds looted from state offices and headquarters 
of the UBEF and that it was still battling to recover another 3.1 billion naira 
looted by officials of the UBEF.208 
SERAP alleged in its civil suit that these findings by the ICPC were not an 
isolated case but rather an illustration of the high-level corruption and theft of 
funds meant for primary education in Nigeria with the result that over five 
million Nigerian children have no access to primary education. SERAP further 
alleged that the Nigerian government had contributed to this problem by 
‘failing to seriously address allegations of corruption at the highest levels of 
government and the level of impunity that facilitate corruption in Nigeria.’209 
SERAP sought from the ECOWAS court a declaration that every Nigerian 
child is entitled to free and compulsory education210 and asked that the court 
should (1) order the Nigerian government to make adequate provisions for the 
compulsory and free education of every Nigerian child; (2) arrest and 
prosecute public officers who diverted 3.5 billion naira from the UBE fund; (3) 
compel the Nigerian government to fully recognize primary school teachers 
unions freedoms; and (4) compel the Nigerian government to assess progress 
in realizing the right to education as well as obstacles impeding the access of 
Nigerian children to education.211 
The ECOWAS Court found that the ICPC Report that made conclusive 
findings of corruption would not per se amount to a denial of the right of 
education without more.212 There has to be, in the opinion of the court, a clear 
linkage between the acts of corruption and a denial of the right of education. 
The court pointed out that ‘in a vast country like Nigeria with her massive 
resources, one can hardly say that an isolated act of corruption contained in a 
report will have such devastating consequence as a denial of the right to 
education ….’213 
The court rejected what it referred to as a sweeping conclusion made by the 
applicant that this was not an ‘isolated case but an illustration of high-level 
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corruption in Nigeria. However, the court held that the right to free and 
compulsory education was justiciable under the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. While the court did not consider the evidence presented 
sufficient for it to make a finding regarding the illegality or constitutionality in 
respect of the plaintiffs’ allegations, they conceded that the fact of 
embezzlement or theft of part of the funds allocated to the basic education 
sector would have a negative impact since the shortage of funds would disable 
the sector from performing as envisaged. As such the court held that pending 
the attempts to recover the funds by the ICPC it was necessary that the 
government of Nigeria should ‘take the necessary steps to provide the money 
to cover the shortfall to ensure a smooth implementation of the education 
programme ….’214 
9.8.5 The Succeeding Government 
A category of victim that is more likely to have the ‘will’ to bring a private 
action is the victim that is left ‘holding the can’ of a looted treasury or 
unsustainable transactions entered into as a result of bribes. For such victims, 
private civil remedies may offer a more effective method of recovery and 
relief. 
In March 1999, the High Court in London ordered the freezing of all accounts 
belonging to former Nigerian ruler Sanni Abacha’s family. This followed 
revelations by the UK monetary regulator − the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) − that it had discovered 23 banks in the UK that had handled $1.3 
billion of the transactions on behalf of the Abacha family between 1996 and 
2000. The Financial Times reports that the banks included the London 
branches of Germany’s Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, France’s BNP 
Paribas and Credit Agricole as well as Switzerland’s leading banks, Credit 
Suisse and UBS. The court order also reportedly named Britain’s high street 
banks HSBC, Barclays and NatWest. American banks Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch and Citibank were also featured in the list seen by the FT alongside 
several Nigerian banks.215 
According to the report, the lawyers acting for the Nigerian Government 
obtained the court order after delays in pursuing criminal prosecutions in 
Britain. The government was able to freeze $30 million stashed in UK banks. 
Toby Graham points out that this case shows that when it comes to the 
recovery of corruption proceeds, the civil law route is quicker. He remarks in 
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respect of the Abacha case ‘Nigeria’s case in the High Court illustrates this. 
The action started in June 1999 and many of the issues were dealt with at a 
hearing just over a year later in December 2000.’216 
9.8.6 Summary  
While the cases discussed above show that that complainants seeking to 
institute a claim for damage to the public interest were faced with a variety of 
challenges, there is nevertheless a discernible movement towards the use of 
private remedies, and so it may be argued that the victim of corruption is 
gradually moving to the center stage. This group of private actors is developing 
a new dynamic in the fight against corruption by using private methods of 
redress as opposed to the public-criminal state-centered processes of 
enforcement. Encouraging such private litigants should be a deliberate aspect 
of anti-corruption policy as a viable and important method of ensuring that 
corrupt activity is more reported, investigated and litigated. 
9.9 Encouraging the Private Litigant  
As regards empowering the private litigant, the issue of private remedies can 
be viewed from (1) the perspective of legal standing to sue; (2) the cost of 
instituting legal proceedings and (3) the retaliation that may be suffered by the 
whistle-blower that exposes corrupt activity. The private victim is an untapped 
resource in the fight against corruption. Encouraging the ability of the private 
victim to enter into the sanctioning processes of corruption is an important 
method of confronting the realities of the negative consequences of corruption 
on governance and political structures. A system compromised by corruption 
can be assisted not only by external agencies (such as tackling the supply side 
of corruption) but also by empowering individuals within the system. Creating 
mechanisms that enable such local challenges to the  status quo is an important 
step in this regard. The following sections detail some responses to these 
challenges.  
9.9.1 Standing to Sue: Rights ius quaesitum tertio 
As discussed above, a primary problem for such a potential private litigant 
seeking a claim for damage to the public interest is the lack of legal standing to 
bring a claim. Such a potential plaintiff may suffer the consequences (but not 
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be a direct party) of the contract tainted by corruption. A suggestion is made 
below about encouraging the use of third-party beneficiary clauses in a bid to 
provide legal standing and empower these as yet underutilized actors in the 
fight against corruption. 
There are typically two bilateral contracts that accompany the corrupt 
exchange. The first is the primary contract to give a bribe where the parties are 
typically the bribe-giver on the one hand and the bribe-recipient on the other. 
The second is the secondary contract that results from a successful bribery 
exchange between the bribe-giver and the principal of the bribe-recipient. 
Contractual rights and obligation flow from these two sets of contracts to the 
principal, bribe-recipient and bribe-giver, respectively. Parties affected by 
these contracts that fall outside of these configurations are third parties.217   
Contracts entered into with government officials will often have a public 
purpose. A contract to build a school, provide telecommunications, equip a 
hospital, provide  electricity, roads, clean water, telecommunications to give a 
few examples, are intended to benefit more persons than simply the immediate 
parties to the contract.218  Does a party who stood to gain some benefit under a 
contract have a right of enforcement or damages with respect to such a 
contract. Can third-party rights ius quaesitum tertio arise with respect to 
contracts tainted by corruption? Or put in another perspective: can ‘contracts 
be used as a tool to extend and enforce public values?’219 
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The question that arises with regard to the rights of such third parties is the 
extent to which these parties can sue on the contract tainted by corruption.220 
There is no new standard established under the UNCC in this regard and 
recourse must be made to the fundamental principle of domestic law to 
determine the extent to which such third parties are allowed to bring a claim 
for non-performance. In the three jurisdictions studied in this book, the rights 
of a stranger to a contract, or third party to seek the performance of obligations 
under certain circumstances, are well accepted.221 
The general principle of privity of contract in all jurisdictions, as well as the 
requirement for consideration in common law jurisdictions in the US and 
England would ordinarily shut the door on a right of persons who have not 
provided any consideration to sue on a contract. While a particular group of 
persons may well benefit from the performance of a contract that is tainted by 
corruption, the right of enforcement is restricted to the parties to the contract. 
A company, for example, who performs a shoddy job or does not perform 
optimally because the bidding process was compromised by bribery, does not 
owe a contractual obligation to the citizens who are deprived of the benefit of 
the contract, but only to the government authorities with whom the contract 
was entered into. 
However, all three jurisdictions studied in this book recognize the right of 
persons who are not parties to a contract to sue on the contract under certain 
circumstances. In general, the third party has to become a beneficiary of the 
contract within the contemplation of the parties to the contract. In the US, 
parties to a contract can by agreement give rights to a beneficiary that is not a 
                                                     
 
220   A related question, outside the scope of this book, that arises with regard to corruption as a 
relevant factor in assessing the validity or enforceability of contracts is the rights of such 
innocent third parties or holders in due course of assignments of rights under the contracts such 
as the banks and other financial institutions that finance commercial transactions where a 
contract is declared unenforceable as result of corruption. See further Chapter 1, Footnote 48 
above in this regard. 
221   See for example Sec. 302 of the Restatement (2nd) Contracts, which provides that: (1) Unless 
otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended 
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party to the contract.222 Sec. 302(1) of the Restatement states that a beneficiary 
of a promise under a contract is an intended beneficiary if the recognition of 
such a right of performance by the beneficiary reflects the intention of the 
parties.223 An intended beneficiary can be distinguished from an incidental 
beneficiary who has no enforcement rights as there was no intention or 
promise by the parties to the agreement to confer rights on such a person.224 
In the UK, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 provides for a 
limited right of action by third parties if the contract expressly provides that 
the third party may enforce a contractual term225 or where the contract purports 
to confer a benefit on the third party.226 There is no right of enforcement by the 
third party if on a proper construction of the contract it appears that the parties 
to the contract did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party,227 or 
the third party is not expressly identified in the contract by name as a member 
of a class or as answering a particular description.228 
The Dutch Civil Code provides for a limited right by third parties to seek 
performance where ‘the contract provides the right for a third party to claim 
performance from one of the parties or to otherwise invoke the contract against 
any of them if the contract contains a stipulation to that effect and the third 
party so accepts.’229 Once the third party has accepted the stipulation, the third 
party is deemed to be a party to the contract.230 
The three jurisdictions considered in this book make it possible for parties to a 
contract to extend the right to sue on the contract to third parties. As 
Farnsworth notes, ‘[i]f the parties have provided either that the third party has 
the right to enforce the agreement or that the third party does not have the right 
the court will give effect to that provision.’231 Using the contract as a tool to 
extend public values repudiating corruption by creating standing for the group 
of persons most often directly affected by the negative influence of corruption 
in contracts with a public dimension, raises interesting possibilities with regard 
to the fight against corruption. Farnsworth notes that government contracts for 
public services are subject to the rules on third-party beneficiaries but that 
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courts are sensitive to problems such as the possibility of excessive financial 
burden, the risk of a multitude of claims, the likelihood of impairments of 
services as well as the difficulty in determining the intent of the government as 
factors that have caused the courts to be reluctant to accord individual 
members of the public rights as beneficiaries.232  
However, giving third parties standing to bring a claim with respect to 
contracts tainted by corruption is a method of empowering and protecting the 
public.233 Therefore a balance should be struck between ‘circumscribing third-
party standing to enforce government contracts to protect private parties who 
contract with the government from endless litigation,’234 on the one hand, and 
the fact that lack of standing to bring a suit may leave members of the public 
with no recourse especially where the government has a monopoly on initiating 
sanction. Zalesne writes that where the ‘government is the only party that can 
enforce a contract on behalf of the public, the government failure to act is 
particularly devastating ….’235 
Avoiding frivolous suits or opening the floodgates to litigation is an important 
consideration to support a very restrictive approach to third-party beneficiary 
rights.236 However, the actors in the international transactions tainted by 
corruption may have in the third-party beneficiary clause a method of creating 
a self-regulatory mechanism that encourages compliance with the anti-
corruption laws. The third-party beneficiary doctrine can provide an 
opportunity for a private-public partnership in the fight against corruption by 
using a sleeping clause to expressly make a clearly defined group of 
individuals who will benefit from a public contract, either by location or 
performance, intended beneficiaries and stipulating evidence of corruption or 
fraud in the contracting process as the trigger to activate the clause. If there is 
no evidence of corruption, the clause will not come into effect. If there is 
evidence of corruption (on terms that can be stipulated in the contract), the 
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third-party beneficiary clause will come automatically into effect. The 
identified third-party beneficiaries will become parties to the contract and 
acquire standing to sue on the contract as a party to the contract.  
A third-beneficiary clause could serve as an additional incentive for parties to 
contract in such a manner as not to activate the clause. Such a clause will be to 
the benefit of the government seeking to fight corruption by providing an 
incentive for companies to comply with anti-corruption rules and it could also 
be an incentive for corporations as it provides one more argument for the 
choice to comply. The fact that the trigger is linked to evidence of corruption, 
limits the scope of frivolous suits but at the same time by increasing the risks 
associated with bribery, can further level the playing field. Such a clause can 
be instituted by governments and international agencies in public procurement 
contracts. It can also be adopted independently of the state as a standard in 
large-scale contracting. Companies involved with contracts of a public 
dimension may show evidence of commitment to society by the inclusion of 
such a clause. The real value of such a clause is, of course, where it is never 
triggered into operation but rather serves as a self-regulatory incentive for 
compliant behavior.  
The advantage of an intended beneficiary clause is that once inserted, it can 
kick in automatically where corruption is established and give a right of suit to 
the parties that ultimately bear the brunt of corrupt transactions. It can also 
circumvent the conflict of interest problems where a compromised government 
is the same entity charged with initiating the sanctioning process by creating 
independent standing for the indirect victims of corruption. 
9.9.2 Public Interest Litigation 
Even if the right to initiate a legal action is granted or exists, this may be more 
illusory than real, where the cost of undertaking such a measure by a plaintiff 
is too great. To encourage a public/private partnership in the fight against 
corruption, strategies to encourage the private litigant are essential. The 
overview of the position in the US, England and the Netherlands, shows that 
the US with its robust litigation culture also provides the most incentives by 
way of reward for the private litigant. The UK provides some encouragement 
by way of assistance with the costs of litigation while the Netherlands provides 
the least incentive.  
In the US there is a very long tradition of encouraging the private litigant. A 
good example of legislation that incentivizes public/private co-operation is the 
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False Claims Act,237 which is based on the ancient common law principle of 
qui tam.238 The False Claims Act imposes liability on persons that commit 
fraud against the Federal Government, and very importantly, provides for civil 
actions for such fraudulent claims as, for example, instances where a federal 
contract is obtained through the payments of bribes or other corrupt payments. 
The person who suffers in this instance is the American taxpayer in terms of 
lost revenues to the government as well as the social costs of contracts that are 
acquired via uncompetitive processes.239 The right to bring a civil action is 
given to both the Attorney General and private persons.240 
The False Claims Act creates a private interest in the form of a reward for 
successful prosecution.241 The citizen bringing a claim under the False Claims 
Act is not bringing a claim based on the citizen’s private injury, but rather on 
the assignment of an injury that is inflicted on the public. Sturycz points out 
that it is accepted that the standing of the relator (the citizen who brings the 
claim under the False Claims Act) is ‘assigned’ by the Act from the fraud 
claim that vests in the government as a result of the injury caused to the 
general public. This assignment theory has been explained in terms of an 
enforceable unilateral contract, the terms and conditions of which are accepted 
by the relator at the filing of an action.242 This gives the relator the interest and 
the standing to bring a claim. 
Apart from the False Claims Act, another initiative that encourages a 
public/private partnership in the fight against corruption is the recent Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,243 which was signed 
into law by President Barack Obama on 21 July 2010. This Act creates new 
incentives for a public/private partnership with regard to the provisions of the 
                                                     
 
237 The False Claims Act, enacted during the US civil, was revised in 1986 to strengthen the right 
of private parties to sue if codified in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3729-3733. 
238    Qui tam is abbreviated from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur, meaning ‘[he] who sues in this matter for the king as [well as] for himself.’ 
239 See Information on False Claims Act Litigation, (31 January 2006), available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at p. 2 (1986), as reprinted 
in 1986 USCC.A.N. 5266, 5266-67. This Information states that ‘From fiscal years 1987 
through 2005, settlements and judgments for the federal government in FCA cases have 
exceeded $15 billion, of which $9.6 billion, or 64 per cent, was for cases filed by whistle-
blowers under FCA’s qui tam provisions. The whistle-blowers share of the qui tam settlements 
and judgments was over $1.6 billion during this period.’ 
240 Sec. 3730. Civil Actions for False Claims. 
241 See generally N. Sturycz, ‘The King and I?: an examination of the interest qui tam relators 
represent and the implications for future False Claims Act litigation’, St. Louis University 
Public Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 459, 2009. He notes that the US Ninth Circuit has held that 
‘the only private interest at stake in a qui tam action is the interest which Congress has created 
in a reward for successful prosecution,’ at p. 31. 
242 N. Sturycz, id., at p. 9. 
243 Pub. L. pp. 111-203, H.R. 4173.  
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Securities and Exchange Commission or Department of Justice. With the 
Dodd-Frank Act, private citizens who report information that leads to 
successful enforcement actions under the FCPA which result in monetary 
sanctions exceeding $1 million are entitled to between 10-30% of the penalty 
recovered.244 The Dodd-Frank Scheme essentially incentivizes whistleblowing 
and creates a private interest in the form a reward that encourages a plurality of 
plaintiffs to initiate the disclosures of information that may bring secret bribery 
transactions to light. 
There is no similar pattern of incentivizing public/private co-operation in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The closest processes that encourage 
private participation in the institution of legal proceedings for corrupt acts are 
strategies that reduce the cost of instituting private suits in the interest of the 
public on the one hand and strategies that protect the informant who blows the 
whistle on corrupt activity on the other. However, both of these methods fall 
short of motivating a broad range of potential plaintiffs, as there is no private 
interest in the form of reward created. Indeed public interest litigation is 
associated with the work of nonprofit civil society organizations. The 
following section looks at protective cost orders, alternative fee arrangements 
and whistle-blower protection under in the UK and the Netherlands as the 
closest approximation of a process to engage private citizens in the fight 
against corruption in these jurisdictions. 
9.9.2.1 Protective Cost Orders 
The need to encourage private actions can also be interpreted from a costs-
perspective. In the UK a strategy that emerges from the anti-corruption 
jurisprudence is an order to ensure that the plaintiff bringing the claim will not 
be required to pay the costs of the defendant or any third party regardless of 
who wins the suit. A Protective Costs Order allows a judge to award costs out 
of central funds where it is in the interest of justice to allow a private party to 
initiate a claim that is in the interest of the general public.245 
                                                     
 
244 Sec. 922. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act H.R. 4173 Whistle-
blower provisions provided by amending The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC 78a et 
seq.) by inserting after Sec. 21E the following: ‘SEC. 21F. SECURITIES 
WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTION.’ 
245 Examples of Protective Costs Orders are R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte CPAG, (1999) 1 WLR 
347 (Dyson J. set down restrictive guidelines, and refused to grant protective costs orders on 
the facts.); Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. Prime Minister et al., [2002] EWHC 2777 
(Admin) (Divisional Court made a partial protective costs order (capping costs to £25,000) in 
CND’s challenge to the legality of the Iraq war); R (Refugee Legal Centre) v. SSHD, [2004] 
EWCA Civ. pp. 1296 and 1239 (Court of Appeal granted a protective costs order by consent to 
allow the Refugee Legal Centre to challenge the UK’s fast-track asylum system).  
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The Corner House case made UK legal history in public law litigation by 
establishing the full extent of the protective costs order. According to the 
Corner House statement on this dispute, the Corner House instituted legal 
proceedings against the UK’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on the 
grounds that the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) had, in 
November 2004, significantly weakened its rules aimed at reducing corruption 
without consulting the Corner House or other interested NGOs. The ECGD 
had, however, ‘carried out extensive and detailed consultation with its 
corporate customers and their representatives,’ who had lobbied the ECGD 
intensively on these rules. ‘The one-sided nature of the consultation that did 
occur … led to a result biased in favor of the ECGD’s commercial customers.’ 
The Corner House’s claim before the court was that was that the ECGD’s 
failure to consult with other interested organizations ‘was a serious breach of 
basic public law standards of fairness and the ECGD’s own published 
consultation policy.’246 
The Corner House was awarded an unprecedented full ‘protective costs order’ 
for a judicial review.247 This meant that it would not have to pay the 
government’s legal costs if it lost because it was bringing the case in the public 
interest.248 On 13 January 2005, just as a two-day hearing in the High Court 
was to begin, the government settled out of court. It agreed to instigate a full 
public consultation on its changes to its anti-corruption rules, and to pay the 
Corner House’s legal costs.249 
The Court of Appeal in this case remarked that the general purpose of a 
Protective Cost Order is to allow a claimant of limited means access to the 
court in order to advance his case without the fear of an order for substantial 
costs being made against him, a fear which would disinhibit him from 
continuing with the case at all.250 In the words of the Court of Appeal in this 
case, the traditional practice of the losing party paying the winning parties 
costs has led to a growing feeling that ‘… access to justice is sometimes 
unjustly impeded if there is slavish adherence to the normal private law costs 
regime.’251 
                                                     
 
246 The Corner House press release, 25 January 2005, 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/corner-house-double-victory-uk-government-
departments-anti-bribery-rules-and-public-intere-0.  
247 R (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, [2005] EWCA Civ. 
248 The Corner House press release, id., Note 245. 
249 Id. 
250 R (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, [2005] EWCA Civ., 
Para. 6. 
251 Id., Para. 28. 
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In a case cited by the Court of Appeal in The Corner House case, Lord Diplock 
emphasizes the need, in some instances, for a public/private partnership in the 
interests of the rule of law and justice. He states: 
‘It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a 
pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, 
were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the 
matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the 
unlawful conduct stopped. The Attorney-General, although he occasionally 
applies for prerogative orders against public authorities that do not form part 
of central government, in practice never does so against government 
departments. It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial 
review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is 
unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which 
they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what 
they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the 
only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of 
what they do, and of that the court is the only judge.’252 
The Court of Appeal laid down the criteria that should be taken into 
consideration in granting a Protective Costs Order as follows: 
A protective costs order may be made at any stage of the proceedings, on such 
conditions as the court thinks fit, provided that the court is satisfied that: 
i. The issues raised are of general public importance; 
ii. The public interest requires that those issues should be resolved; 
iii. The applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the case; 
iv. Having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the 
respondent(s) and to the amount of costs that are likely to be 
involved it is fair and just to make the order; 
a. If the order is not made the applicant will probably 
discontinue the proceedings and will be acting reasonably in 
so doing. 
b. If those acting for the applicant are doing so pro bono this will 
be likely to enhance the merits of the application for a PCO. 
c. It is for the court, in its discretion, to decide whether it is fair 
and just to make the order in the light of the considerations set 
out above.253 
In coming to its decision the court stated among other things that:  
‘the case raised issues of general public importance. The first reason was that 
it relates to the way in which major British companies, supported by credit 
guarantees backed by the taxpayer in accordance with a statutory scheme, do 
business abroad. Obtaining contracts by bribery is an evil which offends 
                                                     
 
252 House of Lords in IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, 
[1982] AC 617. 
253 Id., Para. 74. 
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against the public policy of this country. When the interests of the taxpayer 
are involved, the question whether or not companies are obliged to provide 
details of money paid to middlemen, such as were required by ECGD with the 
strong endorsement of the relevant minister before the changes were made, is 
a matter of general public importance.’254 
9.9.2.2 Alternative Fee Arrangements 
Other measures that can encourage a private litigant to initiate claims for 
corrupt activities can be generally grouped in strategies that relieve the costs of 
instituting actions.255  These are contingency, conditional and third party 
funding schemes to bear the cost of instituting litigation. 
Contingency fee arrangements center around paying legal fees for the lawyer 
as a percentage of the monies recovered from the claim.  Contingency fees are 
widely used in the United States but are not permitted in the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. Another alternative fee arrangement is the conditional fee 
agreement  (otherwise referred to as ‘success’ or ‘uplift’ fees). This 
arrangement differs from the contingency fee regimes that are allowed in the 
United States, which are based on a percentage of the compensation received 
by the successful claimant. Conditional agreement fees, on the other hand, are 
contingent on the success of the case and not on the damages awarded. If the 
lawsuit is won, the conditional fee arrangement allows that an agreed 
additional percentage of the normal fees charged (that is not related to the 
amount recovered) to be paid to the lawyers over and above the normal fee. 
Conditional fee arrangements are allowed in the United Kingdom under the 
Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990.256 However, a recent ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights calls into question the recoverability of such 
                                                     
 
254 Id., Para. 137. 
255 For an overview of the alternative fee arrangement see: ‘The Law Reform Commission of 
Hong Kong Report on Conditional Fees’, 2007. Available at http://www.hkreform.gov.hk. 
256 Sec. 51 provides that a conditional fee agreement which satisfies all of the conditions 
applicable to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a 
conditional fee agreement; … Sec. (2)(a) defines a conditional fee agreement as ‘an agreement 
with a person providing advocacy or litigation services which provides for his fees and 
expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances; and (b) a 
conditional fee agreement provides for a success fee if it provides for the amount of any fees to 
which it applies to be increased, in specified circumstances, above the amount which would be 
payable if it were not payable only in specified circumstances.’ Sec. 51(3) provides that every 
conditional fee agreement (a) must be in writing, (b) it must not relate to proceedings which 
cannot be the subject of an enforceable conditional fee agreement; and (c) it must comply with 
such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by the Lord Chancellor. In April 2000 the 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 was amended by the Conditional Fee Agreements 
Regulations 2000. On 1 November 2005 these regulations were revoked. In March 2011, 
following the review of civil ligation costs carried out by Lord Justice Jackson, the ministry of 
Justice announced plans to reform conditional fee arrangements.   
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success fees.257 Conditional fee agreements are also not allowed in the 
Netherlands.258 
Third-party funding by professional investors is another mechanism to fund 
private litigation. Such professional funders see the court case as an investment 
opportunity and will take a certain percentage of the compensation or 
settlement reached between the parties.259 This is a new and emerging method 
of spreading the risk of financing private litigation. Also of value to the private 
litigant is the spreading of the costs via class actions. Clearly there has to be a 
real investment opportunity such as the possibility of punitive damages, triple 
damages or some other form of award that would make such third-party 
funding an attractive proposition. 
9.9.2.3 Encouraging the Whistle-Blower 
Another group of persons to be encouraged to step up are the onlookers who 
seek to blow the whistle on a corrupt act. The UNCC requires that each State 
                                                     
 
257 MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 39401/04, the European Court of 
Human Rights, 18 January 2011, decision that the requirement to pay success fees, as an 
unsuccessful defendant in breach of confidence proceedings, constituted an interference with 
an applicant’s right to freedom of expression. Whilst the interference was prescribed by law 
and had a legitimate aim of achieving the widest public access to legal services for civil 
litigation, the depth and nature of the flaws in the CFA system were such that the Court 
concluded that the impugned scheme exceeded even the broad margin of appreciation to be 
accorded to the UK. Here, Ms. Campbell was wealthy and not excluded from access to justice 
for financial reasons and her lawyers did limited CFA work (which limited their potential to 
act for impecunious claimants with access to justice problems) and MGN’s case was not 
without merit, yet it was required to pay a large success fee. In such a case, the requirement to 
pay success fees was disproportionate.  
258 ‘Resultaat gerelateerde beloningssystemen voor advocaten: Een vergelijk ende beschrijving 
van beloningssystemen voor advocaten in een aantal landen van de Europese Unie en Hong 
Kong’, Eindrapport Kenmerk 1347/5381972/05, M. Faure, T. Hartlief, N. Philipsen. 
http://wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/internationale-vergelijking-beloningssystemen-
advocatuur.aspx. 
259 In Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd & Ors, [2005] EWCA Civ. 655, 26 May 2005, the Court of 
Appeal set down guidelines for the use of third-party funding. ‘We consider that a professional 
funder, who finances part of a claimant’s costs of litigation, should be potentially liable for the 
costs of the opposing party to the extent of the funding provided ... Overall justice will be 
better served than leaving defendants in a position where they have no right to recover any 
costs from a professional funder whose intervention has permitted the continuation of a claim 
which has ultimately proved to be without merit. If the course which we have proposed 
becomes generally accepted, it is likely to have the following consequences. Professional 
funders are likely to cap the funds that they provide in order to limit their exposure to a 
reasonable amount. This should have a salutary effect in keeping costs proportionate. In the 
present case there was no such cap, and it is at least possible that the costs that MPC had 
agreed to fund grew to an extent where they ceased to be proportionate. Professional funders 
will also have to consider with even greater care whether the prospects of the litigation are 
sufficiently good to justify the support that they are asked to give. This also will be in the 
public interest.’ At Paras. 41 and 42. 
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party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate 
measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person 
who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent 
authorities any facts concerning offenses established in accordance with this 
Convention.260 All jurisdictions provide incentives for persons who provide 
information leading to the discovery of corrupt acts by way of whistle-blower 
protection. Again, the US leads the way with the recent Dodd-Frank Act, while 
the UK and the Netherlands provide varying degrees of protection.  
All three jurisdictions have provisions that encourage the ‘whistle-blower’. 
These provisions seek to protect rather reward. Persons who of their own 
volition seek to protect the public interest and who may risk their livelihood or 
welfare in the process are encouraged to make such public interest disclosures 
by allowing such persons a right to civil actions for redress should they suffer 
any victimization as a result. The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 encourages 
the whistle-blower by allowing a civil action to be instituted in respect of any 
act of retaliation against an employee of a publicly quoted company who 
provides information about FCPA violations.261 The Whistle-blower Protection 
Act of 1989262 protects federal employees who face retaliation for disclosing 
information about Government illegality, waste, and corruption. Whistle-
blowers facing retaliation can raise this as a defense before an administrative 
Panel − the United States Merit Systems Protection Board. 
In the United Kingdom, under the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998,263 
where a disclosure that is in the public interest is made to an employer, legal 
adviser, minister of the crown, or person ‘prescribed’ by the order of the 
Secretary of State, the worker has a right not to be subjected to any 
detriment.264 A worker may make a complaint to an employment tribunal if 
any such detriment is suffered.265 The worker may be entitled to 
compensation266 and, if dismissed, compensation for unfair dismissal.267 
The Act defines as ‘protected disclosures’ information that shows that a 
criminal offense has been committed, is being committed, or is likely to be 
                                                     
 
260 See Art. 33 UNCC. 
261 Sec. 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. pp. 107-204, 116, Stat. 745 amends US 
15 with Sec. 1514A, which stipulates for civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud 
cases. 
262 Pub. L. pp. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16. 
263  The Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998 amends the Employment Rights Act 1996 by 
adding Part IVA after Part IV of that Act. 
264 See Sec. 43 and 47(B) Employment Rights Act. 
265 See Sec. 48. 
266 See Sec. 49. 
267 See Sec. 127(B). 
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committed; that a person has failed, is failing, or is likely to fail to comply with 
any legal obligation to which he is subject; that a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur; that the health or safety of any 
citizen has been, is being, or is likely to be endangered; that the environment 
has been, is being, or is likely to be damaged, or that information tending to 
show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, 
is being, or is likely to be deliberately concealed.268 Knowledge of a corrupt 
act, as defined under the UK laws and the UK ratification of the UNCAC, 
would clearly fall within the scope of this definition of protected disclosures. 
In the Netherlands, the STAR (Stichting van de Arbeid), Code Tabaksblat, the 
Ambtenarenwet,269 as well as the Decision Besluit melden vermoeden van 
misstand bij Rijk en Politie, 572 (2009), published in the Staatsblad 2009, 
572.270 Under the Code Tabaksblat, all publicly listed enterprises are obligated 
to implement a whistle-blower arrangement that should protect employees in 
their legal rights, which should have a self-regulating effect, as the compliance 
of the Code is annually reported by the Frijns committee. Under the Code, 
companies in the Netherlands must ensure that employees have the possibility 
of reporting alleged irregularities. Dutch companies must report on their 
compliance with the code, and in cases where requirements have not been met, 
the company must explain why, according to the code’s ‘comply or explain’ 
rule.  
The Public Servant Law (Ambtenarenwet) requires that government agencies 
have whistle-blower arrangements to protect public servants who disclose 
undesirable practices. Such whistle-blowers are encouraged to make an 
internal report. In the alternative, if the public servant feels that an internal 
report will not suffice, an external report can be made to the Integrity 
Commission of the Government (Commissie Integriteit Overheid), which can 
investigate the case and make recommendations to the necessary authorities. In 
addition the Civil Law Convention against Corruption, which is in force in the 
Netherlands, requires that state should provide ‘… for appropriate protection’ 
against any unjustified sanction for employees who have reasonable grounds to 
suspect corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to responsible 
persons or authorities.’271 
 
                                                     
 
268 See Sec. 43B Employment Rights Act. 
269 Public Servants Law (Ambtenarenwet) Art. 125quinquies. 
270 Besluit melden vermoeden van misstand bij Rijk en Politie (Stb. 2009, 572).  
271 See Art. 9 CLC. 
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9.10 Observations  
Private remedies for corruption involve moving beyond the criminal law and 
using mechanisms provided under the private law in seeking a remedy. The 
motivation for doing this is clear. It allows an action to be instituted 
independently of an unwilling state, it allows the wronged party to have a 
voice in the process of sanction, and it restores the wrong done to a victim of 
corruption either by compensating the victim or using the action against the 
defendants as an example to deter others from engaging in the causative 
wrongful activity. 
Apart from these motivations, the private action also encourages a plurality of 
intervention points in the fight against corruption and encourages a broad range 
of persons to act not only on their behalf, but also in the general public interest 
by instituting action-seeking redress for wrongs occasioned by corruption. This 
helps to shape an environment where victims are more aware and wrongdoers 
are more open to the risk of litigation. Arguably such an environment pays a 
positive role in the fight against corruption. The examination of the provisions 
of the UNCC alongside the position of the right to private remedies in the US, 
England and the Netherlands leads to the following findings. 
9.10.1 Effect of Art. 35 UNCC 
9.10.1.1 Civil Liability as Sanction and as Right of Redress  
Civil liability for corruption finds global expression as a part of the sanctioning 
processes for corruption under Art. 26 UNCC and a right to institute legal 
proceedings by the individual who has suffered damage under Art. 36 UNCC. 
While Art. 26 cannot be regarded as a foundation for private remedies for acts 
of corruption inasmuch as it advises civil liability as a sanction to be resorted 
by governments where criminal liability for legal persons may not be available, 
it introduces the notion that in the sanctioning processes for corruption, 
‘liability should be achieved’ by whatever means. This emphasizes the gravity 
of corruption and the necessity to find effective methods of sanction and 
deterrence. In this regard, Art. 26 civil liability is an important tool in the mix 
of strategies not just where a country does not have criminal liability for 
artificial persons but for all members of the UNCC in a bid to ensure that 
liability for corrupt acts is established and effective punishment and sanction 
schemes are developed. 
9.10.1.2 Limited Scope of Private Right of Action under Art. 35 UNCC   
Art. 35 UNCC is the cornerstone on which the notion of private redress is 
built. One of the important features of the UNCC as a global instrument is the 
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right it gives to private persons to institute legal proceedings for damage 
suffered as a result of corruption. Art. 35 mirrors the desire expressed in the 
preamble of the convention where the need to involve ‘citizens and groups 
outside the public sector such as civil society, non-governmental organizations 
and community based organizations’ is seen as an important element in 
ensuring the ‘effective’ prevention and eradication of corruption. However, an 
examination of the content of Art. 35 shows that it is mostly symbolic in 
character because of the narrowness of its application.  
Art. 35 promises a private right of action for victims of corruption but delivers, 
at best, a confirmation of such a right as already exists under national systems 
of law. Art. 35 gives a very limited right of redress to only a very particular 
group of people. This is because (1) Art. 35 subjects its provisions to the 
principle of sovereignty and non-interference; (2) it subjects the 
implementation of Art. 35 to the fundamental principles of domestic laws of 
participating states; and (3) by virtue of its pre-conditions to applicability only 
where a causal link can be established between the person instituting the claim 
and the party responsible for the damage. This places a significant evidential 
burden on the plaintiff seeking redress under Art. 35. 
In substance, Art. 35 does not add much in terms of civil liability regimes, as 
they already exist under domestic laws. The US has, in any event, formally 
indicated that Art. 35 does not provide a novel private cause of action under 
US law. In England and the Netherlands, where there is no reservation to Art. 
35, the substance of the articles does not create a new private right of action 
nor does it add to existing civil liability regimes. The benefit of Art. 35 is that 
it does impose a requirement on states to ensure that the domestic legal 
processes provide measures to seek compensation for every party who is linked 
causally to damage suffered by corruption. This may add a layer of argument 
to courts considering questions of jurisdiction in such claims. 
9.10.1.3 Art 35 UNCC: No Change to Civil Liability Regimes   
This chapter shows that the framework for private remedies for corruption is 
very much still a national affair. There is no stand-alone private right of action 
created for victims of corruption under the Convention. Only to the extent a 
private right of action to enforce criminal anti-corruption laws exists under 
national laws can a victim stake a direct claim to the protections provided by 
the international criminalization of corruption. The different jurisdictions 
studied in this book, namely the US, England and the Netherlands, do not grant 
any novel private right of action to enforce criminal anti-corruption rules as a 
result of Art. 35. Any right of action as may exist is found in traditional 
principles of civil liability and not in any specially devised regime of a private 
right of action for acts of corruption. 
CHAPTER 9 – INSTITUTING PRIVATE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
472 
 
9.10.1.4 Articulation of Acts of Corruption as Legal Wrongs  
The foundation for the private action for corruption lies in the criminalization 
of acts of corruption that renders these acts legal wrongs. With the worldwide 
consensus repudiating international corruption, grand scale corruption, and 
corruption in national and international business is recognized worldwide as 
both a criminal and civil wrong. The UNCC in Arts. 15-25 defines acts of 
corruption for which private actions may be instituted. These acts of 
corruption are typically crimes under most legal systems. However, by 
grouping them together under the umbrella of acts of corruption the UNCC 
creates a normative link between these different activities. In the US, England, 
and the Netherlands corruption as a legal wrong is conceptualized in terms of 
bribery in the public and private sectors. It is notable that the acts of corruption 
defined in the UN Corruption move far beyond the traditional act of bribery 
but covers all actions that undermine the processes of governance, such as 
embezzlement of property both in the public and private sectors, trading in 
influence, abuse of function, illicit enrichment, laundering of proceeds of 
crime, concealment of crimes as well as obstruction of justice. This establishes 
an international platform on which a consensus regarding of the rectification 
for damage caused by such corrupt acts in an international tort liability regime 
for corruption could emerge.  
9.10.2 Claims for Damage to Private Interests 
The interests that are protected by the criminalization of acts of corruption fall 
primarily into two groups. The first groups consist of acts where damage 
accrues primarily to a private interest, and the second groups are acts of 
corruption for damage that accrues primarily against the public interest. In the 
first group are the traditional acts of corruption such as domestic, foreign and 
private bribery under Arts. 15, 16 and 21 UNCC as well as the embezzlement 
of property in the private sector under Art. 22. The interests damaged by these 
acts of corruption are the employer of a national public servant under Art. 15, 
the employer of a foreign public official under Art. 16, the employer or 
principal of employee or commercial agent in Art. 21, as well as the owner of 
embezzled private property under Art. 22. 
By including domestic, international, public and private bribery under the 
collective umbrella of acts of corruption, the artificial distinction between these 
substantively similar acts is avoided. This is a helpful development that allows 
for greater coherence. In the US, England and the Netherlands, bribery is 
criminalized across both the private and public sectors as well as with respect 
to national and international bribery.   
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The Claim by the Principal: The position in the US and England is fashioned 
by the common law principle of the fiduciary relationship. This has led to the 
development in England of a sui generis approach to the issue of establishing 
liability for damage caused as a breach of the duty of loyalty. All three 
jurisdictions provide for monetary relief to the principal for the breach of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty as it is referred to under the common law or the duty 
to act in the best interest of someone in a position of trust. Under the US and 
English common law constructive trust, the principal may also recover the 
benefit received by the agent. This benefit is not solely restricted to the amount 
of the bribe but may also include any profits or any other benefit that has 
resulted from the abuse of the fiduciary duty. However, after the recent 
Sinclair Investments case in the UK, the vehicle of the constructive trust is in 
some doubt.  
Central to the position in the US and England is the notion that harm is 
occasioned by the act of abuse of the position of the fiduciary regardless of 
whether or not there is a consequential contract or proven loss to the principal. 
There is a strong moral connotation to the court’s rulings, which seek to deter 
the taking of commissions received honestly and those taken ‘behind the 
master’s back’. The principal must have the ‘fullest information’ of the 
activities of the agent. The courts are called upon to ‘hold the precise and firm 
line’ against secret payments. This is not just to protect the private interest of 
the principal but more importantly to protect the public interest as well as the 
‘interests of efficiency.’ Thus the law is willing to make presumptions about 
the motive of the agent, the harm to the principal and assume a minimum level 
of damage in the sum of the bribe. 
In the absence of presumptions in favor of the plaintiff under Dutch law as 
well as the strict requirements for causality, proof of damage and the 
quantification of damage, is a major hurdle for the plaintiff in the Netherlands. 
However, where a plaintiff can establish a causal link, a plaintiff has a right to 
‘full compensation,’ which includes material damage, loss of profit and non-
pecuniary loss. 
The Claim for Tortious Interference: Apart from cases centered on the agency 
relationship, third parties have sued in tort for damage caused as result of 
bribery. In the US and England, tortious liability will lie in cases of bribery on 
the basis of interference with contractual relations and prospective business 
relations. However, the limitation of this approach is that as an intentional tort 
to prove intention, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to cause 
a particular injury to the plaintiff in giving a bribe. In England, seeking redress 
for bribery as an international tort of interference may for this reason not be the 
most efficient route, since the position of the civil law on bribery does not 
require proof of reliance or intention. Bribery as a sui generis tort, which 
presumes intentionality and reliance, is a desirable step that lightens the burden 
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of proof on the prospective litigant because it enables proof of the occurrence 
of an act of corruption to serve without more as the basis for liability. This is in 
keeping with a desire not only to restore the rights of the plaintiff that have 
been breached, but also emphasizes the sanctioning element of seeking to deter 
the occurrence of such corrupt actions. This is a model that is immensely 
helpful in encouraging the private litigant.   
The central feature of the interference torts is the unlawfulness of the conduct 
of the party offering a bribe. As has been stated quite rightly, the ‘freedom to 
compete necessarily contemplates the probability of harm to the commercial 
relations of other participants in the market.’272 The criminalization of 
corruption on a global scale removes bribery practices from accepted practices 
to foster competition. The nature of bribery is that it undermines the very 
notion of free competition. The intentional interference in the business 
activities of another by giving bribes may result in liability to party who suffers 
economic loss. In the US and England, bribery can serve as a foundation for 
liability for the economic torts. In the Netherlands, while there is no special 
category of economic torts, the general principle of liability for unlawful acts 
renders parties liable for damage caused by bribery in tort.  
The requirement for intentionality remains a weak spot in the use of the 
intentional tort of economic interference to fight corruption. Rarely will the 
damage be shown to have been intended particularly where there is an open 
call for bids. Again, the establishment of causal link between the act 
complained of and the damage suffered by the claimant, as the ADT case 
shows, can be a difficult burden to shift. Furthermore, it will be a significant 
challenge to establish that for the bribery transaction the claimant would have 
won the contract.273 
                                                     
 
272 See Restatement (3rd) Unfair Competition, Comment (a) Sec.1 at p.4. 
273 It is interesting to note the successful claim by a losing competitor from another jurisdiction. In 
the South African case of Transnet Ltd v. Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd, [2005] (1) SA 299 
(SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought by Transnet Ltd against a 
Johannesburg High Court judgment ordering it to pay damages of R57 654 550.00 to an 
unsuccessful tenderer in a tender process that Transnet admitted was irregular, fraudulent and 
dishonest. There were ‘strong’ indications from Transnet that Sechaba, the losing competitor, 
would be awarded the tender, however another company Skotaville was unexpectedly awarded 
the contract. Secheba alleged that the award of the tender to Skotavillie was the result of a 
fraudulent tender process and sued Transnet for damages. It claimed compensation in the sum 
of R60 million being the net profit which it would allegedly have been able to make in the 
three years following the award of the contract. The principal question before the Supreme 
Court was whether on the facts of the case the loss of prospective profits was recoverable. The 
court held that the losing competitor was entitled to recover the full amount of prospective 
profits it would have made if it had won the tender.  
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Shareholder Actions: In addition to agency-based suits, in the United States 
third parties are also using allegations of FCPA violations to file FCPA-related 
antitrust and securities claims. Losing competitors alleging loss of contracts as 
well as governments claiming damage due to international bribery have filed 
civil suits for corrupt transactions by using alternative criminal statutes such as 
the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, the Clayton Antitrust 
and Robinson-Patman Acts. FCPA-related suits have also been filed by 
shareholders who have brought class actions for damage resulting from false 
and misleading information about a company’s bribery activities which cause a 
fall in share prices as well as derivative suits where shareholders seek 
indemnity from the actions of its executive officers who have engaged in 
corrupt activity. There is no parallel securities litigation in the UK or the 
Netherlands, but with the coming into effect of the new UK Bribery Act as 
well as provisions in the New UK Companies Act (2006), the scope of 
shareholders’ rights to bring derivative suits is increased to some extent. This 
may well increase the opportunity for securities litigation as a feature of 
remedies for corruption under UK law. 
9.10.3 Claims for Damage to Public Interest 
In each of the acts of corruption described in Arts. 17-10 of the UNCC as well 
as Arts. 23-24, the party who suffers the effect of the legal wrong is the general 
public as represented by the state. Where the primary party that suffers damage 
is the state, the notion of private remedies is more complicated. This group of 
government and civil actors seeking redress for damage examined in this 
chapter are acting on behalf of the indirect victims of corruption that do not 
have as clear a path to redress as compared with the methods available to direct 
victims such as principals, shareholders and third parties affected by 
uncompetitive behavior. A section of cases drawn from several jurisdictions, 
however, shows the different strategies that have been employed by parties 
seeking to protect the public interest. This includes a governments seeking 
damages under theories of social damage from Costa Rica; a state company 
seeking mandatory restitution for a settlement reached in respect of corruption 
involving its officials; a private citizen instituting claims to compel state 
authorities to commence an investigation into alleged corruption against sitting 
and former African presidents; and several examples of civil society seeking to 
compel the state government into taking action or complying with international 
commitments against corruption. This list is drawn from a variety of 
jurisdictions and points to the growing emergence of a new group of players 
and strategies that may shape developments in the fight against corruption in 
the years to come. These attempts point to a new dynamic in the fight against 
corruption by using private law mechanisms to seek redress. However it must 
be emphasized that this is still a difficult path to follow. 
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9.10.4 Schemes to Encourage the Private Litigant  
 
(a) Exploiting Third-Party Beneficiary Principles  
Contracts tainted by grand corruption very often fall into the category of state 
or public contracts where the government enters into contractual obligations 
with a private sector entity in an international environment. The direct parties 
to the contract are the government on the one hand and the corporation on the 
other. The primary beneficiaries of the contract on the other hand are often the 
individuals who stand to benefit if the contract is properly executed.  Using the 
interventions of third-party beneficiaries, who have the motivation to seek 
remedies for the damage suffered as a result of harm caused by lack of 
performance on public contracts, could also have an important policing effect 
in the fight against corruption. All three jurisdictions studied in this book 
provide for the possibility to include third parties as intended beneficiaries. 
This provides an example of how existing private law principles can be 
exploited to meet both public and private sector interests. It would be 
inefficient and counter-productive to open the flood gates of litigation with 
respect to public contracts. However, if the intention is to encourage 
compliance with anti-corruption rules by creating an environment where the 
choice to comply is a logical choice for the corporation, the intended 
beneficiary clause could play an interesting role. An intended beneficiary 
clause that is triggered into operation only where there has been evidence of 
corruption relating to the contract may serve as a helpful tool to encourage 
compliance with anti-corruption laws. 
(b) Incentivizing the Private Litigant 
Other important aspects in the use of private remedies in the fight of corruption 
are the costs and financial risks of bringing such claims. Incentivizing 
public/private co-operation in the fight against corruption is an important step 
in broadening the participation of private actors. In the US, the False Claims 
Act and the Dodd-Frank Act and well established contingency  and alternative 
fee arrangements  provide a reward as a percentage of the sums recovered that 
can help to motivate the risk undertaken by the private litigant. Such claims are 
clearly to be encouraged as not only being in the interest of the public, but also 
as an important facilitator of claims against corruption where the involvement 
of private actors is an essential aspect of circumventing a conflicted state. 
There is no similar pattern of incentivizing public/private cooperation by way 
of reward in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The nature of 
encouragement of the private litigant is found in the measure that reduces the 
costs of taking such actions and whistle blowing measures that protect the 
party making the disclosures. The Corner House case in the UK made legal 
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history as regards the availability of protective costs order, which allows a 
judge to award costs out of central funds where it is in the interest of justice to 
allow a private party to initiate a claim that is in the interest of the general 
public. This should greatly facilitate the capacity organization and other private 
actors to bring claims to fight damage caused by corruption to the general 
public. With regards to  alternative fee arrangements, such as conditional fees, 
contingency fees and third-party funding, none of these are allowed in the 
Netherlands, and only contingency fees and third party funding are allowed in 
the UK. 
Information about corrupt activity is a crucial element in fighting corruption. 
All the jurisdictions considered in this study have provisions to protect the 
whistle-blower. Art. 33 UNCC and Art. 9 Civil Law Convention require that 
states put into place measures to protect persons who disclose information 
about corrupt acts. The US, UK and the Netherlands all have provisions that to 
varying degrees protect the whistle-blower. The provisions of the Whistle-
blower Protection Act of 1989 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provide 
protection for persons that provide information about FCPA violations and 
other corruption-related activity. The UK Public Interest Disclosure Act of 
1998 protects the discloser of any information that is given is in the public’s 
interest. In the UK and the US, State administrative boards help to ensure 
redress for any retaliatory acts taken against such persons. In the Netherlands 
there is a strong element of self-regulation, and persons making disclosures are 
encouraged to first make internal disclosures to their employer. The Stichting 
van de Arbeid, Code Tabaksblat encourages the establishment of procedures to 
enable employees report on irregularities, and the Public Servants Law 
(Ambtenarenwet) sets up an Integrity Commission to oversee external 
disclosures by whistle-blowers where an internal disclosure is thought unlikely 
to have the desired effect. 
9.11 Conclusion  
This chapter shows that there are two levels of private remedies for corruption. 
The first level can be described as the level of the direct victim (damage to 
private interests). This level is well articulated in the US, England and the 
Netherlands and bears some elements of commonality. Direct redress is 
centered on the agency relationship between the principal and agent. In all 
three jurisdictions there are strategies available to the principal of the disloyal 
agent for seeking redress for damage caused as a result. Beyond this area of 
commonality, in agency-related actions and tort-related claims, there is great 
dissimilarity regarding the use of antitrust rules and securities law to found 
corruption related claims. While these are commonplace in the US, there is so 
far no an equivalent legal provision or actions by shareholders or third parties 
affected by uncompetitive behavior in the UK and in the Netherlands.  
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The second level − the level of the indirect victim (damage to the public 
interest) − is an emerging area. An examination of illustrative cases shows that 
government, citizens and NGOs are pushing the boundaries of redress using 
private law. Attempts to use concepts such a social damage and to benefit from 
provisions providing mandatory restitution demonstrates creativity in seeking 
for private redress for the indirect victims of corruption. Furthermore the 
efforts of government and civil society in public interest litigation emphasize 
the importance of public/private co-operation in the fight against corruption. 
Private law claims for the public wrong of corruption can positively influence 
the environment in which acts of corruption affecting public interests occur.  
A suggested method for increasing private participation is the use of third-
party beneficiary principles to make groups of people  intended beneficiaries 
with a limited right of suit that is triggered on evidence of bribery by a party to 
the contract. This could serve as a control mechanism that encourages 
compliance with anti-corruption rules by all parties bidding for such contracts. 
Such a requirement could be imposed by the contracting state as part of the 
conditions for prospective bidders. 
The benefits of engaging in a public/private partnership in the fight against 
corruption is most clearly articulated under US law, where reward schemes 
such as those found under the False claims Act and the Dodd-Frank Act may 
motivate the private actor to file anti-corruption suits that benefit the general 
public. The absence of such incentives under the UK and Dutch law will no 
doubt have a negative impact on attracting private actors to partner with the 
state in fighting corruption. The protective cost order regime of the UK is 
certainly a step in the right direction and will encourage civil society to file 
public interest claims, although this is a much narrower group of potential 
plaintiffs than those that may be attracted under a reward model of the 
private/public partnership. A critical element in encouraging a public/private 
partnership is the need for information about corrupt activity. Protecting the 
whistle-blower is essential and having this is recognized not just in the UNCC 
but in the UK, the US and the Netherlands. This is an area of commonality 
where there is sufficient convergence to found a common approach to protect 
whistle-blowers that provide information on corrupt transactions. 
In conclusion it can be stated that while the UNCC, in its call for a right to 
institute legal proceedings for damage suffered by corruption, has not 
significantly changed existing civil liability regimes, the breadth of the 
international framework of rules repudiating corruption as well as the civil 
liability provisions of the UNCC itself are changing the tenor of the anti-
corruption discourse by giving expression to efforts to seek redress not just for 
the direct victims of corruption such as principals, shareholders and parties that 
suffer the effects of unfair competition, but also for, and probably more 
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importantly, the indirect victims that often bear the brunt of the political, 
economic and social unrest that corruption causes.  
On a final note it may be argued that the private right of redress also serves a 
restorative function. It provides a modality for the person wronged and the 
party that caused the wrong to enter into a dialogue. Such a direct 
confrontation creates more awareness for all parties and creates the opportunity 
for negotiated settlements that can assuage the victim and at the same time 
does not ‘punish’ the corporation adversely in a manner that affects its viability 
as a contributor to economic growth. Effective schemes for private remedies 
provide may also add weight to voices within a corporation that push for 
ethical business over profit by any means. This is probably the most important 
argument for private remedies, i.e. its ability to shape the environment in 
which the rational choice for a corporation would be compliance with anti-
corruption rules. 
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CHAPTER 10  
TOWARDS A TRANSACTION APPROACH1 
‘The framing of policy challenges can have profound consequences for assigning 
responsibilities to relevant actors and determining whether the combination is capable is 
capable of meeting the overall policy objectives.’ 
J. Ruggie.2 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
A constant theme in this book has been the need for a conceptual shift in the 
approach to fighting international corruption.3 The motivation for this shift is 
the difficulty in translating national criminal law-centered approaches to 
fighting corruption into effective strategy in the environment in which 
corruption in international business occurs. Chapter 2 emphasized the 
complexity of the challenges faced in fighting corruption and how these are 
exacerbated by the fact that corruption in international business occurs in a 
situation where there is no clear nexus of governance, no super regulatory 
system, where states with a monopoly on the criminal processes of sanction, 
play a diminished role, and where multinational corporations are important 
shapers of the regulatory agenda. This is an environment where dislocated 
agreements and contracts are the primary medium of control rather than state-
based models of punishment and sanctions. 
Chapter 3 charted the genesis and development of the worldwide consensus 
against international corruption and showed how the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and the international regulatory framework against corruption have led to a 
model of public/private partnership in the fight against corruption. This can be 
seen as an acknowledgement of the limitations of the state in uncovering, 
                                                     
 
1   The chapter is based in part on a paper presented at the Governing Security under the Rule of 
Law International Conference of the Research Programme Monitoring, Safety & Security 
Erasmus University Rotterdam on the 23rd April 2010, and subsequently published as: A. 
Makinwa ‘A Transaction Approach to Fighting International Corruption.’ in J. Blad, M. 
Hildebrandt, K. Rozemond, M. Schuilenburg & P. Van Calster (Eds.), Governing Security 
under the Rule of Law?, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2010, at pp. 175-194. 
2   J. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 20087 April 2008, 
Available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf. at Para. 10. 
3   See development of definition of international corruption in Chapter 3 at Sec. 3.10ff. 
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investigating and establishing corruption by large complex organizations. This 
public/private collaboration suggests that the future of the fight against 
corruption lies in a shift beyond the traditional focus on the offender in 
classical state-centered approaches to sanction, to methods of engaging 
stakeholders in a process of mutual co-operation.  
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide national models of private remedies to fight 
corruption from the United States, England and the Netherlands as well as 
under international arbitration. Individuals using processes of private law to 
seek redress for damage suffered as a result of corruption are illustrative in 
showing how a focus on the consequences of corruption is an important 
medium for empowering the private litigant in a manner that addresses some of 
the conflict of interest problems inherent in the criminal law approach. It also 
changes the dynamics of the anti-corruption discourse by bringing the silent 
victim into the mainstream of the sanctioning processes for corruption. This 
opens the door for a change of focus in the anti-corruption discourse that 
recognizes the importance of a holistic approach to fighting corruption which 
is more complete in its identification of the full range of interactions involved 
in the corrupt exchange as the template for the construction of strategy. 
In Chapters 8 and 9 the international framework for private remedies that is 
articulated in the UNCC against corruption is compared with the positions on 
private remedies from the various jurisdictions studied. The picture that 
emerges is one where the need for consistency between the public wrong of 
corruption and the private law consequences is still a work in progress. The 
traditional divisions between private and public law need to arrive at 
consonance. A public law approach may be too limited and a private law 
approach may be too abstracted. This suggests the need for a framework that 
works towards consonance. This may imply the need to reframe the problem of 
how to best tackle international corruption.  
Chapter 10 seeks to reframe the problem by using the insights drawn from this 
study to propose a conceptual framework that brings the various threads 
followed in this book together in the transactions that characterize corrupt 
exchanges.4 By charting the interactions negatively affected by corrupt 
activity, a multi-level approach helps to organize the transactions embodied in 
                                                     
 
4  This is in some ways analogous to Philips Allott’s description of practical theory, thinking as 
action − the level at which theory is actualized in the process of our acting in relation to actual 
situations. He notes that the ‘functioning of theory is … highly biologically adaptive, as the 
human mind is able to assimilate changing needs and opportunities, and to respond efficiently 
by modifying its action in relation to an ever-changing environment …. To change the way in 
which we present the world to our minds is to begin to change the world.’ P. Allot, The 
Emerging Universal Legal System, in J. Nijman, A. Nollkaemper (Eds.), New Perspectives of 
the Divide between National and International Law, OUP, Oxford, 2007, p. 61, at p. 64. 
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the interactions in a coherent narrative that is not artificially bound by 
traditional public and private law categorizations. The objective is to restore 
transactions damaged by corrupt activity in the hope of creating an 
environment where the risk of engaging in acts of international corruption 
outweighs the gains of non-compliance. Such an environment could act as a 
catalyst for increased private/public partnerships in the fight against corruption 
with government authorities as well as private actors playing important roles 
in the sanctioning processes against corruption.  
Shearing aptly summarizes the need for changes in conceptual thought patterns 
in today’s regulatory environment when he asks, how a theoretical jump can 
be made to:  
‘positions that recognize a diversity of governing auspices; that is, to positions 
that recognize the role of the state while at the same time recognizing, and 
bringing clearly and explicitly into the equation, the role of non-state auspices 
as well as non-state providers of governance.’5  
This chapter attempts to make this jump with the transaction approach to 
fighting corruption.  This approach sees the transactions that are influenced by 
the corrupt acts as an important point of intervention in the fight against 
corruption. It emphasizes the need for an approach that reflects the more 
diffuse processes of sanction and the plurality of sources of governance that 
characterize the international business society.   
In the first part of this chapter, the motivation for a transaction approach to 
fighting corruption is outlined by examining the pitfalls in the current 
sanctioning environment. The single-level approach of criminalization results 
in conflict of interest problems as well as a schism between the public law 
consensus to criminalize international corruption and the private law contracts 
and transactions that result from the successful violation of the anti-corruption 
laws. This creates a paradox that encourages inefficient implementation and 
encourages risk taking.   
In the second section the various levels of transacting that are affected by the 
corrupt exchange are identified. Effective anti-corruption strategy must 
anticipate the issues that arise across the identified mandate, violation and 
consequence levels to the extent that they create and influence the environment 
in which international corruption occurs. Anticipating and addressing the 
                                                     
 
5   C. Shearing, Reflection on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in J. Wood, B. 
Dupont (Eds.), Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, CUP, Cambridge, 2006, at 
pp. 1-32, 26. 
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issues that arise across levels of interaction and in particular the contract that 
results from the successful violation of the anti-corruption rules, provides more 
coherency and effectiveness in devising anti-corruption strategy. The corollary 
is also true. Pursuing a single-level approach in the face of interconnected 
levels can create paradoxes and fault lines of incoherence. Furthermore, a 
multi-level approach enlarges the conceptual scope of redress for damage 
caused by corrupt activity, thus increasing accountability and risk for 
corporations engaging in corrupt behavior.   
The final section summarizes the advantages of a transaction approach. The 
transaction approach proposed in this chapter embraces a multi-level 
perspective of the interactions affected by a corrupt exchange in a single 
narrative. This creates an opportunity to change this environment in a manner 
that increases the risk of engaging in corrupt activity and, by so doing, 
positively impact the fight against international corruption.6 
10.2 The Paradox of ‘Consensus’ and the ‘Successful Violation’ 
Corruption in international business is typically referred to as grand 
corruption. It occurs at the highest levels of governance and ‘distorts the 
central functions of government.’7 International corruption properly defined 
has three primary elements: (1) an international element, (2) a commercial 
element, and (3) as involving government officials.8 This means that while the 
criminalization of international corruption is an important and necessary first 
step, it presents a structural conflict-of-interest problem. Implementation using 
the criminal process is dependent on government officials, who are key actors 
in international corruption. Implementation is also strongly influenced by 
political as well as economic interests.9 The dependence on the apparatus of 
                                                     
 
6   Thaler and Sunstein argue that by carefully designing the architecture of the environment in 
which people make choices, we can positively influence the choices peoples make (choice 
architecture). While Thaler and Sunstein argue that government and business can ‘nudge’ the 
consumer into making better decisions (liberal paternalism), this book focuses on government 
and the private actor as the ‘nudging’ factors that influence corporate choices. The 
environment in which businesses transact is a motivator to the choices that corporations make. 
Therefore an environment that makes the transaction tainted by corruption a more risky 
propositions is more likely to encourage compliance than an environment that focuses on the 
offender and treats the transactions as an after-thought. See T. Thaler, C. Sunstein, Nudge: 
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Penguin, New York, 2009. 
7   UN Convention against Corruption New York, 31 October 2003, in force 14 December 2005, 
2349 UNTS p. 41; (2004) 43 ILM 37 (hereinafter, the UNCC). 
8   See Chapter 3 above on the key elements of international corruption.  See also Art. 1 OECD, 
1997, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, 37 ILM 1998, at p. 1 (hereinafter the OECD Convention). 
9  The attempts by the Blair government to stop the investigations into bribery allegations 
involving BAE, a British defence, security and aerospace company, are a rather apt example of 
this. See Corner House Research & Campaign against Arms Trade, R (on the application of) 
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the state in initiating, investigating and sanctioning international corruption is a 
grave impediment to prosecution. The degree of success is dependant not so 
much on the fact of criminalization but on the political will to prosecute.10  
The positive effect of the international regulatory framework has been the 
emergence of a global standard or consensus condemning international 
corruption.11 This consensus is symptomatic of an international society held 
together not by territory or sovereignty but by the dynamics of mutually 
dependent relationships in a series of collaborative agreements.12 The 
consensus against international corruption has shaped the objectives of the 
international anti-corruption discourse in its acceptance of three basic 
propositions. 
The first proposition is that international corruption is detrimental to the 
common good.13 The rhetoric of the international instruments condemning 
corruption describes the ‘seriousness of the problems and threats posed by 
corruption to the stability and security of societies.’14 It is also linked to 
organized and economic crime involving ‘vast quantities of assets, which may 
constitute a substantial proportion of the resources of states.’15 Not 
surprisingly, it has been described as ‘the greatest obstacle to economic and 
social development.’16 This has resulted in international business practices that 
were once regarded as legal, becoming criminalized as a violation of the norms 
that co-exist for the good of the international society. Ilias argues that 
                                                                                                                            
 
v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] EWHC 714; Corner House Research & Ors, R 
(On the Application of) v. The Serious Fraud Office, [2005] EWCA Civ 192. 
10  The United States stands in the forefront of prosecuting anti-corruption cases. This is to be 
contrasted with the very meager levels of enforcement demonstrated by the rest of the World. 
Cf. for statistics on US anti-corruption enforcement efforts under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 2008, Shearman & Sterling LLP, available at 
www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA_Trends.pdf. 
11   A. Makinwa, ‘The rules regulating transnational bribery: achieving a common standard?’, 
International Business Law Journal, Vol. 1, 2007, at p. 17.  
12   Velasquesz points out the importance of a core common morality as necessary for international 
economic interaction. Without this, economic interactions would be ‘nasty and brutish if not 
short’. M. Velasquez, ‘International business morality and the common good’, Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 1992, pp. 2-27.  
13   In G. Abed, S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, 2002; S. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences and Reform, CUP, Cambridge, 1999; A. Dreher, T. Herzfeld, ‘The Economic 
Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence’, Monograph on file at Wageningen 
University and Research Center Publications (Netherlands), 2005, at: 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0506/0506001.pdf.  
14  Preamble Para. 2 UNCC. 
15  Id.  
16  See World Bank Website on Corruption: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm.   
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corruption should in fact be viewed as a crime against humanity.17 The 
establishment of a base line of legality is the first requirement of the rule of 
law. It removes international corruption from the realm of purely private 
commercial agreements. At this point, the private activities of international 
traders move into the domain of public security. Criminalization is thus the 
litmus test against which the norm eschewing international corruption is 
identified.  
The recognition of a norm condemning international corruption implies a 
necessary response where the norm is violated. Hildebrandt remarks that 
punitive interventions are the counter actions that nullify the initial action.18 
The consensus about criminalization has resulted in a wide-reaching 
international framework of rules that prohibit, stigmatize and punish 
international corruption.19 The punitive reaction to international corruption is 
the necessary precursor of a co-coordinated strategy to fight international 
corruption. It is also the logical consequence of the proposition that 
international corruption is detrimental to the social and economic development 
of nations. 
The second proposition posited by the consensus is that there is a need for 
common rules to tackle international corruption. The need for a collaborative 
response is necessary in an integrated world market, which is characterized by 
high volumes of trade occurring outside the domestic jurisdictions of states. 
International corruption occurs within the purview of international trade, which 
is an activity fostered and promoted by the State but carried out mainly by 
private persons.20 The business practices in this supranational space emanate 
not so much from national institutions but from the actors and merchants in an 
essentially self-regulatory environment. Considerations of pragmatism coupled 
with party autonomy result in ‘a self-validating legal discourse.’21 Private 
                                                     
 
17   B. Ilias, ‘Corruption as an international crime and crime against humanity: an outline of 
supplementary criminal justice policies’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4 No. 
3, 2006, pp. 466-484.  
18  M. Hildebrandt, Trial and Fair Trial: From Peer to Subject to Citizen, in A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. 
Marshall, V. Tadros (Eds.), The Trial on Trial Judgment and Calling to Account, Hart 
Publishing, London, 2006, at p. 20.  
19    Criminal law has a definitional function. It helps to categorize certain acts as detrimental to the 
public good and therefore prohibited. S.1.01 of the American Model Penal Code illustrates this 
when it states that ‘the general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offences 
are: (a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens 
substantial harm to individual or public interests ….’  
20  Teubner points out that the ‘lex mercatoria, the transnational law of economic transactions, is 
the most successful example of global law without a state,’ id., at p. 3. 
21  Teubner emphasizes that ‘the new living law of the world is nourished not from stores of 
tradition but from the ongoing self-reproduction of highly technical, highly specialized, often 
formally organized and rather narrowly defined, global networks of an economic, cultural, 
academic or technological nature.’ Id., at p. 7. 
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actors have fashioned a ‘common platform’ of interaction that caters privately 
to private interests, which has drifted further and further away from the control 
of individual states in a process that proceeds on a ‘case-by-case basis’ rather 
than as a ‘comprehensive system.’22 
The fashioning of common rules to fight corruption occurs against the 
backdrop of criminalization. This has introduced a moral and public tone into 
the fight against international corruption.23 It is no longer simply a matter of 
private agreement between parties. Drawing on the views of writers such as 
Philippe Plateau,24 Bukovansky asserts that ‘capitalism requires a generalized 
and universalistic, rather than particularistic and limited, moral code, because 
the operation of markets requires trust.’25 As Donaldson and Dunfee point out, 
international trade is capitalistic and opportunistic, yet it is predictable in its 
need for certainty that transactions will be honored, contracts upheld, property 
respected and all of this in the absence of a supranational enforcing body.26 The 
articulation of the rule of law27 becomes imperative as globalization and 
integration make national borders opaque. However, there is no clear route to 
the proclamation of this rule. The rule of law is closely associated with the role 
of the state within its own territory and struggles with a ‘relocation’28 to the 
gap between states without descending into ‘meaninglessness’29 or ‘mere 
                                                     
 
22  Teubner points out that ‘[t]oday’s globalization is not a gradual emergence of a world society 
under the leadership of interstate politics, but a highly contradictory and fragmented process in 
which politics has lost its leading role.’ See Teubner, id., p. 5. 
23  See M. Bukovansky, ‘Corruption is Bad: Normative Dimensions of the Anti-Corruption 
Movement’, Working Paper No. 2002/5, Australian National University, Department of 
International Relations, 2002, at p. 3.  
24  J.P. Platteau, ‘Behind the market stage where real societies exist—Part I: The role of public 
and private order institutions’, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 30 No. 3, 1994, p. 533. 
25  In his view, the texts of the global anti-corruption regime imply, but fail to reflect upon, the 
notion that some sort of universal, generalized morality is necessary’ for the continuous 
capitalistic growth of markets. See M. Bukovansky, id., Note 23 above. 
26  In their ‘integrative social contracts theory’, Donaldson and Dunfee argue that ‘all particular or  
“macrosocial contracts” whether they exist at the national industry or corporate level, must 
conform to a hypothetical “macrosocial” contract that lays down objective moral boundaries 
for any social contracting.’ See T. Donaldson, T. Dunfee, Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts 
Approach to Business Ethics, Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, at p. 6. 
27  The expression ‘rule of law’ was coined by Albert Venn Dicey in his treatise ‘An Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution’, 10th edn, Macmillan, London, 1959. From Plato 
and Aristotle to modern-day writers, the rule of law represents the essential idea that laws 
should govern societies rather than the arbitrary compulsions of men. As such no one is above 
the law and good governance is best represented by a ‘government of laws and not of men.’ 
See J. Adams, ‘Part the First: A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts’, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
(1780), Art. XXX. 
28  Expression taken from the title of the Conference, ‘Relocating the Rule of Law’ held at the 
European University Institute, Florence, Italy, on 8-9 June 2007. 
29  J. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in A. Hutchinson, P. Monahan (Eds.), The 
Rule of Law, Idea or Ideology, Carswell, Toronto, 1987, p. 1. 
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sloganeering.’30 The moral tone is evidenced by the condemnation of 
international corruption and the public effects of the damage it inflicts. 
A third proposition embraced in the consensus on criminalization is that 
systems of ‘effective restraint’ should accompany the de-legitimization of 
corrupt practices. Minor and Morrison write that the predominant response to 
criminal behavior today:  
‘…reflects an adversarial conception of justice and is characterized 
by retribution and utilitarianism. The aims of traditional sanctions 
are to achieve vengeance, just deserts, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and/or rehabilitation by punishing offenders and placing them in 
treatment programs.’31 
The assumption in classical criminal punishment theory is that effective 
punishment of the offender will deter the commission of further acts of 
international corruption that harm society.  
These propositions are at the heart of the global consensus criminalizing 
international corruption and undeniably hold true. However, the stability of 
this consensus is challenged by the paradox of the contract that results from the 
successful violation of the rules prohibiting international corruption. If the 
norm prohibiting international corruption is successfully violated, the proof of 
success is the contract that comes into being as a result of the bribe that has 
changed hands. The persistence of international corruption as a transnational 
crime confirms the fact that contracts tainted by international corruption 
continue to flourish.  
Anti-corruption rules have criminalized international corruption, but the status 
of transactions resulting from the successful violation of the prohibition is not 
so clear. This is not uncommon, and MacQueen speaks about the ‘silence of 
regulatory legislation’ that accompanies criminal prohibitions.32 The ‘silence’ 
on the part of regulation raises the question of the effect of criminalization on 
resulting private transactions. As shown in Chapters 9 and 10, this leaves the 
question about the effects and status of these transactions to be determined by 
national courts. This leads to the uncertainty of national values and 
                                                     
 
30  J. Raz, ‘The rule of law and its virtue’, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 93, 1977, at p. 195.  
31   K. Minor, J. Morrison, A Theoretical Study and Critique of Restorative Justice, in B. Galaway, 
J. Hudson (Eds.), Restorative Justice: International Perspectives Monsey, Criminal Justice 
press/Kugler Publications, NY, USA/Amsterdam, 2004, p. 118. 
32   H. MacQueen, Illegal and Immoral Contracts: Towards European Principles, in M. Hesselink, 
E. Hondius, C. Joustra, M. Veldman (Eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 3rd edn, Ars 
Aequi Libri, Nijmegen, 2004, pp. 287-289. 
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interpretations.  This uncertainty undermines the proportionality of response 
that should discourage further acts of international corruption.33 A system that 
does not address with equal severity the consequence of the successful 
commission of international corruption but rather focuses principally on its 
perpetrators, leaves open windows of opportunity that encourage risk-taking.  
Beck remarks that the principle of proportionality requires ‘a reasonable 
relation between the goal pursued and the means used.’34 He argues that the 
principle can only come into operation once a specific aim has been selected. 
Courts confronted with contracts tainted by corruption must balance the need 
to fight the insecurity caused by corruption on the one hand and the freedom of 
contract on the other. Decision making in respect of contracts tainted by 
corruption must not lose sight of the public interest that the criminalization of 
international corruption seeks to protect. 
10.3 Pitfalls of Current Approach  
Two major windows of opportunity emerge as a result of the dichotomy 
between the criminalization of corruption and the contracts that it leaves in its 
wake. The first window is the potential trade off of the gains to be made from 
the contract that results from a corrupt exchange. The second window is the 
potential to protect the contract tainted by corruption with the private law 
principles of freedom of contract as well as resorting to international 
arbitration. The windows of the ‘trade-off’ and ‘resort to international 
arbitration’ undermine current approaches to tackling international corruption 
to the extent that the element of uncertainty they engender supports an 
environment where the risk of engaging in corrupt behavior may not offer 
significant advantages over compliance. 
10.3.1 The Trade Off  
The choice between the violation of the prohibition and the contract that results 
from successfully committing acts of international corruption presents a net 
gain or net loss proposition. The choice here is not based so much on the 
deterrent effect of the criminal prohibition and the threat of punishment, as it is 
on the fact that such criminal behavior brings into place a transaction or 
contract of financial value. This creates a choice between the value to be 
gained as a result of the successful violation of the criminal rules, or the loss to 
                                                     
 
33   C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment (Chapter 12, The Purpose of Punishment), 
Translation by D. Young, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianopolis, 1986. 
34   G. Beck, ‘The idea of human rights between value pluralism and conceptual vagueness’, 25 
Penn State International Law Review, 2007, p. 615, at pp. 650-651. 
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be borne by adhering to the rules. The fact that the contract stands apart from 
the criminal process makes this choice possible. The contract left standing 
encourages speculative behavior that is premised on several factors: firstly, 
how high the risk of discovery is; secondly, even if discovered, how high the 
risk of successful prosecution and punishment is; and thirdly, whether in any 
case the potential profit to be made from the resulting contract outweighs the 
risk posed by punishment. 
The fundamental ethic of a corporation is the need to make a profit. Companies 
will favor a course of action that best boosts company earnings and satisfies 
shareholders. An environment that is essentially ‘silent’ on the contract tainted 
by corruption motivates choices that may not be present to the same degree in 
an environment that extends the punitive effects of criminalization to resulting 
contracts or transactions. Furthermore, where the satisfaction of shareholders 
can be quantified in terms other than company profits, the choices of 
corporations will be influenced by those terms. An environment that seeks to 
restore the interactions damaged by corrupt activity increases awareness about 
a corporation’s corrupt activity, damage caused to peoples or the environment, 
penalties, fines, disgorgement of profits, reputational implications, and suits by 
shareholders themselves. The risk to the corporation and changing 
considerations of shareholders that result from such an environment can 
positively influence compliance. 
The view of the corporation as an entity that makes rational choices35 
combined with the efficiency theories of law and economics,36 writers as well 
as public choice arguments37 suggest a growing understanding of the role of 
the environment on crime as well as preventative measures.38 Rational choice 
would defer to the most profitable course of action. On the supply side of the 
corruption equation, companies will weigh the course of action that will best 
boost company earnings and satisfy shareholders. The conditioning effect of 
the environment applies equally to the demand side of the bribery equation. 
The government official demanding a bribe benefits from the fact that the 
contracts resulting from the corrupt exchange are treated apart from the 
                                                     
 
35  D. Cornish, R. Clarke (Eds.), The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on 
Offending, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1986. 
36  R. Posner, ‘Optimal sentences for white collar criminals’, American Criminal Law Review, 
Vol. 17, at p. 409. 
37  S. Khanna, ‘Corporate crime legislation: a political economy analysis’, Washington University 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 82, 2004, p. 95. 
38  See for example the study by C.R.A. van der Sloot, where she argues that all recent crime 
control policy plans include preventative measures that target the facilitating circumstances 
present in the legitimate environment. C. van der Sloot, Organised Crime Prevention in the 
Netherlands: Exposing the Effectiveness of Preventative Measures, Boom Juridische 
Uitgevers, Den Haag, 2006, at p. 225 
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criminal acts. This strengthens the hand that demands the bribe. The 
environment in which a corrupt exchange takes place fundamentally influences 
the choice for compliance. From this viewpoint, creating an environment that 
encourages the choice for compliance is a critical factor in moving the fight 
against corruption forward. 
10.3.2 Resorting to Private Justice  
A second window opened by the contract left standing is the opportunity to 
protect the contracts by utilizing private systems of dispute settlement. For 
several decades the internationalization of world trade has resulted in strategies 
to minimize the risks associated with the lack of uniformity in national laws 
and practices. International arbitration is regarded as a risk-efficient, neutral 
method to resolve disputes regarding contracts of an international character 
and is premised on the fact that within the private sphere, persons are given the 
freedom to regulate their private transactions. The arbitration process is 
controlled by the parties to the dispute in a confidential process.39  
International arbitration is a private process of dispute settlement that is 
underpinned by the principle of freedom of contract. It is premised on the fact 
that within the private sphere persons are given the freedom to regulate their 
private transactions. The state ensures that the legitimate expectations created 
by such private agreements are met by giving into properly constituted 
agreements to arbitrate the force of law. The arbitration process is a private 
one, controlled by the parties to the dispute in a secret and confidential 
process.40 The principle of party autonomy gives parties to the dispute the 
freedom to decide on the place of arbitration, the rules that will govern the 
dispute, the procedure to be followed and most importantly the arbitrators that 
will decide the dispute.41 This process is safeguarded by an international 
                                                     
 
39  See Chapter 7 for a full description of the role of international arbitration and contracts tainted 
by corruption.  
40  See generally A. Redfern, M. Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2004, pp. 1-130.  
41  Lord Hoffmann in the recent case of West Tankers Inc (Respondents) v. RAS Riunione 
Adriatica di Sicurta SpA et al., [2007] UKHL 4, At Para. 17, states that:  
‘People engaged in commerce choose arbitration in order to be outside the procedures 
of any national court. They frequently prefer the privacy, informality and absence of 
any prolongation of the dispute by appeal which arbitration offers. Nor is it only a 
matter of procedure. The choice of arbitration may affect the substantive rights of the 
parties, giving the arbitrators the right to act as amiables compositeurs, apply broad 
equitable considerations, even a lex mercatoria which does not wholly reflect any 
national system of law.’  
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framework of rules that ensure worldwide enforcement of arbitration awards42 
and limited court intervention.43 
The fact that the bulk of international commercial contracts contain an 
arbitration clause means that contracts tainted by international corruption are 
more likely to fall under the jurisdiction of a private international arbitration 
panel than a national court of law.44 In short, the confidentiality of the 
international arbitration process can act as a layer of protection for contracts 
tainted by international corruption.  
10.3.3 Effect of Pitfalls 
The reality of the contract left standing creates an incentive for actors in the 
corrupt exchange to influence the discourse in a manner that protects the 
contract. This leads to a sort of double speak. There is on the one hand the 
worldwide acknowledgement of the detrimental consequences of international 
corruption and collective desire to see it eliminated, and, on the other hand, the 
exasperation of companies faced with real losses where the contract left 
standing goes to a more ‘amenable’ competitor. The official dialogue may 
become no more than mere talk, while the business of corruption continues in 
the ‘real’ world. Blundo describes this in terms of the ‘real’ functioning and 
the ‘official’ functioning of a state beset by corruption.45 Thus, while the 
existence of the anti-corruption rules may lend itself to best practices, the 
reality of the ‘street’ sustains a strong incentive to do what it takes to survive 
the competitiveness of international business. A tipping point of futility may be 
reached where the gains of the anti-corruption rules are eclipsed by the 
inadequacy of the system. This dynamic may lead to cracks in the consensus 
and the unified front against corruption. The contract left standing is at the 
                                                     
 
42  See in particular the United Nations Economic and Social Council 1958 New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (MAL).  
43  Art. 5 Model Arbitration Law adopted in many countries worldwide provides that ‘in matters 
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Arbitration, in O. Meyer (Ed.), Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, (Schriftenreihe des 
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45    G. Blundo, O. de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State, Zed Books, London/ New York 
2006, p. 4. 
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heart of this dichotomy, and profoundly influences the environment that shapes 
the occurrence of international corruption. 
Tarrullo remarked in 2004 that despite the impressive institutionalization of 
anti-corruption obligations and programs, ‘there is little evidence of any 
diminution in the incidence of corruption in, and by nationals of the … 
participating countries.’46 It would seem that this still holds true today. While 
there has certainly been a paradigm shift in the rhetoric against corruption and 
periodic high-profile cases that shows that it is no longer business as usual, 
there is also the view from the street, where the perception of ordinary citizens 
is that corruption is still a very present problem.  
As a response to the problem of international corruption, governments the 
world over have resorted, as a first line of defense, to more and more 
regulation. However, such regulation only superficially addresses the major 
conflict of interest problem at the core of international corruption. The conflict 
of interest problem is based to some degree on the fact that the realities of 
international commerce and globalization have made the public/private divide 
and the distinctions between public and private bribery, foreign and domestic 
bribery, and criminal as opposed to civil approaches to tackling bribery, more 
nuanced. Globalization is changing the frontiers of what used to be the realm 
of private as opposed to public law. The traditional role of the State as the 
provider of security is challenged by the increased participation of the private 
sector in the provision of security.47 It is also challenged by the instances 
where the State has joined in the fray as a private contractor and shareholder. It 
has indeed been asserted that sates ‘acting alone are no longer a sufficient 
means of producing security […]’.48 The private sector plays an increasingly 
important role in determining the rules that govern international trade, and the 
role of government is challenged by the blurring of the boundaries between 
public and private interests.  
On the part of the corporate world there has been a surge of initiatives in the 
establishment of compliance departments and corporate codes. In their 
                                                     
 
46  D. Tarullo, ‘The limits of institutional design: implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention’, Vol. 44, Iss. 3, Virginia Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 665-666. 
47  Some authors have referred to the TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
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48 L. Loader, N. Walker, ‘Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing,’ EU Working 
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response to the increasingly regulated business environment, the emphasis 
seems to be to institute and implement internal compliance systems. Indeed, 
the experience of prosecution in the United States suggests that the existence 
and consistency of application of such compliance systems can have a dramatic 
effect on the negotiating ability of a company where an infringement of anti-
corruption laws does occur. The presence or absence of an effective 
compliance system may also significantly increase or reduce the severity of 
punishment. It is therefore not only desirable, but also a matter of responsible 
management to establish such monitoring and compliance systems within a 
corporation. Indeed the corollary is true, that a multinational corporation in 
today’s business climate that does not have such a monitoring and compliance 
structure in place could well be liable for a breach of the duty of care.49 
However such a ‘cover-my-back mechanism’ may not suffice to displace the 
fundamental ethic of the corporation to make profit. The company culture may 
be reflected not so much in its codes and compliance structures as it is in the 
driving need to turn a profit. 
Increased regulation and high profile prosecutions certainly do imply that there 
is a changing tide, but they may also mean that international corruption has 
become more complex. The stakes of being caught are higher and therefore the 
amounts demanded as well as the strategies to avoid detection and distance the 
corruption from the corporation will also necessarily become more finely 
tuned. Criminalization creates a false separation between transactions that 
occur in the corrupt exchange and those that occur after the commission of the 
offense. Yet, all these transactions are in fact connected and shape the 
environment in which international corruption occurs. This suggests the need 
for an approach to sanctioning international corruption that accommodates 
transactions occurring at all levels of interaction. 
10.4 Anti-Corruption in a Quandary? 
Where does this state of affairs leave the fight against corruption? On the one 
hand there is no doubt that impressive strides have been made in the last three 
decades. The normative framework in which international corruption occurs 
has radically changed. There is content, definition and sanction for what has 
been identified as a common international problem. To this extent, this can be 
                                                     
 
49  In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996) the 
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reporting system in place could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty by the company’s board 
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described as triumph for the rule of law. The tendency toward disorder, where 
each party sets its own rules according to its own interests, has been set aside 
for a collective agreement that punishes international corruption for the benefit 
of all. Why then is international corruption still such a problem and why must 
we continue in our search for an efficacious strategy to combat corruption?   
Given the antiquity of the problem of corruption, it could be argued that 
corruption is an existentialist problem that is simply a part of human nature. It 
may even be the case that continuing to fight against such an inevitable aspect 
of human nature is the surest way to entrench it in deeper and make it more 
complex. This will consequently make international corruption more difficult 
to tackle and uncover. If this is the case, then criminalization and other 
attempts to solve the problem of international corruption may well serve to 
make the problem more systemic. 
The contrary argument to this point of view is that, the problem faced in 
tackling international corruption is symptomatic of the problems of governance 
in a global environment that lacks a nexus of governance. To articulate the rule 
of law in this context, strategies that anticipate dispersed sovereignty and 
sanction must be adopted. The challenge faced by traditional sovereign-
centered strategies characterized by the criminal law approach should not be 
seen as a sign of the intractableness of the problem, but rather as an indication 
that the approach adopted may need to be adapted to meet the challenges posed 
by a society that is supranational in character. At this level, traditional 
divisions between the public and private sectors, and public and private law are 
changing.50 Perhaps, not surprisingly, traditional approaches may prove 
insufficient to meet the particular issues raised by this form of society. 
The aforementioned conflict of interest cut across several levels. Governments 
are on the lookout for economic growth and expansion for the good of their 
citizens. This produces a lack of political will to prosecute companies that are 
bringing in that economic growth and expansion. Again, government officials 
engaged in acts of international corruption represent the very group in society 
that is charged with the protection of the public against such acts of corruption. 
Thus a conflict emerges that pits the private interests of an elite group against 
the interests of the common population. Another conflict of interest emerges at 
the level of the corporation that is on the losing side of a corrupt deal. This is 
the conflict between throwing good money after bad, or cutting one’s loses. 
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Often, the participants affected by a corrupt exchange may have good reasons 
to let sleeping dogs lie. 
Fighting against the status quo must contend with the fault lines of conflicts of 
interest and recognize the limitations faced by such a deeply conflicted group 
of actors. Beccaria’s dream of a society protected by its sovereign, who uses 
punishment to deter the commission of harmful acts, falters where sovereignty 
is dispersed; where the sovereign is a part of the problem and society itself is 
complex, fragmented and self-regulatory. Nonetheless, the detrimental effects 
of international corruption and its negative social consequences motivate the 
need to continue seeking effective schemes of restraint. The first has been the 
restraint sought in criminalization. The question that arises in view of the 
mixed results of criminalization is whether an alternative conceptual 
framework may help to concretize the foundation laid by criminalization. 
10.5 Changing the Conceptual Framework 
Three features stand out in the environment that influences international 
corruption: the first is the regulatory framework; secondly, the contracts that 
come into being as a result of the successful violation of the anti-corruption 
rules and are the immediate result of international corruption; and thirdly, the 
damage suffered by persons affected directly or indirectly by the effects of the 
contract. There is a clear distinction between the influence exerted by the 
contract that results from the violation of anti-corruption rules and the 
corruption damage suffered by victims as a result of corruption. The former 
embodies the actions of parties acting on their own free will to enter into and 
negotiate a binding agreement, while the latter is founded in the occurrence of 
a legal wrong that arises in the absence of any contractual relationship. This is 
typical of the division between contract and tort obligations. Both of these 
obligations fall within the purview of private law. However, there is a line of 
congruence in that in both cases the redress sought in consequence of the 
breach of obligations arising under contract or tort law is initiated 
independently of the state. 
The direct line of consequence between the legal rules prohibiting international 
corruption and the resulting contract as well as the damage resulting from 
international corruption is one that is somewhat blurred by the strict division 
between public and private law. In real life such demarcations are not so clear-
cut. This divide creates a distortion that influences the environment in which 
the prohibited acts of corruption take place. While some aspects of the 
corruption in interaction are caught within the ambit of the traditional criminal 
law regulation, several aspects of this interaction lie beyond the reach of 
criminalization in the sphere of private law. An artificial public/private 
boundary does not accord with the realities of the corruption environment. 
Adopting a transaction approach places the corrupt exchange in the context of 
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its environment and provides a holistic view of the processes of the corruption 
exchange. 
Corruption occurs in interaction. It stands to reason that attempts to curtail 
corruption should address that process of interaction. Changing the focus of 
the fight against corruption from the individual to the transactions that arise 
between the various participants involved in the corrupt exchange, enables the 
complex mechanisms that underlie the process of international corruption to be 
viewed as a cohesive whole. Typical international business interactions that 
may involve corruption include corporate fraud, private-to-private corruption, 
private-to-public corruption, market collusion, cartels, as well as corporate 
lobbying.51 Attempts by succeeding governments,52 the competitor who has 
lost a bid as a result of unethical practices,53 shareholders,54 principals,55 and 
non-governmental organizations along with ordinary citizens56 to institute 
claims based on acts of bribery and corruption provide a rough typology of 
‘victims.’57 For such victims private remedies may offer a more effective 
method of recovery and relief.58 There is, however, an even larger group of 
                                                     
 
51  Transparency International, 2009, ‘Report on Corruption in the Private Sector’, Global 
Corruption Barometer Report, pp. 13-75.  
52  See for example the BBC News report ‘Abacha Accounts to be Frozen’, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1576527.stm.  
53  An example is the US case of Lamb v. Philip Morris 915 F.2d 1024, (6th Cir. 24 August 
1990), where Kentucky tobacco farmers filed a civil suit against Philip Morris and BAT 
arguing that the ‘donations’ promised by the defendants’ subsidiaries amounted to unlawful 
inducements designed and intended to restrain trade.   
54  A good example is in re Immucor, 2006, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72335 (N.D. Ga. 4 October 2006). 
After Immucor announced that it was to be formally investigated by the SEC for violations 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, this prompted shareholders to file a complaint under 
Sections 10-b and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The shareholders claimed that Immucor had 
understated the potential number of FCPA violations for improper payments that it was facing, 
reporting the SEC investigations as an ‘isolated event.’ It turned out that there had been several 
acts of corruption committed by Immucor over a period of several years. 
55  For example in the 2003 Tesco Stores case, Mr. Pork, a manager in Tesco’s e-commerce, was 
found to have received a bribe of ₤323,749.99 from a customer that did business with Tesco, 
Delta Computer Systems (UK) Ltd. 
56  E.g. the civil action by Transparency International (France) and Mr. Gregory Ngbwa Mintsa, a 
Gabonese citizen, in December 2008 to call for an investigation into how large amounts of real 
estate and other assets were acquired in France by presidents Denis Sassou N’Guesso of 
Congo, Omar Bongo-Ondimba of Gabon and Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea. 
See Press release by Transparency International (France),  
 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2009/2009_05_06_fra
nce_case. 
57   See Chapter 8 for a full discussion of the international framework for private redress and the 
methods and strategies that have been used to institute private legal actions for harm suffered 
as a result of corrupt acts. See also A. Makinwa, International Corruption and the Privatization 
of Security, in M. Hildebrandt, M. Makinwa, A. Oehmichen (Eds.), Controlling Security in a 
Culture of Fear, Boom Publishers, The Hague, 2010, p. 99, at pp. 112-119.  
58   T. Graham, ‘The Implications for Intermediaries Handling the Proceeds of Corruption: The 
Abacha Case Study’. Presented at the ‘Stop Money Laundering!’- Conference, 26 February 
2002, London.  
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persons that suffer the damage of international corruption. These are the 
indirect victims, citizens of states whose social, economic and political 
progress is negatively impacted by corruption. The direct and indirect victims 
of international corruption are much closer to the damage suffered than a 
paternalistic state. They are also motivationally better situated to seek redress 
for the harm they have suffered. 
An approach to fighting international corruption that takes into cognizance the 
factors in the legal environment that encourage or catalyze the occurrence of 
corruption and also those factors that result from it, provides a coherent view 
of the processes of the corrupt exchange. The legal environment that surrounds 
the commission of international corruption includes not just the perpetrators of 
the offense, but also the persons whose trust has been abused by acts of 
corruption as victims who have suffered damage as a result of the corruption 
that has occurred, as well as the consequences of corruption in the transactions 
and contracts that remain following acts of corruption. A multi-level 
framework in the fight against corruption reflects the complexity of the factors 
that play a role in shaping the environment in which corruption occurs. 
Articulating these levels of interaction is an important conceptual basis upon 
which to formulate strategies to fight corruption. 
10.6 Levels of Interaction 
The interconnectedness of acts of corruption and their consequences suggests 
that to effectively address the damage caused by international corruption, the 
various levels of interactions impacted by the corrupt exchange should be 
taken into account. This book identifies three main levels of such interactions, 
which can be referred to as the mandate, violation and consequence levels. 
10.6.1 The Mandate Level 
Government officials do not exist in a vacuum but are bearers of a mandate 
granted to them as the representatives of citizens. The government official is an 
agent not just of the government on whose behalf the official negotiates but, 
more pertinently, of the people, who put the government in power. Actions that 
harm the public interest are outside the mandate of representatives. Where an 
act of international corruption occurs, there is a breach of mandate. This 
affront to the public interest is at the heart of anti-corruption regulations and 
strategy.  
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International corruption represents a classic case of a breach of trust. This trust 
embodies the duty to act in the best interest of the public to whom this trust is 
owed. The breach of the public trust has far-reaching consequences and 
eventually threatens the social fabric. The abuse of mandate by international 
corruption results in the coming into being of contracts that are won not on the 
basis of the best bid, but on the basis of the party most willing to give a bribe. 
This results in the systematic corrosion of the institutions of government, as the 
responsibility to the public is abdicated for the pursuit of private gain. 
Ultimately the public interest also embodies private interests because in the 
absence of an effective and efficient public sector, the private sector cannot 
function optimally. Framing the discussion in these terms immediately 
broadens the scope of anti-corruption strategies to include the articulation and 
protection of the interests of the grantees of the public mandate. Seen this way, 
a primary function of anti-corruption strategy is the restoration of the trust 
breached by addressing the damage done to the givers of the public mandate by 
acts of corruption. 
It is clear that from a mandate perspective, in every instance where an act of 
corruption occurs, there is a breach of mandate. Outside of this foundational 
context, corruption is sometimes viewed as a victimless crime because it is 
conceptualized as a private agreement occurring with the consent of 
transacting parties.59 Ruggiero makes the point that the study of corruption 
tends to focus on the individuals who have been involved in the corrupt 
exchange with the result that corruption ends up ‘being assimilated to a form of 
victimless crime, where the actors involved are equally determined to 
participate in the exchange and pursue their private if illegal interest.’60 
Ruggerio rightly argues that ‘the impact of the corrupt exchange may not be 
perceived when attention is only centered on the specific setting in which it 
takes place.’61 Indeed the full impact of corruption is felt beyond the specific 
instances in which it takes place precisely because it represents an abuse of a 
mandate that results in harm to the givers of that mandate. Beyond the specific 
contractual relationships of the bribe-giver, the bribe recipient and the person 
to whom the bribe-recipient stands in a position of trust, there is a larger group 
of indirect victims who are affected by the consequences of corruption. These 
                                                     
 
59   Some writers argue that there is also a psychological reason for corruption being perceived as a 
victimless crime. They state that ‘On most cases of public corruption, given that there is a 
mishandling of public resources, it is often stated that the whole society is being harmed and 
because the whole society isn’t a proper name or a person, harming society as a whole is a 
sentence that won’t trigger regret or aversion.’ They further state that when a victim is not 
identified or perceived, there is no reason for thinking that harm is being inflicted and mirror 
areas of the brain are not activated. See E. Salcedo-Albarán, I. De León-Beltrán, M. Rubio, 
‘Feelings, brain and prevention of corruption’, Vol. 3, Iss. 3, International Journal of 
Psychology, 2008, p. 2, at pp. 11ff. 
60  V. Ruggiero, Crime and Markets: Essays in Anti-Criminology, OUP, Oxford, 2006, at p. 106. 
61  Id. 
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are the mandate-givers who suffer damage and loss as a result of the corrupt 
actions of their governing officials and elite.  
In the corruption exchange, the norm violation is directly linked to the 
relationship between the parties. It is the damage to that relationship that 
triggers the injury that is occasioned by international corruption. 62 Entering 
into a position of conflict of interest is a breach of mandate because of the 
secrecy that accompanies the agreement to give a bribe. In the interactions 
between the parties involved or affected by the corrupt exchange, the mandate-
giver is kept in the dark. Clearly if the agreement to accept a bribe has the 
consent of the party to whom the duty is owed, there is no question of bribery 
or corruption. The element of secrecy by the bribe-recipient is directed at the 
mandate-giver, and is an abuse of the mandate. This secrecy can only be 
directed at the mandate-giver and from this perspective the injury caused by 
this act of secrecy accrues to the mandate-giver. This identifies the real victims 
at the violation level of corruption in interaction. 
Secrecy has been referred to as a key distinguishing element of the bribery 
transaction.63 It has been remarked that ‘the real evil is not the payment of 
money but the secrecy attending to it’.64 The term secrecy in the international 
corruption discourse is probably best interpreted as a lack of consent.65 The 
fact is that in many countries, particularly those rated poorly on the 
Transparency International Indexes, corruption is an open secret. The 
perception of people is that it is an increasing phenomenon and that their 
government officials are on the take. Clearly there is knowledge about the 
general fact of bribery if not necessarily the specific case. However, general 
knowledge does not equate to consent. For a bribe to lose its character as a 
bribe there has to have been consent to its occurrence. Referring to the lack of 
                                                     
 
62   Discussing the meaning of fiduciary relationship, the courts in Wilson v. Hurstanger Ltd 
[2007] EWCA Civ 299, stated that it was one where the agent was required to ‘act loyally for 
the defendants and not put himself into a position where he had a ‘conflict of interest’; see 
Para. 34. 
63  Lord Romer remarked on the definition of a bribe, ‘If a gift be made to a confidential agent 
with the view of inducing the agent to act in favour of the donor in relation to transactions 
between the donor and the agent’s principal and that gift is secret as between the donor and the 
agent—that is to say, without the knowledge and consent of the principal—then the gift is a 
bribe in the view of the law.’ Hovenden and Sons v. Millhoff [1900] 83 L.T. 41, at p. 40. 
64  Chitty J. Shipway v. Broadway [1889] 1 QB p.369 and p. 373. As has been remarked, ‘If a gift 
be made to a confidential agent with the view of inducing the agent to act in favour of the 
donor in relation to transactions between the donor and the agent’s principal and that gift is 
secret as between the donor and the agent – that is to say, without the knowledge and consent 
of the principal – then the gift is a bribe in the view of the law.’ See Hovenden and Sons v. 
Millhoff, [1900] 83 L.T. 41, at p. 43. 
65  Consent requires that the party to whom the fiduciary duty is owed has ‘full knowledge of all 
the material circumstances and of the nature and the extent of [the agent’s] interest’. Wilson v. 
Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299, Para. 35.   
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secrecy as a lack of consent is representative of the nature of bribery across 
various levels of interaction.  
Referring to the lack of secrecy in terms of a lack of consent further 
emphasizes the relationship between the mandate-giver and the perpetrators of 
acts of corruption. A transaction approach sees the party whose trust is 
betrayed not only in the narrow terms of the classic ‘principal’ of a corrupted 
agent, but more broadly in terms in the mandate-givers who have entrusted a 
public official with specific duties. The challenge lies in formulating the 
theoretical framework for this notion of ‘trust’ and the consequent remedies for 
its breach.  
A transaction approach makes a direct link between acts of international 
corruption and the abuse of mandate that it represents. Such a perspective 
views criminal law boundaries as artificial to the extent that the definition of 
the criminal offense excludes the actual victims. Seen in this way, a primary 
function of anti-corruption rules should be the restoration of the trust breached 
by addressing the damage suffered to the grantees of the abused mandate. The 
challenge this raises is how to encourage and facilitate the process of 
restoration of trust in the sanctioning processes for international corruption. 
The mandate level of the corrupt exchange brings to the fore the particular 
problem of the indirect victim of the corrupt exchange and the larger issue of 
the nature of the social contract in a global age. 
10.6.2 The Violation Level 
The next level interaction can be described as the violation level, where the 
giving and acceptance of a bribe occurs. This is the familiar terrain of criminal 
law. It is also the level at which the private law discourse about corruption 
primarily occurs. The public and private articulations of corruption share a 
common core and the fundamental substance of the interaction is the same. 
Public law looks to the bribe-recipient and the bribe-giver as the offenders who 
stand on both sides of the corruption agreement, and sanction their actions via 
punishment. Private law looks at the relationships and contracts that arise 
between the bribe-giver, the bribe recipient and the principal of the bribe-
recipient the resulting contracts as tainted by the breach of the obligation to act 
in the best interest of that principal. The remit of public and private law is the 
agreement (contract) to give a bribe. The focus of criminal law is somewhat 
narrower than private law in that it focuses solely on the bribe-giver and the 
bribe-recipient, whereas private law also addresses the position of the mandate 
giving principal. To the extent that the contract to give a bribe is central to 
public and private law discourse, it can be asserted that the substance of the 
interaction is the same. Indeed the actors are the same. If this is the case then 
the outcome of that interaction from the viewpoint of the law should be 
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consistent. From a violation perspective the logical result of an interaction that 
is in substance alike, is that the consequential response is similar.  
The nature of a bribe in public and private law discourse is fundamentally the 
same. The giving of a bribe creates a conflict-of-interest situation.66 This 
conflict-of-interest situation causes the injury that both the public and private 
law seek to avoid in their responses. The Civil Law Convention highlights this 
conflict-of-interest issue where it describes corruption as an act that ‘distorts 
the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of the 
bribe.’67 The criminal law statutes do not explicitly focus on the conflict-of-
interest issues that occur in the violation of the duty to act in the best interest of 
the party to whom the duty is owed. However, this is implied in the description 
of the offense, which speaks of corruption as an act that causes an ‘official to 
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.’68 The 
official duty of the official is owed to a mandate-giver that stands just outside 
of the criminal law formulation. The acting or refraining from acting creates a 
conflict situation between the government official and the party to whom the 
official owes the duty to act properly.  
The violation level brings to the fore the need for a broader notion of sanction 
when applied to artificial persons. The emphasis is not so much on fines or 
incarceration as it is on taking the profit out of corrupt exchanges, punitive 
damages, disgorgement, constructive trusts, disbarments from bidding for 
public contracts and strategies that encourage corporate behaviour that enables 
sanction to be negotiated and the avoidance of public processes of criminal 
prosecution. The violation level also raises questions about the access to justice 
by the direct but also the indirect victims of corruption, as well as the role of 
international arbitration in the policing of corruption. Most importantly, the 
development of a public-private partnership is particularly crucial at this level 
to encourage voluntary self-policing and disclosure by actors in the corrupt 
exchange. 
10.6.3 The Consequence Level 
A third level of corruption in interaction is the consequence level. This level of 
interaction results from the breach of trust at the mandate level and the 
                                                     
 
66   In Anangel Atlas v. Ishikawajima-Harima [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 526, a UK court posed the 
question, ‘what is the essential nature of a bribe? …’ In the view of the court the test for 
determining whether a payment constituted a bribe was: ‘whether or not the making of it gives 
rise to a conflict of interest, that is to say, puts the agent into a position where his duty and 
interest conflict.’  
67   Art. 2 CLC. 
68  Art. 15 UNCC; Art. 1 OECD Convention. 
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successful breach of the anti-corruption rules that occurs at the violation level 
of interaction. The focus of interaction at this level is the contract that comes 
into existence as a result of the fact that the anticorruption rules have been 
successfully violated. The contract left standing influences behavior and 
affects the deterrent effect of anti-corruption strategies. Allowing persons to 
benefit from contracts resulting from bribery transactions is a contradiction to 
the logic of the anti-corruption rules. Without due consideration of the effects 
of the consequence level, progress in the fight against international corruption 
is seriously compromised. The contract left standing, as a contract between 
‘consenting parties,’ is often a private contract to which the rules and 
principles of private contracts should apply. However, to adopt this reasoning 
is to ignore the manner in which the contract came into being in the first place, 
which could set up private law as a cloak for transactions that go against the 
public interest.  
The interactions at the consequence level are also complicated by the blurring 
of the lines between the public and private sectors. The normative framework 
that gives content and definition to international corruption puts the state 
through its government officials, and international companies at the center of 
the corruption conundrum. These are the principal parties to the transactions 
that result from international corruption and raises questions about the ability 
of the state via its government officials to act as an effective and independent 
provider of security regarding such corruption. As Friedmann points out, ‘the 
increasing participation of public authorities in contracts creates the wider and 
as yet generally unexplored problem of the dual function of the state, as a 
superior and as an equal.’69  
The interaction between the public and private sectors is all the more 
complicated because the traditional dichotomy between the sectors is 
collapsing. Inherent principles in liberal thinking are the freedom of the 
individual and the limited role of the state, which assumes a distinction 
between the private and public spheres of activity. The liberal notion of 
freedom of contract assumes a freedom to create and confer legal rights and 
obligations in a private self-regulating system.70 In this private sphere the 
interest of the individual is the primary focus and not that of the society. Yet, 
in modern times, the state is increasingly joining the fray as a private 
contractor and shareholder.71 This challenges the notion that the state 
                                                     
 
69. W. Friedmann, ‘Changing functions of contract in common law’, University of Toronto Law 
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 15, 1951-1952, at p. 23. 
70   H. Collins, Regulating Contracts, OUP, Oxford, 1999, at pp. 57-58. 
71   L. Backer, ‘The private law of public law: public authorities as shareholders, golden shares, 
sovereign wealth funds, and the public law element in private choice of law’, Tulane Law 
Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2008, p. 62.  
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represents and protects the public interest in a public/private transaction. The 
autonomy of the private contractor conflicts with the paternalistic state. In such 
a framework, where does the nexus of governance lie? Clearly the provision of 
security in this overlapping zone cannot be easily ascribed to the state.  
 
Figure 2. Summary – Levels of Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where private transactions impact the society because of their public 
dimension, the role of the private contractor state as protector of the public 
interest merges with the actions of a private player in a contract transaction. 
How does one reconcile the role of the state as a private contractor with that of 
the protector of the public interest? Where the government becomes a private 
actor, governance must be abdicated or reconstructed. Harden remarks that the 
conceptual divide between ‘public’ and ‘private’ has ceased to correspond to 
the way the world actually works. ‘Legal structures and ways of thought need 
to be re-adapted accordingly’.72  
Some of the issues that are emphasized at the consequence level of the corrupt 
exchange are the status of contracts tainted by international corruption, the 
contract as a regulatory tool, the empowerment of individuals seeking redress in 
private rights of action, the encouragement of private litigation by extending 
                                                     
 
72  I. Harden, The Contracting State, Open University Press, Buckingham, UK, 1992, p. 4. 
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standing to sue to indirect victims who suffer damage as a result of acts of 
corruption, facilitating private litigation in the fight against corruption by 
adopting schemes that reward the private litigant for protecting the public 
interest as well as the facilitation of class actions and defrayment of litigation 
costs. Furthermore at the consequence level developing an environment where 
the choice for compliance becomes the rational choice means expanding the 
potential for private disclosure of acts of corruption by developing robust 
whistle-blower protection.  
10.7 Advantages of a Transaction Approach 
A transaction approach anticipates and addresses issues that occur at the 
various levels of the corrupt exchange in a single coherent narrative. Focusing 
on the transaction can be viewed broadly as a restorative approach that 
‘emphasizes repairing the harm caused by crime,’73 in a restitutive process.74 It 
is a form of restorative justice where the aim is to repair the ‘harm caused or 
revealed by criminal behavior.’75 It also portrays security in terms of a process 
that seeks to retie the cords of broken interactions in a bid to promote social 
harmony. By addressing the injury caused to victims, stripping away profits 
made from corruption and challenging the validity of transactions tainted by or 
resulting from international corruption, a transaction approach can expiate the 
‘outrage to morality.’76 This translates the need for vengeance into a format 
that corresponds with a ‘soulless’ corporation. The effect of undoing the injury 
caused by the transaction may provide a powerful incentive to ensure that 
transactions are not of the sort that may suffer the risk of ‘being undone.’  
Where government officials are key players in the corruption equation, 
recourse must certainly come from other sources. A transaction approach to 
fighting corruption enables a change in perspective that identifies the areas that 
catalyze such recourse. This approach broadens the purpose of the sanction in 
the fight against corruption from not just punishment of the offender, but also 
to the effect of breaches of mandate and the contract left standing as a result of 
a successful violation of the anti-corruption rules. Looking at corruption in 
                                                     
 
73  See http://www.restorativejustice.org/. There is no consensus definition of the term ‘restorative 
justice’. However, one aspect that seems to be shared by writers in this field is the viewpoint 
from the perspective of the victim rather than the offender or in terms of restoring the social 
contract of society rather than punishment of the victim. See general discussion in H. Zehr, B. 
Toews (Eds.), Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, NY, 
William Publishing, Devon, UK, 2004, pp. 1-47. 
74  Durkheim’s view of the devolution of repressive law and the growth of restitutive law as 
societies become more complex is particularly relevant in the context of the highly complex 
and differentiated society of trading nations represents. A. Giddens (Ed.), Emile Durkheim: 
Selected Writings, CUP, Cambridge, 1972, p. 126, at pp. 130-140. 
75  http://www.restorativejustice.org/.  
76  A. Giddens (Ed.), Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings, id., at p. 126.  
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interaction enables these perspectives to be viewed in a process that 
encourages coherency. 
The normative foundation laid by criminal law at the violation level is 
augmented by the potential of private law in addressing issues raised at the 
mandate and consequences level. Here lies the potential of private law and the 
involvement of civil society.77 At the consequence level, the ability of private 
law to follow the money and not just the offender brings economic and 
reputational consequences that can be of serious significance for commercial 
players. In this sense, private law may in many ways be better equipped to 
ensure that the principal actors in international corruption − the multinational 
corporations and government officials − do not profit from their crimes.  
Looking at corruption in a series of interactions helps to emphasize the fact 
that the path to progress in the fight against corruption must explore methods 
of overcoming the monopoly of the state in the initiation of the sanctioning 
process. Private law processes of dispute settlement have a role to play in the 
fight against corruption. The private action brought by litigants before courts 
of law or, as is more likely in international commercial disputes, before 
international arbitration tribunals, can play a vital role in ensuring that the 
ramifications of the criminalization of international corruption are consistently 
applied in private transactions amongst individuals.78 
A transaction approach encourages coherency across the public and private law 
divide in the fight against international corruption by, on the one hand 
recognizing the role of criminal law and regulation, and on the other 
recognizing the role of private law in policing the transactions, rights and 
obligations that occur in corrupt interactions. The transaction approach also 
recognizes that the intricateness of the interaction between the public and 
private sectors as well as between private and public law implies that a solely 
criminal law approach or private law approach may not be sufficiently flexible 
to deal with the range of issues that occur in the corrupt exchange. A lack of 
flexibility leaves vital elements out of the process of redress. Yet, these 
elements interact together and influence the final outcomes of successful anti-
corruption strategy. The process of identifying and restoring transactions and 
relationships compromised by corruption broadens the corruption discourse to 
                                                     
 
77  A. Portnoy and J. Murino speak of an imminent front that is being opened by ‘private parties 
now joining the fight against corruption.’ See ‘Private actions under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: an imminent front?’, IBA’s International Litigation News, April 2009. 
78  A. Makinwa, Civil Remedies for International Corruption: The Role of International 
Arbitration, id., Note 44 above. 
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embrace elements such as breaches of trust, contracts, assets, and damage 
caused by corrupt exchanges. A transaction approach encourages a broader 
perspective in juristic formulations.  
The existing normative framework that gives content and definition to 
international corruption puts the state, government officials and international 
companies at the center of the corruption conundrum. This raises questions 
about the ability of the state, via its government officials, to act as an effective 
and independent provider of security regarding international corruption. The 
persistence of international corruption motivates the need for new models of 
intervention. By linking the interactions affected by the corrupt exchange at the 
various levels and drawing a consistent line from mandate to consequence, a 
transaction approach provides a basis to review existing principles and theory 
in a coherent single narrative.  
The transaction approach throws up three basic challenges. These challenges 
are firstly, the articulation of the notion of trust and the consequences for its 
breach that occurs at the mandate level; secondly, the incorporation of the 
process of restoration of trust in the sanctioning processes for violations of 
anti-corruption rules; and thirdly, the regulation of the consequences of 
corruption in the differentiation, interpretation and enforcement of contracts 
tainted by international corruption. Addressing these challenges may help to 
move the fight against corruption in a positive direction.   
10.8 Conclusion  
This chapter proposes a shift in the conceptual framework in the fight against 
corruption that moves the corruption discourse beyond its traditional focus on 
sanctioning the offender to focusing on the transactions that are tainted by the 
corrupt exchange. The transaction approach proposed in this chapter identifies 
the mandate, violation and consequence levels of interactions as critical stages 
in the corrupt exchange where interventions can be made to provide security. 
By seeking to restore interactions damaged by corrupt exchanges, the 
transaction approach can empower victims, bypass the monopoly of the state 
to initiate sanctions, and exploit the pragmatism of the international 
marketplace. In this terrain, the dynamics of contracting that underpin the 
entire trading system can be harnessed as a regulatory tool.  
In a changing international society, principles of justice must adapt to this new 
terrain. Looking at corruption as a series of interactions helps to emphasize the 
fact that the path to progress in the fight against corruption must explore nodes 
of governance beyond the state and capitalize on the fact that a vital node of 
governance is emerging from the growing role of private actors in international 
society. By addressing ‘broken’ interactions, the environment in which 
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corruption occurs becomes less predictable in that there are several points of 
intervention to trigger the sanctioning processes for corrupt acts.  Such an 
environment is arguably one that better encourages compliance with anti-
corruption rules.  
The transaction approach to fighting corruption looks to the environment of 
international trade as the critical element in encouraging or discouraging 
compliance with the anti-corruption rules. The purpose of sanction is seen not 
so much in terms of vengeance and retribution but rather in terms of creating 
an environment that encourages compliance. Looking beyond state-centered 
theories of punishment opens the door to developing models of sanction that 
may be more consistent with the realities of the agreement-based environment 
in which international corruption occurs. Finally, while this chapter is specific 
to the challenge of international corruption, a larger script that emerges is a 
viewpoint that sees the provision of security as a shared function of public and 
private law in an emerging international society. 
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Chapter 11 
Final Conclusions  
 
‘The human donkey requires either a carrot in front or a stick behind to goad it into 
activity.’ 
The Economist1 
 
The last 30 years have witnessed a fundamental change in the approach to 
fighting corruption. There has been a shift from a focus on fighting corruption 
on the so-called demand-side of corruption to tackling corruption at the place 
of origin of bribes and other inducements i.e. the supply-side of corruption. 
There has also been a shift from fighting primarily domestic corruption to 
fighting corruption that occurs in other countries. Furthermore there is global 
consensus on the criminalization of corruption occurring in business 
transactions. This progress notwithstanding the ominous scale of corruption 
world-wide makes it clear that these are only the first steps of what is still a 
challenging journey. The perception remains that governments are ‘ineffective 
in the fight against corruption’ 
This book has argued that one of the causes of the seeming ‘ineffectiveness’ in 
the fight against corruption are the structural gaps of criminalization especially 
when transposed into an international environment. These gaps, to a certain 
extent, can be overcome by private law processes. Where the state is a major 
actor in grand scale corruption, the monopoly on initiating sanction held by 
that same state under the criminal processes creates a conflict of interest that 
impedes effective enforcement. Furthermore, the international environment of 
an integrated world economy renders state-based solutions to international 
crimes problematic. A lack of effective enforcement sets into motion a vicious 
cycle of impunity. The failure of the rule of law leads to a further breakdown 
of order and development.  
This book has tried to show that that the consequences of successful acts of 
bribery are not sufficiently addressed within the existing criminal law 
formulations. Yet, these consequences play a central role in the international 
                                                     
 
1   ‘The Carrot and the Stick’, The Economist, 29 June 1946. Reprinted in American Affairs, Vol. 
8, No. 4, 1946, p. 282. 
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transacting environment. They act as an incentive for risk taking on the part of 
corporations. As a result of this, corruption may in fact become more complex 
and even harder to detect as a response to criminalization. Simply put, 
corruption is not an abstraction but takes shape in the form of agreements, 
payments, kickbacks and other transactions. The disconnect between public 
deterrence and private consequence is one that needs to be surmounted in order 
to bring coherency to the fight against corruption. 
A central theme of this book is that private remedies can change the 
sanctioning environment for corruption in a manner that positively influences 
compliance. An environment that makes contracts tainted by corruption open 
to challenge, encourages and rewards private litigants and encourages self-
reporting by offenders can fundamentally change the behavior of corporations 
and other actors in corrupt exchanges. Simply put, it is the environment, not 
the anti-corruption rules per se, that influences the choice for or against 
compliance. The rule merely creates the standard against which choices are 
made. The environment influences the choice that is made.  
This book suggests that private actors will play an important role in filling the 
remedial gaps in the fight against corruption. Private remedies for corruption 
cover the range of private-actor led legal actions to remedy harm occasioned as 
a result of corruption. Unlike public law, which concentrates on punishing the 
offender, private remedies are centered on transactions. This book places the 
private actor in a central role in the fight against corruption and represents a 
shift from traditional state centered-criminal law approaches. This is a logical 
extension of the international repudiation of corruption in business transactions 
as well as of the changing international regulatory environment. The future of 
the fight against corruption will see the increasing use of private initiatives as 
well as private-public partnerships. This concluding chapter presents the final 
conclusions on the foundations for private remedies, the models of private 
remedies and the emerging international framework discussed in this book. 
11.1 The Foundation for Private Remedies 
The challenges of fighting corruption are complex and far-reaching. Therefore, 
it is important to put any discussion about strategies to fight corruption within 
the larger context of the social, economic and political realities that present 
great challenges to fighting corruption. The slow progress in turning the tide 
and the yearly statistics from data collection institutes such as Transparency 
International emphasizes the fact that there are no easy solutions to be had. 
Corruption is insidious and resilient. The motivation for continued attempts to 
develop effective strategies to fight it is in response to the threat corruption 
poses to our way of life, to social security and economic development. The 
stark effects of corruption make it imperative to continually evaluate current 
approaches and, by identifying gaps, to shift the focus of anti-corruption 
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strategy to these areas. This is the principal motivation for this book. Private 
remedies for corruption address a gap in the present anti-corruption discourse 
that predominantly revolves around state-centered approaches in the fight 
against corruption.  
The challenges and threats posed by corruption have occasioned an 
international response in a line that can be drawn from the watershed US 
FCPA to the global UNCC. This can be viewed as a first-stage response to 
corruption in international business transactions. The resulting international 
regulatory framework provides a baseline of legality upon which rules 
repudiating corruption across diverse jurisdictions and legal systems have 
taken shape. The criminalization of corruption in international business, 
whether of a public or private nature, is now a fundamental principle of 
worldwide application. To the extent that bribery in business transactions is 
now criminalized by a variety of national, regional, intergovernmental and 
international instruments, the horizon for private remedies has become more 
visible. 
The fundamental first-level consensus regarding international corruption that 
has taken shape over the last three decades provides the foundation and 
motivation for this work on private remedies. However, it should be noted that 
the technical definition of international corruption is only a starting point. The 
repudiation of international corruption has provided a baseline of legality that 
is expanded in its application. It provides a common basis of agreement and 
strategy in the fight against corruption, but also, and maybe more importantly, 
it provides a global basis for national public policy against corruption in 
business transactions in general. Furthermore, as the cases and laws reviewed 
in this book show, the business environment and the legal mechanisms 
supporting it have outgrown the public and private distinction. The one 
category that remains the focal point of strategy and reform is corruption in 
commercial transactions. 
In a global trading system characterized by a plurality of systems and values, 
this first-level consensus provides a ‘starting point’, where the public policy of 
140 state parties of the UNCC is the same. In many ways the private law 
approach to corruption in an international environment is a second-level 
response that must piggyback a first-level international consensus repudiating 
and defining corruption. In the absence of such a consensus, talk of an 
international framework for private remedies is grossly premature. However, 
the corollary is also true. In the presence of an international consensus 
repudiating acts of corruption in business transactions as criminal acts, the 
expansion of the role of private remedies for corruption is inevitable. 
The central role of the FCPA in these developments cannot be 
overemphasized. The FCPA not only catalyzed the movement that led to the 
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worldwide criminalization of corruption in business transactions; the process 
of implementing the FCPA has produced a model of the private-public 
partnership that is providing great impetus to the role of the private actor in the 
sanctioning of corruption. This is creating a convergence of law, public policy 
and best practices that hangs over every business transaction whether national 
or international. The model of implementation of the FCPA has significantly 
affected the anti-corruption discourse from punishment ex post to prevention 
and compliance ex ante.  
This process is shifting the focus of the sanctioning environment from a 
singular focus on the punishment of the offender to the role of the private 
actor. One can draw a lesson from the principle of functional equivalence 
adopted under the OECD Convention as a pragmatic strategy to ensure the 
attainment of regulatory aims by seeking compliance in a manner ‘tailored to 
local legal traditions and fundamental concepts.’ The FCPA is not perfect but 
it does represent, at least for now, the spider in the web in the fight against 
corruption in business transactions. The carrot-and-stick approach to 
compliance that has emerged in the implementation of the FCPA creates an 
incentive for companies to self-police and self-disclose instances of corruption. 
More importantly, it also catalyzes a process whereby companies put in place 
mechanisms that can change internal corporate culture. This creates a ripple 
effect through the corporation’s sphere of influence in a manner that places the 
private actor, acting alongside the state, in a central role in the fight against 
corruption.  
The primary profiteer of an effective system of compliance in the fight against 
corruption is the international business community where the bottom line is an 
impartial motivator of choices. The critical mass of compliant companies that 
level the playing field is as much an imperative of regulation by government as 
it is of private actor led mechanisms. Business standards, codes, corporate 
reporting and verification schemes can be positively exploited by the savvy 
corporation in a world that is connected to a degree that is completely unique 
in history. This provides great business opportunity as well as risk. New 
emphasis is given in this environment to the opportunities the private actor has 
by way of remedy in the fight against corruption.   
This changes the sanctioning environment in a manner that recognizes the 
importance of the private actor to fill the gaps of the criminal process. Three 
such gaps are discussed in this book. Firstly, the conflict of interest that results 
where the state, a key player in business transactions involving grand scale 
corruption, is also the party who initiates the sanctioning process under 
criminal law approaches. Criminalization gives the state a monopoly on the 
right to initiate sanction for corruption. This, however, means that 
implementation using the criminal process is dependent on government 
officials. This dependence on the apparatus of the state in initiating, 
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investigating and sanctioning corruption is a grave impediment to fighting 
corruption. The degree of success is dependant not so much on the fact of 
criminalization but on political will, economic interest and the capacity of the 
state in question. Secondly, the fact that the criminal law focuses on the 
offender leaves the resulting contracts and transactions as an incidental part of 
anti-corruption strategy. The persistence of these contracts incentivizes risk 
tackling and undermines the effectiveness of the criminal process. Thirdly, the 
criminal law approach leaves the victim who has suffered harm as a result of 
corruption outside the sanctioning process.  
Private remedies help to bridge these gaps to some degree. The motivated 
private actor can, independently of the state, initiate a sanctioning process for 
corruption wherever a jurisdictional link can be founded. This can encourage 
contracting in a manner that avoids such private suits, protects the validity of 
resulting contracts, as well as avoids the increased possibility of reputational 
harm that they occasion. This book is not a rejection of the criminal law 
approach but rather a response to the foundations set by the criminalization of 
corruption in a global world. Private remedies are complementary to the 
criminal process and a necessary step to make the gains of criminalization 
more concrete.  
The findings of the Nigerian case study illustrate that where the process of 
criminal sanctions for corruption is compromised by historical, political, 
economic or social factors, alternative methods of tackling corruption must be 
explored. In the absence of global governance, methods of bypassing the 
compromised state become the logical way forward in the fight against 
corruption. Private remedies, private actors and public/private partnerships 
create the opening that enables consequences of corruption to be challenged 
independently of the state. 
11.2 Models of Private Remedies 
The foundation set by the FCPA and the normative framework that has taken 
shape do not sufficiently address the regulatory vacuum created by a criminal 
approach that is essentially ‘silent’ about the transactions that result from 
corrupt exchanges. This presents choices that have a negative effect on 
compliance. Grand corruption often comes packaged as international contracts, 
which usher in welcomed foreign direct investment, yet, at the same time 
encourage practices that erode the capacity of institutions of governance. The 
resulting social inequality and social unrest undermines the message of the 
liberal trading system. A complicating element with international contracts is 
that oversight over such transactions is often dislocated from domestic 
processes by virtue of arbitration clauses that subject such contracts to the 
jurisdiction of private arbitration panels rather than national courts of law. The 
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confidentiality of the international arbitration process further insulates the 
contract tainted by corruption by removing it from the ‘public eye.’  
Corruption occurs in transactions, and by focusing on these transactions in 
place of the traditional offender, new strategies in the fight against corruption 
can be developed. A functional comparative approach was adopted in this book 
to assess the legal responses in the US, England and the Netherlands to the two 
major contracts associated with the corrupt exchange. The same functional 
approach was used to evaluate the legal responses in these three jurisdictions to 
the question of instituting legal proceedings for damage suffered as result of 
corruption.  
 
The Primary and Secondary Contract 
The global consensus against corruption has implications for the private law 
where it concerns the agreements and transactions resulting from the corrupt 
exchange. Ultimately the corrupt exchange is an agreement between 
individuals. It also results in an agreement or contract between parties. The 
consequences of corruption do not stop at the boundary of public law but spill 
into areas governed by private law. It stands to reason, therefore, that measures 
to tackle these consequences must anticipate a plurality of sources of 
intervention: by courts; by administrative agencies; and by arbitration 
tribunals, all working in concert across different legal systems. The review of 
private remedies in the three jurisdictions chosen for study as well as under 
international arbitration show some interesting areas of convergence but also 
of dissonance with regard to the status of the contracts tainted by corruption.  
These contracts have been described in this book as the primary contract and 
the secondary contract, respectively. This classification has been adopted to 
emphasize the origin, distinction and connection between the two main 
contracts that emerge from the corrupt exchange. The primary and secondary 
contracts are both tainted by the fact of corruption. It is, however, important in 
discussing anti-corruption strategy to distinguish between these two categories 
to facilitate clear analysis as well as a better understanding of how their status 
is affected by public policy considerations. 
The primary contract evidences the agreement to give and receive a bribe. It 
may take the shape of a commission, consultancy, or other agency agreement. 
The parties to the primary contract are the bribe-giver and a bribe-recipient, 
who stands in a special position to a third party with whom the bribe-giver 
eventually seeks to enter into a contract. It is the relationship between the 
bribe-recipient and this third party that provides the foundation for the bribery 
exchange. In the absence of this relationship there would no basis for the 
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primary contract. As such, the primary contract between the bribe-giver and 
the bribe-recipient is the nexus around which the entire bribery exchange and 
consequential transactions hang.  
The secondary contract is best viewed as the positive result of a corrupt 
exchange. As the name implies, it is the contract that comes into being between 
the successful bribe-giver and the party (the principal or employer) with whom 
the bribe-recipient stands in a special relationship. This contract is dependent 
on the prior existence of the primary contract to give a bribe. It would never 
have come into being but for the successful execution of the primary contract. 
For these reasons it is referred to in this book as the secondary contract to 
emphasize this aspect of dependency.  
In the three jurisdictions studied, the grounds for invalidating the primary and 
secondary contracts are founded in the fact of incompatibility with statutory 
criminal prohibitions and public policy. There is some question about the 
actual scope of the criminal prohibition of bribery. As a result of rules 
criminalizing bribery in all three jurisdictions, there is a clear prohibition of the 
conduct of giving and taking a bribe. However these prohibitions do not make 
mention of the resulting contracts. On the face of it, the contracts resulting 
from the corrupt exchange are not touched by the criminal prohibition. A 
distinction should be made here between the primary and secondary 
agreement. The primary agreement, though not mentioned in the criminal 
prohibition, is evidence of the very conduct, i.e. the giving and taking of a 
bribe, which is prohibited by the rules. The secondary contract, on the other 
hand, does not evidence or involve the giving or taking of a bribe between the 
parties to the contract.  
The logic of the criminal prohibition that makes corruption a criminal act is 
applied to the primary and secondary contracts by Art. 34 UNCC, which 
requires that states should take the fact of corruption into consideration with 
respect to contracts tainted by corruption. Art 34. of the UNCC sets corruption 
apart from the generally accepted vitiating elements of mistake, 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, unconscionability as well as 
frustration and illegality. Art 34 gives corruption the status of an independent 
vitiating element in countries that have ratified the UNCC. This gives added 
impetus to the general jurisprudence regarding contracts tainted by corruption 
and underscores the existence of international public policy regarding the 
status of the primary and secondary agreements. 
The central question before the court is whether the primary and secondary 
contracts are contracts that the court will enforce. Several factors determine the 
judicial response to this question. Firstly, if there a statutory prohibition with 
respect to the making of such a contract, the court is clearly mandated to 
uphold the law. Secondly, even if there is no express statutory prohibition, 
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public interest may require that such contracts are not enforceable on grounds 
of public policy.  
With regard to the primary contract, jurisprudence in the US, England and the 
Netherlands shows that the courts will consider a contract that evidences 
conduct that is prohibited by law in the same light as the conduct itself. The 
effect of the prohibition of bribery is to render the contract that evidences the 
giving of a bribe unenforceable because it is incompatible with the statutory 
prohibition. Even where a literal interpretation of the criminal statute can 
arguably restrict the criminal prohibition to the conduct and not to the contract, 
in all three jurisdictions, public policy serves as the barrier to enforceability of 
the primary contract. The courts will not enforce a contract that evidences a 
breach of the criminal law in the public interest. 
As such, there is a general consensus regarding the status of the primary 
contract, i.e. the agreement to give and receive a bribe. In the eyes of the law it 
is unenforceable. In England and the US, the courts make it clear that the 
corridors of justice are closed to the parties to such a contract. The courts will 
not intervene with respect to such a contract but leave the parties as they have 
found them. The Netherlands arrives at a similar result. A contract to give a 
bribe is a nullity as it is contrary to good morals and public order. Parties can 
derive no rights under such a null agreement and no recourse to the courts of 
law beyond an act of the court or declaration by the party seeking to annul the 
contract. This renders the contract to give a bribe a very unstable proposition 
because it has no status within the national court system.  
As has been pointed out, international transactions are often subject to private 
dispute settlement processes and may well be beyond the reach of national 
courts. Does the availability of private international arbitration provide 
protection to the parties of the primary contract? The answer to this is negative. 
There is a convergence of international public policy as well as mandatory 
national prohibitions that constrain the members of arbitration panels. Tribunal 
awards show that there is a general acceptance of the fact that a contract to 
give a bribe is unenforceable. Arbitrators have a duty to render awards that will 
be upheld in the place of enforcement and are ill-advised to grant a ruling with 
respect to a contract that is in contravention of mandatory law. Given the 
world-wide scope of the criminal prohibitions of bribery in business 
transactions, it is unlikely that there will be any jurisdiction where such bribery 
is not a criminal act.  
Apart from this duty to act in a manner that will produce enforceable awards, 
the arbitration process, along with the courts, is a custodian of the public 
interest. The state in delegating dispute settlement powers to the arbitration 
tribunal sets a boundary as to what the arbitration process can achieve. The 
boundary that is set reflects matters of public interest whose effect on society is 
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such that private parties cannot opt out of public prohibitions by private 
agreements. In this regard the ability of the international arbitration to apply a 
consistent standard to the primary and secondary contract regardless of 
whether the contracting parties are from a civil or common law jurisdiction 
affirms the importance of an international arbitration system. The primary 
contract will not be enforced by an international arbitration tribunal.  
However, in the absence of mandatory reporting requirements or independent 
oversight of the arbitration process, the discretion as to whether or not to enter 
into a determination on the merits of a primary (or secondary contract for that 
matter) is left with members of the arbitration tribunal.  This book has 
highlighted the dangers of leaving the arbitration panel with this discretion. 
Essentially, by making determinations on matters of public dimension the 
machinery of the state is bypassed by private agreement and the arbitration 
process closes the door to the full scope of recourse that would be available to 
both the direct and indirect victims of corruption. This raises questions about 
the appropriateness of international arbitration as a legitimate forum in respect 
matters that infringe on public rights.  
Furthermore, where a matter involves allegations of corruption, parties by 
agreement should not be able to exclude the rights of participation of other 
stakeholders, affected by the occurrence of corruption. These factors lead to 
the suggestion in this book for the socially responsible arbitration tribunal that 
links the strengths of private international arbitration with those of public 
criminal law. Beyond a certain defined threshold, the primary obligation of the 
arbitrator, as agent to the parties, is replaced by an obligation to the larger 
society. Where it is clear that a contract is tainted by corruption, tribunals 
should have a mandatory reporting responsibility to the society that displaces 
their responsibility to the parties in dispute before them.  
The response of the courts and international arbitration tribunals show that the 
primary contract is an intrinsically unstable transaction from the point of 
enforceability. The courts will not intervene and the arbitration panel is 
constrained. Where there is a dispute, the position of the law leaves the 
defendant with a clean walk-away. It is a shield in the hands of the 
unscrupulous party who can rely on the law to avoid responsibility under the 
contract. In the US and in England the courts have noted that this position is 
not for the benefit of the defendant, but for the interests of justice. In the 
Netherlands the primary agreement to give bribe will fall within the category 
of immoral transactions that ought not to be valued in money for which a claim 
for a counter-performance or reimbursement is barred. With this outcome in all 
three jurisdictions, it is inopportune that a defendant may unfairly benefit, but 
this is not the overriding factor for consideration. As regards the primary 
contract, the private law is utilized in an instrumentalist manner as a means of 
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shaping conduct and as a deterrent to activities that are contrary to the public 
interest.  
The secondary contract in all the three jurisdictions studied is recognized as a 
contract that is valid on its face. It is in no fashion prohibited by the criminal 
rules. In the US and in England, the courts have extended the public policy 
against enforcing the primary agreement to the secondary agreement. 
However, an important difference is the prerogative that is left in the hands of 
the betrayed principal. Jurisprudence suggests that the secondary contract that 
comes into being between the bribe-giver and the principal of the bribe-
recipient is unenforceable at the instance of the principal. This is to avoid the 
double injury of first a betrayal of the duty of trust and then an unenforceable 
contract. This means that the onus rests with the principal. The bribe-giver will 
have no competence to compel the principal who seeks to walk away from a 
contract that is the result of a bribery transaction. This can serve as a warning 
to potential bribe payers who may be left with an unstable contract where the 
bribery of the agent becomes known to the principal who then decides to 
repudiate the agreement.  
In the Netherlands, the position does not tilt in the principal’s favor in this 
manner. Similar to the position in the US and England, the secondary contract 
is regarded as a valid contract. This means that the principal has to establish 
some defect of consent sufficient to annul the contract. This not a 
straightforward proposition because of the onus of proof on the part of the 
principal seeking annulment. For reasons explained in this book, the most 
promising ground in this regard is that of error. To this extent, the law in the 
Netherlands regarding the secondary contract is not as favorable as the position 
in the US and England. Establishing a global concensus on the non-
enforceability of the primary and secondary contracts is an important step in 
moving the fight against corruption forward. The public dimension of contracts 
tainted by corruption should play a role in distinguishing such contracts as 
regards validity and the measure of damages for breach. 
The public interest dimension of the primary and secondary contracts leads to 
the suggestion in this book that such contracts should be differentiated when it 
comes to enforcement. The public dimension of contracts tainted by corruption 
should play a role in distinguishing such contracts as regards validity and the 
measure of damages for breach. Such contracts should be assessed in a manner 
that reflects the process by which they came into existence. Where it is in the 
public interest to deter that process, arriving at determinations of invalidity of 
such contracts may be helped by separating them into a class where 
considerations of public interest supplant party autonomy. 
The vulnerability of the primary contract, and to some degree the secondary 
contract tainted by corruption, is a factor that can be utilized by the informed 
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litigant and civil society. It is in the interest of justice to extend the public 
policy considerations that have resulted in the criminalization of corruption to 
these contracts. An international framework regarding private remedies should 
work towards the repudiation of both the primary and secondary contracts 
setting public policy as the overriding consideration. Where such a public 
interest defined policy is consistently applied across jurisdictions there will be 
a second-level private law consensus that corresponds with the first-level 
consensus on criminalization that has already been achieved. The protection 
and empowerment of the contracting party who repudiates the primary or the 
secondary contract is a key manifestation of such a second-level consensus. To 
paraphrase an oft-quoted statement, at this juncture of the private process of 
contracting, party autonomy is trumped by public interest, not for the sake of 
the parties but for the good of society and global justice. 
Instituting Legal Proceedings 
Private law processes have the potential to by-pass the monopoly on initiating 
sanction held by the state. The potential of the private law is that it creates a 
plurality of points at which the sanctioning process for corruption can be 
initiated and/or enforced. Instituting legal proceedings with respect to 
corruption is however centered on the availability of legal standing to bring a 
claim. Private claims for corruption have been broadly classified in this book 
into claims primarily based on damage to private interests on the one hand, 
and claims primarily based on damage to the public interest on the other. As 
might be expected the jurisprudence for redress for damage to private interest 
is more developed than claims for damage to the public interest where the 
jurisprudence is still very tentative.  
The claim for damage to the private interest in the three jurisdictions studied 
centers on harm caused by the abuse of the agency relationship. The primary 
victims of harm caused by corruption are principals, shareholders as well as 
third parties affected by uncompetitive behavior. With regard to claims to the 
private interest under the common law in the US and England, the basis of the 
claim is expressed in terms of a fiduciary relationship while under Dutch law it 
is expressed in terms of a position of trust or mandate. This is characteristic of 
the classic relationship between an agent and a principal, the agent’s power to 
put the principal in a contractual relationship with a third party is the platform 
that is abused for personal advantage by the agent. The act of bribery is 
complete, whether or not it results in a contract between the principal and the 
offeror of the bribe. The focus of right of redress is on the breach the duty to 
act in the best interests of the principal and the very negative implication this 
has on society and business.  
There is a strong moral element to the remedial schemes in the US and 
England which focus not only on compensation for loss but also on stripping 
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away any profit or benefit that may accrue to the agent or person that offers the 
bribe. The principal may recover the bribe and, under the notion of the 
constructive trust, any other material benefit including proceeds of such 
benefits from the agent.  However this position is now open to question with 
the recent ruling rejecting the principal’s claim to all proceeds in Sinclair 
Investment v. Versailles. It is hoped that in moving the fight against corruption 
forward, mechanisms such as the constructive trust will be supported and 
especially applied to disputes involving contracts tainted by corruption. The 
measure and purpose of damages in such cases cannot be separated from the 
illegal foundation of these contracts. The private claim for damages in respect 
of the primary or secondary contract and public criminal prosecution of 
persons who commit acts of bribery should strive for a similar result.   
In England and the US, the principal may in addition sue for damages for any 
harm that was caused by the agent’s conduct from both the agent and the 
offeror of the bribe. Certain irrebuttable presumptions about motive of the 
bribe-giver, the effect of the bribe and loss to the value of the bribe ease the 
burden of proof on the principal and make the tort of bribery, some have 
argued, sui generis. However, the principal must elect between remedies and 
not recover twice on the same account.  
Under Dutch law, damage caused by bribery falls within the notion of 
unlawfulness (Lindenbaum-Cohen), which is applied to cases of performance 
or non-performance by a person that is against good morals or the duty to take 
care. The betrayal of trust due to an agent’s bribery results in an obligation to 
redress such damage as may be caused to the principal as a result of such 
action. There are no presumptions in favor of the principal under Dutch law 
and compensation has to be strictly proven. To establish a claim it must be 
shown that the principal was put into a disadvantageous position and loss was 
suffered as a result of the bribery transaction.  This puts a significant burden of 
proof on the plaintiff principal that provides little incentive for the pursuit of 
such claims. This is not in keeping with the spirit of Art 34 UNCC. For 
problems of international dimension such as corruption, the emergence of an 
international standard of criminalization means that there is a need to have 
similar treatment of parties that suffer damage regardless of jurisdiction. As the 
world seeks for models of transnational governance it is hoped that Art 34 
UNCC will provide a basis for an eventual convergence in the treatment of the 
plaintiff principal across common and civil law systems. 
With regards to damage to the public interest, the notion of private remedies is 
more complicated. This group of claimants do not have as clear a path to 
redress as compared with the methods available to direct victims such as 
principals, shareholders and third parties affected by uncompetitive behavior. 
A selection of cases drawn from several jurisdictions, however, shows the 
different strategies that have been employed by parties seeking to protect the 
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public interest. These cases include governments seeking damages under 
theories of social damage from Costa Rica; a state company seeking 
mandatory restitution in respect of a settlement reached in respect of 
corruption involving its officials; a private citizen instituting claims to compel 
state authorities to commence an investigation into alleged corruption against 
sitting and former African presidents; several examples of civil society seeking 
to compel the state government into taking action or complying with 
international commitments against corruption. This list is drawn from a variety 
of jurisdictions and points to the growing emergence of a new group of players 
and strategies that may shape developments in the fight against corruption in 
the years to come. These attempts point to a new dynamic in the fight against 
corruption by private actors using private law mechanisms to seek redress.  
The overview of the US law shows the vigorous nature of the plaintiff bar. The 
creativity shown by claimants in bringing claims has resulted in the most 
diverse palette of private proceedings. Apart from the traditional 
principal/agent claims, class actions and derivative suits using unfair 
competition and securities laws have been used to seek damages caused by 
bribery in business transactions. In addition there are laws such as the False 
Claims Act that present opportunities for the private prosecution of anti-
bribery laws. This has not as yet been used as a significant avenue for bribery-
related litigation but it does have potential for the prospective claimant. In 
many ways the development of private remedies from a US perspective is very 
much a plaintiff-led process.  
In the UK the focal point of private remedies is restricted primarily to claims 
centered on a breach of the fiduciary relationship between a principal and 
agent. There is little class or derivative action with regard to bribery-related 
damage. Judicial policy is, however, very supportive of the plaintiff principal 
not because of the justice of the case but because of the abhorrence in which 
bribery is held by the court. The courts have refused to aid the bribe-giver 
whether in the role of the plaintiff or as the defendant in suits brought by the 
betrayed principal. This is clearly to the advantage of the party who seeks to 
repudiate the obligations under a contract because there is no sanction if this 
party chooses to walk away from the primary or secondary agreement. The 
English model of private remedies can be characterized as a judiciary-led 
process.  
In the Netherlands, the private litigant plays a rather limited role as is probably 
to be expected in a non-litigious society. The Netherlands model can be 
characterized as a rules-led process where the provisions regarding causality 
present a significant hurdle to the potential litigant. There is also no class or 
derivative action along the lines of the practice in the US and the rather limited 
practice in the UK. The emergence of court-sanctioned collective settlements 
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seems to point to an approach that leans more towards amicable resolution of 
bribery-related claims than active litigation. 
The private litigant is faced with problems of the costs of litigation, relatively 
small claims and problems of legal standing. The US provides the most 
favorable environment for the private claimant, with reward schemes to 
encourage the private actor. Incentives for whistle-blowers, private prosecutors 
as well as established class actions, support the private claimant in the quest to 
hold government and companies accountable. In the UK, favorable rulings 
with regard to public interest litigation are an encouragement to civil society 
participation in the fight against corruption. However, the class action does not 
have the same development as in the US nor are there established reward 
schemes for the private prosecutor. 
 In this sense, England and the Netherlands present a similar restrictive 
landscape for the private claimant. Alternative fee arrangements, such as 
contingency fee arrangements, are not allowed in these countries. A 
conditional fee upon successful outcomes of cases is however, allowed in 
England as are third party funding schemes. None of these schemes are 
allowed in the Netherlands. As such while the private litigant in the US can 
rely on mechanisms that support and reward the private actor, this is not the 
case in England and particularly the Netherlands. Ultimately the advantage of 
vigorous private litigation in the fight against corruption is to make the 
environment in which corruption exchanges take place more susceptible to 
challenge. As such, schemes of reward for the private litigant in matters arising 
out of the corrupt exchange should be developed and encouraged. 
This book suggests a method of encouraging the indirect victim in a manner 
that avoids opening the floodgates of litigation, but at the same time provides 
legal standing in cases involving damage to the public interest. Parties to 
contracts can use principles relating to third party beneficiaries, which are 
present in all three jurisdictions studied in this project, to provide standing for 
persons who are not parties to the contract under conditions that are carefully 
calculated to act as an incentive for compliant behavior by all parties 
connected to the contract. Evidence of corruption (on terms that can be 
stipulated in the contract) will trigger the third party beneficiary clause to come 
into effect. Identified third party beneficiaries could then become parties to the 
contract and acquire standing to sue on that contract. Such a sleeping third 
party beneficiary clause could both encourage the indirect victims of 
corruption to become more active by creating legal standing to sue, and also 
serve as an additional incentive for parties seeking contracts with a public 
dimension to contract in such a manner as not to activate the clause. 
The models of legal redress show that the rules about causality, standing to 
sue, and the cost of litigation are obstacles in the way of the private litigant. 
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Where this private litigant ia a key to overcoming the conflict of interest 
problems that undermine the effective implementation of anti-corruption rules, 
and where actions by private litigants have the ability to shape the environment 
in which corruption in international business takes place by exposing 
corporations to less predictable risk, mechanisms that overcome these 
obstacles should be encouraged and exploited. The increasing activity from 
private actors in initiating the sanctioning process in areas where the state is 
compromised or less effective is a welcome development and an important tool 
of social engineering in today’s deterritorialized and integrated world 
economy.  
11.3 Towards an International Framework 
The UNCC provides the broad framework for private remedies for 
international corruption along two flanks: (1) the validity of transactions 
resulting from or tainted by acts of corruption (Art. 34 UNCC), and (2) the 
right to privately institute claims for damage suffered as a result of corruption 
(Art. 35 UNCC). The UNCC has almost universal reach with 140 countries, 
including all the major economies as parties. However, the international 
framework that emerges from an analysis of these provisions is one that 
provides mere regulatory guidance as opposed to the introduction of any real 
changes in legal processes of member states. The subjection of Art 34 and 35 
UNCC to national law and the principles of non-intervention mean that they 
bring no real change to domestic laws.  
There is no new legal regime introduced by Art. 34 UNCC regarding contract 
validity for contracts tainted by corruption. However, the UNCC does 
introduce a new level of convergence for contract law doctrine by instilling the 
notion of corruption as an independent vitiating factor for contracts tainted by 
corruption. This enables the development of principles that differentiate such 
contracts from generalized notions of contract law and enable a ‘bottom up’ 
convergence of judicial responses that are consistent with the UNCC with 
regard to such contracts. This is particularly significant in countries like the 
Netherlands, where judicial policy in respect of the secondary contract presents 
the plaintiff seeking to annul the contract with significant challenges. The 
primary and secondary contracts tainted by corruption lose to some extent the 
trappings of a particular legal culture and become deculturalized within the 
framework of international public policy established by the UNCC.    
In a similar vein to Art. 34 UNCC, Art. 35 UNCC does not change the position 
of the private litigant or expand the scope of the right to private remedies under 
national systems. It provides a right of action only to the extent that this is 
already provided under national laws. It also does not ease the requirements of 
standing and causality necessary for legal proceedings to be instituted. Art. 35 
is formulated in narrow terms of causality that favor only the direct victims of 
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corruption who are faced with a burden of proving quantifiable damage caused 
by the act of corruption. This subjection to domestic laws and the language of 
the Art. 35 UNCC shows that for the time being there is no new international 
platform for the private plaintiff.  
This fact notwithstanding, Art. 35 UNCC gives moral weight to the notion of 
private actions by citizens and civil society for harm suffered as a result of 
corruption. It is hoped that a broadest interpretation of the notion of damage, 
beyond quantifiable compensation, will be associated with the notion of 
damage under Art. 35. The focus of the UNCC is not merely to restore the 
harm done to the particular parties to the transaction but also the harm done to 
society at large. Encouraging and empowering civil society is part of the 
avowed aim of the UNCC framework of private remedies. As such, the 
purpose of damages contemplated by the Convention is arguably more than 
merely compensatory but also has a punitive and deterrence objective. A strict 
interpretation of the notion of damage in Art. 35 as merely ‘compensatory’ 
arguably falls short of the purpose of the UNCC. 
Art. 35 of the UNCC represents international acknowledgement of the role of 
the private actor. Governments that are serious about fighting corruption 
should consider methods of incentivizing the potential plaintiff. Art 35 UNCC 
recognizes the need to look beyond the state in charting a path forward in the 
fight against corruption. Creating and encouraging possibilities to empower the 
private actor is one such mechanism. The UN in its sphere of influence should 
give credit to nations that encourage the private plaintiff and seek strategies to 
bring the letter of the convention in line with its spirit and the fundamentally 
important objective of encouraging and equipping citizens and groups outside 
the public sector to partner in the fight against corruption. Furthermore, a real 
measure of success of the UNCC will be the bridging of the schism between 
the direct and indirect victims of corruption.  
A logical step in reviewing anti-corruption strategy is a re-examination of the 
basic premises of current approaches to fighting corruption. This book 
emphasizes the need to develop environment sensitive conceptual frameworks 
triggered by the real world in which corrupt exchanges occur. To this end, the 
insights drawn from this book are used to propose a transaction approach to 
fighting corruption that places the transaction, not the offender, as the logical 
central point of intervention in the fight against corruption. The transaction 
approach acknowledges the symbiotic relationship between the interaction in a 
corrupt exchange and environment in which this exchange occurs. It 
recognizes that there are several layers of interaction and that each level of 
interaction plays a role in creating the environment in which international 
corruption occurs. Addressing only one level (e.g. the violation) fails to 
address issues that arise at other levels of interaction leaving an incoherent 
environment that encourages risk taking. Each level of interaction needs to be 
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addressed to create an environment that is cohesive for compliance. A 
transaction approach encourages exploiting opportunities for reform that are 
found in the real interactions between parties to transactions affected by 
corruption. 
11.4 Areas for Future Research 
This book has sought to maintain a very clear course on the questions of (1) 
transaction validity and (2) the right to institute legal proceedings, which are 
the primary aspects of the private law framework provided under the UNCC. 
Several related areas however warrant future inquiry.  
From an empirical standpoint, it will be helpful to develop a method to test the 
impact of criminalization and private remedies on the fight against corruption. 
This book has referred to the need to develop effective sanctions for corruption 
and postulates public/private so-operation as one method to achieve this. This 
raises the question, what is the measure of effectiveness? What quantifiable 
difference does the changing regulatory environment have on the way business 
is conducted and how has this impacted the fight against corruption? 
Developing indices for measurement will provide concrete evidence of the 
veracity of some of the assumptions about the compliance inducing nature of 
the regulatory environment developed in this book.  
Another area of inquiry is the notion of the contract tainted by corruption as an 
instrument for deterrence. This is an area where more clarity is needed 
especially with the recent UK Sinclair Investment ruling. What is the proper 
function of private law at the junction of the private and public law? A related 
question is the proper approach towards contracts that have a public 
dimension. Should such contracts be differentiated as a separate class to enable 
the development of rules that are specific to such contracts? If so, what would 
be the conceptual basis of such differentiation?  Can such a differentiation 
serve as a basis for similar treatment across the civil /common law divide? 
Furthermore, how does the originating criminal act of bribery affect the 
position and role of holders in due course of rights assigned or derived from 
contracts tainted by corruption in the fight against corruption?  
An idea proposed in this book is using a third party beneficiary clause as a self-
regulatory mechanism in inducing compliance. Of interest in further research 
would be the assessment of the acceptability of such a mechanism and the 
development of a standard form third party beneficiary clause. Developing 
such a clause could be an easily achievable self-regulatory mechanism that can 
emerge from an agreement about business practices and standards by the 
contracting parties themselves. 
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The chapter on international arbitration ends with a suggestion for a socially 
responsible arbitration panel. The growing acceptance of the arbitrability of 
matters of public dimension and the expanding role of the arbitrator suggest 
the need for research into the nature of dispute settlement at the crossroads of 
private and public law. Developing a model that maintains the intrinsic 
advantages of commercial arbitration yet reconciles the public elements of 
criminality that are present in transactions tainted by corruption is an important 
challenge. 
Finally, an important area for further research is the development of sector-
specific conceptual frameworks and models such as the transaction approach 
suggested in this book. Understanding how sector specific models interact with 
the broader questions of transnational governance will be an interesting and 
needed area of inquiry. 
11.5 Final Words 
Developing a common strategy of private remedies is a necessary step in the 
international fight against corruption. Just as the international consensus 
criminalizing corruption has shaped the fight against corruption by creating a 
normative framework that influences policy and practice in international 
business on a global scale, it can be expected that an international consensus 
on private remedies for corruption will also impact the environment in which 
corruption occurs in a manner that pushes the fight against corruption a step 
further. This is not an alternative to the criminal process but rather a 
complementary process that recognizes the overlapping roles of the private and 
public law in the regulation of transnational transactions.  
A corollary with a team sport is appropriate. A game with no rules is no game 
at all. Players from different cultures, speaking different languages, holding 
different norms, customs and rules, can and do play together in a team. In so 
doing they accept and are bound by the rules of the game. To the extent that 
they play by the rules, there is a game. To the extent that they do not, there is 
none. International business is a ‘game’ with very definite rules that are 
dislocated from a single, particular society but are no less binding. The binding 
force is located not in a state but in the ‘game.’ This discussion about private 
remedies for corruption is located within this framework. Private remedies can 
influence the transacting environment or ‘game’ in which corruption in 
international business occurs in a manner that motivates a choice for 
compliance with anti-corruption rules. This is a logical extension to the ‘FCPA 
approach’ to implementation, and contributes to the creation of an environment 
where preventive measures, hard and soft law mechanisms, self-regulation, 
self-policing and self-referral acquire real significance for the short and long-
term interests of the corporation.  
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This book advocates an approach to fighting corruption that is not self-
regulation because there is a real ‘stick.’ Neither is it a solely state-centered 
process of sanction and punishment because the possibility of negotiating 
punishment presents a real ‘carrot.’ It is a hybrid, third way that uses choices 
occasioned by ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ to the corporation to instigate fundamental 
changes in the way it does business. On the international stage this will have a 
‘trickle-down’ effect that has the potential to change international and 
domestic business practices. This provides a counter-balance to the impunity of 
compromised governance systems and can serve as a powerful agent for 
change. 
Pragmatism should be the guiding principle of anti-corruption policy. 
Sometimes a half loaf is better than none. The traditional criminal process 
where an offender is punished may provide more psychological satisfaction 
than processes of private-public partnerships. If, however, the objective is to 
change an environment in a manner that encourages compliance, for many 
reasons traditional methods have failed to live up to expectations. The 
opportunity of private remedies for corruption lies in its potential to change 
company practices and culture from within (for example suits by shareholders 
and challenges to the validity or contracts entered into by the corporation) and 
also from external pressures (such as private actions by a variety of actors, the 
opportunity to negotiate sanction with enforcement authorities). This creates a 
strong basis for a choice for compliance and, more importantly, for the 
integration of mechanisms to ensure compliance into company operations. 
This is a model of fighting corruption that concedes to the reality of the 
international market place. 
From a methodological viewpoint by:  
(1)  classifying and distinguishing between the primary and 
secondary contracts resulting from corruption as well as 
private and public interests seeking redress for harm 
suffered as a result of corruption;  
(2)  introducing the possibility of using third party beneficiary 
clauses to provide legal standing for victims of corruption;  
(3)  suggesting the need for a socially responsible arbitration 
tribunal; and  
(4)  advocating a transaction approach to fighting corruption;  
this book provides a method of thinking about private remedies for corruption 
in a manner that, it is hoped, will clarify and stimulate further development of 
anti-corruption law and policy.  
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In closing, it is important to acknowledge the inter-woven nature of the societal 
triggers for corruption. This makes it clear that there is no easy legal solution 
to be had. Tackling underlying factors of social inequality and social mobility 
are probably a more far-reaching strategy in breaking the cause-and-effect 
dynamics of corruption. Recognizing the limitations of the law should add 
impetus to efforts to humanize the effects of globalization and capitalism. 
In essence, the law cannot be isolated from the social problems created by the 
cycle of poverty and lack of governance. Indeed the law itself can become a 
victim of the cycle. For this reason any attempt to solve the problem of 
corruption normatively is only half the story. Fortunately, the need for order 
and stability in the global market is a driving force for creative solutions to 
even this most intractable of social problems. One such creative development 
is the expanding role of private actors and processes in the fight against 
corruption. For this reason, one may safely assert, that the journey towards an 
international framework on private remedies for corruption is certainly 
underway. 
 
‘… Now that they see some kind of partnership developing … with the supply 
side beginning to tighten its belt … yes I think that it hands out hope … early 
days yet, but I think it hands out hope.’(00:14:16) 
(Participant 4)  
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Summary In Dutch 
Privaatrechtelijke Handhaving en Corruptie 
De ontwikkeling van een internationaal raamwerk  
 
Inleiding 
In de afgelopen 30 jaar zijn we getuige geweest van een fundamentele 
verandering in de aanpak van corruptie. Bij de bestrijding van corruptie is de 
aandacht verschoven van de zogeheten vraagzijde van corruptie naar de 
herkomst van corrupte gelden, d.w.z. de aanbodzijde van corruptie. Er heeft 
tevens een verschuiving plaatsgevonden van het bestrijden van corruptie die 
hoofdzakelijk in eigen land wordt gepleegd naar het bestrijden van corruptie in 
andere landen. Bovendien bestaat er nu mondiale overeenstemming over het 
strafbaar stellen van corruptie die zich bij zakelijke transacties voordoet. 
Ondanks het feit dat er vooruitgang is geboekt, maakt de nog altijd 
zorgwekkende omvang van corruptie wereldwijd duidelijk dat slechts de eerste 
stappen zijn gezet en dat er nog een lange en moeilijke weg te gaan is.  
In dit boek wordt betoogd dat een van de oorzaken van het uitblijven van 
vooruitgang in de strijd tegen corruptie wordt gevormd door de structurele 
leemtes die ontstaan bij de strafbaarstelling ervan, vooral wanneer de corruptie 
plaatsvindt in een internationale omgeving. Op het terrein van de grootschalige 
corruptie, dat in dit boek centraal staat, zijn multinationals en overheden vaak 
de belangrijkste spelers. Daar waar de staat deelneemt aan criminele 
activiteiten, creëert het monopolie dat bij diezelfde staat rust op het instellen 
van traditionele strafrechtelijke sancties een belangenverstrengeling die 
doeltreffende handhaving in de weg staat. Bovendien maakt het internationale 
karakter dat eigen is aan een geïntegreerde wereldeconomie het moeilijk om op 
nationaal niveau oplossingen voor internationale misdrijven te formuleren. 
Door een gebrek aan doeltreffende handhaving ontstaat een vicieuze cirkel van 
straffeloosheid, waarbij het falen van het recht leidt tot een verdere afbraak van 
ordening en ontwikkeling. 
In dit boek wordt tevens beargumenteerd dat binnen het strafrecht onvoldoende 
aandacht wordt besteed aan de gevolgen van corruptie. De gevolgen, die 
bestaan uit de totstandkoming van een of meerdere overeenkomsten, vervullen 
echter een centrale rol in de internationale context waarin transacties 
plaatshebben en zetten bedrijven aan om risico’s te nemen. Corruptie kan als 
gevolg van strafbaarstelling juist complexer en nog moeilijker traceerbaar 
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worden. Om een effectieve strijd tegen corruptie te kunnen voeren, zal deze 
discrepantie tussen publieke afschrikking en private gevolgen opgeheven 
moeten worden. Corruptie is immers geen abstractie, maar neemt de vorm aan 
van overeenkomsten, betalingen, steekpenningen en andere transacties. Dit 
roept vragen op over hoe het privaatrecht dient te reageren op corruptie. Een 
tweede aspect van dit onderzoek is te analyseren hoe de uiteenlopende 
civielrechtelijke en strafrechtelijke benaderingen kunnen worden 
samengebracht in een overkoepelend, coherent raamwerk. De scheiding tussen 
publiekrecht en privaatrecht, die het bestaande anti-corruptieonderzoek 
kenmerkt, creëert een stel onsamenhangende regels van wat in werkelijkheid 
één verhaal is.  
Dit boek betoogt tevens dat de bestaande delictsomschrijvingen van 
corruptie binnen het strafrecht onvoldoende recht doen aan het 
resultaat van succesvolle vormen van corruptie. Geslaagde omkoping 
resulteert namelijk in contracten en overeenkomsten die op hun beurt 
een centrale rol spelen in internationale handelsmarkten. Dit zet 
bedrijven mogelijk aan tot het nog heimelijker uitvoeren van 
corruptie. Strafbaarstelling kan daarom tot gevolg hebben dat 
corruptie nog complexer en moeilijker op te sporen zal worden. 
Deze discrepantie tussen publieke afschrikking en private gevolgen moet 
worden opgeheven om samenhang te brengen in de strijd tegen corruptie. 
Corruptie is eenvoudig gezegd geen abstractie maar neemt de vorm aan van 
overeenkomsten, betalingen, smeergeld en andere transacties. Dit roept vragen 
op over het privaatrechtelijke antwoord op dergelijke transacties. Een tweede, 
aspect van dit onderzoek was te bezien hoe de uiteenlopende civielrechtelijke 
en strafrechtelijke benaderingen moeten worden samengebracht tot één 
samenhangend raamwerk. De scheiding tussen publiekrecht en privaatrecht die 
het huidig anticorruptieonderzoek kenmerkt, creëert een stel onsamenhangende 
regels van wat in werkelijkheid één verhaal is.  
Het VN-verdrag tegen corruptie uit 2003 (UN Convention against Corruption, 
verder: UNCC) biedt een kader waarbinnen deze vragen kunnen worden 
beantwoord. Het UNCC geeft een model voor privaatrechtelijk ingrijpen in de 
strijd tegen corruptie en wel op twee punten: ten eerste in artikel 34 dat een 
regeling bevat betreffende de rechtsgeldigheid of verbindende kracht van 
overeenkomsten die het gevolg zijn van corrupte activiteiten en, ten tweede, in 
artikel 35 dat tot doel heeft personen die schade hebben geleden als gevolg van 
corruptie een privaatrechtelijk middel te bieden om schadeloos gesteld te 
worden. Samengevat gaat het enerzijds om de rechtsgeldigheid van transacties 
en anderzijds om het recht om een vordering aanhangig te kunnen maken. 
Deze twee manieren van ingrijpen vormen de grondslag van het onderzoek in 
dit boek.  
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De onderzoeksvraag die in dit boek centraal staat, bestaat uit vier delen: (1) 
Waarom is een internationaal raamwerk voor privaatrechtelijk handhaving van 
anti-corruptieregels nodig en wat moet de grondslag daarvan zijn?; (2) Wat 
bieden nationale rechtsstelsels momenteel op het gebied van privaatrechtelijk 
handhaving bij corruptie?; (3) In hoeverre vormt het nationale recht een 
aanvulling op het raamwerk voor privaatrechtelijke handhaving, zoals geboden 
door het UNCC?; (4) Kan er een conceptueel raamwerk worden geformuleerd 
waarin de uiteenlopende elementen van straf- en civielrechtelijke strategieën in 
de strijd tegen corruptie zijn opgenomen?  
Methodologie 
Om de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, is gekozen voor een functionele 
rechtsvergelijkende benadering. Deze benadering kan om een aantal redenen 
worden gerechtvaardigd. Aangezien grootschalige corruptie een probleem 
van internationale omvang is, vereisen voorstellen voor hervorming een 
methodologie die toepasbaar is op uiteenlopende nationale posities om 
uiteindelijk te komen tot een ‘gemeenschappelijke oplossing’. Bovendien 
moet de handhaving volgens het internationale anti-corruptieraamwerk op 
staatsniveau gebeuren, waardoor er vanwege verschillen tussen rechtssystemen 
een groot aantal handhavingsmethoden bestaat. Door de functionele 
rechtsvergelijking te hanteren, waarbij de aandacht dus uitgaat naar de functie 
in plaats van de inhoud, kan een beeld worden geschetst van hoe het 
privaatrecht in uiteenlopende jurisdicties op corruptie reageert.  
Leidend bij de keuze van de jurisdicties voor de rechtsvergelijking in dit boek 
was de geschiedenis die voorafging aan de totstandkoming van het wettelijke 
anti-corruptieraamwerk. De Verenigde Staten was in 1977 het eerste land dat 
verstrekkende anti-corruptiewetgeving aannam (de ‘Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act’), die de basis legde voor het internationale raamwerk tegen corruptie. 
Belangrijk zijn ook de landen waarvan het recht het internationale 
handelssysteem sterk heeft beïnvloed en dat nog steeds doet. Grootschalige 
corruptie is een kwestie van internationaal handelsrecht en wordt sterk 
beïnvloed door de Westerse traditie. Gekozen is voor Engeland en Nederland 
omdat deze landen tamelijk representatief zijn voor twee grote rechtsfamilies 
(civil en common law), waarvan de onderlinge verschillen in sociale en 
rechtshistorische ontwikkeling worden weerspiegeld in de reikwijdte en de 
inhoud van het handelsrecht. Het feit dat het onderzoek zich richt op de anti-
corruptieregelgeving en -praktijk in deze jurisdicties, betekent dat de 
bevindingen in dit boek specifiek gelden voor deze landen. Niettemin werpen 
zij tevens een licht op de problemen, beginselen en concepten waarmee men te 
maken krijgt bij de ontwikkeling van een internationaal, privaatrechtelijk 
antwoord op het corruptieprobleem. Het feit dat de meeste internationale 
overeenkomsten een arbitragebeding bevatten, betekent waarschijnlijk dat het 
merendeel van de geschillen over internationale handelsovereenkomsten die 
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besmet zijn door corruptie wordt behandeld door een internationaal 
arbitragetribunaal in plaats van door een rechtbank. Om deze reden wordt in dit 
boek tevens onderzocht hoe in de internationale arbitrage wordt gereageerd op 
het probleem van de rechtsgeldigheid van transacties alsook welke rol de 
internationale arbitrage speelt bij de privaatrechtelijke handhaving van anti-
corruptiewetgeving.  
Om beter zicht te krijgen in de problemen die bij het ontwikkelen van een 
privaatrechtelijk antwoord op corruptie kunnen worden verwacht, is in het 
kader van dit onderzoek een preliminaire, kwalitatieve casestudy verricht over 
Nigeria, zodat de kwestie van privaatrechtelijke handhaving in een sociale 
context kan worden geplaatst. Deze contextualisering verschaft inzicht in de 
onderling samenhangende omstandigheden waaronder grootschalige corruptie 
zich voordoet. Hoewel de casestudy louter illustratief bedoeld is, heeft zij een 
aanzienlijke invloed gehad op de richting en reikwijdte van het onderzoek en 
de ingenomen standpunten in dit boek.  
Samenvatting van dit boek 
Het eerste deel van dit boek, The Foundation for Private Remedies (De 
grondslag voor privaatrechtelijke handhaving), gaat in op het eerste aspect van 
de onderzoeksvraag, te weten: Waarom is een internationaal raamwerk voor 
privaatrechtelijk handhaving bij corruptie nodig en wat moet de grondslag 
daarvan zijn? In hoofdstuk 1 en 2 worden de uitdagingen besproken waarmee 
rekening moet worden gehouden bij pogingen om strategieën te ontwikkelen 
ter bestrijding van corruptie. Deze uitdagingen bestaan ruwweg uit het 
probleem van definiëring, de uitdaging voor bestuurlijke processen, de 
uitdaging waarmee bedrijven te maken krijgen, de uitdaging voor het 
gerechtelijke apparaat en de uitdaging die voortvloeit uit een herschikking van 
de internationale samenleving. Deze uitdagingen bieden een illustratieve 
achtergrond voor het internationale normatieve raamwerk waarbinnen het 
plegen van grootschalige corruptie wordt veroordeeld. Dit raamwerk staat 
centraal in hoofdstuk 3, waarin het proces wordt beschreven dat heeft geleid tot 
een wereldwijde consensus over het verwerpen van internationale corruptie: 
van de hierboven vermelde Amerikaanse Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(verder: FCPA) tot aan de verscheidenheid aan regionale, 
intergouvernementele en internationale instrumenten. Deze wereldwijde 
consensus biedt een legitimatie die als basis dient voor de bespreking van 
privaatrechtelijk handhaving bij corruptie door (a) internationale corruptie aan 
te merken als een onrechtmatig daad en (b) door nieuwe inzichten te bieden in 
de implementatieprocessen waarbij private actoren zijn betrokken.  
In deel 2 van het boek, Models of Private Remedies (Modellen van 
privaatrechtelijke handhaving) wordt het tweede aspect van de onderzoeksvraag 
behandeld, namelijk: wat bieden nationale rechtsstelsels op het gebied van 
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privaatrechtelijke handhaving bij corruptie? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, 
wordt het nationale recht van drie rechtsstelsels geanalyseerd en wordt gekeken 
naar het perspectief van internationale arbitrage. In hoofdstuk 4 tot en met 7 
wordt ingegaan op de vier voornaamste relaties die door corruptie worden 
beïnvloed. De eerste relatie is de relatie tussen de persoon die de steekpenningen 
betaalt en de persoon die de steekpenningen ontvangt (de agent), waarbij de 
laatste zich in een vertrouwenspositie bevindt ten opzichte van een derde (de 
principaal) om de onderhandelingen in diens belang te voeren. Deze relatie komt 
tot uitdrukking in de overeenkomst die in dit boek het primary contract (de 
primaire overeenkomst) wordt genoemd omdat daaruit de betaling van 
steekpenningen blijkt en omdat deze het begin vormt van een reeks van 
transacties en overeenkomsten. De tweede relatie is die tussen de betaler van de 
steekpenningen en de principaal. De overeenkomst tussen deze partijen is het 
gevolg van de betaling van steekpenningen aan de agent en wordt het secondary 
contract (de secundaire overeenkomst) genoemd omdat deze het resultaat is van 
de uitvoering van de primaire overeenkomst. De derde relatie die de basis vormt 
voor de beschouwingen in dit boek is die tussen de principaal en de deloyale 
agent. De term principaal wordt ruim uitgelegd en ziet op elke partij die 
vertrouwen stelt in een ander om zijn belangen zo goed mogelijk te behartigen. 
De relatie tussen degene die de steekpenningen betaalt en de agent werkt als een 
katalysator op corruptie. Zonder de vertrouwensbasis tussen deze partijen zou er 
geen grond zijn voor de betaler van de steekpenningen om met de agent te 
onderhandelen en zou er evenmin een secundaire overeenkomst tot stand komen 
waardoor de principaal jegens de betaler van de steekpenningen wordt 
gebonden. Een vierde verhouding, die indirecter van aard is, ontstaat wanneer 
een persoon als gevolg van corruptie schade lijdt maar met geen van de partijen 
een contractuele relatie heeft. Deze persoon wordt in dit boek de indirect victim 
(het indirecte slachtoffer) genoemd. 
 
In deel 3 van het boek, Towards an International Framework (De 
ontwikkeling van een internationaal raamwerk), worden het derde en vierde 
deel van de onderzoeksvraag beantwoord, te weten: op welke gebieden heerst 
overeenstemming en wat zijn de verschillen met het oog op een internationaal 
raamwerk voor privaatrechtelijke handhaving bij corruptie en hoe kan dit 
raamwerk worden geconceptualiseerd? Daartoe wordt in hoofdstuk 8 
onderzoek gedaan naar de verschillende benaderingen ten aanzien van de 
rechtsgeldigheid van overeenkomsten die besmet zijn door internationale 
corruptie en worden deze benaderingen vergeleken met het raamwerk van 
artikel 34 UNCC. Vervolgens worden in hoofdstuk 9 de benaderingswijzen 
van de gekozen rechtsstelsels geanalyseerd ten aanzien van de mogelijkheid 
om in geval van corruptie een gerechtelijke procedure aanhangig te maken, 
waarbij deze ook worden vergeleken met het kader van artikel 35 UNCC. In 
hoofdstuk 10 worden de verschillende onderdelen samengebracht en wordt een 
conceptueel raamwerk gepresenteerd dat in de toekomst kan worden gebruikt 
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in de strijd tegen corruptie, waarbij de omgeving waarin internationale 
corruptie plaatsvindt en de interacties die corruptie kenmerken als uitgangspunt 
worden genomen. In dit conceptuele raamwerk moet de strijd tegen corruptie 
zich logischerwijs richten op de transactie en niet op de pleger. In hoofdstuk 
11, het laatste hoofdstuk van het boek, worden op basis van de bevindingen 
conclusies getrokken en worden suggesties gedaan voor verder onderzoek.  
Bevindingen 
 
De belangrijkste bevindingen van dit boek kunnen als volgt worden samengevat:  
 
Deel 1: Grondslagen voor privaatrechtelijke handhaving 
De strafbaarheid van corruptie in het internationale zakenleven, of deze nu van 
publieke of private aard is, is tegenwoordig een beginsel dat wereldwijd wordt 
toegepast. De fundamentele first level consensus over internationale corruptie 
die in de afgelopen drie decennia vorm heeft gekregen, biedt de grondslag voor 
dit onderzoek naar privaatrechtelijke handhaving bij corruptie. Hij biedt een 
gemeenschappelijke basis van overeenstemming en strategie in de strijd tegen 
corruptie, maar tevens, en wellicht belangrijker: in de strijd tegen corruptie geldt 
die consensus als uitgangspunt, omdat zij inhoudt dat alle UNCC-verdragsstaten 
de corruptie in het internationale bedrijfsleven aanmerken als een schending van 
de openbare orde. Wanneer een internationale consensus bestaat over de 
kwalificatie van corrupte handelingen bij zakelijke transacties als criminele 
gedragingen, dan is een grotere rol van privaatrechtelijke handhavingsmiddelen 
bij corruptie onvermijdelijk. 
 
Het implementatieproces van de FCPA heeft een model opgeleverd voor 
publiek-private samenwerking die een grote stimulans inhoudt voor de rol van 
de private actor in het proces van sanctionering van corruptie. De convergentie 
van recht, openbare orde en ‘best practices’ die hiermee wordt gecreëerd, hangt 
boven elke nationale en internationale zakelijke transactie. Het 
implementatiemodel van de FCPA heeft het anti-corruptiediscours, van 
bestraffing ‘ex post’ tot preventie en naleving ‘ex ante’, aanzienlijk beïnvloed. 
Dit proces zorgt ervoor dat de sanctionering van corruptie niet langer uitsluitend 
gezien wordt als de bestraffing van de dader door de autoriteiten maar dat 
daarbij ook een rol voor de private actor is weggelegd. Dit zorgt voor een 
prikkel voor bedrijven om zich vrijwillig te houden aan anti-corruptieregels en 
gevallen van corruptie te onthullen alsmede om te zorgen voor mechanismen die 
uiteindelijk de interne bedrijfscultuur kunnen veranderen. Het voorgaande zorgt 
voor een sneeuwbaleffect in de invloedsfeer van de onderneming waarbij de 
private actor samen met de staat een centrale positie inneemt in de strijd tegen 
corruptie. 
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Deel 2: Modellen van privaatrechtelijke handhaving 
  
Transactiegeldigheid 
Uit het onderzoek naar privaatrechtelijke handhavingsmiddelen in de drie 
gekozen jurisdicties en in de internationale arbitrage komt naar voren dat er 
enkele interessante gelijkenissen én verschillen zijn wat betreft de juridische 
status van overeenkomsten die door corruptie besmet zijn. Deze 
overeenkomsten, respectievelijk het primary contract en secondary contract in 
dit boek genoemd, dienen van elkaar te worden onderscheiden. De primaire 
overeenkomst vormt het bewijs van de corruptie, omdat hieruit blijkt dat in strijd 
met de regels steekpenningen zijn aangeboden en aangenomen. Uit de 
secundaire overeenkomst blijkt niet dat een contractspartij steekpenningen heeft 
betaald of geaccepteerd. In de drie onderzochte jurisdicties wordt de 
nietigverklaring van de primaire en secundaire overeenkomst gebaseerd op het 
feit dat zij in strijd zijn met wettelijke bepalingen en/of de openbare orde. 
Onduidelijk is echter of het strafrechtelijke verboden zich ook uitstrekken tot 
deze contracten. De relevante strafrechtelijke bepalingen die het aanbieden of 
aannemen van steekpenningen verbieden, maken nergens melding van de 
contacten die als gevolg hiervan zijn gesloten.  
 
Met betrekking tot de primaire overeenkomst laat de jurisprudentie uit de 
Verenigde Staten, Engeland en Nederland zien dat rechters een overeenkomst 
waaruit wettelijk verboden gedrag blijkt op dezelfde manier beschouwen als het 
gedrag zelf. Het gevolg van een verbod op omkoping is dat de overeenkomst 
waaruit omkoping blijkt nietig is omdat zij is aangegaan in strijd met een 
wettelijk verbod. De nakoming van een dergelijke overeenkomst is daardoor erg 
onzeker omdat nakoming niet kan worden afgedwongen. Omdat er tevens een 
convergentie plaatsvindt op het gebied van de internationale openbare orde 
alsmede van dwingende nationale verboden, die door de leden van 
arbitragepanels toegepast moeten worden, blijkt ook uit de uitspraken van 
arbitragetribunalen dat algemeen wordt aangenomen dat een overeenkomst om 
steekpenningen te betalen nietig is.  
 
De secundaire overeenkomst wordt in alle drie onderzochte jurisdicties in eerste 
instantie als geldig erkend. Zij wordt op grond van het strafrecht op geen enkele 
wijze verboden. In de Verenigde Staten en Engeland hebben de rechtbanken het 
openbare orde-begrip echter uitgebreid zodat niet alleen het primaire contract 
maar ook het secundaire contract niet in rechte kan worden afgedwongen. Een 
belangrijk verschil met de primaire overeenkomst is echter dat de bedrogen 
principaal een belangrijke bevoegdheid toekomt. De jurisprudentie wijst uit dat 
in deze landen de secundaire overeenkomst die tot stand komt tussen de betaler 
van de steekpenningen en de principaal van de ontvanger van de steekpenningen 
door de principaal vernietigd kan worden. Ook in Nederland wordt de 
secundaire overeenkomst in beginsel als een rechtsgeldige overeenkomst 
beschouwd. Dit betekent dat de principaal een gebrek in de 
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wilsovereenstemming moet aantonen en wel een zodanig gebrek dat de 
overeenkomst nietig kan worden verklaard. Dit is geen eenvoudige opgave 
omdat de bewijslast op de principaal rust. In dit boek wordt beargumenteerd dat 
de grondslag van dwaling in dit verband als meest bruikbaar kan worden 
aangemerkt. Met het oog op de strijd tegen corruptie is de Nederlandse 
regelgeving met betrekking tot de secundaire overeenkomst niet zo gunstig als 
de positie die in het Amerikaanse en Engelse recht wordt ingenomen.  
 
Het ondernemen van gerechtelijke stappen 
Bij het aanhangig maken van een privaatrechtelijk geding wegens corruptie is 
van cruciaal belang of de eiser bevoegd is tot het indienen van een vordering. De 
particuliere vorderingen die kunnen worden ingesteld wegens corruptie worden 
in dit boek ingedeeld in twee categorieën: aan de ene kant de vorderingen die 
hoofdzakelijk zijn gebaseerd op schade aan private belangen en aan de andere 
kant vorderingen die primair zijn gebaseerd op schade aan het publieke belang. 
Dit boek laat zien dat, in lijn met de verwachtingen, het recht betreffende 
vergoedingen voor schade aan private belangen verder ontwikkeld is dan op het 
gebied van particuliere vorderingen wegens schade aan het publieke belang, 
waar het recht nog in de kinderschoenen staat. De rol van de staat als hoeder van 
het algemeen belang blijkt een obstakel te vormen om procesbevoegdheid toe te 
kennen aan private partijen die een vordering willen indienen wegens schade 
aan publieke belangen. 
 
Een vordering wegens schade aan een privaat belang betreft in de drie 
onderzochte jurisdicties de schade die is veroorzaakt door misbruik van de 
principaal-agentrelatie. De voornaamste slachtoffers van de schade die is 
veroorzaakt door corruptie zijn principalen en aandeelhouders. Onder de 
common law in de Verenigde Staten en Engeland wordt deze verhouding 
aangeduid met de term ‘fiduciary relationship’, terwijl zij op grond van het 
Nederlandse recht afwisselend ‘vertrouwenspositie’ of ‘mandaat’ wordt 
genoemd. Er zit een sterk moreel element in de schadevergoedingsregelingen in 
de VS en Engeland, die zich niet uitsluitend richten op compensatie van geleden 
nadeel maar ook op het wegnemen van het eventuele voordeel of dito winst voor 
de agent of de persoon die de steekpenningen aanbiedt. 
 
Het Amerikaanse en Engelse recht kent bepaalde presumpties met betrekking tot 
schade en ‘reliance’, waardoor de bewijslast van de principaal verlicht wordt en 
die ervoor zorgen dat de tort of bribery als sui generis moet worden aangemerkt. 
Onder het Nederlandse recht is geen sprake van dergelijke presumpties en 
gelden de normale bewijsregels. Naast een actie tegen de agent wegens het 
schenden van de loyaliteitsplicht, kan de principaal de agent of de aanbieder van 
de steekpenningen ook wegens onrechtmatige daad voor de rechter dagen. Het 
blijkt echter moeilijk om een oorzakelijk verband te bewijzen tussen de daad en 
de schade. De principaal moet aantonen dat hij als gevolg van de omkoping in 
een onvoordeligere positie is gebracht.  
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Daar waar de schade door corruptie is geleden door het grote publiek, brengt de 
notie van privaatrechtelijke handhaving meer problemen met zich mee. De weg 
die deze categorie eisers moet afleggen om vergoeding te verkrijgen, is 
moeizamer dan die van directe slachtoffers (zoals de principaal en 
aandeelhouders ). Uit zaken die voor dit onderzoek uit verschillende jurisdicties 
zijn geselecteerd blijkt echter dat er door partijen die het algemeen belang 
nastreven, verschillende strategieën worden gehanteerd. Het onderzoek laat 
voorbeelden zien van derden die schadevergoeding proberen te krijgen op grond 
van oneerlijke concurrentie, van overheden die op grond van theorieën van 
‘social damage’ (maatschappelijke schade) schadevergoeding proberen te 
krijgen van Costa Rica; van een staatsonderneming die ‘mandatory restitution’ 
probeert te verkrijgen in verband met een schikking die was getroffen naar 
aanleiding van corruptiepraktijken waarbij haar functionarissen betrokken 
waren; van een burger die eist dat de autoriteiten een onderzoek instellen naar 
vermeende corruptie door huidige en voormalige Afrikaanse presidenten en 
enkele voorbeelden waarbij burgers de overheid proberen te dwingen tot actie 
over te gaan of tot nakoming van internationale afspraken op het gebied van 
corruptie. Deze voorbeelden zijn afkomstig uit uiteenlopende jurisdicties en 
wijzen op de opkomst van een nieuwe groep spelers en nieuwe strategieën die 
de ontwikkelingen in de strijd tegen corruptie in de komende jaren vorm kunnen 
gaan geven.  
 
Private procespartijen wordt geconfronteerd met procedeerkosten, relatief 
geringe vorderingen en problemen die te maken hebben met procesbevoegdheid. 
In de Verenigde Staten zijn de voorwaarden voor private eisers om een 
vordering in te stellen wegens corruptie het gunstigste, met 
compensatieregelingen die in het leven zijn geroepen om particuliere actoren 
aan te moedigen gerechtelijke stappen te ondernemen. Ook beloningen voor 
klokkenluiders, private aanklagers en ‘class actions’ hebben een vaste plaats 
gekregen in het Amerikaanse rechtssysteem en helpen de particuliere eiser om 
de overheid en ondernemingen ter verantwoording te roepen. In het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk hebben gunstige rechterlijke uitspraken over publieke belangen de 
deelname van burgers in de strijd tegen corruptie bevorderd. De class action 
heeft er echter niet dezelfde groei doorgemaakt als in de Verenigde Staten en 
ook bestaan er geen vaste vergoedingsregelingen voor private aanklagers. In 
deze zin bieden Engeland en Nederland eenzelfde restrictieve omgeving voor de 
particuliere eiser. Terwijl de private procespartij in de Verenigde Staten kan rekenen 
op mechanismen die hem stimuleren en belonen om een vordering in te dienen, is dit 
niet het geval in Engeland en nog minder in Nederland. 
 
In dit boek wordt een methode voorgesteld om het indirecte slachtoffer te 
stimuleren om een vordering in te stellen op een wijze die de sluisdeuren niet 
openzet maar waarbij wel procesbevoegdheid kan worden toegekend in zaken 
waarin schade is toegebracht aan het algemeen belang. Contractspartijen kunnen 
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een beroep doen op de rechtsfiguur van de derde-begunstigde, ‘third party 
beneficiaries’ die aanwezig is in alle drie onderzochte jurisdicties. Op deze 
manier wordt aan particuliere actoren die partij zijn bij overeenkomsten met een 
publieke dimensie onder bepaalde voorwaarden procesbevoegdheid toegekend, 
welke voor alle betrokkenen fungeert als een prikkel om de anti-corruptieregels 
na te leven.   
 
Deel 3: Naar een internationaal raamwerk 
 
Het eerdergenoemde VN-verdrag biedt een breed raamwerk voor 
privaatrechtelijke handhaving bij corruptie en doet dat op twee punten: (1) de 
rechtsgeldigheid van transacties die het gevolg zijn van corruptie of besmet zijn 
door corruptie, en (2) het recht om een vergoeding te vorderen wegens geleden 
schade die het gevolg is van corruptie. Het feit dat deze bepalingen onderworpen 
zijn aan nationale rechtsregels en aan het non-interventiebeginsel betekent dat 
het nationale recht vrijwel hetzelfde blijft. Artikel 34 UNCC introduceert dan 
ook geen nieuwe rechtsmiddelen om de geldigheid te betwisten van contracten 
die besmet zijn door corruptie. Wat het verdrag wel doet, is een nieuw niveau 
van verbintenisrechtelijke convergentie introduceren door corruptie aan te 
merken als een onafhankelijke factor die contracten die besmet zijn door 
corruptie nietig maakt.  
 
Op vergelijkbare wijze als artikel 34 biedt ook artikel 35 UNCC slechts een 
vorderingsrecht voor zover dit aanwezig is in het nationale recht. Ook de 
procesbevoegdheids- en causaliteitsvereisten die nodig zijn om een proces aan te 
spannen worden niet versoepeld. In artikel 35 is de causaliteit strikt 
geformuleerd, waardoor uitsluitend de directe slachtoffers, die kwantificeerbare 
schade door corruptie hebben opgelopen, onder het beschermingsbereik van 
deze bepaling vallen. De toepasselijkheid van nationaal recht en de formulering 
van artikel 35 impliceren dat de private eiser voorlopig geen nieuw 
internationaal platform tot zijn beschikking heeft. Desondanks kent artikel 35 
UNCC een moreel gewicht toe aan de notie van private acties door burgers 
wegens schade die is geleden als gevolg van corruptie. Dit is relevant voor een 
ieder die belang heeft bij een ‘level playing field’ omdat het een tot nu toe 
onvoldoende benutte methode toepast om naleving van anti-corruptiewetgeving 
te bevorderen. Het zou wenselijk zijn als het schadebegrip van artikel 35 ruim 
zou worden geïnterpreteerd, waardoor ook schade die niet kwantificeerbaar is 
eronder kan worden geschaard. Het UNCC richt zich immers niet alleen op de 
vergoeding van schade aan de partijen die direct bij de transactie betrokken zijn 
maar ook op het herstel van de schade aan de maatschappij als geheel. 
Onderdeel van het openlijk beleden doel van het raamwerk voor 
privaatrechtelijke handhaving van het UNCC is om de burgers en de ‘civil 
society’ aan te moedigen om een vordering in te stellen.   
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De verkregen inzichten uit dit boek worden gebruikt om een Transaction 
Approach (transactiebenadering) ten aanzien van corruptie te formuleren, 
waarbij niet de overtreder maar de transactie een centrale positie inneemt. De 
Transaction Approach erkent de symbiotische relatie tussen de interactie in een 
corrupte transactie en de omgeving waarin deze transactie plaatsvindt. Verder 
wordt in deze benadering onderkend dat er verschillende interactielagen zijn en 
dat elke laag een rol speelt in het creëren van een omgeving waarin 
internationale corruptie plaatsvindt. Door uitsluitend één niveau aan te pakken 
(zoals de overtreding), blijven andere niveaus buiten schot, waardoor een 
onsamenhangende omgeving ontstaat die risicovol gedrag stimuleert. Om 
internationale corruptie terug te kunnen dringen, moet een omgeving worden 
gecreëerd waarin naleving van anti-corruptieregels wordt aangemoedigd. Om dit 
te bereiken, moet elk interactieniveau als zodanig te worden aangepakt.  
 
Tot slot 
 
Privaatrechtelijke handhaving van anti-corruptieregels vormt een aanvulling op 
de strafrechtelijke handhaving. In dit boek wordt geenszins gesuggereerd dat zij 
een alternatief vormt voor strafrechtelijke sancties. Privaatrechtelijk handhaving 
moet eerder gezien worden als het logische gevolg van strafbaarstelling en een 
noodzakelijke stap om de voordelen van strafbaarstelling te benutten. Een 
belangrijke bevinding, die naar voren komt in de zaken die voor dit boek zijn 
bestudeerd, is dat privaatrechtelijke handhaving de omgeving waarin corruptie 
voorkomt kan veranderen op een wijze die de naleving van anti-corruptieregels 
bevordert. Een omgeving waarin contracten die besmet zijn door corruptie 
aangevochten kunnen worden, die private procespartijen aanmoedigt en beloont 
en overtreders aanspoort zichzelf aan te geven heeft een positief effect op de 
handhaving van anti-corruptieregelgeving. Doordat privaatrechtelijke 
handhaving zich richt op de gevolgen van corruptie, krijgt het slachtoffer, dat in 
het strafrechtelijk proces buiten spel staat, een centrale positie in de strijd tegen 
corruptie.  
Vanuit een methodologisch oogpunt biedt dit boek, door onderscheid te maken 
tussen de primaire overeenkomst en secundaire overeenkomst die het gevolg 
zijn van corruptie, tussen de private en publieke belangen die worden geschaad 
en waarvoor vergoeding kan worden gevorderd, door de mogelijkheid te 
onderzoeken van het gebruik van bestaande beginselen en rechtsfiguren zoals 
het beding ten behoeve van de derde third beneficiary clauses om te voorzien 
in procesbevoegdheid, en door te pleiten voor een Transaction Approach ten 
aanzien van corruptie, een methode die de verdere ontwikkeling van anti-
corruptiebeleid kan verhelderen en bevorderen met betrekking tot publiek-
private samenwerkingsverbanden in het algemeen en privaatrechtelijk 
handhaving in het bijzonder. 
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